

CERFE

UNITED NATIONS  
CENTRE FOR HUMAN  
SETTLEMENTS (HABITAT)

Settlement Upgrading Programme (SUP)  
First Phase (1st part)  
15 December 1994 - 14 April 1995

INTERIM REPORT ON CERFE'S ACTIVITIES IN THE PERIOD  
31 JANUARY 1995 - 28 FEBRUARY 1995  
("OUTPUT 2")

SUCCESS STORIES IN  
SETTLEMENT UPGRADING AND  
PROVISION OF SERVICES TO THE URBAN POOR

*Rome, 28 February 1995*

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## Table of contents

<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	
<b>Introduction</b>	5
1. Institutional framework	6
2. The source documents	6
3. Identification of success stories	7
4. Analysis of success stories	8
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	
<b>Stories of final success</b>	10
Success story # 1 Kumasi sanitation project	11
Success story # 2 Pilot project in peri-urban neighbourhoods of Cochabamba (Bolivia)	13
Success story # 3 Upgrading solid waste management in Cairo	15
Success story # 4 Lesotho's Low-cost Urban Sanitation Program	17
Success story # 5 Environmental sanitation in a compound of Bamako (Mali)	20
Success story # 6 Resource mobilization for settlement upgrading by women-based groups in Luzon (Philippines)	22
Success story # 7 Resettlement in Port Sudan (Sudan)	24
Success story # 8 Orangi Pilot Project - Low cost sanitation and upgrading in an informal settlement at the outskirts of Karachi (Pakistan)	27

2

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Success story # 9	
Namuwong Upgrading and Low Cost Housing Scheme	30
Success story # 10	
Hyderabad incremental housing development scheme - Delivery of plots with incremental construction of infrastructure in Hyderabad (Pakistan)	32
Success story # 11	
Environmental upgrading in a slum of Olinda (Recife - Brazil)	35
Success story # 12	
Million Houses Programme-Urban Housing Sub-programme - Urban shanty improvement project in Colombo (Sri Lanka)	37
Success story # 13	
Cooperative for water and sanitation management in Martin Coronado - Greater Buenos Aires (Argentina)	39
Success story # 14	
Baldia Soakpit Pilot Project - On-site sanitation project at the outskirts of Karachi (Pakistan)	42
<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	
<b>Stories of intermediate success</b>	<b>45</b>
Success story # 15	
Demonstration project of on-site sanitation in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso)	46
Success story # 16	
Establishment of the State Environmental Sanitation Technology Company (CETESB)	48
Success story # 17	
Settlement planning and training - Institutional development and support to planning programmes in Lybia	50
Success story # 18	
Institutional support to the Municipality of Dubai (United Arab Emirates)	52
Success story # 19	
Low-cost sanitation project in Haryana (India)	54

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Success story # 20	
City Data Programme - Kenya Pilot Project	56
Success story # 21	
Land-sharing in Hyderabad (India)	58
Success story # 22	
Ruamjai Samakki Resettlement project in Bangkok (Thailand) - Resettlement of the population of a squatter settlement	60
Success story # 23	
Regularization of an illegal settlement at Sengki (Thailand)	62

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## CHAPTER ONE

### **Introduction**



## **1. Institutional framework**

On 9 December 1994 CERFE has been charged by UNCHS (Habitat) to provide the services of three consultants (Mr. Andrea Ambrogetti, Ms. Alessandra Cancedda and Mr. Luciano d'Andrea, sociologists) to carry out activities of scientific and operational Secretariat of the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC) Network on Services for the Urban Poor (Project No IT-GLO-94-T05), which is co-ordinated by the UNCHS (Habitat) Settlement Upgrading Programme (SUP).

This Report is referred to the activities carried out by CERFE in the period 31 January-28 February 1995 and is part of the Output 2 which includes two tasks: task "g" ("undertaking a feasibility study on rendering the Information Bank more "user-friendly"; the study should also explore possibilities for its connection to computer networks such as the Internet") and task "h" ("identifying success stories and positive experiences in the field of settlement upgrading and services for the urban poor, in order to produce information materials for the "Voices from the City" newsletter).

This Report is devoted to task "h".

## **2. The source documents**

In order to identify success stories in the field of services for the urban poor and settlement upgrading, an analysis has been conducted of two sets of documents.

The first set is represented by some new entries in the Information Bank of the Network on Services for the Urban Poor. These are 21 documents that have been inserted in the archive after 31 December 1994, i.e. after the Draft Research Report had been ultimated. Out of these 21 documents, 8 contained success stories which have been included in this report.



The second set is represented by the 531 texts which have been object of the WG/U Report and the Draft Research Report. These texts have not been systematically reviewed, since the most significant material had already been distilled in the previous two reports. Instead, the latter have been used as sources, and some of the success stories referred to in them have been taken to be included in this report. Obviously, the original source documents of these stories have been read again to find the necessary information which was not present in the WG/U and Draft Research Reports.

About the first set of documents, the following information may be given. All documents have been published by international organizations and programmes, and namely UNCHS (Habitat), UNDP-World Bank - Urban Management Programme, UNDP-World Bank - Water and Sanitation Programme. These prevalence of documents from the international co-operation as sources of success stories is a shortcoming which should be overcome in the future, by soliciting documents also from other types of actors (national governments, local governments, utilities, research institutions, networks of NGOs and research centres, etc.).

All documents, but two, regard all regions of the world, one regards the Arab states and one subsaharian Africa.

The years of publication are: 1991 (1 document), 1992 (2 documents), 1993 (2 documents) and 1994 (3 documents).

### 3. Identification of success stories

In both the new entries and the older sources, 23 success stories have been identified and have been included in this report. They can be divided into two groups, according to the character of the success which seems to have been attained.

The first, larger group includes 14 stories of **final success**, i.e. actions or projects for which the information provided by the source allows to



say that there was an increase in the delivery of water supply and sanitation services to the urban poor, actually utilizable (appropriate).

The second group is formed by 9 stories of **intermediate success**, that is actions or projects which are still in progress or for which the source does not report a final success, but only the attainment of an intermediate objective as, for instance, the mobilization of economic and financial resources, the identification of appropriate technologies, the achievement of a better knowledge of peri-urban settlements.

One limit of the present report is the fact that only documental sources have been used, and thus the information is as much up-to-date and reliable as the quoted source. Although all the consulted sources are highly authoritative, in the future a cross-check with other sources, including representatives of beneficiaries, would be convenient.

#### 4. Analysis of success stories

For each success story identified, the following items have been considered in the analysis:

- **title**: official name or, in absence of it, name assigned by the author of the text;
- **success attained**: final or intermediate success;
- **beneficiaries**: the target population most directly interested by the project;
- **outcome**: the main results obtained, which leads to consider the story a "success story";
- **actors**: the entity which acted as the main executor of the project or action, and the other entities involved (it is specified when they are the financing institutions);
- **financial features**: information provided by the source on the amount of money invested in the project, both by external support agencies and governments, and by beneficiaries;





- **key strategic elements:** the key elements evidenced by the WG/U Report which are adopted in the strategic design of the project or action;
- **description:** summary of the actions undertaken for the implementation of the project or action;
- **evaluation on the part of the source:** quotation of comments made by the author of the text on the outcome of the project or action, when available;
- **constraints:** main factors which hindered the implementation of the project or action;
- **factors of success:** facilitating elements;
- **source:** the document from which the success story has been drawn (in case the document referred in turn to another source, the latter is reported as "original source").

As concerning the **key strategic elements** evidenced in the WG/U Report, it may be observed that the most frequently adopted ones in the considered projects and actions are people's participation, and cost recovery and resource mobilization (both present in 14 stories out of 23), followed by appropriate technologies (8 stories), institutional reform and capacity building (7 stories) and security of tenure (6 stories).

