

# Playing with the Essence of Life

*Thesis about organisation control and disputes over the interrelated issues of water and land in a Moroccan oasis village.*



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Ma-Thesis 'Culture, Organisation & Management'

By C.C. Otte

Supervisor H.Wels

August 31th 2000, Amsterdam



*...just because of the simple fact people have to live together*  
*(Elias 1970)*



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*Voor pap en mam*

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# Glossary

<i>Aiyans</i>	The assistants of the <i>amghar</i>
<i>Ait</i>	People, children from
<i>Amghar</i>	The person principally for safety in the village, the chief
<i>Amghar n-igran</i>	The person, who is responsible for the land in the village, appointed by the traditional village council
<i>Amzourai</i>	Literally the first people whom settled
<i>Ahl Todgha</i>	The ethnic group living at the upper part of the Todgha valley
<i>Ait El Hart</i>	The ethnic group living at the break point of the Todgha valley. There were the water supplies of the river stops during summer
<i>Ait Atta</i>	A social group living at the end of the valley
<i>Bled-el-Makhzen</i>	Centralised power
<i>Bled-es-Siba</i>	Literally 'the land of beast', the area in Morocco outside sultanic control
<i>Bled kharadj</i>	Land that can be used for collective purposes
<i>Caid</i>	Administrator of the rural communities
<i>Dirham</i>	Morocco's currency
<i>Habous</i>	Religious land
<i>Haratin</i>	Black, sedentary oasis agriculturists
<i>Iqabline</i>	The black group who is located at the bottom rung of the valley
<i>Imazighen</i>	'white' and 'free' Berber
<i>Igzdu</i>	Camping unit
<i>Jamaa</i>	Present the district council of a certain region
<i>Jihad</i>	The holy war of the Arab, which had as purpose to convert as many people as possible to Islam
<i>Kadi al-orf</i>	The traditional judge

<i>Khettara</i>	A series of water wells, which are connected underground by a channel, to bring the groundwater to the surface
<i>Liff</i>	A <i>liff</i> is an alliance system between two parties what resulted often in a payment of one party to another party
<i>Marabout</i>	A minister, person of Berber by birth who also enjoys a religious status.
<i>Pasha</i>	Administrator of the urban communities
<i>Qsar</i>	Fortified village
<i>Shurfa</i>	A group of people who claimed to be descendants of Muhammed
<i>Suq</i>	Market
<i>Seguia</i>	An irrigation network of many channels
<i>Sougaiuo</i>	Plural of <i>seguia</i>
<i>Taggourte</i>	A part water and a part land. Also called an unit of irrigated land.
<i>Tanast</i>	A bucket, the former time-measure for the <i>taggourte</i>
<i>Transhumance</i>	A co-existence of settles agriculture life with of pastoral nomadism

# Introduction & The Central Question

*While I am brushing my teeth a well-know sound annoys me. I look down, I am not surprised to see that I did not turn the tap off well. Mmm, I believe that is the umpteenth time now. While continuing to brush my teeth, I turn off the tap. I look up and see myself in the bathroom-mirror, and start wondering why I was not more precisely. It is such a small action -turning off the tap while brushing one's teeth- but I remain to forget. And continue through forgetting I contribute over and over again to the waste of water. Why do I a loose rein on this small action? I know water is a valuable resource. Valuable because without water, no life is possible. Water is a good of vital importance, on which every human being depend (Agnew & Anderson 1995). But unlike other materials, no value is placed on water. In my view, most people in developed countries use water without thinking of the value of this vital resource. In other regions of the world, this negligence is not possible (Thorbrietz 2000: 17).*

Basically, the earth has enough water for everybody but it is distributed very unequally. Less than one percent of the global water resources are concentrated in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, but five percent of the world's population lives in this arid zone, characterised by high temperatures (a July average of over 30 degrees) and little precipitation. At one time, this zone was populated by nomads with a lifestyle adapted to the harsh realities of nature (Thorbrietz 2000: 19). One of the countries where nomads adapted their livelihood to the features of the arid zone, is Morocco. Morocco is the country where I carried out my fieldwork to collect data for this thesis.

In Morocco, as in other oasis settlements, the former social organisation of the nomads was based on the utilisation of marginal resources. Water was and still is one of these marginal resources. Without water, life in these areas becomes almost impossible to support for any length of time because of the extremely high temperatures found in these areas. The nomads used the water efficient by applying several techniques, of which the traditional irrigation system, called the *khettara*<sup>1</sup>, is one. A traditional village council ruled over the oasis settlement and managed the irrigation systems as well. Economic, political and social events throughout

the years, like the Arabic invasion in the eight century, the French Protectorate in 1912, and Morocco's independence in 1956, changed the social organisation of the nomads, which resulted, in most cases, in 'obligated' sedentarization (Findlay 1994: 129-158, Lentjes 1981). This thesis deals with the influence of the changing circumstances throughout the years on the social organisation related to water in a village, partly inhabited by settled nomads, in an arid zone of Morocco.

The 'obligated' sedentarization, population growth and the need to more and other products caused more water consumption and expansion of agricultural lands (Findlay 1994: 158). In the Todgha valley, a valley situated in the South of Morocco, the interrelated issues of water and land were, and still are, the centuries-old subject of conflicts between different villages and tribes. After all, without water and land one cannot survive in these areas. Centuries-old conflicts arose again between the villages. Tadafalte, a small oasis village situated at the downstream of the Todgha valley, was one of those villages. Government's influence had become great since Morocco became independent. This institution 'solved' the conflicts over land and water between the villages in the Todgha valley. Through the spread of the government's influence, the position of the traditional village councils in oasis settlements in Morocco, lost its prestige. This prestige lost also happened in Tadafalte, which is inhabited by descendants of the nomad-tribe Aït Atta. The reduced position created inability of the traditional village council in Tadafalte to seek agricultural opportunities for future generations, resulting in that numbers of people left and still leave Tadafalte to seek urban employment or to work in other countries (Findlay 1994: 146, Fieldwork 1999).

These migrants sent their earned money to the stay-behinds or invested it in their native-village, which caused distorted relations in the organisation of water use in Tadafalte. For example, some migrants invested in agricultural technology for their fields, such as water pumps. As result, these villagers did not depend on the traditional irrigation as their fellow-villagers. Due to the previously named events, the dependency relationships, roles, privileges and mandates of the concerned participants<sup>2</sup> around water in Tadafalte, an oasis-village in Morocco, changed and are still changing. A consequence of such change is that only few people still take responsibility for the maintenance of the irrigation systems in Tadafalte (Fieldwork 1999). The changes in the social relations around the organisation of water in an oasis settlement in Morocco are what this thesis concerns. The village Tadafalte seemed to me an interesting case for to collect data for this subject.

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<sup>1</sup> An underground irrigation ditch, explicit explanation will follow in paragraph 2.3.

<sup>2</sup> I hereby take for granted that a participant can be an organisation, an individual or a group, according to the definition of Pfeffer and Salancik (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 2).



The emphasis is put on the features of the current organisation of water in Tadafalte, which are predominantly the result of changed circumstances from the past. By clarifying the social relations related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, one could gain a better understanding of the present-day situations and problems in an oasis-settlement. The societal relevance of this research is that the reduced importance of the traditional village council, the migrants' remittances, the usage of water pumps, political inferences and changed economic circumstances, has disturbed the mutual relationships in oasis settlements. A possible consequence of these changed relationships is that the low water table will continue to go down, nobody takes responsibility for the traditional irrigation systems. If one knows who is responsible for the organisation of water, one knows whom to approach to instigate possible changes related to its use of water.

About two years ago, an EU-project named 'Interaction between Migration, Land & Water Management and Resource Exploitation in the Oases of the Maghreb' (IMAROM) recruited students for carrying out research in a valley in Morocco concerning environment, agricultural transformation, and migrants. The main objectives of the IMAROM-project were to examine the effect of migrants' investments on the use of land and water in oasis-areas and how the investments affected social and economic changes. I was interested, because I also studied, at subsidiary level environmentology at the Institute of Environmental Issues at the Free University of Amsterdam. After I obtained permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Morocco to conduct research in that country, I carried out my research during a period of four months (February-June) in the Todgha valley. My aim was to find out the present-day social relations between the different participants related to the organisation of water in a village of the Todgha valley and in what context the social relations have evolved. Tadafalte became that village.

To clarify the social relations between the participants in Tadafalte, the relations can be seen as a complex and dynamic 'game'. Different 'players', perceptions, objectives and means are present in the 'game'. In addition, the different 'players' act on different levels (micro, meso or macro), which promote continuous dynamic in the 'game'. To gain full understanding of the social relations that relates to the organisation of water, it is necessary to include all the 'players' involved (Elias 1970: 70-76). Considering everything I described above, the central question of this thesis is:

*How are the present-day social relations between the different 'players' related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, and in what context have the social relations evolved?*

The organisation concept is taken from Tennekes' perspective on organisations (1995). This perspective does not pay much attention to the mutual influences between the organisation and its environment. Therefore, the resource dependency perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is added to my theoretical framework. The disadvantage of both theories is that they do not pay much attention to the effect of historical events, while these events can still have impact on the present-day organisation. For this reason, the figuration perspective of Elias (1970) is added to my theoretical framework as well.

The collected data are mainly based upon written sources, observation and interviews with the inhabitants of Tadafalte as well as with some governmental institutions, which had a role in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The book by David Hart (1981) and the annual reports of Hein de Haas and Hassan El Ghanjou (February 2000), who conducted research in the Todgha valley at the same time, were of great value. For more information on the methods of research followed and the choice of Tadafalte, refer to appendix 1.

First of all, my theoretical framework is presented in the next chapter. In this chapter I underline my theoretical framework, which consists of the organisation theories of Tennekes (1995), Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) and the social theory of Elias (1970). The theoretical framework will be illustrated by examples from the field. As a result, the reader will already be familiar with the subject; the *case-study*, the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

In chapter two, Morocco in general and the research site, the Todgha valley, are introduced. Morocco is described in general terms, so as to obtain an impression of the country and locate the research site. The Todgha valley with its specific characteristics is outlined so as to understand the context of the research site. This means for example attention is paid to the physical environment of the Todgha valley, the irrigation systems used in the valley, and its inhabitants. In addition, this chapter also deals with Morocco's economic and political history

specifically related to water management, offering insight into the historical influences on the organisation of Tadafalte throughout the years.

In chapter three, the *case study*, Tadafalte and its features are presented. One can see how important certain features are in the social organisation of water in Tadafalte and how crucial water is for Tadafalte's social organisation. This includes Tadafalte's history, its irrigation system and its changes, the way water use is organised, and its overall impact on the social relations in Tadafalte.

In chapter four, the different 'players' forming the social relations related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte are outlined. Some 'players' who have direct or indirect connection to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, but are not inhabitant of the village, are described throughout all the chapters. These 'players' are government institutions, which have influence on the organisation of water in Tadafalte predominantly based on authority. The structural features of these 'players' are described in the appendix to which the reader is referred. In addition, in this chapter the interrelations between the 'players', the game of water, are outlined so as to comprehend the present-day situation of the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

Each chapter is followed by a chapter conclusion, in which the found data of *the case-study* is tested to the theories of this thesis. The chapters are followed by a summary of the analysis of the results, as well as the theories used. This thesis concludes with a reflection and a re-commendation for future research.



# Chapter 1

## The Theoretical Framework

*How strange these people are*

*How strange I am*

*How strange we are* (Elias 1970)

### 1.0. Introduction

Through the introduction it will become clear that the Moroccan society has been influenced by social, political and economic events throughout the years. An example of such an event is a new government structure in 1912 under the French colonisation. These events cause changes in the dependency relations between people, their perceptions and their behaviours. For example, the Arabs invaded Morocco in the eighth and eleventh centuries, bringing with them what became the dominant religion Islam. The consequence of this event is that the structure of the society changed, new configurations<sup>3</sup> emerged like the group of *shurfas*. The group of *shurfas* claimed to be descendants of Muhammad. In those days, people ascribed to this group an important religious role in the organisation of their village. People believed that if a person was related to Muhammad, they could bring peace to a village. By offering the *shurfas* houses and land, the inhabitants of villages attracted those people to come and live there. What were the consequences of the coming of this group in the organisation of a village, the organisation related to water management? Have the dependency relations between people or groups within a village changed, or have they remained the same? Are there elements of the organisation, which could resist the change? How do people, as individuals and as a collective, react to

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<sup>3</sup> Elias introduced this concept to serve as a simple conceptual tool to loosen the dichotomy between 'the individual' and 'society'. The term indicated that people have relations and are connected with each other. As Elias puts it human figuration are pluralities of interdependent people who are linked to each other in numerous ways because people have to live with each other (Bax 1978: 223, Elias 1970: 130). For the discussion about the dichotomy, see Bax (1978), *Figuration Analysis: A better perspective for networkers: with an illustration from Ireland*, pp. 221-230.

events and the changes they bring? Do people adjust to the changes, do they isolate themselves from the changes or do they respond by means of taking actions to prevent the changes from happening?

In my opinion the answer to these questions can be found in the social sciences, particularly in the configuration perspective of Elias (1970<sup>4</sup>), and in the organisation theories, considered I take from Tennekes (1995) its anthropological perspective on organisations. This perspective on organisations is inspired by the sociologist Elias. In his perspective, Elias gives much attention to historical-political processes<sup>5</sup> on the local level. To incorporate Elias' perspective into organisation analyses, one can consider the way people operate as the political arena of an organisation (Tennekes 1995: 10).

Tennekes defines organisations as social bonds<sup>6</sup>, which are constructed consciously in order to realise certain objectives. In the past, the nomadic ancestors of the inhabitants of Tadafalte decided to settle on a certain place to prevent starvation in the future. The result of this action was the village Tadafalte. To realise the objective -preventing starvation-, the village needed structure -a village council, rules and so on- to maintain the social order in the village. By creating an organisation, the organisation could survive in its context. However, people manage an organisation. The different views and interests people have cause continued interactions between people. The interactions, although restricted by elements of the organisation structure, can result in internal changes in the organisation. In other words, there is a constant interaction between the structure and the actions of people in the organisation (Tennekes 1995: 40-44).

The disadvantage of Tennekes' idea is that his explanation of the context's influence on the organisation and visa versa was not satisfying to answer the central question of this thesis. Every organisation is in one way or another dependent on its context. This fact also applies on Tadafalte's organisation of water. Tennekes only explains the influence of the context in terms of changed bonds, but he does not explain what kind of elements the context consists of, how the context causes changes in the organisation, or whether the organisation can react on the changed context (Tennekes 1995: 43). Such an internal perspective tends to consider that it can solve organisation problems without regard to look at their organisation context. Possible consequences of this viewpoint are, for example, dissatisfaction, laziness and boredom by the members of the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 8/9). Therefore, an organisation theory

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<sup>4</sup> See also Elias 1971, and Elias & Scotson 1976 (Bax 1993: 87).

<sup>5</sup> Elias defines political processes in terms of dependency relations between individuals, which are characterised by continually processes of meaning systems on the one hand and on the other hand processes of forming power and dependency (Bax 1995: 116/117).

<sup>6</sup> Social bonds are seen as the networks of personal relations.

dealing with the influence of the organisation on its context and the impact of the context on the organisation will be added to my theoretical framework.

The resource dependency perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) gave me the most satisfactory explanation about the influence of the context on the organisation and the impact of the organisation on the context. In their book, Pfeffer & Salancik reason that in order to understand the behaviour of an organisation, one must understand the context, and the organisation context, of that behaviour. The assumption behind this thought is that no organisation is completely self-contained. Inescapably, the organisation depends on other organisations for the resources it requires to survive in its context. An asymmetrical relationship arises between the organisations with regard to the allocation of its resources. Pfeffer and Salancik have two explanations for this asymmetrical relationship, which will be explained in the next paragraph (Lammers 1994: 198-201, Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Pröpper (1993) comments correctly that Pfeffer and Salancik do not develop an idea how organisations can differ under the same circumstances. For example, organisations can differ their internal structure or in their strategies.

For this reason, I turned to social science for my theoretical framework. To know how the current organisation related to water management in Tadafalte functions, one must locate the changes first. Most of the changes happened before the present-day situation but they can still have a major impact on the way the organisation currently operates. In addition, the events can have different effect on the present organisation. For example, some villages in the Todgha Valley do not have a traditional village council anymore while in Tadafalte this traditional institution still functions (Fieldwork, File Diary February 16th 1999). Therefore, Elias uses a historical dimension in his configuration perspective (Bax 1993: 49-51).

Elias introduced the concept figuration to cancel out the dichotomy between the group and the individual. A figuration is concept to indicate a group of people bound up together by relations of power and dependency. By using a deeper time perspective, Elias shows that the present configurations have changed and are still changing Configurations are thus in a constant flux. The movements are caused by constant mutual interaction between individuals. Processes of the forming of power and dependency on one hand, and the processes of meaning systems on the other hand are present in the mutual interaction (Bax 1995: 116-117). In other words, Tadafalte's present organisation related to water management is a product of historical events, which is still, although dependent on its context, in a process of change. Before I explain Elias' configuration perspective in paragraph 1.2, I will first outline the organisation theories. The chapter is enclosed by a summary of the three organisation theories.

