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The author uses the case of Aguas del Illimani, a consortium headed by Lyonnaise des Eaux, in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, to explore how typical concession agreements (i.e. monopoly private service supplier) can be designed to best serve poor neighbourhoods.

TitleDesigning pro-poor water and sewer concessions : early lessons from Bolivia
Publication TypeMiscellaneous
Year of Publication1999
AuthorsKomives, K
Secondary TitlePolicy research working paper series / World Bank
Volumeno. 2243
Paginationii, 33 p. : 6 tab
Date Published1999-11-01
PublisherWorld Bank
Place PublishedWashington, DC, USA
Keywordsbolivia la paz el alto, case studies, low-income communities, piped distribution, policies, sdipol
Abstract

The author uses the case of Aguas del Illimani, a consortium headed by Lyonnaise des Eaux, in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, to explore how typical concession agreements (i.e. monopoly private service supplier) can be designed to best serve poor neighbourhoods. She states that this can be achieved by: providing clear contract objectives, financial incentives and a range of service connection options; by eliminating policy barriers that exclude the poor; and by allowing new service providers to enter the market. Despite the initial success of Aguas del Illimani, it is still too early to conclude that it will be sustainable or to predict how privatization will ultimately affect poor households in La Paz and El Alto.

Notes14 ref.
Custom 1202.2, 205.42, 827

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