Only in one case out of 23, all four key elements specifically referring to peri-urban settlements are applied in an integrated manner, whereas in 6 cases three of them are adopted. Thus, in 7 cases out of 23 there is a complete or almost complete convergence between the strategies applied in the interventions and the key strategic elements identified by the Working Group on Urbanization of WSSCC.

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CHAPTER TWO  
**Stories of final success**



## SUCCESS STORY # 1

### 1. Title

Kumasi sanitation project

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Over 6,500 people living in three low-income communities.

### 4. Outcome

Over 250 units of home-based twin-pit VIP latrines have been completed. Maintenance of public latrines has been improved.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: World Bank

5.2. Other involved entities: UNDP (funding agency), Government of Ghana - Ministry of Health, Department of Community Development, Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, private contractors managing latrines in franchising.

### 6. Financial features

1,1 million US\$ have been invested by UNDP. The community has established a revolving fund which provides two-year loans. Each family invests 55US\$ plus a 10US\$ monthly instalment.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Appropriate technologies
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization

### 8. Description

The project started in 1989. The first step was to elicit the needs and preferences of people in various communities in Kumasi. A "willingness to pay" survey was conducted among more than 2,000 representative residents to determine their

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preferences for various sanitation technologies and their financial resources to support new systems. It was found out that families on average were willing to pay about the same amount for sanitation as they paid for rent, electricity or water.

In three pilot areas, a total of 250 new or improved units have been constructed, serving almost 6,500 users. A revolving loan scheme was utilized.

Also the management of Kumasi's public latrines was rethought. These latrines suffered from years of maintenance neglect. In 1990 twelve latrine sites serving more than 20,000 people daily were selected for franchised management. Five private contractors took charge, paying the city 15 per cent of their total revenues. Their performance seems to be better than that of the city administration.

The success of the home and public latrine pilot projects has led to development of a larger "Strategic Sanitation Plan" for Kumasi for the 1990. This plan involves a range of technological solutions - from conventional and simplified sewerage to VIP latrines - to address various economic and demographic conditions.

Moreover, the strategic sanitation planning methodology is being extended to 11 more secondary cities.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The success of the home and public latrine pilot projects has led to development of a larger "Strategic Sanitation Plan".

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

Strategic planning and the comprehensive analysis of the situation conducted.

#### **12. Source**

UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, *Annual Report 1992-1993*, p. 35.

D. Kinley, "Kumasi's People Pay for Better Sanitation Services", in *Source*, July 1992, pp. 4-9.





## SUCCESS STORY # 2

### 1. Title

Pilot project in peri-urban neighbourhoods of Cochabamba (Bolivia)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

400 families

### 4. Outcome

The project has provided a water supply system and on-site sanitation solutions, and a survey shows that all these services are actually used.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program - Regional Water and Sanitation Network for Central America

5.2. Other involved entities: World Bank - Integrated Health Project (funding); water utility of Cochabamba

### 6. Financial features

Information on the World Bank fund is not provided by the source. 44.000 US\$ have been invested by the beneficiary households.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Cost recovery and resource mobilization (each household paid US\$ 110 for its connection)
- Appropriate technologies (on-site sanitation)

### 8. Description

Provision of a water supply system and on-site sanitation solutions to 400 households. The population is willing and able to assume responsibility for the

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management of the water system and has signed a technical assistance agreement with the urban water utility.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The Cochabamba Project has provided a water supply system and on-site sanitation solutions to 400 households and has demonstrated that a high level of cost recovery is possible from a peri-urban population (....) A survey indicates that all of the sanitation facilities are being used".

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned for the project in point; explicitly mentioned for a twin pilot project in the city of Santa Cruz, where "the results of the on-site component of the project were disappointing, due in part to the technical constraints of the high water table of the area and because the urban utility was never completely convinced of the appropriateness of the on-site solutions".

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Willingness-to-pay of the population.
- Willingness of the population to take responsibility in the management of the system.

#### **12. Source**

UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Annual Report 1992-1993, page 48.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 3

### 1. Title

Upgrading solid waste management in Cairo

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Residents of "several parts of the city". Informal sector groups of garbage collectors and local contractors.

### 4. Outcome

Time of waste collection in Cairo has been reduced of 30-50%

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Cairo local government

5.2. Other involved entities: Zabbaleen (informal sector groups of garbage collectors), Wahis (local contractors)

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- Institutional reform and capacity building
- Appropriate technologies

### 8. Description

An informal sector group of garbage collectors, known as Zabbaleen, and local contractors, known as Wahis, has been transformed into the private Environmental Protection Company (EPC). EPC has the contract for waste collection in several parts of the city. The formation of the EPC has established the Wahis and Zabbaleen as key participants in the local governor's program to upgrade solid waste management in

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Cairo. The Wahis administer the system, market the company's services, collect household charges, and supervise service deliveries. The Zabbaleen collect and transport the waste, supplying their labour in exchange of rights to recycle the waste.

**9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Positive evaluation: there has been an increase in the revenues of the informal sector involved; an improvement of the service; the Cairo governorate is trying to extend the EPC service in other areas of the city.

**10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

**11. Factors of success**

Involvement of the informal sector

**12. Source**

Urban Management Programme, *Toward Environmental Strategies for Cities* (edited by Carl Bartone, Janis Bernstein, Josef Leitmann and Jochen Eigen), World Bank, Washington, 1994, p.58. Original source: *Environmental Quality International, Extension of Technical and Advisory Services to the Zabbaleen Gameya Phase II*. Report presented to the Ford Foundation, December 1988.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 4

### 1. Title

Lesotho's Low-cost Urban Sanitation Program

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

58,500 inhabitants, equal to 45% of the Maseru population, and almost all inhabitants of 13 district towns

### 4. Outcome

In the capital city, about 7,500 latrines have been constructed; in the 13 district towns, more than 1,000 have been built between 1988 and 1990. The programme seems sustainable. The executing team (USIT) has become a government department.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Urban Sanitation Improvement Team

5.2. Other involved entities: World Bank, World Bank - IDA, UNDP; Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Overseas Development Administration, Canadian International Development Agency, International Development Research Centre (funding agencies), Government of Lesotho, Save the Children Fund (additional assistance), British Council (scholarships).

### 6. Financial features

No information is available on the several funds which have been provided by the above mentioned donors.

Considering that converting an old brick pit or bucket latrine in a VIP latrine costed about \$230, it may be estimated that about 2 million US\$ have been invested by the beneficiaries.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Appropriate technologies
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization



- Institutional reform and capacity building

### **8. Description**

In 1980 USIT started the pilot work in Maseru by constructing a number of demonstration latrines and assisting with the supervision of a site-and-service scheme in Khubetsonana. The pilot project was extended by assisting in the upgrading of Ha Thamae, an old area of Maseru, where the IDA-funded project upgraded roads and water supplies, gave home improvement loans (including money for sanitation) and promoted improved sanitation.

In 1983, USIT undertook a nationwide training of all local carpenters who made the traditional zinc sheet superstructures for unimproved pit latrines. A monitoring tour of the country in early 1985 showed that most of the carpenters were making and selling good VIPs.

After the pilot work, an integrated sewerage and sanitation project was started by USIT in 13 district towns. The 13 towns project sought to motivate individuals and institutions to effect improvements for their own sanitation. USIT trained local builders and provided householders with a technical service and advice to ensure the use of the right technology. In addition to motivating people, USIT educated the people in basic hygiene as well as in the proper use, operation and maintenance of the latrines. A credit line for loan assistance was created to facilitate the construction of latrines.

From 1987 the project expanded again in Maseru and became a national urban on-site sanitation program.

### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Positive evaluation of the diffusion of VIP latrines and the eradication of the old system

### **10. Constraints**

- At the beginnings, poor construction of the dividing wall and water flow around the outside and into the closed pit through the unmortared joints caused a contamination with infiltration from the fresh excreta.
- Resistance of people towards manually emptying a kind of latrine (Ventilated Improved Double Pits, with alternating pit system).