## 1.1. Organisation Theories

As I remarked earlier, I use Tennekes (1995) anthropological perspective on organisations. According to his perspective, social bonds form an organisation. The social bonds are constructed consciously in order to realise certain objectives. Although an organisation is constructed consciously, the organisation changes the objectives of its constructors quickly. The reason for the changes is that between the (consciously) intended objectives and the actual results of the organisation, tensions arise. Members of the organisation who interact with each other, or through external events, cause the tensions. For example, the migrants' investments in water pumps disturbed the relations around the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The result is that the management of an organisation, the traditional village council in this case, is constantly occupied with re-adjusting the actions of the social bonds so as to gain the set objectives. In other words, a constant interaction between the structure and the actions of the members of the organisation is present in the organisation. Therefore, Tennekes distinguishes between an organisation-as-a-life-world and an organisation-as-system<sup>7</sup> (Tennekes 1995: 35-41).

Starting from the system-perspective, members of the organisation and outsiders define the organisation as an objective reality of structures, mechanisms, factors and variables. These elements of the objective reality are aimed at surviving the organisation context. According to this perspective, even the actions of people can be seen as a system. Certain factors and fixed mechanisms, like the terms of employment or rules of the company, determine the outcome of people's actions. This view corresponds with the way a manager looks at an organisation: an organisation is a means to accomplish certain objectives. However, the management of an organisation is also part of the social bonds of the organisation. To accomplish the organisation's objectives, individuals and groups, each with their own view, interests, personal preferences and ambitions, have to work together. These different interests make members of the organisation take different actions, which do not correspond with one another or with the objective of the organisation. Tensions between the different actions and the objectives of the organisation are the consequence. The tensions, different views, personal preferences, dependency relations of the organisation members are also called the organisation-as-a-life-world. An organisation is, thus, not only a formal collaboration (organisation-as-a-system), but also a community in which people spend an important part of their life (organisation-as-a-life-world) (Tennekes 1995: 41-44).

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<sup>7</sup> Tennekes derives this distinction from Habermas. Habermas introduced both terms within a framework of a systematic thinking of several fundamental theoretical discussions, which is discussed within the sociology the last decade (Tennekes 1995, 55). An explanation of this discussion will follow in paragraph 1.2..



This dualistic thought<sup>8</sup> implies that the management regulates the daily life in the organisation (the organisation-as-system). Through rotation of the members of the management, or through other external influences, the rules the management set can change. The new members can have a different view on the policy related to their organisation, or their view can be influenced by external demands. The result is that the members of the management try to re-adjust the policy to their views or to the current demands to accomplish the once set objectives (Tennekes 1995: 42-45).

The disadvantage of Tennekes' view is that he does not devote much thought to the influence context and organisation. In numerous ways, an organisation is connected and dependent on its context (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 3). The organisation itself is part of the same surroundings. In addition, the context of the organisation becomes freer and lies further away, like the inter-organisation relations, which can be regional, national, and finally global (Pröpper 1998: 32). When, for instance, the olive-market collapses (global), this event will have effect on the peasants of Tadafalte because they cultivate olives for the market (local) (Fieldwork, File Interviews Peasants 1999). Therefore, I want to take a closer look at existing organisations theories dealing with the organisations and their context.

The open system theory of Katz and Kahn is one of the theories dealing with organisations and their context. They ascribe much influence to the context on the organisation. According to their theory, an organisation is defined as a social system, which consists of recurrent cycles of input, transformation and output. To locate a system, to specify its function, and to understand its functions, therefore, requires that this cyclical energetic process be traced and identified (Katz & Kahn 1966: 452/453). This way, the organisation can react and adjust to the continuous demands of its context, because it know the important systems related to the functioning of the organisation in question (Pröpper 1993: 199, Katz & Kahn 1966). The condition for the dynamic development of the organisation in question is that no big internal clashes of interests occur in the organisation (Lammers 1997: 286). Thus, not much attention is paid to the action of people. They see the organisation mainly as a system. This way, their theory does not agree with Tennekes' dualistic perspective and is not much use to my theoretical framework.

The resource dependency perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) provided the most satisfactory theory for my theoretical framework. In their perspective, these two theorists pay much attention to the impact of the context on the organisation and visa versa. An open-system perspective on organisations is not new. Katz and Kahn already explained the influence of the context on the organisation by means of an open system perspective. Many other theorists (Perrow, Barnard, Weber) also recognise the importance of the context on the organisation.

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<sup>8</sup> Tennekes took this dualistic thought from Lammers (1989: 481-483) (Tennekes 1995: 39).

However, they describe the organisation in terms of how it operates, on the condition that the existence of the organisation is taken for granted (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 1).

Pfeffer and Salancik state that an organisation is embedded in a context comprised of other organisations. They define an organisation as a coalition of groups and interests, which are often contradictory. Each participant, which may be other organisations, groups, or individuals, attempts to obtain its interest from the collective by interacting with others. The result of these interactions and exchanges is the collective, known as organisation. The participants can differ in the degree to which the organisation controls their activities. Some participants provide resources but are not tightly bound to the organisation. Other participants have more control in the organisation, but do not provide resources. The contradictory interests are maintained by providing inducements to participants who provide the organisation's scarce resources<sup>9</sup>, otherwise the latter is not able to survive. The organisation depends on those other organisations for the scarce resources. Even seemingly self-contained organisations require some transactions with their context for survival<sup>10</sup> (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 1/2/29/36/256).

In the past, the inhabitants of Tadafalte had access to sufficient water for irrigating their fields. Their main water source was the groundwater, which was dependent on the melt water of the Saghro Mountains. Today, the villagers of Tadafalte expect to have less groundwater in the future because of people who settled in collective pasture land<sup>11</sup>, which is situated in the Saghro Mountains. These people irrigate the land by means of water pumps. Due to the use of water pumps in these areas, the villagers of Tadafalte expect that the groundwater level will fall down in their village.

When the context of the organisation changes, as described in the case above, the supply of resources becomes more or less scarce. Organisations can either lose the battle to survive or simply change their activities in response to these contextual factors. In the case of Tadafalte, the villagers filed a lawsuit against the people in the Saghro Mountains to stop their agricultural activities. To understand the actions taken by an organisation, one has to know something about the organisation's context and the problems it poses in obtaining scarce resources. To express the dialectic between the organisation and its context, Pfeffer and Salancik state in their study:

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<sup>9</sup> The determination of what is scarce is itself open to debate because it depends on the situation, on what people believe is scarce for the moment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 259).

<sup>10</sup> Pfeffer and Salancik give as example an abbey. This institution was designed to be virtually self-sufficient. However, abbeys were peopled by people, and humans are mortal. This meant that new members had to be recruited from the outside, which required the organisation to maintain relations with sources of recruits (for example, families and prisons) (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 2).

<sup>11</sup> Pasture land means land that only is used to pasture the sheep of the nomads. In the old days, this happened frequently. Because fewer nomads exist today, this does not happen much anymore. For more information, see chapter 2.3.

*“What happens in an organisation is not only a function of the organisation, its structure, its leadership, its procedure, or its goals. What happens is also consequence of the context and the particular contingencies and constraints deriving from that context (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 3).”*

The organisation has two options to survive in its context: making internal adjustments, or dealing with and managing the context. To carry out one of the two options members of the organisation must, first, understand the effects of the context on organisations and the effect of organisations on their context. Second, one has to determine the degree of dependency of the organisation on the context (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 3/4/256).

To understand the effects of the context on organisations and the effect of organisations on their contexts, Pfeffer and Salancik provided in their study three concepts as tools to bring more coherence to the interaction between the two. These three concepts are: organisation effectiveness, organisation context, and constraints. The effectiveness of an organisation is in its ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions in order to meet the demands of the various groups and organisations concerned with its activities. Organisation effectiveness is, thus, an external standard, but the concept does not imply that the organisation is at the mercy of its context. An organisation is able to manipulate, influence and create acceptability for itself and its activities (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 10/12).

The concept of organisation context covers any event in the world which has any effect on the activities and outcomes of the organisation. The effect can only be measured changes in the organisation structure. For example, the French Protectorate (1912-1956) caused a new governmental structure in Morocco, which had effect on all levels of the Moroccan society. An organisation can respond in two different ways on an event, because not every event has the same impact on organisations. First, the organisation does not respond to or is affected by the event because the organisation is buffered or isolated from certain elements in the context. The second way organisations can react to an event is that it does not notice the event. It does not notice the event due to a safety device, which is built in the organisation throughout the years. The safety device is meant to protect the internal operations of the organisation from external influences. The safety device of the organisation functions by means of systems for gathering, screening, selecting, and retaining information (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 12-14). For instance, to be prepared for sudden changes the traditional village council in Tadafalte maintains contact with several government institutions (Fieldwork 1999).

Constraints is the third concept. This concept is important for understanding organisation-context relationships. Constraints are mainly found in the domain of behaviour because behaviour is influenced by personal preferences, and physical or cognitive abilities. Also, groups are affected by constraints. The interest of others, mostly larger social units, governments, religion, and competitors can assert great influence on individuals' actions. No individual is free from constraints, not even a leader or a highly placed person. Thus constraints effect the individual's actions as use as on the relation of organisation and context (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 14-16).

To determine the degree of dependency of the organisation on the context, three factors are critical: (1) The importance of the resource, and the extent to which the organisation requires it for continued operation and survival. (2) The extent to which the interested groups have discretion over the resources' allocation and use. (3) The availability of other alternatives or the interested group's control over the resource. By knowing the degree of dependency, the organisation can more or less reduce its uncertainty over the resources, which are important for the survival of the organisation. This way, the attempt of the organisation to satisfy the demands of a certain group, can be seen as a function of the dependency of the organisation on that group. The dependency function is related to other groups and the extent to which the demands of different groups conflict with each other (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 45, Pröpper 1993: 258).

The section above shows that the actions between people, groups or organisations determine or create the organisation outcome. The actions of these participants are all aimed at the allocation of the resources resulting, most of the time, in asymmetrical relationships. The relationship is asymmetrical because both persons are dependent on each other for the outcome. The result of interdependency is that nothing comes out quite the way one wants it to. For example, corruption is only possible when both parties agree with the conditions of the corruption. It appears like if one is the powerful party in the relationship but it all depends on the activities contributed by each. One person is more easily influenced than another person is by a corrupt officer for example. The first person will probably pay more slush money than the less easily influenced person will (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 40/41).

In the asymmetrical relationship Pfeffer and Salancik distinguish between symbiotic relationship and competitive relationship. In symbiotic interdependency, the output of one organisation is the input of the other. The input can have negative or positive effects for one, or for both organisations. The use of a water pump seems<sup>12</sup> like a positive thing for the owner of the water pump (more water, better harvest), but it can have a negative side-effect for landowners, who own land near the water pump (less water, worse harvest). The competitive relationship can be seen in the light of a game model. Two or more organisations depend on the same resources, and they will compete over these resources with each other. Interdependence can thus be an important concept for an organisation, because it creates possibilities for achieving the desired outcomes. With interdependency, processes of power on one hand, and processes of meaning systems on the other, are inextricably connected (Lammers 1994: 198-201, Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 40-42).

Pfeffer and Salancik explain mainly the processes of forming power and meaning systems in relation to scarce resource and to diminish uncertainty. This is a limited perspective according to Pröpper (see introduction). There are more factors at play, which determine the development of an organisation. Certain elements in an organisation can be determined by events, which happened a long time ago. However, if organisations underwent the same event, why do differ organisations so much? Which aspects of the event or of the organisation cause this difference? And why is a certain event more or less important for the existence of an organisation than for another organisation? In other words, Pfeffer and Salancik explain the existence of an organisation in too limited a manner while certain events, like the invasion of the Arabs, also cause changes in the context and the structure of organisations on local, national and global levels. Moreover, each organisation will react differently to these changes: one village could become more religious than the other (Pröpper 1993: 271/272). A theory that deals with the impact of (historical) events on relations between human beings (but not explained in terms of scarce resources) is the configuration perspective of Elias, which will be explained, in the next paragraph.

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<sup>12</sup> One does not know exactly the long-term effects of the use of water pumps.

## 1.2. Elias' Configuration Perspective

As I mentioned in the previous paragraph, Pfeffer and Salancik's resource dependency perspective is too limited to understand the current complex situation of Tadafalte's social organisation because it takes no historical events into account. By knowing the historical events and their influences on the organisation, one can better understand the functioning of Tadafalte's present organisation. Related to the case, the ancestors of the Tadafalte's inhabitants decided to settle down under certain circumstances on this particular spot: but what were the motives to settle there? Did they wage war about this piece of land or did they have a mutually dependent relationship with another ethnic group in the valley? And during that time, did every village in the valley found their social organisation with the same objective? Elias believes that changes are the result of changes in social bonds, the so-called figurations, which human beings form with each other. If one does not accept this starting point, the fact is ignored that individuals are mutually dependent. This mutual dependency is caused by the simple fact that people have to live with each other. Through this, they exercise influences on each other, and eventually, the mutual influencing can change the individuals' situation in which the individuals are situated. For example, people would never have accepted Islam as their main religion, if it did not fit in with their habits, their convictions and their perception of identity (Obdeijn *et. al* 1999: 167). Thus, Elias creates with his sociogenetic and historical perspective, a synthesis between society, individual, the psychological and the cultural (Bax 1993: 48).

Individual and society are aspects of men who belong together. Together with others, people form structures and what is more, those structures can influence the actions of the people in question. Therefore, these two interconnected elements should not be separated analytically or given different emphasis. In order to break away from this thinking, Elias introduces the concept of configurations, or figurations. He argues that human figurations are pluralities of interdependent people who are linked to each other in numerous ways, which the people realise partially at best. As the author says: '*Individuals always come in figurations and figurations are always formed by individuals*' (Elias and Dunning 1966: 396/397 in Bax 1978: 221-223).

The term configuration is a core concept in the Elias' perspective and it serves as a simple conceptual tool. This conceptual tool indicates that people are connected to, and have relations with each other by means of power- and dependency-relations. The mutual dependency results in behaviours being geared to one another. For example, a person can take a powerful position in a network, but he or she can only take it because the people allow him to do so (Bax 1993: 50).

By introducing the concept of figuration, Elias also makes clear that a network is no thing that exists independently from the individual who compromise it, nor can it be used as an explanatory factor for a person's actions. For example, the actions, conflicts and communication between people cause continuous changes in the configurations. Configurations are thus in a constant flux. These changes must be understood as a relatively autonomous and purposeless –but nevertheless structured- developmental process. The structure of its change is relatively independent of the members' objectives (Bax 1978: 223, Bax 1995: 116/117).

As said before, the main causes of the constant flux are the power balance between people on the one hand and the process of meaning systems on the other. These two processes form the network-structure. Most configurations are interconnected with larger ones, which each follow their own courses, relatively independent of the objectives of its members. The pressure of the larger configuration can be very high for the smaller ones. One has to follow orders or carry out work of the larger configuration, and those are not always in agreement with the actions of the smaller configuration (Bax 1993: 49-51).

When a configuration is small and simple, like in the time of Tadafalte's foundation, the chains of interdependencies are relatively short and not complicated. Often the control is carried out by a few powerful persons -the traditional village council of Tadafalte- which have control over a small area characterised with a few constants, such as who is in charge, or who can declare war. In that time, the inhabitants of Tadafalte had no government that interfered in their business; only the traditional village council had control over them. In general, this causes an unequal power balance. The few powerful acts, as they can only be understood in relation to the figuration in which they are entangled. This means power is relative matter. It is not something a person owns, in the same way one can owns land or possess water which is one possession until it is sold and become the possession of someone else. For that reason, the power balances are in a constant flux (Bax 1993: 49-51).

Elias explains this process on the basis of the process of state formation and structure development in Western Europe<sup>13</sup>. Since the Middle Ages, state formation in Western Europe has had a certain regularity, structure and development in a specific direction. The consequence was that more and more people became more dependent on each other in economic, social, and on other ways. The more mutual dependency relations between human beings caused enlargement and complication of the length of the network, the chains of mutual dependency, and reduced the power differences between people. The result was that people have been forced to be considerate of each other and keep their own emotions, such as rage or tendencies towards violence, under control. This external social constraint has gradually become virtually

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<sup>13</sup> See Bax 1993: 49/59, Bax 1995:116, Goudsblom & Mennell 1998: 39-50 for more information.

automatic. In Elias' conception the automatism is an ongoing process that always manifests itself on a plurality of life-terrain's and on all kind of levels in society (Bax 1988: 49-59, Bax 1995: xviii, 116, Goudsblom & Mennell 1998: 39-50).