### **11. Factors of success**

- Appropriateness of the technological solution: adequate to expectations, socially acceptable and affordable.
- "No subsidies": users finance their latrines themselves, or through a credit mechanism. The users directly employ private sector local builders, who are trained in latrine construction.

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- Focus on promotion: issues of health and status have been addressed through various media.
- Proper institutional arrangement: work with government structures, collaboration with related programs, and running costs kept appropriate to government budgets, so that the local government could afford to take over the costs once donor financing is phased out. Careful selection of expatriate and local staff and localization of staff over time.

#### 12. Source

Isabel C. Blackett, *Low-Cost Urban Sanitation in Lesotho*, Water and Sanitation Discussion Paper Series, UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, Washington, 1994.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 5

### 1. Title

Environmental sanitation in a compound of Bamako (Mali)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Residents of some areas of Bamako

### 4. Outcome

A problem which hindered the use of sewerage was solved and better arrangements for maintenance were established.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNDP - PROWWESS

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- People's participation
- Appropriate technologies
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization

### 8. Description

In Mali, a focus group discussion on environmental sanitation was held among families living in a compound in Bamako. These identified the local blocked and overflowing sewers as their most critical sanitation problem. In discussing the problem, it became clear that education and awareness alone were not sufficient. The journey of garbage from within the household to the garbage dump was traced. Constrained by resources, the city authorities had only two garbage collection trucks; these were able to collect

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community garbage infrequently. Realizing this, local women stopped carrying the garbage to the designated sites and dumped it, instead, in the open sewers, which subsequently became blocked. Follow-up discussions with city authorities led to privatization of garbage collection in some areas of Bamako. This included a collection contract with a women's cooperative.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Positive evaluation

#### **10. Constraints**

Scarce resources and means of the local government, insufficient to ensure an effective service

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Discussion with a group of citizen, which enabled to identify the problem and find solutions
- Privatization of the service and contracting-out maintenance to a women's cooperative

#### **12. Source**

Deepa Narayan, *Participatory evaluation: Tools for Managing Change in Water and Sanitation*, World Bank Technical Paper number 207, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 87.



## SUCCESS STORY # 6

### 1. Title

Resource mobilization for settlement upgrading by women-based groups in Luzon (Philippines)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

The population of a neighbourhood

### 4. Outcome

Several improvements obtained in upgrading the settlement

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: a local NGO

5.2. Other involved entities: Tulungan Sa Tubigan Foundation (funder)

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- People's participation
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization

### 8. Description

The Tulungan Sa Tubigan Foundation, based in Manila, provided support to a local NGO in Bulacan Province in Luzon to organize women-based groups, called "sitios", that were formed around neighbourhood water taps. With the assistance of field organizers, the women first successfully joined together to collect fees and manage pump repairs. The field workers then helped the women to organize and plan actions to address other group needs. Deciding to build walkways in their neighbourhood, the women began by successfully petitioning for cement to complete the job. Following this,



they organized regular solid waste management for the neighbourhood. Then they set up a separate fund for income-generation activities and organized their own day care project. Currently they have plans to provide lighting in their neighbourhood, and expand income-generating activities.

**9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Positive evaluation

**10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

**11. Factors of success**

- Field workers who helped the women to organize and plan actions to upgrade their neighbourhood.

**12. Source**

Deepa Narayan, *Participatory evaluation. Tools for Managing Change in Water and Sanitation*, World Bank Technical Paper number 207, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 96.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 7

### 1. Title

Resettlement in Port Sudan (Sudan)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

40.000 illegal squatters

### 4. Outcome

Squatters have been resettled and provided with basic services

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: government of Sudan

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Security of tenure (information on the squatter settlement)
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- People's participation

### 8. Description

In Port Sudan, in 1970 more than half of the rapidly increased population, due to the large influx of immigrants from the rural areas, was living in squatter settlements. The environment in these areas was extremely unhealthy from both the physical and social points of view. From 1969 to 1975 a resettlement programme was implemented that, in spite of a severe shortage of public and private funds, aimed at improving living conditions.

The schedule of operations was as follows.

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a) A socio-economic survey and assessment of the existing building structures, carried out by a government team composed of a social surveyor, a planner and an architect. During the work in a *deim* (squatter settlement), they also discussed with the people about their circumstances and expectations.

b) Design of a new settlement: on the basis of these findings, draft plans were prepared and discussed with the population of the *deim* and amendments agreed upon by the people were included in the final plan. Simultaneously, lists of prospective plot-owners were prepared and their contribution to the programme in terms of money and work-hours was discussed.

c) Preparation of the sites: the general work was carried out by the prospective plot-owners, guided by the government team, while water mains and standpipes were installed by hired plumbers. Concurrently, the financial contribution from the prospective plot-owners was collected, amounting to some 2 per cent of their annual income. This was used to cover some expenses such as the hiring of equipment and the purchase of building materials on behalf of the poorest people, all in addition to similar facilities provided by the local government.

d) Transfer of existing shacks to the new settlement: the usable materials (paste wood and tins) were transferred on lorries and carts, and the new units, rebuilt on designated plots. Additional materials were provided to replace cardboard and rags. The work was carried out by 150-200 men at a time, organized in small groups and assisted by skilled carpenters as required. Each household, therefore, was required to supply about two work-days. During the day of transfer, accommodation was provided for the families involved. After the operations, the families were given a model plan of a complete house. The people were also instructed how to make provisions for the disposal of waste water and sewage.

#### 9. Evaluation on the part of the source

"The implementation of this programme has been most successful"

#### 10. Constraints

Not mentioned

#### 11. Factors of success

A major guideline in the planning of the resettlement has been to obtain full participation of the people involved. Apart from giving the relocatees as far as possible a voice in the decision-making, this was also conceived in economic terms by intensively utilizing their only abundantly available resource, that is, their under-employed labour.

Two other factors seem to be responsible for the success of the operation.

- First, a very realistic view was adopted as to the fact that the resources of the people determine the standard of their shelter and environment.

- Secondly, a recognition that fast results were required so as to maintain initial enthusiasm and momentum. To effect this, regular government procedures were avoided

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and for the preparation and implementation a small team of government staff was appointed on an ad hoc basis, which closely cooperated with the representatives of the *deims*, the former squatter settlements.

**12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *Evaluation of Relocation Experience*, Nairobi, 1991, pp. 34-35. Original Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "The resettlement in Port Sudan Town", in *Human Settlements in Africa: The Role of Housing and Building*, Addis Ababa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1976, pp. 103-112.



## SUCCESS STORY # 8

### 1. Title

Orangi Pilot Project - Low cost sanitation and upgrading in an informal settlement at the outskirts of Karachi (Pakistan)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

800.000 residents of the settlement

### 4. Outcome

A low-cost sanitation programme has been effectively implemented, which has led to a wider upgrading project of an informal settlement.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Orangi Pilot Project, which in the last years has split in: Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute (OPRTI), Orangi Pilot Project Society (see above), Karachi Health and Social Development Association, Orangi Charitable Trust (who runs the economic programme).

5.2. Other involved entities: United Nations Population Fund (through the NGO Council), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Aga Khan Foundation, Swiss Government, Federal Bank of Co-operatives, women's organizations and many others have funded the project; an Orangi Pilot Project Society has been registered in July 1989 to act as a funding agency.

### 6. Financial features

Considering that the target of the project was of 43,000 housing units, and that the cost of the sanitation program was about 65 US\$ per house, it may be estimated that the total cost of the project was of about 2,790,500 US\$. However, only 10% of this cost was actually covered by project funds, while the remaining 90% was covered by the people in cash or in labour (the work done was worth about 1,100,000US\$).



### **7. Key strategic elements**

- Security of tenure
- People's participation
- Appropriate technologies
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization

### **8. Description**

Orangi is an unauthorized settlement of 94,122 houses which have been built during the last 20 years with the help of illegal sub-dividers. These have even arranged supply of water, transport and police protection. The general policy of Karachi's government has shifted in the last years from trying to resettle squatters in housing colonies (which were not enough to shelter the increasing immigrant population), to upgrading and regularizing the unauthorized settlements (*katchi abadis*). In this context, a local foundation in 1980 sponsored the Orangi Pilot project (OPP).

OPP considers itself a research institution the objective of which is to analyse the outstanding problems of Orangi and then, through prolonged action research and extension education, discover viable solutions to them.

OPP 's analysis showed that sanitation was a more urgent problem in Orangi than actual house building, since waterlogged lanes and soakpits were adversely affecting the health of the dwellers and decreasing the value of their property. OPP therefore launched a low-cost sanitation programme.

People were organized in lanes and elected lane managers who, on behalf of the lane, formally applied to the OPP for assistance. The OPP technical staff then surveyed the land, established benchmarks, prepare plans and estimates (of both labour and materials), and hand over this data to the lane managers. The lane managers collected the money from the people, called meetings to sort out any social problems which might occur due the undertaking of this work, received tools from the OPP, and made arrangements for carrying out the work. The OPP staff supervised the work.

Some adjustments were necessary after a first evaluation of the programme, to correct some technical problems: first, according to the initial designs of the OPP, the sewerage and excreta were discharged into the open out-flow area which became a serious health hazard. Secondly, because of lack of water to carry sewage, many lines were clogged up and had to be cleaned out. To overcome these two problems, it was decided to place a one-chamber septic tank between every connection and the sewage line. This prevents the solids from flowing out into the drain. The size and design of the tanks was determined not according to any engineering standard but by its cost to the user.

Following the successful sanitation programme, OPP launched a low-cost housing programme in 1986, using the same approach.

### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"After 10 years of research and successful extension, OPP programmes have become models to be replicated elsewhere".





## 10. Constraints

Not mentioned

## 11. Factors of success

- The most important reason for OPP's accomplishment is the community organization and participation in the designing and management of the programme.
- Another reason is appropriating and adapting technology to allow people themselves to carry out the work, at reduced cost. This led to maximizing the use of local resources: personal savings and initiative; manual and managerial skills.
- A success factor was that standard engineering technology and implementation procedures, the product of the traditional client-engineer-contractor relationship, were modified to suit a new system where the user, organizer, and implementor were one, and often they had little or no technical knowledge or artisan skill.

## 12. Source

T. Harpham and P. Vaughan (eds.), *In the Shadow of the City. Community Health and the Urban Poor*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.

UNCHS, *Improving Shelter. Actions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*. UNCHS, Nairobi, 1992, p. 88.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 9

### 1. Title

Namuwong Upgrading and Low Cost Housing Scheme

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Over 1500 households with a population of about 10,000 should have benefited from the project on its completion.

### 4. Outcome

There is an increased stock of improved housing; about 8 kilometres of new roads; a water-supply network based on over 7 kilometres of pipes and 50 water standpipes, one for each group of about 20 homes; street lights and electricity in homes; ventilated improved pit latrine in each home. Residents participate in a waste-recycling project. The welfare facility network includes schools, clinics and day-care centres.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNCHS (Habitat)

5.2. Other involved entities: UNDP, Shelter Afrique (funding agency); Government of Uganda-MLHUD

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- People's participation
- Cost Recovery and resource mobilization

### 8. Description

The project, started in 1988 (and to be completed in 1992), has been aimed at giving the people of Namuwong, a slum situated within Kampala city boundaries, decent shelter

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to live in, reducing homelessness and improving the living environment. It has involved the upgrading of the existing housing stock and the construction of new houses for the local community. The community elected representatives through the resistance councils (RCs) at village, ward and zone levels have participated actively in making such decisions as planning the project area, land acquisition, compensation, subdivision and the allocation process. People have mobilized finances for land acquisition and building loans, and promoted informal-sector employment and income-generating activities. The community-based Namuwongo Housing Co-operative Society produces building materials and upgrades or constructs houses for members. The private-sector civil and building contractors are involved in the construction of infrastructure (roads, drains, water supply systems, etc.). They are also involved in the provision of other social services such as day-care centres, schools, health clinics and religious institutions. The community has been the source of semi-skilled and unskilled labour required by contractors.

The project has developed a training programme consisting of week-end workshops, short courses and study tours, together with on-the-job training for residents and community leaders alike. An important outcome of the project has been the formation and legal registration of the Namuwongo Housing Co-operative Society, the first of its kind in Uganda. It has been formed with about 150 members of the community. They were assisted in the process by the MLHUD/United Nations Team and the Project Housing Co-operatives Officer.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The Namuwong Scheme is a good example of government/community cooperation in an upgrading project, as urged by the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000".

#### **10. Constraints**

Local firms which had been awarded contracts for roads, water drainage, water supply and project site offices suffered from limited financial capacity to inject initial capital and retain a healthy cash flow for the contract.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Community mobilization: "once people recognize a need, it is easy for them to organise themselves into an orderly dynamic group involved in productive activities".
- The organizational structure of the Housing Co-operative: "It gives the community a chance to organize for profit and also provides a forum through which they are exposed to organizational skills, problems and challenges".

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS, *Improving Shelter. Actions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*. UNCHS, Nairobi, 1992, p. 118.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 10

### 1. Title

Hyderabad incremental housing development scheme - Delivery of plots with incremental construction of infrastructure in Hyderabad (Pakistan)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

About 3000 households

### 4. Outcome

Families have settled on a land plot and have gradually built water and sanitation services in it

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Hyderabad Development Authority

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

In 1988-1989 the Hyderabad Development Authority has given out Rs 1,1 million (about 71,500 US\$) for housing loans to families. The money is actually lent by a commercial bank, and the Authority acts as intermediary and turns it to committees of allottees. The total loan envisaged by the bank is of Rs 5 million (325,000 US\$).

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Appropriate technologies
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- People's participation

### 8. Description

After the failure of the implementation of some sites-and-services schemes, the Hyderabad Development Authority decided to develop an alternative scheme, which





incorporated some features which usually contribute to the success of illegal subdivisions: ease of entry thanks to a simplification of the allocation process and reduction of initial costs for the allottee; immediate delivery of the plot to the allottee who does not need to wait for the provision of infrastructure and services; and incremental development of infrastructure and services as and when the financial conditions of the residents permit.

HDA sought the collaboration of some illegal subdividers to subdivide plots and bring in people. A system to select the families which were really in need was established: a reception area where families in immediate need of shelter could settle temporarily. The HDA officials observed the family for two weeks to see if its need was genuine, and, if they were satisfied, they would allocate a family a plot on condition that it built and started living on the plot immediately. Each family started paying a development charge. Instalments were deposited in a separate bank account for each block (or sub-sector), managed by a block leader. Each block decided by popular vote which type of infrastructure was to be provided and how it would be constructed. However, each family was required to build a pit on the plot to guarantee minimum sanitary conditions in the scheme. Water was initially supplied by trucks from the HDA, but when the settlement grew, HDA laid an 8-inch water pipeline with a few public standposts. Residents at the settlement used bucket latrines at the start of the scheme, but now almost all of them have built soak-pit latrines.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The Hyderabad incremental housing scheme is a fairly successful attempt to provide basic housing to low-income groups. It is a radical approach based on the recommendations of the Global Strategy for Shelter, which has placed people first, gives them plots at a rate they can afford, encourages them to build houses before the infrastructure follows".