Although this ongoing process has a certain direction and structure, no single external or internal factor can be the only isolated cause for changes in situations. A constant dynamic is present due to the fact that people form configurations together and influence each other. Changes are the result of this dynamic, but they cannot be predicted. This means that the configurations of the organisation of water in Tadafalte can change due to one move, for example the purchase of water pumps. Every movement is determined by a previous one. It is important to realise that with each move the configurations change. The moves of the different individuals interweave and the end result therefore cannot be explained by noting at the behaviour of one person only. In other words: no single or small groups of individuals are responsible for the structure that comes into existence, but many people are (Bax 1993: 50-51, Elias 1970).

To understand the consequences of the people's moves and their development process, Elias uses a deeper time perspective. This way, one can analyse the development process of a configuration. In case of the development process of the state, the process is characterised by reduction or loss of relative autonomy at the lower level (loss of duties) on one side. On the other, this process is characterised by concentration of functions and authorities (centralisation) as well as the surfacing of the function differentiation at a higher level (Bax 1993: 49-52). One move on a higher level often has consequences for the freedom of movement at a lower level, because in configurations, power and dependency relations are present. These processes determine the process of state formation. The same processes happen also in a religious regime<sup>14</sup>, only their thought is legitimated and propagated by religious specialists. The concept regime implicates the formulation of ideology and the creation of strategies and tactics. Regime is furthermore an open concept, which means it can be applied on several levels of societal integration. This opens a certain perspective, because religious regimes and secular regimes, states, show remarkable similarities. Both regimes fulfil important functions on the field of organisation and orientation, and they carry out a policy that is aimed at '*nation building*' and '*community building*'. In addition, both regimes have an organisation structure, which aims to control 'on the inside' and a defend 'from the outside'. In other words: both religious regimes as secular regimes are confronted with problems of internal cohesion and external confrontation.

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<sup>14</sup> The term regime is used to indicate configurations of human beings linked to each other in terms of control and dependency. This term makes the usual distinction between individual and community superfluous (Bax 1993: 10-11, Bax 1995: xvi).



They will both try to solve the problems by attracting and monopolising a variety of sources of power (Bax 1993: 60-61).

One can illustrate the network of relations of the organisation of water in Tadafalte as a regime situated in the Todgha valley. The regime of Tadafalte can be understood as a complex of configurations in which power is fragmented and dispersed over many individuals. Therefore, one has to include all participants of Tadafalte's regime related to water management, because they form and are part of this regime. It is thus necessary to gain a complete understanding of the regime of Tadafalte as a relatively autonomous developmental process. By using the metaphor of a game for people forming configurations, the intertwining connections and the webs of relationships can be viewed in isolation and become understandable. The game model is a didactic model to make the study of societies easier and accessible to scientific reflection. The primary purpose of the game model is to facilitate a reorientation of our powers of imagination and conceptualisation. According to Elias, the game is the result of the interweaving moves of a number of players, or teams who compete with each other. The teams are the different figurations people forms with each other on religious, economical, social or political grounds. A player consists of people forming configurations based on a more or less formalised and institutionalised constellation of dependency relations. These figurations should not be seen as fixed structures because all the moves the team or player make are anything but independent of each other (Elias 1970: 71-76).

In a game analysis, perceptions and actions of players cannot be viewed independently from each other because balances of power are an integral element in all human relationships, not just in relations between states. The power of a player is called in terms of the 'relative strength of the player' because a player's strength varies in relation to his opponent's. This also applies for power and many other sociological issues. The game model can make the sociological problems more graspable although when one assumes that social reality is the consequence of the interweaving movements of many people, it is also understandable why it is often almost impossible to locate the starting point of a certain direction of a certain developments. In the same way that a game is a constant flux, a configuration is. In other words, a game is not determined by one single player, but has a relatively autonomous development. In the *case-study*, Tadafalte's regime cannot be viewed separately from other players. Players who are related to the organisation of Tadafalte in one way or another and are each characterised by processes and developments (Elias 1970: 71-76).

## Chapter Summary


There are always people who want to get property of scarce resources, like water. Some people will obtain the source, others not. Such situations contribute to unequal power relations and conflicts. The consequence of unequal relations is that people will compete with each other and will search for social ties to help realise their goals. The competition causes movements and changes between the social relations of the different participants, which can be an organisation, an individual or a group, affected by the scarce resource (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). According to Tennekes (1995), social relations together form an organisation, which is constructed consciously in order to realise certain objectives. An organisation can be approached from two different viewpoints: the organisation-as-life-world (the human actions) and the organisation-as-system (the organisation structure). The organisation structure and the actions of the members of the organisation are constantly interacting with each other to realise the set objectives. Eventually, the interaction results in tensions. To reduce the tensions and to accomplish the set objectives, the members of an organisation will generally try to readjust their policy to their (changed) views or to the current demands (Tennekes 1995).

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view not internal adjustments of an organisation as result from changed social relations as explanation for changes in organisations. They state that in organisations, there are processes of mutual influencing, and dependency relations between the organisation and its context, considering their resource-dependency perspective on organisations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) define an organisation as a coalition of groups and interests, which sometimes can be contradictory. All interests of the different participants are aimed at acquiring the scarce resources with which the organisation can survive in its context. The influence of the organisation context is as important as the influence of the organisation on the context since both can try to control, influence and even manipulate the situation through different means in order to gain the scarce resource (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).


In addition, to acquire the scarce resources, there are other influences on an organisation and its context, such as a country's history, politics and religion. These factors can also play major roles in the performance of an organisation. This is not surprising because people have relations with others in order to guarantee or improve one's own moral, social and psychological progress. Out of these social relations develop social forms, which have clearly described structural features. But humans keep on interacting with each other, which results into changes in the social forms. Elias' figuration-perspective states that the social forms result in mutual dependency. In dependency-relations, processes of power and systems of meaning are central, causing networks of interdependencies among individuals, which change constantly. To know how the figuration, the relations between different individuals and groups, function

today, one has to trace changes and situations, which had influence on the relations in question of the former days (Bax 1988).

By using the metaphor of a game for people forming figurations, the relations, related to the *case-study*, can be viewed as a complex and dynamic 'game' in which many different players, perceptions, objectives and means are present. The different players also act on different levels (micro, meso, and macro), which all stimulate the dynamic of the 'game'. In addition, each player is characterised by previous processes and developments. By using the game analysis, the intertwining connections and the webs of relationships of a player can be viewed in isolation and become understandable. In other words, it is necessary to include all players who are related in any kind of way to Tadafalte's organisation of water (Elias 1970: 70-76). Before I outline the different players, who are connected to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, I will deal first with some specific features of the research site, the Todgha valley, and Morocco in general.



Map 2.1. The map of Morocco  
 Source: Lentjes (1995).



Map 1.2. The Map of the Todgha valley

## Chapter 2

# Morocco and the Todgha Valley

*I keep getting amazed that this country (Morocco) is so beautiful and contradictory at the same time, really unbelievable...Rabat is such a modern (Western) city in contrast to the 'exotic' city Marrakech where snake charmers still perform on the Place Jamaa el Fna (a huge square in the old part of Marrakech). The Ourika valley, which I visited today, is so strikingly different from the Todgha valley. At the Ourika valley, water is in abundance and causes floods everywhere the eye can see while at the Todgha valley water is scarce and one has to use it carefully. For me, this all seems odd and contradictory but it also makes the country so attractive to me (Personal diary C. Otte, 28-2-99).*

### 2.0. Introduction

The above personal experience makes clear that the physical environment and the social economic inequality<sup>15</sup> in Morocco are divergent. The divergence in Morocco is not without reason. For example, physical geographic elements, the ethnic composition and historical facts can determine the way a country, a region or a village has developed throughout the years. Related to the *case-study*, these factors should have influenced, and can still influence the social relations between the different 'players' related to Tadafalte's organisation of water. For this reason, this chapter looks at the events through the social relations between the different 'players' related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte have evolved. In other words: the context of the social relations related to Tadafalte's organisation of water is discussed in the view of my theoretical framework. This chapter is viewed predominantly from Elias' configuration perspective (1970) because he states that by knowing the historical events and their influence on the organisation, one can understand better the functioning of Tadafalte's present organisation of water.

Before I lay out the present and historical situation of the research site, I first want to make some preliminary remarks about Morocco. This way, one gains an idea of the current

situation in this country. The short description shows the great differences Morocco offers. I assume the differences are the result of historical events, which also had effect on the organisation of water in Tadafalte. After a short description of Morocco, I want to make some explicit remarks about the Todgha valley, to understand the setting of the research site and so that one can picture where the Todgha valley is situated in Morocco. Then, the physical data of the Todgha valley is presented to understand the essence of water in this region. In addition, in this paragraph, the traditional irrigation system, the *khettara*, which is used in the Todgha valley, is explained. This way, one can understand the technical aspects of this irrigation system and its value for obtaining water in these areas. These sections are followed by a summary about the inhabitants of the valley and their interrelations in paragraph 2.3.. This paragraph makes clear the effect of the presence of three different ethnic groups in the Todgha valley on the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

In paragraph 2.4., the political and economic history of oases settlements, specifically aimed at water management in the Todgha valley, is outlined. According to Elias' perspective, historical events have shaped lasting features on the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Also, in this paragraph, the current administrative situation is described so as to clarify the influence of the present government institutions -the other 'players'- on the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Some government institutions interfere in an indirect way in the organisation of water in Tadafalte, although this is outside their jurisdiction. Despite this, these government organisations are confronted with the problems the related issues of water and land can cause between villages in the Todgha valley. This matter is taken seriously by the institutions. In addition, during the fieldwork it appeared that a connection existed between the different institutions and the players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. For this reason, the government institutions are also included in this thesis. Chapter two ends with a conclusion.

## 2.1. Morocco in general

*'Morocco seems like a tree that with its nourishing roots is reaching deep into African ground and with its leaves is taking breath in the wind blowing from Europe.'* This pronouncement of late King Hassan makes clear Morocco has undergone and still undergoes influences from different regions. The main cause Morocco undergoes so many influences is that many people from Morocco and from other African countries try to cross over the Strait of Gibraltar, which separate the country from Europe. In general, these people try to search to the richness of

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<sup>15</sup> Social economic inequality is defined when the differences of influences, status and prosperity are the consequences of societal structures with a durable character. The differences can lead to unequal access to the (natural) resources of a country for individuals and groups (Lentjes & de Mas 1990: 6).

Europe, which Europe is known for in Morocco (Lentjes 1995: 55/56). The influences of the passing people is manifested in for example the existence of different ethnic groups, many (Moroccan) migrants, different dialect-languages and many distinctions between the urban regions and rural regions in Morocco today. One can also say: '*Morocco is the closest of all African Countries to Europe*' (Background notes Oct 1978, Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 12,14).

Over time, the borders of Morocco changed many times as a consequence of wars. Today, the borders of Morocco are clear: It lies on the north-west corner of Africa, with nearly 1,950 kilometres of coastline on the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Its neighbours are Algeria and, if one approves the annexation of the Western Sahara, Mauritania. Topographically, Morocco is divided into open, agriculturally plain area in the north-west and economically poor mountains and plateaus in the eastern and southern regions. The coastal plateau is the most densely populated, economically advanced *and* arabized part of Morocco. In this part of the country the government lays in one of the major cities, which are nearly all located in this region. At the other side of the Atlas, in the eastern and southern regions, the population is sparse and concentrated on scattered oases along the Todgha and the Drâa Rivers for example. Many people migrate from this region due to hidden unemployment, big social and economic inequality and a rise in population. Cities like Casablanca and foreign countries like France have major appeal to the rural population. These factors are the reason that the majority of the population lives west of the Atlas Mountains (Background Notes Oct 1978, Lentjes & de Mas 1990: 15, 38).

Morocco has a population of more than 30 million (July 1997 est.). Of this number, almost 60 percent is between the ages of 15 and 64 years, persons who can be economically active in Morocco. About 50 percent of the population work in agriculture, the others are employed in industry's or in the service sector. The population growth rate was 2.02 percent in 1997. This year, about -1.08 of the 1000 people migrated to other countries, like France and Holland ([www.morocco.com/facts/population.html](http://www.morocco.com/facts/population.html) 13-5-00).

The main ethnic groups are the Arabs and the Berbers, which constitute 99.1 percent of the population. Other ethnic groups are Jews (0.2%), French and others (0.7%). Most inhabitants of Morocco are Muslim (98.7%), only a small percentage is Christian (1.1%) or Jewish (0.2%) ([www.morocco.com/facts/population.html](http://www.morocco.com/facts/population.html) 13-5-00). The official language is Arabic, and French is often the language of business, government and diplomacy. Although the principal language is Arabic, Berber dialect is spoken widely in rural areas. One suspects that over 40 percent of the population speak the Berber dialect, which is strikingly different from the Arabic language. The ethnic group Berbers see themselves as the original inhabitants of Morocco. According to them, the Arabs are just 'visiting' Morocco (Fieldwork Diary February 24th 1999).

In the field, one could feel the negative feelings towards the Arabs strongly. One of the reasons for these negative feelings towards Arabs is due to the fact that Arabs fulfil most functions in the government sector (Fieldwork Diary February 24th 1999). In addition, the Berber dialect is also sub-divided into three dialects, namely Tadhelhit, Tamazirht and Zonatiy ([www.morocco.com/facts/population.html](http://www.morocco.com/facts/population.html) 13-5-00, Lentjes 1995: 7). The dialect is one of the features causing divisions in the social ethnic group Berbers. It so happens that the Berber population is a segmental society<sup>16</sup>, which means that the Berber population is divided into many groups, each with a co-operative character. Under certain conditions, the groups can work together or become each other's enemies (Claessens 1974: 81).

Morocco is ruled by the King. The King is the Head of State. In addition, he is the religious leader of Morocco, and as a result his influences extend over many areas. One of his duties is to appoint the Prime minister and the Cabinet. The Parliament consists of 264 members, which are elected to 4-year-term. Seven principal political parties are allowed in Morocco. The other parties are excluded for participation in parliament. One of these parties is the Istiqlal Party, the largest political party in parliament. For administrative purposes, Morocco is divided into 16 administrative provinces, sub-divided into 65 regions. Each province is headed by a Governor appointed by the King ([www.morocco.com/facts/govern.html](http://www.morocco.com/facts/govern.html) 13-5-00, Background notes Oct. 1978).

According to Elias, the described present situation in Morocco can be seen as a secular regime (states). A secular regime is characterised by many configurations. In this case, the configurations are for instance, the ethnic group of Berbers, the group of peasants, or the people who live on the economically advanced plateau in the north-west of Morocco. These configurations determine the process of state formation in Morocco. The process of state formation is confronted by problems of internal cohesion, like the migration of the people from the South due to the bad circumstance there. Through a centralist government structure, the King of Morocco and his government try to control the problems.

The phosphates industries are Morocco's most important asset because the country has over 70 percent of the world's proven phosphate deposits. Phosphate is Morocco's major export product. Other export products are confection, fertilisers, fish and vegetables. Unfortunately the profit from exports does not exceed the costs of the imports (1993). Goods like consumption goods, investment goods, half products and raw materials have to be imported into Morocco (Lentjes 1995: 74).

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<sup>16</sup> According to definition of Claessens segmentation means that the tribe is divided and sub-divided over and over again until the division reached the family-units. The Berber is more an ethnic group but show some similarities with this definition. For more information, see Claessens (1974) *Politieke Antropologie*, p. 80-83.



One of the weak features of the country's economy is that so many people are dependent on agriculture. In 1995, Morocco had a negative economic growth because of the failure of the harvest, while in the years before, the economic growth was positive<sup>17</sup>. The main reason is that the agriculture is dependent on rainfall. Another disadvantage of the agricultural sector is that the majority of the population still works at small, family (self-sustainable) farms. These farms do not apply modern techniques, but most of the time use primitive methods of cultivation. The consequence of these methods is that they are time-consuming and have low yields (Lentjes 1995: 37-43). The primitive methods of cultivation are mostly used in rural regions, like the Todgha valley, where the conditions are not present to apply modern techniques. To understand the physical, social, and economic-political conditions, the Todgha valley and its specific characteristics is presented in the next paragraph.

## 2.2. The Todgha Valley

*The surroundings of the Todgha valley are very beautiful. In the beginning I thought 'Is this the place where I have to hang out for four months? Oh no.' But now after two tours with Hein, everything is amazing. I am so impressed how the local people can cultivate their land with so little water. The river is not as big as I thought. I imagined that the size of the river should be the same as a river in Holland, but nothing about this is true. The river is much smaller but it is used so effectively that many agricultural products can grow (Personal Diary C. Otte, 8-2-1999).*

The Todgha valley region is located in the administrative Province Ouarzazate, in Southern Morocco. Today, the valley is divided into four districts, one urban, Tinghir, and three rural regions, Todgha El Oulya, Todgha Soufla and Taghzoute. The rural regions are controlled by the *caïd*. The *pasha* manages the urban region. In 2000, the Todgha Valley contains 64 villages, inhabited by approximately 70,000 inhabitants. The valley is home to three ethnic groups: predominantly the ethnic group Ahl Todgha lives at the upper reaches of the valley, the Ahl El Hart inhabit two villages, El Hart Mrabtin and Niaamine, in the middle of the valley, and the tribe Aït Atta occupies the lower reaches of the valley (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 3, Fieldwork, File Diary February 10th 1999).

The valley's chief town is Tinghir, which is located 169 km east of Ouarzazate and 162 km west of Errachidia. This means that the Todgha valley is situated between Morocco's main oases regions, the Draâ and the Tafilalt. The course of the Todgha winds for about forty kilometres through a mostly dry riverbed and has an average width of one kilometre.

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<sup>17</sup> In the years '70-'80 the economic growth was 5.6%, between '80-'93 the economic growth was 3,7%, and in 1994 it was 11% (Lentjes 1995: 74).

The Todgha river, which originates in the High Atlas, starts running aboveground in the magnificent gorge. The gorge is the narrowest point of the valley where the Todgha starts, surrounded by rocky faces, which can reach a height of 300 meter above the riverbed. From this point, the Todgha flows through the valley. Until Tinghir, the valley is relative small, which leads to two opposite implications. On one hand, not much land in this part of the valley is available to cultivate products. On the other hand, the people who live in this part of the valley have first access to water from the river. Therefore, water in this part of the valley is not the main source of conflict; land is<sup>18</sup>. After the Todgha river passes Tinghir, the flow of water decreases and more land is available: the valley becomes wider. From this point, the local population makes more use of the traditional irrigation system, the *khattara*. With this ancient system, one can tap underground water so as to irrigate the fields (a detailed explanation of this system follows in paragraph 2.3.). In other words: at the upper reaches of the valley one can find more water than at the lower reaches of the valley. This fact determined the relations between the different ethnic groups in the past (El Ghanjou & De Haas 2000: 2, Steinmann 1993b: 109-112). Through one of the three group gained direct access to the scarce resource water in the valley, dependency relations between the three ethnic groups were created. Pfeffer and Salancik call these relations 'competitive relationships'. Two or more organisations, in this case three ethnic group, compete over the same resource, upon which they all depend.

Despite semi-arid conditions, agriculture is possible in the valley. In general, a semi-arid climate possesses the next characteristics: a short rainy season, scattered intensive rain fall with unexpected aridity, in the summer high temperatures, and a high degree of variation during the rainy season (Hudson 1987: 7). Therefore, the availability of water is a daily problem in oasis settlements. In summertime, it can even prevent agricultural activities (Lentjes 1981: 9). As Aït-Hamza puts it: *Les impératifs naturels sont les plus déterminants de la vie économique au Maroc présaharien* (Fieldwork, File Articles Aït Hamza (a): 164). Thus, traditional oasis agriculture has a labour-intensive character and the natural oasis condition determines the economic life. The agriculture is predominantly aimed to optimise the scarce natural resources of the area, like water. The scarcity explains that water as well as the soil are people's private possession because for a peasant in a semi-arid climate, access to water is of vital importance. The matter of life or death around water created the complex system of water rights in the past (de Haas 1999: 1, Lentjes 1990: 17).

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<sup>18</sup> In the field, I was told the price of land in this part of the valley can be higher then the price of land in the lower part of the valley (Fieldwork, File Diary February 12th 1999).



Plate 2.1. The Todgha river at the upper part of the valley



Plate 2.2. The dry river bed of the Todgha at the downstream of the valley



Plate 2.3. Agriculture in the Todgha valley, at the background the High Atlas Mountain range



Plate 2.4. The old *qsar* of Tabsabest

As in other oases, the growth of the population, the inheritance system according to Islamic laws<sup>19</sup> and the natural borders (like a mountain or no water) of the countryside worsened the poor situation of the peasants. Most inhabitants of the valley, as in other oases, possess only small pieces of land as a consequence of the previously named factors. On average, peasants in oases own 0,5 hectare of land, often-scattered (CMV 1996, Fieldwork, File Articles Aït-Hamza (b) : 74). Especially in the past, water and land were a source of conflict between different ethnic groups in oasis settlements, as in the Todgha valley. To prevent the conflicts, one tried to lay down the division of water. The division of water resulted mostly in dependency relations (Hoffman 1967: 40/41, Fieldwork, File Articles Ouhajou (d): 98-100). Today, the conflicts are not so public and aggressive anymore, but the age-old feeling for dominance can still come up very quickly and can even result in violent conflicts, as happened between Tadafalte and El Hart in 1998<sup>20</sup> (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999<sup>21</sup>). This situation shows that, in Elias' view, historical events still play a role in the lives of the players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The result of such events is a structural feature, the age-old feelings between the two villages, in social relations.

In the Todgha valley, the cultivation of agricultural products like alfalfa, almonds, wheat and corn are dependent on two water sources: the Todgha river and the groundwater-table. Both sources are dependent on the amount of melt water from the High Atlas (Steinmann 1993b: 109). These two sources are used to irrigate land, and in some cases, as of drinking water. The water of the Todgha river can be used through means of small irrigation channels. Especially in the upper reaches of the Todgha valley one can use the river's water. In general, inhabitants of the upper reaches have more say in the division because these villages can prevent it flowing to the villages of the lower part of the valley. In other words: *'la prioritie de l'amont sur l'aval'*. To prevent conflicts over the water in the past, the following situation happened in nearly all oasis settlements. First, the water was divided on the valley-level, then it was divided between the villages, which divided it among the families who lived there (Fieldwork, File Articles Aït-Hamza (b) : 77-82). This system still functions in many oasis surroundings.

In the Todgha valley, the following division of water is created throughout the years. The ethnic group Ahl Todgha in the upper reaches of the Todgha valley has divided the river water among the villages. The division usually depends on the size of the village and the dependency relations over water. El Hart Mrabtin and Niaamine are the last villages where one

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<sup>19</sup> The Islamic law proclaims that every child inherits an equal plot of land after the death of its father. (Lentjes 1990: 18)

<sup>20</sup> See for more information about this conflict paragraph 2.5..

<sup>21</sup> See chapter for more information over the conflict between inhabitants of Tadafalte and El Hart Niaamine.

can make use of the river as water source. These villages are only allowed to use the river during the winter when more water is available as a result of lower temperatures, low evaporation rate and more precipitation in the High Atlas. In summer, the villages have to utilise, like all other villages in the lower reaches of the valley, the traditional irrigation systems, the *khattara* (Büchner 1986: 82/83, Fieldwork File Diary February 12th 1999). The competitive relationship between the three ethnic groups in the valley in Pfeffer and Salancik's view changed into a symbiotic relationship. In a symbiotic relationship, the output of one organisation is the input of the other. In this case, the villages of upper parts of the valley have more access to water than the middle part of the valley. The say of the upper villages over water can have negative or positive effect on the water supply for the villages situated in the middle of the valley. The next case shows a negative effect of a decision, the output, made by the villages at the upper part of the valley, which could have happened had a third party not interfered in the matter.

*According to my respondents, several years ago a conflict happened between the inhabitants of two villages, El Hart Mrabtin and Niaamine, and the people of the villages of the upper part of the valley. The last mentioned people did not want to pass the river water to the two villages anymore. They gave as reason that the flood of river water was disappearing. The inhabitants of El Hart Mrabtin and Niaamine were so furious about the cut off that they complained publicly at the caid's office. Because of the public confrontation with the administrator, the caid had to interfere, otherwise he would let the ethnic groups solve the problem internally (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999).*

This incident demonstrates the power of the villages in the water-abundant part of valley. If there had been no third party -the *caid*- the villagers of El Hart Niaamine and Mrabtin probably would have no access to the river water anymore during winter. In Elias' view, the interfering player, the *caid*, is in the Todgha valley present through the enlargement of the configurations in the Todgha valley throughout the years (see chapter 2.5. for more details).

Apart from the use of the river water and the *khattara* as irrigation water, some inhabitants of the valley are fortunate to possess water pumps. The water pump is mostly a supplement to the other sources of water. Since 1972 the water pump has made its entry in the valley and its numbers increased to 1600 according to employers of the CMV (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999). The entry of the water pump is a clear indication that the Todgha Valley is becoming more integrated in the national and international economic systems.

The valley has never really been disconnected from other places because, according to my respondents and other sources (Büchner 1986, Steinmann 1993a, El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000), an important caravan route passed through the valley in the past. However, throughout the years the inhabitants came (uninvited or invited) more and more in contact with other regions and countries. Eventually, people decided to migrate to the economically attractive cities, like Casablanca, and to foreign countries such as France (Fieldwork 1999, El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 2/3). In Elias' view, the configuration of the Todgha valley changed from a small and simple configuration, with only the relations between the three ethnic groups and some interference of the caravan route, into a bigger and more complicated configuration, which even has ties to foreign countries. Through the contact with the outside world, which introduced money, money became an important means in oasis settlements because one could buy things with it. Without money, one could not buy much and was dependable on the yields of agriculture (Moujahid 1992: 387/388).

The attraction and importance of money is specifically noticeable in the young people who want to migrate to Europe to earn it. Naturally, the poor economic situation and the high unemployment figures contribute to the attraction of Europe. This is demonstrated by the next case. One of the respondents preferred working in Europe to studying at the University, while his family wanted him to go to University. He believed that, in Europe he would make a lot of money so he could buy a car. If he stayed in Morocco, he would gain nothing: he would only sit under a palm tree in his village, penniless (Fieldwork, File Diary April 1999). The consequences of the presence of many migrants in the valley is more people migrate to other villages or countries, leaving behind their own. The migrants often invest in the valley, mostly in Tinghir but also in their native villages. They invest for example in a new house or a small shop. People from other regions are attracted by the investments of the migrants because they can come to work and earn money in Tinghir. These people earn wages, by working for example as construction workers, and again more buying power by which the small shop keeper profit from the investment of the migrant. This process is also called the 'multiplier' effect, what means: more people profit from the investment of one person (El Ghanjou & De Haas 2000: 3, Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

Elias interprets these processes as people forming configurations. Through the configurations influencing each other, a constant dynamic in the configuration of the Todgha valley is present. The migrant's investments -a movement- influence the economic situation in the Todgha valley, resulting eventually in more spending-power by the stay-behinds. The configuration in the Todgha valley is changed due to the previous move of the migrants.

Many processes throughout the years have influenced the current situation in the Todgha valley. One of these processes is the history. Historical events can be determining factors for the current situation in the valley. The history related to water management is outlined in paragraph 2.3. following the physical data of the Todgha valley and the traditional irrigation system, the *khattara*. General information about the differences between the ethnic groups, which are present in the valley and their interrelations, are described in paragraph 2.4.

### 2.3. Physical Data of the Todgha Valley

As mentioned above, in the Todgha valley, the irrigation of land is dependent on two water sources: the Todgha river and the ground water table. The supply of these two water sources is dependent on the High and Middle Atlas Mountains, and the Saghro Mountains. The High and Middle Atlas Mountains divide Morocco into a north-east and a south-east side. On the north-west side of the Atlas, water is abundant. The French considered this side the most useful part of Morocco during their regime (1912-1956). This part of Morocco is characterised by a Mediterranean climate with cool winters and dry, hot summers. The mountains have on average low temperatures and the precipitation is higher than in the surroundings areas. Peaks of the High and Middle Atlas ranges rise to 4165 metres above sea level. Therefore, the Atlas Mountains are a border between the wet and the dry part of Morocco. The dry part of Morocco at the south-east, also called the Saharan slope of the Atlas, is strikingly different. The area's high temperatures and low precipitation rate creates a semi-arid to arid climate, as one can learn from the paragraph above. In countries like Morocco and Algeria, it is difficult to cultivate agricultural products when precipitation is below 300 mm a year (Lentjes & de Mas 1990: 6/7, Steinmann 1993a: 9-11).

Due to the existence of a network of pre-Saharan river systems: the Draâ in the west, the Dadds to the Northwest, the Todgha and the Ghris to the Northeast and the Ziz to the east, people are living at the southern slope of the Atlas (Hart 1981: 4). In the past, the first settlements were formed surrounding these rivers. Water was and is an essential element to survive in these environments. Therefore, people settled near the river, for it was an easy task to obtain water. The peasants usually utilised the surface water of the river for irrigation because this water was supplied continuously. The ethnic group, who gained control over the water source, had the economic superiority in such areas (Fieldwork, File Articles Aït Hamza (b) :74).



The Saghro and Atlas Mountains play a significant role as water source for the river and the groundwater. The Todgha valley is situated between these two mountain ranges which resulted in a Saharan landscape, with a width of several kilometres. The width at the lower reaches of the valley can be on average four kilometres. The beginning of the valley, at the gorge, is situated on a relatively high altitude from 1100 metres to 1420 metres at the end of the valley, Ghallil. On average the ground water and the river water have a fall of one percent throughout the valley (El Harradji 1999). The major part of the valley is used for agriculture through the application of three methods of irrigating: intermittent surface water of the Todgha river, the traditional irrigation system, the *khattara*, and today, the use of a 'modern' technique the 'water pump'. The three methods are dependent on snowmelt from the High Atlas and the Saghro Mountains. These two mountains are the reservoirs of enormous amounts of water, which is a result of precipitation (snow or rain) in the mountains and the calcareous stratum in the soil. The calcareous stratum prevents melt water for sinking deeper into the soil. The groundwater level is at average thirty till forty meters deep. If the groundwater level is deeper, it will not be rewarding to drill for water (Steinmann 1993a: 10-12, Fieldwork, File Diary February 13th 1999).

Each year, the Todgha valley receives on average 144-mm of rain<sup>22</sup>. Unfortunately, precipitation rates fluctuate greatly within one year but also between several years. "Wet" years can turn into extremely dry years. For example, in 1962 and in 1981, the Todgha Valley only received on average 30-mm of rain while, in 1964 and in 1989, there was a rain fall of almost 350-mm. Precipitation usually occurs during winter, predominantly in the late fall and early spring with a dry period during the month of January. Decreased precipitation can significantly affect agricultural production (El Harradji 1999, Steinmann 1993a: 10). With no rain, the groundwater level will fall and then people cannot reach it. Moreover, without water, neither irrigation nor agriculture are possible.

Temperature also affects agricultural production. Particularly during summer, the temperature influences the evaporation rate of the water resources. Temperatures can rise to a maximum of 35 degrees in July. The evaporation rate in summer is extreme compared to winter months. Therefore, the peasant prefers to irrigate his fields during the night, as the evaporation is lower during summer time. According to my respondents and the observation during my stay, during the summer, the groundwater level dropped about five metres which affected the water flow in the traditional irrigation system, the *khattaras* (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

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<sup>22</sup> This average is calculated on the basis of a period of 36 years (1962-1997). The calculations are made by the station of Ait Boujjane (1350 metres) (El Harradji 1999).

Naturally the result is a decreased amount of water for irrigation. As a consequence, fewer plots of land are cultivated. If the harvest fails, the peasants have no income. The next example shows such situation.

*During the drought-ridden 1980's, inhabitants of El Hart Niaamine had to sell land because they could not maintain their fields anymore. The situation had to be extremely bad before a person considered selling his land. Most peasants in the valley were emotionally tied to their land because they obtained it from their grandfathers. Their land was sold without water right to villagers of Tadafalte who had a khattara filled with water. The villagers of El Hart Niaamine sold the land without water right because they needed the water for drinking. At that time, the relations between the two villages were stable, and unlike during my stay. Today, the inhabitants of Tadafalte, who bought land from El Hart, irrigate the land by use of water from their own khattara (Fieldwork, Diary March 9th-16th 1999).*

In short: the availability of and the access to water, and the height of the temperature are determining conditions for agricultural production in the Todgha valley. Pfeffer and Salancik see these determining conditions as the organisation context, which can have different elaboration on the activities and outcome of organisations. The inhabitants at the upper reaches of the valley, who can use the water of the river for irrigation, will be less affected by shortage of rain or snow, then the people who live its lower edges. This means that the villages situated at the upper part of the valley can continue their agricultural activities more easily during hot and dry summers than their counter-parts at the end of the valley.

Nevertheless, water is also the greatest danger for the valley. When it rains, it can come down hard. Then, it is not uncommon that big plots of land are swept away or *khattaras* collapse by the fast-flowing river. The current (dry) riverbeds are no matches for the amounts of water. As a result, the river overflows and erodes pieces of land. By planting trees along the riverside particularly in the upper reaches of the valley, the governmental agricultural organisation CMV (see appendix 3,6 for more information) tried to prevent the erosion. The trees hold the soil together. To prevent the collapse of *khattaras*, they have other solutions: to covering the *khattara* with concrete (Fieldwork, Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV, drawing March 12th 1999). All together, water has two different meanings for the inhabitants of the valley. On one side, people cannot live without water in these areas. On the other side, it can endanger their lives. As a saying goes: "water is good server but a bad master".