#### **10. Constraints**

- Before resorting to the illegal subdividers's help to identify the families really in need, a first plot allocation failed and had to be canceled, because many allottee families did not move in: some because they could not afford to build houses, others because they felt no hurry (they already had a house and access to electricity and water supply).
- The Housing Building Finance Corporation refused to give loans to residents, until HDA agreed to use its own long-term deposits as collateral for a loan from the corporation, and extended this loan to the allottees to pay for the roofs of the houses.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Where there are strong committees which enjoy the support of the block residents, a higher level of infrastructure development has been noted.
- The use of methods and the active collaboration of the informal sector (illegal subdividers).



- The incremental development of infrastructure, which are built only after the residents pay for them, thus eliminating the cost recovery problem

**12. Source**

UNCHS, *Improving Shelter. Actions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*. UNCHS, Nairobi, 1992, p.80.



## SUCCESS STORY # 11

### 1. Title

Environmental upgrading in a slum of Olinda (Recife - Brazil)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

A low-income community of about 2,400 people

### 4. Outcome

A slum has been upgraded through improved drainage, construction of sanitation facilities, and road upgrading

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: municipal government of Olinda

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- People' participation
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- Appropriate technologies

### 8. Description

In 1983, the municipal government of Olinda (a city of 400,000 in the metropolitan area of Recife, Brazil) began a project for environmental upgrading, starting with a pilot effort in the Triangulo do Peixinhos slum. Initially, the project focused on improving drainage, using low cost fiber-crete drains (US\$1 per meter constructed) and land fill. The employees who carried out these works were hired through the local community association. In response to community pressure, the project was expanded to include

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solid waste collection. Workers were again contracted in the community to collect household refuse using handcarts. A small aerobic composting unit (250sqm) was established at the former site of an illegal dump to handle all domestic waste in the neighbourhood; the neighbourhood then gradually developed as a centre for recycling businesses. Next, the project became involved with sanitation through the construction of ventilated improved pit latrines (each constructed unit cost \$90; 25 per cent cost recovery was achieved via repayment in an inflation-proof currency - five bags of cement per latrine), and roads upgrading with low cost solid/cement paving (US\$1.50/sqm). All components were produced locally through newly-created micro-enterprises.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The success of the Triangulo pilot activity led to its replication in other areas of Olinda"

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

- The regularization of community involvement through direct contracting.
- The development of community awareness about the importance of maintaining environmental infrastructure.
- The mobilization of household resources for local investment.

#### **12. Source**

Urban Management Programme, *Toward Environmental Strategies for Cities* (edited by Carl Bartone, Janis Bernstein, Josef Leitmann and Jochen Eigen), World Bank, Washington, 1994, p.45. Original source: interview with Rylh Rego, former technical coordinator of the Triangulo do Peixinhos project, and former head of URB-Olinda, April 1992.





## SUCCESS STORY # 12

### 1. Title

Million Houses Programme-Urban Housing Sub-programme - Urban shanty improvement project in Colombo (Sri Lanka)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Residents of a shanty town

### 4. Outcome

The settlement has been upgraded with solid houses, shared toilets and access to safe water

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Government of Sri Lanka, National Housing Development Authority

5.2. Other involved entities: local government, People's Bank

### 6. Financial features

A "People's Bank" lent a maximum amount of 15,000 SLRs, around 600 US\$, to each household involved in the project. Plots allotted were 100, so the financial investment can be estimated in no more than 60,000 US\$.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Security of tenure
- Cost recovery and resource mobilization

### 8. Description

Wathamulla, a shanty town in the metropolitan area of Colombo, was selected for an improvement project. The project had two main priorities: to upgrade the standard of the buildings themselves, and to improve the sanitation and water supply, particularly the canal. During 1982 surveys were carried out and initial plans were



prepared by 1983. The first thing to be done was to issue 40 year leases to households so that, with security of tenure, people would be more likely to commit themselves to the shanty upgrading project. A large area of marshland in central Wanathamulla was filled in and developed as a small sites-and-services project of about 100 plots. These were set aside for Wanathamulla families who were homeless or had to be reallocated because they had encroached on public roads.

Infrastructure improvement needed priority treatment, particularly the drainage canal which runs through the centre of the settlement. This was dredged, cleaned and improved, and, as the settlement developed a garbage-disposal system plus communal toilets, no dumping of refuse into the refurbished canal was allowed.

Each household received a loan of maximum 15,000 SLRs (about 600 US\$) to be paid at an interest of 10 per cent for 15 years on average. through the People's Bank in cooperation with the National Housing Development Authority. People also received training in building upgrading techniques and provided labour for the construction of infrastructure and services.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

This example is included among "Success stories in shelter"

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

- The Million Houses Programme was based on an "enabling strategy", according to which government support is reduced to a minimum, simply streamlining the way for local authorities, under a decentralized planning system, to carry out their housing programmes.

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *GSS in Action*, UNCHS, Nairobi, 1992, p. 58.



## SUCCESS STORY # 13

### 1. Title

Cooperative for water and sanitation management in Martin Coronado- Greater Buenos Aires (Argentina)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

5,000 households

### 4. Achievements

The Martin Coronado municipality is completely served by a water main and a sewerage network, whose technical features are assimilated to the rest of the city

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Cooperativa de obras Servicios Publicos Limitada Martin Coronado (COMACO)

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

The initiative was self-financed by residents

### 7. Key strategic elements

- People's participation
- Institutional reform and capacity building

### 8. Description

The residents of Martin Coronado, like most of the households in Greater Buenos Aires, until 1967 obtained the water from the under-soil by means of wells and dumped the sewage into the sub-soil through "cess pits" of small diameter and great depth, generally situated in the back of the houses.

At the end of 1967, the municipality submitted to the residents some proposals from private utilities for the construction of water and sanitation services in Martin



Coronado. All these proposals had too high costs. Thus residents, organized in the Provisional Commission for Running Water and Sewage, realized they had to adopt more aggressive policy with regard to the choice of business. Under the guidance of a contracted engineer, they developed technical documentation that permitted public bidding for the work, among a number of businesses. The long and complicated procedures and negotiations with the municipality, the public water utility Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion, and the Provincial Government of Buenos Aires, in order to arrange a public tendering for the work, fortified the union of the residents who decided to create a stronger legal structure to execute the basic necessities of the district. The bidding occurred on May 28, 1969. The adopted financial plans permitted an extension of the payments over a period of 15 years, by monthly payments that could not surpass 10% of the minimum salary established by the government. In August of 1970 the "Cooperativa de Obras Servicios Publico Limitada Martin Coronado - COMACO" was created with the assistance of 124 residents. The works started 1971 and included: the construction of the water network and of a water tank; the tunnel crossing underneath the railway lines; the drilling of two water extraction wells; the construction of a sewage purification plant and of the sewage network. The latter grew more slowly and was completed in 1987.

In 1979 a head office for the cooperative was built. It included a meeting hall, administrative offices, storage rooms, and accommodations for one or two employees. Between 1973 the number of registered members has increased from 1000 to 5000.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The COMACO experience is particularly relevant in that, with limited help from the State, and entirely community-financed, it has succeeded in building a complete water and sanitation network".

#### **10. Constraints**

- Lack of support and hostility on the part of the public utility OSN and the national government, which felt threatened by independent residents providing public services.
- Opposition from some locals that looked unfavourably upon a private entity that engaged in a public service.
- The economic crisis, which reduces the financial capacity of the members of the cooperative, which obstructs the realization of new projects.
- The new pricing structure of public enterprises, that prohibits COMACO from paying electricity bills as a provider of a public service - which is at a reduced rate - but as a consumer enterprise.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- The presence of a charismatic and entrepreneurial leader contributed significantly to the success.