Plate 2.5. Brahim Moujane is irrigating his fields



Plate 2.6. The successive of wells of Tadafalte's *khattara*

## 2.4. The Traditional Irrigation System; the *Khettara*

The traditional irrigation system, the *khettara*, was mentioned several times before. The system is used at the lower reaches of the Todgha Valley, and in the village where I carried out my research. A *khettara* is a successive series of wells that reaches the groundwater level. An underground channel connects the water wells. The first wells are drilled for water on the ground water level while the other wells are for the maintenance of the *khettara*. The (covered) channel gradually slopes upward to bring the groundwater to the surface. That way, evaporation is minimised. As the channel reaches the surface, the groundwater flows into the *segui* system. A *segui* system is a network of many irrigation channels, which are called the *souagui*. Each irrigation channel has approximately a measurement of 1 x 1-foot. These small channels run throughout the fields like a maze (Steinmann 1993: 12, Lentjes & De Mas 1990: 17).



Map 2.1. The *khettara*-system

Source: Lentjes & de Mas (1990: 17)

Through the *segui*, the water from the *khettara* finally reaches the plot of land. When it is time to receive the amount of water the peasant is entitled to, he opens the gateway of his plot. After this, he wells a barrier in the *segui* to prevent the water from running. While the water from the *khettara* flows through the *segui* to the plot, the barrier in the *segui* prevents the water from flowing any further. The water turns ninety degrees through the gateway of the plot, and flows to the field for irrigation. The disadvantage of this irrigation method is the loss of water, for a peasant cannot dose the amount of water he needs for his plots. He will not know how much water he will receive for his water right. In addition, water remains in the *segui* after irrigation, which means more loss (Fieldwork, File Diary February 12th 1999).

In the Todgha Valley, the *khettaras* can reach a length of many kilometres and they are an example of the social organisation of villages. In the former days, all inhabitants of the villages helped dig and maintained the wells of the *khettara*. Besides this, the costs of the construction and materials for the *khettara* and *segua* were divided among all villagers. This principle is still present in many villages of the Todgha Valley (Büchner 1986: 84).

## 2.5. Inhabitants of the Valley

*'Don't go climbing on that hill, bad people are living over there.'*

*'What kind of bad people then?'*

*'Black people.'*

*'What is bad about them?'*

*'They want our women'*

*If you want to believe their stories, the black people are cannibals who can pull you by your hair and put you in their big cooking pot's (Personal Diary C. Otte 22-03-1999).*

The above conversation with one of "my" brothers of my host family in Tadafalte makes clear that the relations between the inhabitants of my research village, members of the tribe Aït Atta, and the village nearby, inhabited by a Negroid population, were tense. I was more or less forbidden to talk to these 'Negroid' people. After a while, I heard the real cause behind the negative attitude of Tadafalte's inhabitants towards the Negroid inhabitants of that village. It was not only due to a current conflict but also due to former relations. To understand the present ethnic composition in the valley, and the reason of this conflict, one has to understand the history of the three ethnic groups.

In the Todgha valley, three Berber ethnic groups can be found: the Ahl Todgha, the Aït El Hart and the Aït Atta. The three ethnic groups have distinct cultures, political organisation and historical experiences. The socio-economic and political relations among them were determined, as in other oasis farming systems, by conflicts over the division of land or by control over the available water sources in the valley. This resulted in the three ethnic groups living in different parts of the valley today and a taboo of not intermarrying. Starting from the system-perspective on organisations, Tennekes would mark the taboo as an objective reality of the organisation of the Todgha valley. The similarity between the three groups is that all three speak the Berber dialect Tamazight. In spite of this, tensions between the different groups are continually present, which originated from former relations (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 6, Steinmann 1993a: 10/11).

Today, a hot issue in the valley is the different opinions about which village has the right to former collective undivided land. These contrary opinions with regards to land are based on opposite historical claims. Inhabitants of one village are convinced that a piece of land belongs to them. These villagers claim that they have owned the land since the beginning of this century. Another village disagrees, as the French appointed the land to them (Büchner 1986: 82, Fieldwork, File Interview *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran* 1999). These opposite opinions have an important influence on the present relations between the villages in the valley. It is not uncommon that inhabitants of the different villages do not speak to each other due to these kinds of disagreements. This and other features makes the ethnic composition in the valley complex and makes one wonder which of the three ethnic groups settled in the valley first.

Information about this subject is limited. In addition, local people, originated from the Todgha, gave different answers to my question 'which (ethnic) group was first in the valley?'. The information in this paragraph is mainly derived from authors who have done research in the Todgha valley recently. This way, one can gain an idea of the ethnic composition in the valley and how these relations between the ethnic groups are formed during history. The historical light is important to understand the ethnic composition because the interrelated issues of water and land were, and are the most important sources of conflict in arid environments: who gained control over the sources had economic superiority in the valley (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 6). Each player in the 'water game' in the Todgha valley is characterised by previous processes and developments. Through setting out each player, the relationship between the three groups becomes understandable.

In this paragraph, I will first outline one of the most common legends concerning the origin of the Todgha. Later, the three ethnic groups are reviewed in their probable historically chronological order of arrival in the valley: the Ahl Todgha, the Aït El Hart and finally the Aït Atta's. The paragraph about the Aït Atta is more extensive because all the inhabitants of my research village are descendants of this tribe. Their descendance still has an impact on their current social political organisation. After this paragraph, a paragraph follows about the inter-relations between the three groups. In this manner, one can understand the impact of the past on the current relations between the groups and the effect of these relations on the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

### ***One of the Legends...***

*Once upon time an ancestor called Aâd came to live in the valley. He had two children, a girl, Touda, and a boy, Chedad. Before his death, Aâd divided the greater valley between his children. The upstream part was granted to his daughter and the downstream part to his son. These names were corrupted to become part of the names Tinejda, 'belongs to Chedad', and Todgha, 'belongs to Touda' (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 6).*

### ***The Ahl Todgha***

In the Todgha valley, several centuries ago the ethnic group Ahl Todgha<sup>23</sup> settled in this area where most of the water was present. This part was in the northern half of the valley where the Todgha river originates. The members of this ethnic group gained control of the surface water of the river, gaining economic superiority in the valley. People, who settled in the valley after the Ahl Todgha, were dependent on the water supply of the Ahl Todgha or of the groundwater (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 6). In Elias' view, the player, the ethnic group Ahl Todgha, gained a powerful position through settling at the upper part of the valley, but its powerful position varies in relation to new players.

The exact origin of the Ahl Todgha is not clear, as we know nothing of the early settlements history of the Todgha. The Ahl Todgha does not have a strong group identity like the other two ethnic groups in the valley. Probably their identity is foremost derived from the geographical space they inhabit and defend, and unlike the other ethnic groups in the valley, who refer their identity to a common ancestor. Therefore, one cannot speak of the 'tribe' Ahl Todgha (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 7).

Besides being externally differentiated, the Ahl Todgha are also internal stratified. Each traditional society has certain stratification. The stratification allows the society to function. The group of *shurfas*, descendants of the prophet Mohammed have the most important religious role among the Ahl Todgha although their social role is limited compared to other regions in Morocco. The *shurfas* have functioned as teacher of the Koran, intermediaries in religious affairs as well as *aâdouls*, traditional religious leaders. In the social hierarchy, the group of *mrabtin* is under them. The *mrabtin* are persons who believe they are descendants of the *marabouts*, persons of Berber by birth who also enjoy a religious status. The religious status gives these people religious superiority over other people. After them in the social hierarchy, the 'white' and 'free' Berbers are found, also known as the *Imazirhene*. They are the largest group in the territory of the Ahl Todgha and inhabit almost all villages at the upper part of the valley (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 7).

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<sup>23</sup> Ahl Todgha means literally 'people of the Todgha' (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 6)



The other large group is the 'black' *Iqabline*, who were located at the bottom rung of the social ladder. The common belief is that these people were descendants of former slaves of the 'white' and 'free' Berbers. The distinction between black and white is explicitly made because it is typical for most of Southern Morocco's oases to make a stratification based on skin colour and descent (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 7/8). As a famous Moroccan proverb, cited by Montagne states: '*when an Arab wants a wife, he asks if she can come from a good family: when a Berber wants one, he asks she if she is rich: and when a Haratin wants one he asks if she is white*' (Hart 1981: 213). This indicates there is no question that the black are held to be of inferior status (Hart 1981: 213).

In the villages, the Ahl Todgha are often divided in lineages. Depending on its size, a village can be composed of between two to eight lineages, each, in its turn, composed of several extended family groups. Some ethnic sub-groups of the Ahl Todgha live mixed, which results mostly in adopting the identity of one of the *Imazirhene* lineage. Although they live together, intermarriage remains taboo. In addition, each village functions politically independent, which means no strong inter-villages solidarity exists. In the past, the political independence resulted occasionally in conflicts between the villages. The subject of the conflicts was mostly the distribution of the interrelated issues of water and land. In other words: The village is, besides the lineage, the most important level of the social-political organisation of the Ahl Todgha, and it could function autonomously. Despite this fact and the attacks of other ethnic groups, like the Aït Atta, the Ahl Todgha retained their superior position in the valley throughout the years. This is surprising, but according to collected information, the different villages of the Ahl Todgha were united by an attack of an enemy to protect their territory together (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 8/9).

The internal stratification of this ethnic groups shows, in Elias' perspective, that the different configurations people form in Ahl Todgha are based on religious grounds, like *shurfas*, and on skin colour, the distinction between white and black. Despite the stratification, the configurations were not distinct. They were interweaving because without each other, they never could have retained their superior position in the upper part of the valley.

*The inhabitants of El Hart Mourabitine and El Hart Niaamine.*

At the downstream of the Todgha river, one can find two villages, El Hart Mourabitine and El Hart Niaamine, the distinct Negroid group of *Iqabline*. In 2000, the two villages are the biggest in the valley, inhabited by approximately 9,000 persons. In one village the ethnic group *Mrbatin* lives, in the other village, the *Haratin*. Both forms together a distinct group in the valley because they are not allowed to marry with the 'whites' of the Ahl Todgha, not even with the *Iqabline* of the Ahl Todgha (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 10/11). El Ghanjou & de Haas (2000) put the two villages as a kind of ethnic enclave between the Ahl Todgha of the upper Todgha and the Aït Atta of the lower Todgha.

To indicate their inferior position towards the other ethnic groups in the valley is that one probably will never see a 'white' person living among the Negroid population of the two villages. The other ethnic groups consider the *Iqabline* of El Hart inferior on basis of their descendance. Two explanations for the origin of these Negroid ethnic groups in the valley are giving by the local population. The *Iqabline* of El Hart were either the original inhabitants of the valley, or descendants of slaves from the Saadian period and trans-Saharan trade, imported from West Africa through the caravan trade. Especially the last, most popular, explanation is the cause of the negative attitude of the other ethnic groups against this population. But according to other information, it is possible that their presence in the Moroccan oases date back even before other ethnic groups arrived<sup>24</sup> (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 10/11, Steinmann 1993a: 73/74).

Despite this information, other groups gained economic and military control in the valley. The population of El Hart became small subsistence peasants. They depended on the supply of water of the ethnic group who lived at the upper reaches of the valley as a result their agricultural activities were limited. A client-patron relationship arose between those groups. The patron, a person or group with power, binds his client, a less fortunate person, by means of several personal favours on the principle that he will gain a duty in return. The patron has the most advantage of this system, but the clients get in return favours and protection (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 161). Probable in the relation the patron was the population of Ahl Todgha and the client was the *Iqabline* of El Hart. The *Iqabline* of El Hart produced food for their own villages on their fields. During drought years they depended on the Ahl Todgha patrons for water supply. The Ahl Todgha were obligated to help them during these times due to their religious status. In other words, one cannot really speak of client-patron relations. The stratification of the villages of El Hart resembles that of the Ahl Todgha: the villages are also stratified in different lineages (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 10/11, Steinmann 1993a: 73/74).

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<sup>24</sup> For further discussion about this subject, see El Ghanjou, H. & H. de Haas (2000), *Imarom Working Paper Series, February 2000*.

### *The Aït Atta*

At the lower reaches of the Todgha Valley, where Tadafalte is situated, the tribe Aït Atta lives. All inhabitants of Tadafalte are descendants of the tribe Aït Atta. According to my respondents, this is unique. For this reason, I first outline some general features about this tribe before I get into the situation of the Todgha valley. This way, one can gain an idea how this tribe functions internally and how the internal organisation affects the social relation between the villages or between the ethnic groups in the valley. In addition, it is important to know whether the features of the tribe Aït Atta are still affecting the current situation in Tadafalte. This is discussed in the next chapter. The information is mainly derived from the study by David Hart (1981), who carried out research on the social organisation of the Aït Atta.

The Aït Atta can rightfully be called a tribe because all its members claim to be descendent of Dadda 'Atta, or grandfather Atta. They regard Dadda 'Atta as their common ancestor, although none of them can trace actual genealogical links to him (Hart 1981: 8). Despite this fact, the idea *and* the conviction of a common ancestor cause a strong group identity among the Aït Atta. In addition, the Aït Atta has, as Gellner had observed, one of the world's masterpieces in segmental organisation (Ernst Gellner in Hart 1981: 15). The Aït Atta sees their social segmentation, the division, first and foremost in terms of a genealogical idiom and not only in terms of division<sup>25</sup>. Cohesion between members of the Aït Atta existed and still exists, although the degree of cohesion depends on their shared history (Hart 1981). For instance, the relations between Tadafalte and an Aït Atta village nearby were tense despite their common ancestor. They did not speak to each other anymore because of recent conflict (Field work, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999). In addition, within one fraction the cohesion is stronger than within a sub-lineage. Again within a sub-lineage, the bond among the fractions is stronger than between different sub-lineage's. An Arab proverb shows that this is fully workable and operative in Aït Atta's social structure '*I and my brothers against our cousins, ourselves and our cousins against the rest of our clan, and our clan against the other clans of our ethnic group, and our ethnic group against the world.*' (Hart 1981: 75) In other words, history and the bondage between the Aït Atta-segments play a significant role in Aït Atta's life and shape their point of view of other ethnic groups and sub-lineage's (Hart 1981).

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<sup>25</sup> Although the invocation of segmentation in theory by no means always shows a complete correlation with the reliance on it fact. In 1956 and in 1933, there are cases of the Aït Atta what mind be termed as 'segmentary success' (Hart 1981: 19).

In Elias' perception, the tribe Aït Atta can be marked as a secular regime. The strong group identity of this secular regime results into the mutual dependency of the different Aït Atta-lineages. Through an organisation structure that is aimed to control on the 'inside' and a defence from 'outside', the internal cohesion of the secular regime can be guaranteed against problems. In the past, the secular regime of the Aït Atta guaranteed the internal cohesion towards problems by means of the development of an efficient political system<sup>26</sup>.

The major result of the remarkable degree of internal cohesion and a highly developed and efficient political system, was the aggressive outward expansion of the territory of the Aït Atta. By comparison with other ethnic groups in Morocco, the total surface of the 'Attaland' was enormous, on average between 50,000-55,000 square kilometres, mostly limited by a network of pre-Saharan river systems: by the Draâ in the west, the Dadss to the north-west, the Todgha and the Ghris to the north-east and the Ziz to the east. The point of the Aït Atta's origin was in the Saghro Mountains from which they started their wars (Hart 1981: 1-5).

Before the French Protectorate (1912-1956), the Aït Atta were "transhumants", known as *igzdu*<sup>27</sup> by the Aït Atta's. Transhumance is a co-existence of settled agricultural life with that of pastoral nomadism, each being practised at different and alternating periods during the year. During autumn and winter, the Aït Atta lived in permanent and fixed houses, made of mud-and-stone masonry and grouped into clan settlements of local communities. In spring, a part of each community moved away in different directions in the Atlas. During that period, the Aït Atta lived in black wool or goat hair tents, and pastured their sheep until their return to the lower valleys in autumn. The sheep were, and still are, one of the essential elements in their life. The livestock formed a calculable wealth. The advantage of keeping sheep was that this property was, and still is movable. The Aït Atta sold the sheep at the markets<sup>28</sup> as a result, they could buy grain and could engage in any sort of commercial transaction (Hart 1981:5-8).

One other important feature of the Aït Atta transhumance, as well as that of other tribes, was the use of collective pasture lands. Two or more clans shared pasture lands. Usually the pasture lands had rigid opening and closing dates and in some cases even a limitation on the number of sheep that may be pastured at the land. The two or more clans together defended the land. Passing the land without approval of the 'owners' led to high fines and sometimes to fighting between the trespassers and the 'owners' (Hart 1981: 1-22). Elias indicates this

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<sup>26</sup> Their effective decision making body and military power probably developed through their constant competition with other nomadic tribes in search for pasture land (Steinmann 1993a: 71).

<sup>27</sup> The term *igzdu* means literally camping, or camping unit (Hart 1981: 5).

<sup>28</sup> There were hardly any markets within the 'Attaland, the Aït Atta have to turn to a host of traditional markets within their territory. The Aït 'Atta, although doubtless profiting from the opportunities for economic exchange with strangers that markets offer, have never encouraged strangers inside their region. This is one of the indications that the Aït Atta had and still have a strong internal groups cohesion (Hart 1981: 8).

situation as people form with others structures in this case the collective use and defence of the pasture land by two or more clans. The structures influence the actions of the people in question. Related to this situation, the clans have to watch over the land to prevent other people from passing.

The historical conflicts about sheep of a particular group overrunning the pasture land can presently still lead to conflicts between the groups in question. This means historical events shaped certain relations between groups, which presently still have influence on these relations. Negative feelings back and forth can rise quickly when the conditions for such a situation are present. Elias explains these relations through the existence of social constraints, which have gradually developed throughout the years and have become virtually automatic. The automatism of not creating conflicts is an ongoing process with a certain direction and dynamic, because people form together configurations and influence each other. The changes of the dynamic cannot be predicted and that is what happens when the 'wrong' conditions are created in a situation of influence relations between groups.

Hart demonstrates such a situation in his book (1981) when an interview with members of the Haratin, black people, and Aït Hadiddu, an Aït Atta clan, turned into a violent argument between the parties. The members of the Haratin made some remarks (particular aimed on situation of the past)<sup>29</sup> about the Aït Atta. The members of the Aït Atta did not receive the remarks well. They immediately reacted by roaring that the next Haratin who opened his mouth would be fined 100 sheep on the spot. This example shows how quickly old feelings between certain groups arise and that sheep are indeed an important asset for the Aït Atta. Other elements also played a role in the developed negative attitude of the Aït Atta towards the Haratin. The Aït Atta look down upon them because of their total sedentarisation, while most Aït Atta clan groups are transhumants to the same degree. Besides the total sedentarisation of the Haratin, the Aït Atta were negative about the Haratin because the former had to give to the latter military protection against other ethnic groups. In general, Hart (1981) states that the Aït Atta received in return for their protection the Haratin as agricultural workers for their land, *khettara*-diggers and sharecroppers. Most of the time, a reciprocity-relation<sup>30</sup> arose between the two groups (Hart 1981: 1-22, 211-216).

In the Todgha valley, it appears that the Aït Atta also gave military protection to the members of the ethnic group El Hart in the past. The villages of the Aït Atta lay as a protecting ring around the two villages of the El Hart. However, according to results of research by El

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<sup>29</sup> For more information David Hart (1981), *Dadda Atta and his forty grandsons, the socio-political organisation of the Aït Atta of Southern Morocco*, p. 215.

<sup>30</sup> Reciprocity contains the principle that receipt of goods and services obligates the receiver to give similar services or goods to the donor (Kloos 1991: 220).

Ghanjou and de Haas (2000)<sup>31</sup> and my informants, such a (reciprocity-) relationship has not existed in the Todgha valley. For example, for digging their *khetaras*, the Aït Atta in the Todgha valley employed and still employs people from other regions, since these people are specialists (Fieldwork File Interview peasant, respondent 22 1999). Also, an unwritten rule between the Aït Atta and the El Hart exists: both refuse to render services to each other. It is even considered dishonourable when one of the parties does. There are a few Haratin who work for the Aït Atta. According to El Ghanjou and de Haas these people originate from other regions (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 12). The situation shows that out of the social relations between the Aït Atta and the Aït El Hart in the Todgha valley, social forms are developed, which have clear described structural features, like rules of not rendering services to each other. Tennekes calls these features the objective reality of the structure of the organisation.

The settlement of the villages of the Aït Atta at the lower reaches indicates that the Aït Atta are probably the last settlers in the Todgha valley. Information by El Ghanjou and de Haas (2000), based on a study of oral and written sources, and open interviews (Fieldwork 2000) indicates that the Aït Atta have not settled before 1750-1800 in the valley. During the French Protectorate (1912-1956) the members of Aït Atta were forced to live in this area. The French wanted to control all Moroccans, including nomads. The Aït Atta were the last Moroccan people who were defeated before the French soldiers succeeded, after bitter fighting, in overpowering and controlling the whole of Morocco in 1933 (Steinmann 1993b: 109-111).

In the valley, remainders of the French Protectorate in the form of observation towers are still found. Another influence of the French is that they assigned a specific territory to some villages, based on the information that the land belonged to that village in that time. The reason for the assignment was to create responsibility by the inhabitants of that village. The inhabitants were responsible for all events, which happened in their assigned territory. As one of the respondents said in interview: '*when a person was killed in their territory, the inhabitants of Tadafalte would be blamed for this incident*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igram*). Appendix 2 shows the division of land by the French in the district Taghzoute in 1936.

The result of the appointment of an area to a village by the French is that nowadays people claim that the area is their land, while other ethnic groups consider that land theirs, based on other former events. This problem is specifically perceptible in the relations between the Aït Atta and the *Iqabline* of El Hart. The tensions between them are high. The main cause of the conflicts, which are sometimes violent, is land and water. Land and water are, as in all irrigation societies, the basis of conflicts between ethnic groups, between different villages and

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<sup>31</sup> *Imarom Working Papers Series*, February 2000.

even between individuals within one village. The next situation happened between El Hart and Tadafalte.

*The inhabitants of El Hart claim the land near the water supply, the khattara, of Tadafalte, was only given to the Ait Atta for the duration of the protection the Ait Atta offered them. The Ait Atta consider the land theirs, and as belonging to their (former) clients. Moreover, they feel confirmed in their point of view due to the French, which appointed the land to them in the past (see appendix 2). A conflict over this land arose, which even resulted in a stone-fight (1998) between the two villages (Fieldwork, Diary March 9t-16th 1999).*

The conflict shows that a certain patron-client relation between El Hart and Aït Atta has existed. Despite this knowledge and their reported military strength, the Aït Atta never succeeded to gain direct access to the river water. They had, and still have to irrigate their field by means of the *khattaras* (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 12). In other words: despite their heroic stories about how powerful the Aït Atta were in the past, they did not exactly succeed in overpowering the Todgha valley.

### ***The interrelations between the three groups***

The relations between the three distinct groups are strongly influenced by their history. In Elias' view, the moves the different ethnic groups made in the past stimulated a development process of the configurations in the Todgha valley. The members of different ethnic groups had conflicts in the past. These conflicts still have influence on the configurations in the Todgha valley. Predominantly, tensions between the three groups are always present. For as long as social constraints prevent conflicts, the groups can live in peace with each other. When the conditions of the configurations change in a negative way, old feelings between the different groups will recur and a conflict can arise quickly. It also can happen that the groups will take up the cudgels for each other when the co-operation had been good between the groups in the past.

The basis of the conflicts were and still are mainly the interrelated issues of water and land, for these two sources are of vital importance to survive in these areas. It is surprising that the Ahl Todgha, despite their internal diversity and their lack of tribal identity, succeeded to keep control of the surface water of the Todgha river. Apparently they managed to defend themselves against intruders with success. This way, the Ahl Todgha always had control over the distribution of the river water. They also determined that the two villages of El Hart receive surface water only during winter and decided almost to stop this supply several years ago. In former days, they probably succeeded. Today, other factors, like a central government, play a role in the decision process. The interference of the government, Elias indicates as one of the

previous moves, which caused changes in the configurations of the Todgha valley. These moves have lasting influence on the current situation in the Todgha valley. The Aït Atta never succeeded in gaining access to the river water. Their supply for irrigation is predominantly derived from the *khettaras*. This fact and that this tribe from the Saghro mountains live at the fringe of the valley, makes clear that they were the last settlers in the valley (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 13).

## 2.6. Economic & Political history

Most of the history regarding Morocco's southern region focuses on ancient trans-Saharan trading routes, which linked areas north and south of the Sahara. The reason for this focus is that oases were not isolated spots in the desert in the past, but were always linked with other oases through trading networks. This phenomenon is the basis for Pfeffer and Salancik's view that even seemingly self-contained organisations require some transactions with their context for survival. Tadafalte's organisation depended on other organisation, the caravan-route, for resources which they self could not provide.

The caravans needed places to fill up their water reserve and food supplies before they could cross the desert to the famous trading centre at Timbuktu. It is known that the caravan-route passed the Tafilat and Draâ oases. The trans-Saharan trade created intensive contact between southern Morocco and the current Sahel Zone, linking all the important population centres in north and West Africa. Probably, the contacts have contributed to the present ethnic composition of the population in South Morocco (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 13, Steinmann 1993a: 60/61). The moves, which are made throughout history, shaped other features of the present configurations of Morocco as well such as the region's resistance to centralised government and the economic situation of a region.

Not much is written about the situation in the Todgha valley. Most information for this paragraph is derived from historical overviews of Morocco and information from papers of recent studies<sup>32</sup>. Despite the lack of information, I have tried to give examples of situations of the Todgha valley in this paragraph wherever possible.

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<sup>32</sup> The papers are written by J-H. Büchner (1986), Steinmann S.H. (1993a/b), and El Ghanjou & de Haas (2000). The information of the papers are mainly based on other oases settlements, like the Draâ and Tafilat, which had a more important role in the caravan routes than the Todgha Valley had.



First, the period before the French Protectorate (1912-1956) is reviewed. In that period, the Arabs invaded Morocco, bringing with them what became the most important religion in Morocco, Islam. In this paragraph I also reasoned why Islam was accepted so easily by Moroccans, and the consequences of Islam on present everyday life. I assume religion has an important influence on the perception of identity among the Moroccan people. Second, the period of the French Protectorate (1912-1956) is described. Third, the period after Morocco's independence (1956) is outlined. This paragraph ends with the current administrative situation in the Todgha valley.

### ***The period preceding the French Protectorate***

The early history of the area now known as Morocco remains largely a mystery. Cave paintings give evidence of early occupation. The findings of human remains of an age over 200.000 years are also evidence that there was life in Morocco. Out of scarce sources, the general image of the Moroccan society is one of continuous interaction between on one side foreign oppressors, Carthago and Rome, and on the other side the local population, which was not restrained easily and offered great resistance to intruders<sup>33</sup>. Around 1000 B.C. a civilisation known as Lbyco-Berber. The inhabitants of Morocco during that period are the direct ancestors of today's ethnic group Berber. It is unclear from which region or land these people originated, because few written sources exist, which are also not accurate (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 19-20). The different groups of this civilisation formed around water sources. Depending on its needs and military might, the tribe could keep its land and supply of water. Land ownership did not really exist, land was more a territory than property. Depending on the physical environment and the social circumstances (Lentjes 1980: 77). Due to no clear partitions of property in a tribe, the tribes were at odds with each other continually (Akbar & Hart 1984: 24).

From the eighth century on, with the arrival of the Arabs, more written material becomes available. The motive of the Arab's arrival was the *jihad*, the holy war. The holy war had as purpose to convert as many people as possible to Islam. After the Arab's war of conquest, the Berber tribes, which had retained largely their own habits and their ancient religion during the pre-Islamic period, showed little opposition to the transition to Islam. Three factors played a role in the smooth conversion of the Berber tribes. The society in North Africa resembled the Arab society: a tight tribe structure with a chosen leader, who gained great authority. The second factor was that Islam was simple and unequivocal (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 18, 38-44).

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<sup>33</sup> For more information see Obdeijn, de Mas and Hermans, *Geschiedenis van Marokko*, p19-31.

The last factor was that the Berber could still practise some of their own habits and traditions like exorcism rituals against the 'evil eye'<sup>34</sup>. Especially at the countryside, these customs were preserved. To convert to Islam offered people some positive side effects. One of these side effects was that Muslims did not have to pay all kind of taxes to the Arabs, which Christians and Jews did. Between 700 and 1000 A.C., North Africa came definitively under the influence of Islam (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 18, 38-44). The acceptance of Islam by Morocco's original inhabitants underlines Elias' starting point that people have to live with each other, which results in mutual dependency. The mutual dependency can change the situation in which the individuals are situated. Related to the acceptance of Islam, people would not have accepted Islam as their main religion if Islam did not fit in with their habits, their conviction and their perception of identity.

The practice of Islam caused social and political changes in the tribal way of organisation in Morocco. For instance, Islam proclaimed a juridical framework that made a distinction between rights of ownership<sup>35</sup> and usufruct, the inheritance-system and the duty to take care for your land, which you inherited from our ancestors (Lentjes 1971: 77). In addition, a system of sanctions and rewards to judge about people's good and bad actions was introduced (Ahmed & Hart 1984: 47). These elements of Islam are still integrated in all aspects of the social cultural life of Moroccan people of today. In Morocco, Islam became a natural part of a wider culture social pattern, which is still shared by the whole society (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 167). The influence of Islam shows the synthesis Elias brings with his sociogenetic (historical) perspective on social relations: the societal, the individual, the psychotically and the cultural. The changes in the collective patterns of behaviour and individual feelings in the Moroccan society, like the duty for inherited land, can be explained by the changes in the social relations related to the religion.

In addition, Islam brought a new kind of trading system. Before the Arab period, long-distance trade was only possible by ship. Under Arab influence, a network of trading routes made its entry into the Moroccan society. Oases along the northern edge of the Sahara became markets, whose goods were transported north from Africa, and the other way around. The primary imports from Sudan were salt, gold, and slaves. This way, the Moroccan people came in contact with black Africa, which has not happened before the Arabs arrived<sup>36</sup> (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 40).

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<sup>34</sup> During my fieldwork I have been treated for the influences of the evil eye and I witnessed several other rituals and believes. This means the rituals still exist (fieldwork, observation 03-03-1999-30-4-1999).

<sup>35</sup> The distinction based on ground is made between *bled milk*, private ground, *bled kharadj*, grounds belonging to other groups than Muslims, and state grounds. The three forms of ownership are still heard of in the current developments of ownership (Lentjes 1981: 77/78).

<sup>36</sup> Steinmann (1993a: 61) states that the network of trading routes already existed between 500 B.C. and 100 A.D. Trans-Saharan caravans from the Near East to the Sudanese capital at Timbuktu were the first

Historical sources suggest that the market of Tinghir, one of the largest villages of the Todgha valley, was one of the most important trading places of the central Moroccan Pre-Saharan (De Foucauld 1885: 224, Harris 1895: 313, Beaurpère 1930 in Büchner 1986: 129). The caravan route, which passed Tinghir, connected Tafilalt, the main station of the trans-Saharan trade with Marrakech, a village on the other side of the Atlas Mountains. The Tinghir market had a neutral status and was known for keeping free of conflicts, expressed from internal and regional hostility between different groups in the surroundings (Ubach/Rackow 1923: 128-134 in Büchner 1986: 132). The independence of the Ahl Todgha, who were not allied to, nor belonged to any of the contesting tribal confederations, contributed to the fact that, besides people from the caravan route, other also came from the nearby Saghro and High Atlas to the market of Tinghir for trading (Büchner 1986: 132).

The coming of the Arabs also caused the first established dominant dynasty in northern Morocco. Idriss, an Arab noble, arrived in Morocco in the 780s. Winning the respect of enough Berber tribes, he soon established, what is considered to be the first Moroccan State. After this dynasty, many Berber dynasties - between 1040 and 1470, the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Marinids- conquered and ruled over whole Morocco. Each dynasty was an autocratic power elite managed by a sultan, who was both spiritual and political leader. The dynasties took turns continually, as each dynasty viewed the situation, to end the anarchy in Morocco and developed the country under their governing power (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 17, 32-55).

It seems that the dynasties subjected and controlled all of Morocco, but none of this was true. The people of south Morocco acknowledged the religious authority but they resisted the taxes and the interference of the state functionaries, like the *caid* (in that time, an appointed representative of the sultan) who was responsible for collecting the taxes for the sultan. In the Todgha valley, *caids* were also appointed to collect taxes. The disadvantages of the appointment of these *caids* were that they were mostly foreign to the region and lived in distant places (Middle Atlas, Marrakech). Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these representatives never gained total control over the valley. When they did gain control, it was only temporary (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 13/14) The sultans were for a great part of their time occupied with subjecting the population of the South to the centralised power of the dynasty. To indicate the time a sultan spent on conquering the South makes a Moroccan proverb clear, which goes as follows: '*The sultan's throne is his saddle*' (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 17, 32-55). The southern region

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external forces penetrating southern Morocco, passing the Tafilalt and the Draâ oases. In other words: it is not clear when the trading through caravan routes exactly began.

obtained the name *Bled-es-Siba*, due to their character of independence and resistance against the central power, known as *Bled-el-Makhezen*<sup>37</sup> (Steinmann 1993a: 63).