- The progressive deterioration of the underground water quality has contributed to a rising consciousness on the part of the population and a desire to search for a solution to the problem.
- Technicians as managers of the plant of the cooperative is an extremely important element.
- The management of COMACO has been guided by the principles of the cooperative. This has fostered an interest in attaining efficient management and equitable treatment of the users.
- The generally high educational level and the homogeneity of socio-economic level of the population helped the project.
- The local topography is conducive to the system. It is an extremely flat plain and is located near the Moron River, which can serve as a point of discharge for the network.
- High levels of participation, stimulated by intense informational campaigns have been fundamental.

#### 12. Source

Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales Corrientes (CEUR), *A Self-reliant Cooperative for Water and Sanitation Management: COMACO*, case study undertaken in collaboration with the UNDP/World Bank/Habitat Urban Management Program, for the Mega-cities Project, Buenos Aires, 1990.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 14

### 1. Title

Baldia Soakpit Pilot Project - On-site sanitation project at the outskirts of Karachi (Pakistan)

### 2. Success attained

Final

### 3. Beneficiaries

Almost 5,000 households

### 4. Achievements

At the end of the project a total of 4867 latrines were constructed. Moreover, building upon the increased local capacity, other activities for community development were undertaken, such as the creation of schools and primary health care centres and income-generating activities.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNICEF

5.2. Other involved entities: government of Netherlands (funder); two local NGOs.

### 6. Financial features

Financial assistance did not exceed 60,000 US\$, and the beneficiaries invested about three times more. No information is provided on investments in technical assistance.

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- People's participation

### 8. Description

The Baldia Soakpit Pilot Project was a community-based development project with social and technical features, carried out from 1979 to 1986. It started with the

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objective to introduce improved on-site sanitation in Baldia, a low income area in Karachi which had just been legalized under a new law.

An experimental phase of a year served to adapt the latrine design to local conditions and a strategy for community involvement was established. Baldia was divided into relatively homogeneous wards where people from the same ethnic background lived together who usually had well established community organizations. A pilot ward served as a demonstration area and its sanitation committee as motivators. Wards for project implementation were selected on the basis of socio-economic and environmental conditions by the project team. During the first visits, contacts were established with existing community organizations, and the objective of the project was explained. After a visit to the demonstration area, the organizations were asked to establish a sanitation committee, if they were interested in the project. This sanitation committee was responsible for the planning and organization of the work in their ward, while motivation visits were made by the community organizer. The project had established a maximum amount of subsidy per ward. Four categories of assistance to households were distinguished, varying from full subsidy (for the poorest households) to technical assistance only (for those able to pay). The selection of households for each category was left to the sanitation committee and those wards which had the highest number of people interest, had a priority for inclusion. Thus there was an incentive for the sanitation committees to motivate as many people as possible to contribute to the construction of latrines. There was also an incentive to reduce the cost of latrines because with the same total amount of subsidy per ward, more latrines could be built. In all, six types of latrines were constructed during the project and the cost was reduced from Rs2000 per unit to Rs 800. At the end of the project a total of 1146 latrines were constructed with subsidy and 3721 latrines with only technical assistance, while for every dollar spent in latrine construction by the project, the community spent almost three dollars.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"After successfully having managed the sanitation improvements in their wards, many community organizations started other activities aimed at the development of their wards".

#### **10. Constraints**

No difficulties are mentioned as concerning the sanitation project; problems of sustainability raised for income-generation activities initiated within the project, because of lack of support from the municipal government.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Residents had security of tenure and so were willing to invest in infrastructure.
- The settlement had a stable and homogeneous population and traditional community organizations.

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- The socio-economic conditions were favourable (most people had a regular source of income).
- The community organizer was a woman, so it was easy for her to visit houses and talk to the women, which are often much more motivated for latrines.
- The demand-oriented approach to the selection of families and the subsidization scheme adopted encouraged the community to mobilize its own money (see above "Description").

**12. Source**

IRC - International Water and Sanitation Centre - M. Wegelin-Schuringa, *Participatory Approaches to Urban Water Supply and Sanitation*, Paper prepared for OECD/DAC Meeting on Participatory Approaches to Urban Development, November 1992, Paris, France.





## CHAPTER THREE

### **Stories of intermediate success**



## SUCCESS STORY # 15

### 1. Title

Demonstration project of on-site sanitation in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso)

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

Two neighbourhoods of Ouagadougou

### 4. Outcome

The involved families decided to invest in improved sanitation

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Regional Water and Sanitation Group - West Africa (UNDP-WB Water and Sanitation Program) (RWSG-WA)

5.2. Other involved entities: government of Burkina Faso

### 6. Financial features

On average 100US\$ have been invested by each household

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Cost recovery and resource mobilization
- People's participation ("communities" are defined "the key players in the decision process")

### 8. Description

The project aims to improve neighbourhood sanitation conditions by constructing or upgrading sanitation facilities at the request of the communities



**9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

The increased demand for services on the part of families, achieved through the use of appropriate means of communication (see "factors of success") is positively evaluated.

**10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

**11. Factors of success**

To motivate communities, the project uses both modern communication media such as radio and television, as well as traditional channels such as dance and theatre to reach even those who cannot afford modern means of communication.

**12. Source**

UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, *Annual Report 1992-1993*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 33.



## SUCCESS STORY # 16

### 1. Title

Establishment of the State Environmental Sanitation Technology Company (CETESB)

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Achievements

A strong agency has been established for pollution control

### 4. Beneficiaries

All residents of Sao Paulo

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Government of Sao Paulo

5.2. Other involved entities: World Bank (funding); UNDP and WHO (technical assistance in earlier phases of the effort)

### 6. Financial features

Information on the World Bank fund is not provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Institutional reform and capacity building
- Water resources conservation and management

### 8. Description

The State Environmental Sanitation Technology Company (CETESB) was formally established in 1975 on initiative of the government of Sao Paulo. Indeed its groundings had been laid down with the creation of the State Basic Sanitation Fund (FESB) in 1968 and a big project of technical cooperation with UNDP and WHO in the early 1970s. The establishment of CETESB is part of a large set of investments in basic sanitation and pollution control which have been made by the government of Sao Paulo in the last two decades, especially in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. These investments include World Bank funded initiative, like the Sao Paulo Water Supply and Pollution Control Project signed in 1971, the Greater Sao Paulo Sewage Treatment

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Project of 1978, two consequent Industrial Pollution Control Loans signed in 1980 and 1987, and the Water Quality and Pollution Control Project for the Guarapiranga Reservoir in 1992. Through these investments it has been possible to finance the most important facilities for pollution control and to provide long-term support to important technical assistance measures, such as institutional strengthening, training and research.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"Today, with a staff of over 2,100, including some 650 professionals, CETESB is widely recognized as the most experienced and technically capable environmental protection agency in Latin America. During the past decade, CETESB in turn has provided technical assistance to other state and local agencies responsible for the provision of environmental services in Sao Paulo, as well as in the rest of Brazil and elsewhere".

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

A recent evaluation of the two Bank-supported Industrial Pollution Control Loans concluded that the success of the program can be attributed to several key factors:

- existence of an adequate policy, legal, and regulatory framework at both the national and state levels;
- continual strengthening of an experienced institution (CETESB) that possessed both competent and highly motivated professional staff and the facilities and equipment required to properly monitor and control environmental degradation;
- effective use of a credit line for pollution control equipment and facilities and enforcement sanctions, including negative publicity, against polluters to induce them to use project or other resources to stem emissions or untreated effluents;
- strong political commitment to pollution control objectives by the state government after 1983, together with increasing public awareness of the health and other risks associated with growing pollution levels;
- consistent Bank and other external support to CETESB, helping to reinforce its technical, administrative and financial capabilities and improve its coordination with both private industry and other public sector agencies.

#### **12. Source**

Urban Management Programme, *Toward Environmental Strategies for Cities* (Carl Bartone, Janis Bernstein, Josef Leitmann e Jochen Eigen eds.), World Bank, Washington, 1994, p.80. Original source: World Bank, *World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.