In Elias' view, the base of the contrast between the south and the west was made through a succession of movements in this period. The invasion of the Arabs was the catalyst for the establishment of the first dynasty in Morocco, which was not accepted by the people of the South. The resistance shows also that mutual dependency between the south and the west was not realised because the players did not accept one another. The people in the South did not allow the people of the west to take a powerful position in their figurations. In the balance of power, the people from the South had a relative strong strength in its relation to the dynasty.

Although the Todgha valley remained largely beyond control of the central state power, it was the subject of a limited of military campaigns, *harkas*, of the sultans. The military campaigns were aimed to gain control over trading routes and to collect tribute from the population of the valley. In the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the *Makhzen*, under leadership of Moulay Sliman, penetrated and conquered the Todgha valley. The existing ten villages surrendered quickly, with the exception of the village of El Hart Niaamine. In order to punish the inhabitants of the village of El Hart Niaamine for their resistance toward the *Makhzen*, the Sultan deported the entire population to Meknes, where they worked as slaves in his palaces (Spillman 1931: 214 in Steinmann 1993a: 68). One year later, a *shurfa*, named Sidi Larbi of Ouezzene, acted as intermediary for the Aït El Hart and convinced the sultan to free them. In exchange for the *shurfas* help, the villagers of Aït El Hart promised to send fifteen workers to Ouezzane each year during the peak agricultural period (Racolt 1936: 104 in Steinmann 1993a: 68-69). This tradition still existed during the French occupation. Interestingly, many families in El Hart Niaamine have relatives living in Meknes nowadays. They are probably descendants of the deported population, which had to work for the Sultan as slaves (Steinmann 1993a: 69).

### *The French period*

The treaty of Fès, by which Morocco became a French Protectorate, was signed on March 30th 1912<sup>38</sup>. Immediately, the French were confronted with the same problem as the sultan in the previous centuries: the resistance of the southern population to a central government. Especially, people from the south and the north of Morocco played hard not to be conquered. According to the Protectorate treaty, the French had the duty to reform and improve the

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<sup>37</sup> *Bled-el-Makhzen* are regions controlled by the central state rather than individual tribes. The first dynasties with centralised power were referred to as *Makhzen* power. *Makhzen* means centralised power (Steinmann 1993a: 63). *Bled-es Siba* means literally 'the land of the wild beasts' (Lentjes 1995: 11).

<sup>38</sup> For more background information about the treaty of Fès, see Obdeijn, de Mas and Herman (1999), *Geschiedenis van Marokko*, p. 117-123.

economic situation in Morocco. The sultan had to approve all actions of the French according to the conditions of the treaty, but in fact he had no say in the government matters anymore. From the beginning, the French applied a divide-and-rule policy. The French involved feudal families from the High Atlas in the pacification of the local community. These people were also put in action as *caids* and *pashas*, who gained more and more power. In addition, the number of French administrators grew gradually (in 1925, there were 6,500 in comparison with 20,000 in 1932.). In other words, the government of Morocco was gradually taken over by the French in the form of a centralist French government structure, in which there was no place for Moroccans. The French policy had success in what no sultan ever succeeded, to create realise one Morocco. An end came to the division *Bled-es-Siba* and *Bled-el-Makhezen*, but before it was so far, it took the French three decades to pacify Morocco (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 123-151).

One of the regions that resisted the coming of the French was the Todgha Valley. Before the French came, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the Glaoui family made some attempts to take rule of the Todgha valley. Later, the Glaoui family became one of the loyal allies of the French. In 1919, the *caid* Touzounini from the Draâ subjected almost all villages, except those allied to the Glaoui family. In the same year, the *pasha* of Marrakech, Thami Glaoui, re-conquered the Todgha, although not completely successfully, with French military aid. Some years later, his control over the Todgha diminished and it was restricted only to a few villages. Several years later, on 18 and 19 November 1931, the French finally occupied the valley. The inhabitants of the villages offered little resistance. Some villages, those inhabited by members of the Aït Atta, left after the French conquest. They joined other Aït Atta in their struggle against the French. In 1933, the Aït Atta was finally defeated in the so-called Bougafer war (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 15).

After the occupation, the French established the “Bureau des Affaires Indigènes” at Tinghir<sup>39</sup>. This institution, by the local people also known as “Buro”, fell under the authority of a French officer. The colonial authority divided the valley into three regions: the Aït Todgha, El Hart, and the Aït Atta of the lower Todgha. Viewed from the administrative hierarchy, the three regions together formed the Annexe de Tinghir, which fell under the Cercle du Dadès-Todgha. The Todgha was further sub-divided into several administrative districts, which did not always represent the existing ethnic groups. Most administrative districts continued to exist after independence in 1956. At each administrative district, the French were represented by a *cheikh*, on the village-level by a *moqaddem* (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 14/15).

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<sup>39</sup> Current in this building the office of the *caid* is situated (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000, Fieldwork 1999).

These local representatives of the French had to report the situation in their village to the French Officer, who was situated in Tinghir at the "Buro". For example they had to report conflicts in their village, fights, or when the village was in conflict with other villages. The people who lived in Tadafalte, the research village, spoke highly of the French during that period. For instance, the French protected them much better than the present government, the French were not afraid to punish someone (this was always followed by the sentence '*Now we have human rights but what does it bring us...*'), and the traditional village council kept their independence (Fieldwork 1999, Diary March 9th-16th 1999) But it was the French, with their central state institutions, who diminished the effective power of the traditional village council as first (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 15).

The French also made some efforts for develop the Todgha valley. One of their efforts was the establishment of other services, like the post office, a basic health station and a court. In addition, the French extended the old caravan route to connect Tinghir with the important axle West-East, the road between Ouarzazate to Errachidia and even further to Marrakech and Meknes. A new market place (the current old 'suq', marketplace) was created by the French. The French understood probably the importance of a functional marketplace. These developments gave impulses for Tinghir to develop as the important centre of the Todgha, and perhaps even for the nearby regions. The ancient elite and many of the Jews of Tinghir saw the commercial activities of Tinghir as central. In a short time, they established new business (Büchner 1986: 133-134, El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 13). According to some respondents, the French tried also to stimulate the local peasants to cultivate other products than dates and cereals. They specifically pushed the cultivation of almonds. The French stated to the peasant that *almonds would gain the same value as gold in the future* (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999).

### ***After Independence***

On 2 March 1956, Morocco gained independence. The Istiqlal party, the national independence party who fought hard for the independence of Morocco, had the expectation that the country would become a democracy, free from absolutism. The King had another idea about Morocco's independence: he wanted to maintain power. Late King Hassan, the successor of King Mohammed in 1961, used all available royal means to develop Morocco into an authoritarian state (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 150-154).

One of the King's actions was to increase the support among the rural population because more than three-quarter of the Moroccan population lived in the countryside during that time<sup>40</sup> (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 150-154). Gain the peasants' support is the reason for the establishment of the Office National Irrigation<sup>41</sup> and the performance of many other agriculture developments programs for example (Lentjes 1981: 91-103).

In 1966, the Office Regional de Mise en Valeur et Agriculture (ORMVA) replaced the Office National Irrigation. Promoting the agricultural production became the main objective of the ORMVA. This objective would remain unchanged over the years. Today, this institution tries to realise this goal by means of implementing different activities and accepting development requests from villages. In Morocco nine such agricultural organisations exist. The main office of the agricultural organisation for the Todgha valley and Tadafalte is situated in Ouarzazate, in the province Ouarzazate. This establishment runs the administration of several local organisations in the province. These local agricultural centres are called Centre de Mise et Valeur (henceforth CMV). At the CMV, people work who have direct contact with the peasants in the field and they carry out the activities programs the ORMVA develop (Fieldwork, File Interviews OMRVA 1999, Lentjes 1981: 99). More information on this institution can be found throughout the next chapter and in appendix 3, in which its structure is explained.

With independence, the administration developed by the French was taken over by the Moroccans. The only difference was that a Moroccan administrator from the main cities replaced the French one. The French form of administration was based on exertion of control, and it was hierarchical and centralist. This inheritance is taken over by the Moroccan and improved to perfection. Through a central government, the whole Moroccan society could be controlled effectively<sup>42</sup> (Lentjes 1981: 206/207). During the Protectorate, the national movement had resisted the direct administration of the colonial occupation. It appeared that the administration from Rabat was even more unitarily, penetrating, and more omnipresent than the French administration. In many areas, the local notables thought they would regain control over the areas, which they had controlled before the French came. The arrival of the (Arab) administrators from Rabat, who interfered in all kind of business, was a thorn in their side (Obdeijn *et al.* 1999: 156-157).

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<sup>40</sup> For the other actions, see Obdeijn, de Mas and Hermans (1999), *Geschiedenis van Marokko*, p. 152-154.

<sup>41</sup> In 1961, this institution was founded with the aim to develop the irrigation possibilities and to insure the rateability of the high investments (Lentjes 1981: 99).

<sup>42</sup> The centralism of the government was clearly visible when I wanted to interview someone in ORMVA. This institution first wanted to make sure that I had permission to conduct research before I could interview anyone. By visiting the governor's office, a letter was sent to the ORMVA with the announcement I obtained the permission. After the ORMVA received this letter, I could start the interview but meanwhile I was a day and half day behind schedule (Fieldwork 1999).

The local institutions, like the traditional village council, had to give up their authority to the *pashas* or *caids*. Today, the form of administration is hierarchical, that is, in decreasing power order, provinces, circles, annexes and communes (El Chanjou & de Haas 2000: 15).

In Elias' view, all named elements, like the loss of authority of the traditional village councils, indicates on the development process of a secular regime, the state Morocco. This process is characterised on one hand by reduction or loss of relative autonomy at the lower level. In this case, the traditional village councils lost many duties, which are outlined in chapter 3.4.. On the other hand, this process is characterised by the concentration of functions and authorities as well as the appearance of the function differentiation at a higher level. The central government system of Morocco came into being when independence was won.

In addition, the form of administration cannot be seen apart from the patron-client system<sup>43</sup>, which dominates the actions and thoughts of the Moroccan people. This system functions on all levels of society, from the highest level to the smallest villages. The power and the respect someone enjoys determine the extent of the network, which the person in question is the centre of. In addition, the intensity of the contacts within this network contributes to the extent of the network. The whole system is hidden behind show of official occasions and appearances. Violence and repression can be used towards people, who do not want to cooperate with this system (Lentjes 1981: 207-209).

The Todgha valley falls under the authority of the Annexe de Boulmane, which is part of the Province of Ouarzazate. The seat of the governor<sup>44</sup> and the administrative centre of Ouarzazate, are situated in Ouarzazate, 169 kilometres from Tinghir. It takes two to three hour's drive to get to this city. People have to travel there because essential administrative services are situated there, for which the administrative services of Tinghir are not authorised (El Caid 1996: 46-55,69-73, El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 15/16,Fieldwork 1999).

The French Protectorate also caused other lasting influences, like the development of a road infrastructure, the introduction of the monetary economy, and new sources of income (the establishments of small businesses, banks and so on). In addition, during this period, the French attracted Moroccans to come and work in France. The first people went there in the conviction that they would return to Morocco after a period of working, with enough money. Amersfoort (1977) also called this process circle-migration. Later, it appeared that many migrants stayed in the foreign country and brought their families as well. The migrants often invested their income in their native village or in its surroundings. The investments were water pumps, small shops, or a new house in which the migrants could live when they returned to their country (Lentjes 1981: 60/61).

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<sup>43</sup> For the definition, see paragraph 2.5..

<sup>44</sup> The final responsible of the province.



The developments, which were started by the French, were continued after independence. For example, the main road, connecting Tinghir to Errachidia and Ouarzazate, was paved in the early 1970s. In addition, the road from Tinghir to the gorge (at the upper Todgha) was paved as well. This improvement led to the accessibility of many villages in the valley, especially the one located at the upper part of the valley and along the road. The important function of the paved road can be indicated by the presence of the small shops and houses, which mushroomed along the road. The accessibility through the paved road stimulated the economic growth of the centre of Tinghir because most villages are orientated towards the main village of their valley. A good example of the orientation towards Tinghir is the rapidly grew weekly market of Tinghir. This market had to be moved twice to larger places, and is currently one the biggest in the Moroccan presahara. In addition, many small shops, a small hospital and some banks emerged in the centre of Tinghir. This way, Tinghir can compete on commercial level with other southern centres as Ouarzazate, Zagora, Errachidia, and Erfoud (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 16).

### *The administrative situation in the Todgha Valley*

In the Todgha valley, the administrative districts, designed by the French, remained largely intact after Independence. Only the villages Achdad, Tadafalte and Taghia were under a different authority than that of the *caïdat* of Tinghir situated in the ancient Bureau des Affaires Indigènes. The *caïdat* of Tinghir, in its turn, was part of the Annexe de Boulmane and the Province of Ouarzazate (El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 16).

In 1992, the administrative situation changed. As the result of a new law<sup>45</sup>, the three villages -Achdad, Tadafalte and Taghia- had to be added to the commune Taghzoute. In addition, the Todgha valley gained the status of 'municipalité', recognition of its de facto urban status. After some administrative districts were comprised and the exact borders were determined for the commune urban of Tinghir, the valley consisted and still consists of three rural districts and one urban district: Commune rural of Todgha Oulya, Todgha Souffla, and Taghzoute and the commune urban Tinghir. As mentioned before, the urban district is controlled by the *pasha*. The *caïd* governs the three rural districts. Both officials have been appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (El Caid 1996: 26-55, El Ghanjou & de Haas 2000: 16, Fieldwork, File Diary February 8th 1999).

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<sup>45</sup> This law proclaimed that the villages had to be near the community council (Fieldwork 1999, File Interviews Government representative, respondent *jamaa* 1999)

Every district in the Todgha valley has a district council, the *jamaa*. The district council is chosen by the people of the district themselves. The inhabitants of every separate village choose one representative for the district council to represent his village by standing up for their interests. Within this council, one person is chosen to be the president, known as *rais*. The institution 'district council' has existed since 1958. The district council Taghzoute, in which Tadafalte is situated, was founded in 1964. Before that year, the district council was situated in Tinghir. The main goal of the district council is to issue documents of death, birth, certificate of living and all kind of licenses, to collect taxes from the shops and the market, control the house-building in Taghzoute and to collect the requests of the villages which belongs to their district. The requests of the villages for a new water irrigation system, are predominantly sends on to the intended institutions following a signature of the president. '*It will look better on the request*', the president of the *jamaa* said to me in an interview. The main concern of the *jamaa* Taghzoute is the place Taghzoute because this is the economic centre of the district. For example, the *jamaa* manages the water tower. The inhabitants of Taghzoute have to pay taxes for using that water to the *jamaa*. In addition, the house building in Taghzoute is controlled more then in the surrounding villages and the roads are better-maintained (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999). More information about the *jamaa* of Taghzoute is found in appendix 4.

The task of the *caid* is to represent the government in the villages of the urban districts. Because he does not have a budget (like the *jamaa*), he can only try to listen to problems of the inhabitants of the district and try to solve the problem. In fact, the *caid* wants to be informed well about the situation in his district to prevent any problems in the valley<sup>46</sup>. By means of having weekly meetings with government representatives appointed by him, the *moqaddems* and the *sjiechs*<sup>47</sup> of the villages, and by maintaining contact with the presidents of the *jamaa*'s in his districts on regularly basis, he tries to be as updated as possible. If a problem occurs before the *caid* has the weekly meeting with the *moqaddem* or president of the *jamaa*, the *moqaddem* or *president* is obligated to tell the *caid* about the problem straightaway (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent *caid* 1999)

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<sup>46</sup> Of which the ministry of Intern Affairs will blame him if problems happen (El Caid 1996).

<sup>47</sup> In the bureaucratic hierarchy, this official is little higher then the *moqaddem* and controls several villages in stead only one village (El Caid 1996).

The main problems people come to see the *caid* about concern land and borders, water pumps which are too near a water resource, conflicts within a village or between villages, permissions and other documents (for example, a birth certificate). People often have to obtain a document at the *moqaddem*, the *jamaa* and the *caid* must make sure they have the right documents. Although the government does not recognise the traditional village council officially, the *caid* acknowledges and helps this centuries-old institution. The *caid* helps the traditional village council because the inhabitants of their village choose these people democratically. All villagers approve the policy of the traditional village council and agree with most of their solutions. The advantage for the *caid* is that the traditional village council takes work off the *caid's* hands because the traditional village councils solve problems in the village with their ages-old laws. Otherwise the *caid* has to solve these problems. The disadvantage of the policy of the *caid* is that the traditional system embedded and any progressive action<sup>48</sup> especially of young people is discouraged (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent *caid* 1999).

Land is customarily the subject for conflict in the valley. The policy about land in the valley is that inhabitants of a village are allowed to claim it on condition that this does not cause troubles in the valley. If the inhabitants of a certain village claim a piece of land, the villagers must inform the *caid* and the ministry of Internal Affairs. If the claiming causes any troubles between villages, a meeting will be arranged between the land representatives (*amghar n-igran*) of each village and the *caid* to solve the problem. In case there is no solution, the *caid* is obligated to inform the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Agriculture, which will make a binding decision in this matter.