## SUCCESS STORY # 17

### 1. Title

Settlement planning and training - Institutional development and support to planning programmes in Lybia

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

The public officers working in the field of urban planning and thus, indirectly, all the urban population of Lybia.

### 4. Outcome

The project has prepared a manual for coordinated urban and regional strategic and action plans. It has also provided assistance to the elaboration and updating of urban planning standards. It further established improved administrative planning procedures to the authorities for *baladiya* structure planning, emphasizing environmental and sanitation aspects. In updating the National Physical Perspective Plan of 1985, the project also provided a computerized urban information-management system.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNCHS (Habitat)

5.2. Other involved entities: government of Lybia (funder)

### 6. Financial features

The budget was initially estimated at \$US 2.775.000

### 7. Key strategic elements

Institutional reform and capacity building



#### **8. Description**

Several activities were envisaged, in order to attain the project's objectives. They mainly focused on two major areas: training and direct support.

In order to strengthen the national planning capacity and to develop managerial skills, a training programme was tailored for nationals. In addition to seminars and workshops, the programme included in-service training, designing of courses in operating word-processing and database courses and their application in on-going activities, and overseas training programmes and study tours.

Other activities included were programming for the operation of and updating the urban and regional plans, as well as formulating development programmes at the *baladiya* level. It was, therefore, necessary to review the existing administrative planning mechanisms, and submit relevant updating proposals. The final important activity was to draft a National Physical perspective Plan for the period 1990-2010.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"With more self-reliance, trained nationals are more capable in urban planning and have obtained skills in development and management".

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

Not mentioned

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *Cooperation with the Arab States*, Nairobi, 1993, p. 47.

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## SUCCESS STORY # 18

### 1. Title

Institutional support to the Municipality of Dubai (United Arab Emirates).

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

The municipality of Dubai and thus indirectly the 450.000 inhabitants of the city

### 4. Outcome

Increased self-reliance of local personnel; speeded-up procedures in several areas: the issuing of building permits has been reduced from six weeks to six days; the issuing of licences from three months to four days. The municipality's revenues increased of 117 per cent from 1986 to 1991. Overtime was reduced from Dhs 9 million in 1986 down to Dhs 0.7 million in 1989.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNCHS (Habitat)

5.2. Other involved entities: Government of United Arab Emirates (funder); Dubai Municipality

### 6. Financial features

The budget has exceeded 2,5 million US\$

### 7. Key strategic elements

Institutional reform and capacity building

### 8. Description

The Municipality requested technical assistance from UNCHS (Habitat), which designed this project that aims at providing the Municipality with practical innovations to further its effective and efficient performance, in addition to streamlining procedures in serving the general public.





Project activities included assistance in urban planning, environmental management and training.

The project provided on-the-job training, in addition to seminars and workshops on such subjects as follow-up and development, land surveying, documentation systems, pavement management, etc. Several nationals have also benefited from overseas visits and courses.

A clear managerial policy has been formulated, and proved to be effective, particularly in regulations and procedures in personnel, finance, surveying, etc.

The project has also introduced legislation for more effective environmental protection, as well as documentation and records management systems.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The project has strengthened the municipal capacity and increased its self-reliance in various human settlements areas, particularly in improved and more efficient urban development and services including infrastructure (roads, lighting, drainage, sewerage systems, etc.), public health (waste management, environmental protection, food control, veterinary services, etc.) horticulture and parks, cultural and public services (museum, public libraries, zoo), as well as applying systematical development control through efficient licensing systems and building permits".

"The project has demonstrated, through tangible results, that investment in human settlements institutional development can yield immediate and significant benefits including financial savings, improvements in service efficiency and increased self-reliance".

An evaluation committee assessed the project in mid-1991, and praised the significant successes it had achieved.

#### **10. Constraints**


Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

In order to achieve its objectives, the project emphasizes the improvement of the Municipality's organization and management, as well as reinforcing its technical and administrative capacities. In doing so, several studies were, and are being, prepared on the existing situation, analysing it and proposing operational improvements.

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *Cooperation with the Arab States*, Nairobi, 1993, p.. 50.



## SUCCESS STORY # 19

### 1. Title

Low-cost sanitation project in Haryana (India)

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

Inhabitants of a small Indian town

### 4. Outcome

Increased demand for sanitation services on the part of families which previously were uninterested

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNDP-PROWWESS

5.2. Other involved entities: women's groups created within the project

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

People's participation

### 6. Description

Women's groups conducted self-surveys in preparation for redesigning the project. One of the tools they developed helped the women to explore how they used their time, and what problems they had related to water and sanitation. Discussing in groups, with the help of small cards which depicted everyday's activities, women got aware of how many daily tasks involve the use of water and sanitation. These and other exercises led to dramatic increase in applications for loans for the latrines on the part of families which had been uninterested so far.



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**7. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Positive evaluation

**8. Constraints**

Not mentioned

**9. Factors of success**

Use of tools for group discussion aimed at raising consciousness on the importance of water and sanitation for everyday life.

**10. Source**

Deepa Narayan, *Participatory evaluation: Tools for Managing Change in Water and Sanitation*, World Bank Technical Paper number 207, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 76. Original source: J. Pfohl, 1984.



## SUCCESS STORY # 20

### 1. Title

City Data Programme - Kenya Pilot Project

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

Government of Kenya and municipal governments of 8 cities

### 4. Outcome

The development of a national system of urban data collection has been started

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNCHS (Habitat)

5.2. Other involved entities: Government of Italy - MAE DGCS (funder); Government of Kenya; municipalities of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret, Machakos, Thika and Kakamega)

### 6. Financial features

Around 700.000 US\$ have been contributed by the donor

### 7. Key strategic elements

Institutional reform and capacity building

### 8. Description

In the first phase of the Project, the following activities have been undertaken:

- a survey of urban data-collection and dissemination practices;
- design of a data framework and identification of key urban indicators;
- organization of a Computer Training Workshop for staff from the participating cities and government ministries;
- compilation of data for inclusion in the UNCHS-CitBase;
- sample survey to bridge some of the identified data gaps.





The Project is managed through Steering Committee meetings and workshops of Mayors and Town Clerks of the project cities/municipalities. An Expert Group Meeting has been held in August 1994 to review results of the first phase of KPP.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

Evaluation by the donor: the KPP "has been remarkably successful in developing a national urban data collection system" (ambassador R. Di Leo); "the project has reached one of its objectives: contributing to capacity building and enhancing the decision-making process at both the local and national level of the Government of Kenya" (expert planner A.M. Ceci).

Evaluation by the Nairobi City Council: KPP "has helped to motivate departments in the Nairobi City Council to appreciate the resourcefulness of proper management of data generated in decision making. (...) NCC's management and planning has been improved by the installation of a PC in City Hall".

Evaluation by the Ministry of Public Work and Housing: "KPP has made a major contribution towards the development of a system for urban data collection and processing that would eventually feed into the policy information system".

#### **10. Constraints**

- The structure of some data generated in decision making in City Hall was not compatible with what was required for implementation of KPP. This complicates the implementation process to include reorganising such data to fit into KPP database.
- Shortage of skilled manpower to engage full time in the implementation of KPP.
- Lack of a unified interpretation of definitions used by surveyors.
- Lack of some data requested by the Project, or data that are inaccurate, outdated, invalid or irrelevant.
- Some data source departments - like Police department - consider their data as confidential and cannot release without authority from their head offices.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- Development of relationships with agencies generating and collecting data in the cities on the part of municipalities.

#### **12. Source**

Papers presented at the Kenya Pilot Project Review Meeting held at Gigiri on 23-26 August, 1994.



## SUCCESS STORY # 21

### 1. Title

Land-sharing in Hyderabad (India)

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

Residents of two slum settlements

### 4. Outcome

An agreement was reached between illegal squatters and landlord on the tenure of the land

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Urban Community Development Department in Hyderabad (India)

5.2. Other involved entities:

### 6. Financial features

No special funds seem to have been allocated for this actions

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Security of tenure
- People's participation

### 8. Description

The basic principle of land-sharing is the development of the site under dispute in such a way that one part of the site is reserved for housing the people who lived on the site and the other part, normally that with greatest commercial potential, can be developed by the landowner according to his or her own insights. Land-sharing can be considered as a form of on-site relocation.

Many successful examples of land-sharing arrangements come from Hyderabad (India). Among them are the following ones.



In the case of the 50-year-old slum of Tallibasti, the private landowner tried to evict the slum dwellers in 1952. However, since the slum dwellers were paying rent to the landowner, they took the case to the court claiming that under the Rent Control Act they could not be evicted. The court decided in their favour. The landowner was obliged to work out a compromise with the community leaders. It was agreed that the community would be allocated plots on part of the disputed site. These plots were bigger than their original plots.

The population of Ganhikutir, another slum settlement in Hyderabad, confronted with a dragging conflict over its destination with the private landowners. Inspired by having successfully arranged a dispute over the destination of another slum area, Markandeyanagar, the then-director of the Urban Community Development Department in Hyderabad tried to achieve a breakthrough the stalemate in 1981. By adopting a micro-social planning approach, he managed to work out a land sharing arrangement between the landowners and the slum dwellers.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"In a situation of conflicting interests between the landowner and people who have illegally occupied the site, land-sharing is a development option which provides both actors involved with a solution which is potentially beneficial to them".

#### **10. Constraints**

"Land-sharing is less feasible and more difficult in situations where there are conflicting interests relating to the development of a particular site, or in which many people claim ownership over a relatively small piece of land".

#### **11. Factors of success**

Public agencies play an important role, mainly as a mediator, in achieving land-sharing arrangements

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *Evaluation of Relocation Experience*, Nairobi, 1991, p. 9. Original Source: P. Nayani and U. Adusumili, *Land Sharing in Hyderabad*, New Delhi, HSMI, 1988.



## SUCCESS STORY # 22

### 1. Title

Ruamjai Samakki Resettlement project in Bangkok (Thailand) - Resettlement of the population of a squatter settlement

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

139 families

### 4. Outcome

Security of tenure was achieved

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: Human Development Foundation (local NGO)

5.2. Other involved entities: some government agencies

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Security of tenure
- People's participation

### 8. Description

This case concerns a typical squatter settlement, developed on vacant land of an absentee landlord in Bangkok. As the city gradually developed and land prices increased, the land became valuable. In 1986 the owner, a bank, sold the land to the TCCC land and Housing Company. This company did not allow the inhabitants to remain there any longer. The Ruamjai Samakki community asked the help of the NGO, Human Development Foundation. With its aid the community was organized and managed to obtain fair compensation and much more. Only 22 days after the





community signed the agreement to demolish their houses and move out, they were able to carry out all crucial steps for a resettlement process. Strong and persistent community organization was able to mobilize many other actors to react according to their needs. The methods they used varied from asking, lobbying, confronting and even demonstrating in order to achieve their demands. For instance, although the style of housing construction did not correspond with existing bye-laws, after a number of negotiations and lobbying, the District Authority agreed to issue legal registration for every house in the community. After the dispute for compensation money had been arranged and a plot of land for the resettlement had been selected, the informal community organization was transformed into the Rumajai Samakki housing Cooperative, with 139 members. This legitimate and legal community body was considered appropriate by the community to obtain community loans, own the community land, represent the community in all legal proceedings and manage the repayment system as well as other coordinated work.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"This case is remarkable in that only 22 days after the community signed the agreement to demolish their houses and move out, they were able to carry out all crucial steps for a resettlement process with some help and guidance from an NGO and some government agencies".

#### **10. Constraints**

Not mentioned

#### **11. Factors of success**

- "A very significant factor behind this success was the strong and persistent community organization"
- The aid from the local NGO and from government agencies

#### **12. Source**

UNCHS (Habitat), *Evaluation of Relocation Experience*, Nairobi, 1991, pp. 16-17. Original Source: P. Niyiom, S. Boonyabancha and S. Chuayklieng, *From Eviction Struggle to Incremental Resettlement Process by People in Ruamjai Samakki Resettlement Project*. A research study project of Human Settlements Foundation, Bangkok, submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, April 1990.



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## SUCCESS STORY # 23

### 1. Title

Regularization of an illegal settlement at Sengki (Thailand)

### 2. Success attained

Intermediate

### 3. Beneficiaries

216 families (923 people)

### 4. Outcome

Security of tenure obtained for the 923 residents; following the project, two more slum communities have successfully registered their housing cooperatives.

### 5. Actors

5.1. Main executor: UNCHS (Habitat), UNDP, Netherlands Habitat Commission; Thailand National Housing Authority - Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies (CHHSS)

5.2. Other involved entities: Yanawa District Authority, Department of Co-operative Promotion, Crown Property Bureau, a commercial bank.

### 6. Financial features

No information on the financial features is provided by the source

### 7. Key strategic elements

- Security of tenure
- People's participation

### 8. Description

The Sengki community in Yanawa District, Bangkok, is over 100 years old. The land, owned by the Crown Property Bureau, has been leased to dwellers. In 1978, a major fire destroyed approximately 80 per cent of the houses. The remaining houses deteriorated in quality. As a matter of urgency, those who lost their houses to the fire put up



structures according to what they could afford but without any proper physical plan. Soon the community became overcrowded by the former residents as well as by new squatters. Residents could not do anything to improve the settlement because of illegal and insecure land tenure since the fire. A study by CHHSS evidenced that the Sengki community should be given the highest priority to be developed by the land-sharing strategy.

The community elected a committee which was fully involved in sharing ideas, planning and implementation of the project step by step. Hand in hand with the CHHSS working team, it established the Sengki Housing Co-operative, which was entrusted with the responsibility of finding a loan for the construction of housing, collection of repayments, clearing dwellers from the land, construction management, etc. The Crown Property Bureau agreed to sell 6032 square metres of land at over 65 per cent less than the market price with a 20 per cent downpayment and five years of instalments at 9.75 per cent interest. After the land was paid for, the land titles would be transferred from the Crown Property Bureau to Sengki Housing Co-operative, which would transfer them to the members later. Houses were built through the combination of complete housing and self-help "core housing" units to minimize the disadvantages of the two types. The type is a two-storey row-house with a ground floor that contains a multi-purpose hall and toilet. The area of a dwelling unit is only two thirds of the land plot. In the middle of the settlement there is a concrete main road six metres wide which has water and sewerage on both sides. The Metropolitan Electricity Authority provides electricity to the community, while the Metropolitan Water Work Authority supplies water.

#### **9. Evaluation on the part of the source**

"The project has proved that a land-sharing strategy, promoting the people's organization as the main actor in the housing-development process, is one feasible and rational alternative to eviction of the urban poor from their slum communities".

#### **10. Constraints**

- The formalization of an informal housing system is contradictory to the income-earning structures of the poor, which are informal and irregular; in the Sengki case this has caused problems of repayment.
- There were conflicts among dwellers due to the smaller features of the new plots in comparison with the former ones, and the need to forfeit some part of the land for roads and other infrastructure.
- Lack of flexibility in the existing structure, policy and attitude of governmental organizations involved caused great difficulty in making them cooperate.
- Lack of investment resources for housing construction was another major impediment as the people had no access to any resources.

#### **11. Factors of success**

- The land-sharing strategy chosen.

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- The major role played by the self-organized community: other organizations assumed mostly an enabling and supportive role in giving technical assistance, monitoring and collaborating in order to solve problems caused by rigid official systems.

**12. Source**

UNCHS, *Improving Shelter. Actions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*. UNCHS, Nairobi, 1992, p. 110.

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