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<sup>48</sup> They want for example commercialises the production or land consolidation. These actions cannot be implemented because the ancient laws prevent it.

## Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the physical conditions, social composition, history and the current situation in the Todgha valley. All these factors influenced and still influence each other and determine the way the Todgha valley developed throughout the years. In this development process, the context, the social relations between the different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte came into being.

The physical features of the natural environment of the Todgha valley created, fundamentally, the conditions under which people had to settle. Factors such as scarcity of water and the possibility of dry years in these regions caused people form the first settlements around the visible water source, in this case the river. In Tennekes' view, social relations were constructed in order to realise a certain objective. In this case, it was surviving in the arid zone through settlement near the water source.

The first people in the valley could use the surface water of the river for irrigating their fields and for drinking. The scarcity of the source water in these regions also caused conflicts and dependency relations between different groups. Pfeffer and Salancik also define such relations as competitive relationships. Through competing, each player will try to obtain the scarce resource water. The Ahl Todgha, who may or may not be the first in the valley, gained and kept the scarce water until today. This made them economically superior in the valley, despite of the absence of group cohesion. Due to their position, they could overpower the *Iqabline* of El Hart to their authority: the first dependency relation was created in the valley. The competitive relationship had become a symbiotic relationship. The Ahl Todgha's water use determined the water supply for the Aït El Hart. Through a difficult system of water division, the Ahl Todgha could retain their powerful position because balance of power is an integral element of human relationships. The power of one player, the Ahl Todgha in the relation to another player, the Aït El Hart, depends on the activities contributed by each. Through the division of water, these relations are more or less guaranteed.

At the same time, the Ahl Todgha had the religious duty to help the less fortunate people of the valley in crisis, the *Iqabline* of El Hart. The religious status of the *shurfas* indicates that Islam, brought by Arabs in the 8<sup>th</sup> century, already had made its entry in the valley. The conversion of not only the inhabitants of the Todgha valley, but of all inhabitants of Morocco to Islam have had a major impact on the social cultural pattern of life, and the way life is organised in this country. This means, in Elias' opinion, that the movement of the Arabs had great impact on all aspects of the configurations in Moroccan society, which still last today. They can even be considered social constraints, which had become virtually automatic.

After the Arabs' arrival, the dynasties took turns in ruling over Morocco. Ruling Morocco was not an easy task for the religious and political leader, the sultan, because he came

up against great resistance from the people of the region, known as *Bled-es-Siba*. Their resistance stemmed from the interference of the representative and the refusal to pay taxes. The mutual relations resulted in bad conditions for allowing the new player to assume the powerful position of controlling people in the South. The result of this resistance is that this region lagged behind in development, the *Bled-es-Siba* became a subject of neglect. This factor had lasting influence for future governing powers as well. In other words, the move the ancestors of the people of the South made resulted in perceptions and actions, which have a bad effect of the development of this region.

In the Todgha valley, the nomadic tribe Ait Atta continued offering resistance to the central authority, even when the French came. But before that time, the second dependency relation was created in the valley. The Ait Atta's and the *Iqabline* of El Hart made an agreement: the Ait Atta's obtained land in return for what the *Iqabline* of El Hart was protected against the economic superiors of the valley. This agreement still has major influence on the mutual relations, specifically on the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

Before the French, the major lasting factors were the arrival of Islam and the persistent resistance of the people from the south, for which they did not obtain a good name and caused the lay in development. Although this region had a bad name, the French, after they had the area under control, implemented some developments in the valley and Morocco, to lasting effect. After independence, a great part of the government structure was taken over, only now Moroccans hold the office of the French administrators. The only difference is that the government structure became more central, under the guidance of the sultan. In addition, the patronage-client system, interwoven with the structure of the government, supported the centralism. In this effort to maintain the patronage-client system and the centralism, the socio-economic inequality widened.

The pre-existing conditions, like the socio-economic inequality, played a role in people's decision to migrate to other places, where work could be found. Tadafalte underwent the same processes through people's migrations and the organisation of water became neglected. In Elias' perspective, the previous moves had activated other processes in the social relations related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Because every movement is determined by a previous one, and with each move the configurations change. Not one or more moves are responsible for the structure that comes into existence; many people are. People have to interact, just for the simple fact that people have to live together.

Related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, all the moves enlarged and complicated the chains of mutual interdependency. The first simple oasis settlement today is connected to all kind of different configurations, like the government and the migrants. The base of the dependency has moved to other terrains because of the changes in the configurations. These changes are discussed in the next chapters. In these chapters, the *case study* is presented. The organisation related to water of Tadafalte is the empirical material to verify my theoretical framework, which is discussed in chapter one.

## Chapter 3

### The case study, Tadafalte

*When walking from Taghzoute to Tadafalte, one can see an observation tower. This tower stands on a hill, known as Marouane. The French built this tower to watch over what they called a rebellion area. From the observation tower one can directly look at the old qsar<sup>49</sup> of Tadafalte. Only one man, the moqaddem of Tadafalte during the French period, still lives in the ancient qsar, which is almost falling apart. The observation tower became part of the second qsar of Tadafalte after its inhabitants deserted the first qsar years ago (1976). The villagers built a new qsar around the tower, on the foot of the hill Marouane. The houses were bigger than in the old qsar. When the amount of money and inhabitants increased, even bigger houses were built further along the foot of the hill. Those houses are constructed with different kinds of materials. As construction material one can find concrete, but also traditional building materials such as loam. The majority of the more wealthy people of the town left the second qsar and the poorer inhabitants of Tadafalte took over their old houses (often for nothing). Later on, one started to build in the field on ground of which they thought was not fertile for agriculture. Sometimes those houses are situated two kilometres from the village (Personal Diary C. Otte 1999).*

#### 3.0. Introduction

The relocation of the houses and the use of different kind of construction materials for the houses throughout the years indicate that Tadafalte was affected by past events. For example, in oasis settlements the population growth, especially around 1960, provided people bursting out of their houses in the ancient *qsar*. However, the events are restricted by other conditions, such as a physical border, a mountain, the orientation towards irrigation, and the location of the village in relation to other villages. In addition, the inhabitants of the village came more in contact with the outside world through the migrants. Through this, processes of modernisation and urbanisation are playing a role in the everyday lives of the villagers. The villagers are confronted with a choice: Do they want to become more individualised or do they want to retain their community life? These contradictory processes cause changes in the social relations affecting the organisation of water in Tadafalte. In other words: The decline of the *qsar* is often

accompanied by the decline in the power of social relations (Fieldwork, File Articles Büchner (c) : 105-109).

Before I get into the effect of these events on the organisation, viewed as social relations, I want to make explicit remarks about some features of the organisation of water in Tadafalte. These features are essential to understanding the setting of Tadafalte's organisation of water. Predominantly, the features are created in the past and are a result of the fact that Tadafalte' inhabitants are descendants of the tribe Aït Atta (see previous chapter). These features are integrated in and fundamental to the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

In this chapter, first I give a general image of Tadafalte to acquire the reader with the setting. Second, I will outline the history of Tadafalte according to the villagers. This way, the relations between the neighbours and Tadafalte, and its access to sources of water becomes clear. Third, I will review the relation between the tribe Aït Atta and Tadafalte's inhabitants. The heritage of the Aït Atta tribe has still impact on the social relations related to Tadafalte's organisation of water, and with other groups in the valley. Fourth, I will outline the features of land possession and water rights of Tadafalte, as influenced by the way the tribe Aït Atta is organised. This paragraph explains the basis of the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Then, I will set out the methods of irrigation and their changes throughout the years. In this chapter, the influence of 'outside' players, the ORMVA and CMV, on Tadafalte's organisation of water will come to light. The last paragraph of the chapter is about the modes of agriculture in Tadafalte and the changes they underwent throughout the years. The changes indicate that the attention of agriculture is shifted to another terrain, which affected the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The chapter ends with a summary.

### 3.1. Tadafalte

Tadafalte is a small oasis village, inhabited by members of the tribe Aït Atta. The village is situated at the lower reaches of the Todgha valley, in the district Taghzoute. It is fifteen kilometres to the Southeast of Tinghir, the economic centre of the valley and two kilometres of Taghzoute, administrative village of the district. Tadafalte is surrounded by several villages and a desert. Those villages are Achdad, El Hart Niaamine, Taghzoute and Agoudiem. Along with six other villages<sup>50</sup>, (these villages, except for El Hart Niaamine) Tadafalte forms the district council Commune Rurale Taghzoute N'Aït Atta, the local authority for all Aït Atta villages in the Todgha.

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<sup>49</sup> Fortified village or local community, or fortified dwelling within it.

<sup>50</sup> The other villages were Tabsabest, Ghallil 1, Ghallil 2, Taghia, Thiouline, and Aït Aissa.



Taghzoute is the economic centre of the district for it has a market (*suq*) every week and the district council, the *jamaa*, is established in that village. One can also find some small shops, a driving school, a secondary school, the post office, and a shop with telephone booths in this village. People from different regions come to the market to sell or buy merchandise such as meat, sheep, herbs, kitchen supplies, vegetables and clothes (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Diary May 1999, File Interviews *Jamaa* 1999). According to the district council, the *jamaa* Taghzoute, the district Taghzoute consisted of 11,695 inhabitants in 1994 (see appendix 5 for the census of district Taghzoute).

After the research of Hein de Haas (1999), it appeared Tadafalte had about 1000 inhabitants and 119 families in 1999. A traditional village council, the so-called *amghar* and *aiyans*, manages the village. The traditional village council is predominately responsible for the interrelated issues of water and land. In addition, they regulate (as they did especially in the past) the social life by means of imposing fines and sanctions. This local institution is mainly tolerated by the official institutions<sup>51</sup>, like the *caid*, *jamaa* and *pasha* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives 1999). In the light of Elias' perspective, the institution *amghar* and *aiyans* was formerly the relative 'strongest' player in the relations between the players in Tadafalte's organisation of water. They could fulfill the powerful positions in the village because all parties in the village agreed with this situation. Through the coming of other players from outside Tadafalte, like the *jamaa*, the figurations of the organisation of water changed.

Another 'outside' player in the game of water in Tadafalte is the 'Centre Mise et Valeur', an agricultural sub-division of the OMRMVA, situated in Tinghir (see previous chapter and appendix 3). The main goal of the CMV in Tinghir is to increase agricultural productivity, which can result in economical benefits for the villagers. Visiting peasants in the villages and giving them examples of newly developed seeds or advice about agriculture, are the main activities CMV uses to realise this objective (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999). In appendix 6 the activities the CMV in Tinghir carries out are described in detail.

In the past, members of the CMV used to visit Tadafalte every two weeks, but nowadays they come less often. The members of the CMV seem to be more interested in the developments in Rhallil, the place situated at the end of the valley, because, in their view, this area has more developmental possibilities. Bigger pieces of land, water pumps and agricultural machines (a tractor) are present in this area. The members of the CMV largely lost interest in the old oases (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999). This move of the CMV changed the configurations of Tadafalte's organisation of water, for example the increasing numbers of people who want to migrate.

About 52 families left Tadafalte permanently to work elsewhere. They settled in other places, such as Tinghir, Marrakech and foreign countries like France and Spain. Spain was, especially and still is, a popular destination for (illegal) migration. Most of these migrants send money to their families in Tadafalte on a regular basis. With this money, most families invest in a new house, luxury goods like new clothes, agriculture (water pump) or other business like small shops (de Haas 1999). It also happens that people, who left Tadafalte, retained or created a connection with Tadafalte through their plot of land or by building a house, to which they can return every time they visit Tadafalte. Through building a house, the people can show to other persons how wealthy they are (Fieldwork, Diary April 1999). The next example outlines the boasting:

*In Tadafalte, a big house built in a pompous style exists. One cannot miss the house because it is the highest and most deviant house of Tadafalte. The pompous house has three floors, what is not common in the village, all kind of decorations, a roof of green tiles, and the construction is finished. Predominantly all other new houses in Tadafalte are not completed yet because the people are out of money. A house, whose construction is not finished and only has one floor, is common in Tadafalte. More floors are only possible when there is enough supply of money. The pompous house is only inhabited about a week a year. During the sacrifice feast, the family who owns the house, returns to Tadafalte. Generally for the remainder of the year, the house is empty (Fieldwork, Diary April 1999).*

In other words: I got the impression the house was built to show Tadafalte's villagers how wealthy this family was, and they had succeeded somewhere else. One of my assistants was indeed impressed by the building. He wanted his new house, which he was building during my stay, to be like that house, so beautiful and full of decorations (Fieldwork, File Diary April 1999).

Tadafalte's villagers are, as all inhabitants of the district Taghzoute, predominantly dependent on the traditional irrigation system, the *khettara*, to obtain water. The water from the *khettara* is used both for drinking and for irrigating the fields. Some people in the village also use a water pump, apart from the *khettara* to irrigate their fields. The *khettara* consists of two series of water wells connected each under ground by a channel. The two series end together in one single channel, which transport the water to the fields. Then, the water of the channel switches over to the *segua* system, which has two veins to take the water to the fields for irrigation (Fieldwork, Drawing March 12th 1999, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999).

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
<sup>51</sup>The institution *amghar & aiyans* is not found in the government chart (El Caid 1996).

















Plate 3.1. The village Tadafalte



Plate 3.2. The 'Green' Islands' in the third zone



Map 3.1. The map of Tadafalte

1	Old <i>qsar</i> of Tadafalte		Ancestral lands
2	Tadafalte		The second zone
3	Observation tower		The third cultivated zone
4	School		The third zone with the green islands
5	The new mosque of Tadafalte		Land of El Hart Niaamine
6	The threshing place of Tadafalte		The border made by the donkey
7a	<i>Azzif</i> , the big dry riverbed		The <i>khattara</i>
7b	<i>Izif</i> , the small dry river bed		The place to collect drinking water
8	A road		The two main veins of the <i>segua</i>
9	The road to the villages in the Saghro Mountains		The underground <i>segua</i>
			Direction Achdad
			Direction Taghzoute
			Direction Agoudiem
			Direction Saghro Mountains

Legend map 3.1.

Generally, the total surface of Tadafalte can be divided into three zones<sup>52</sup>: the traditional zone, the second zone, and the third zone (see map 3.1. for location of these zones). The traditional zone is the most important zone for land-owners in Tadafalte because owning a plot of land in this area has influence on other factors, like possession of land in the other zones and the amount of water one can obtain of the *khettara*. In addition, the villagers are emotionally tied to this possession because the plots of land are considered a gift the peasants obtained from their ancestors. This zone is also called the ancestral lands (Hart 1981). Pfeffer and Salancik call it a constraint because the villagers' behaviour is influenced by personal preferences, like emotional alliances. The other two zones are claimed between 1960 and 1970 respectively and are separated by two dry riverbeds that run through the fields. Only owners of land in the traditional zone during that time (1960S, 1970S) could obtain a plot of land in the new zones (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar & aiyans* 1999). The reason for this arrangement is explained in paragraph 3.4. First, the history according to the respondents is outlined in the next paragraph, through one can understand the relations between Tadafalte's inhabitants and its neighbours and its effect on the organisation of water there.

### 3.2. History of Tadafalte

Bit by bit, I was told the oral history of Tadafalte. I summarised it thanks to general similar 'facts', the respondents gave me. I predominantly collected the data on the history by (informally) interviewing Tadafalte's elderly. The data can be found in the fieldwork dairies of March 1th-7th 1999, of March 9th-16th 1999, May 1999, and in the File Interviews Peasants respondent 22 and a document that was given to me from the land representative for Tadafalte, also-called the *amghar n-igran*.

*The exact data on the origin of Tadafalte is not known. From the construction of the oldest qsar, one believes that Tadafalte originated around four centuries ago<sup>53</sup>. People of the tribe Ait Atta settled at this place after disappointments in the harvest and the death of many cattle because of a flood. Since people, also called the Amzourai, had settled at this place before the Ait Atta's arrived, the Ait Atta had to pay for the land if they wanted to live on it. The Amzourai did not use the land because it was too far from where they lived. The ancestors of the inhabitants of Tadafalte wanted the land for living. They decided to buy it from the Amzourai for the amount of ten dirham, about twenty goats and ten sheep. These were great expenditures at the time, the sheep especially were an expensive property for*

<sup>52</sup> This explicit division of the three zones is made by me during my fieldwork to make the total surface well organised.

<sup>53</sup> Regarding the information in the previous chapter about the tribe Ait Atta, probably the ancestors of the inhabitants of Tadafalte inhabited only the village and cultivated the land during autumn and winter because the tribe Ait Atta were transhumants (chapter 2.5).

people. After the deal, the fraction of the Ait Atta builds their village and started cultivating the land. In that time the village was situated along the river.

The people of the village of El Hart Niaamine (the Iqabline), who established before the villagers of Tadafalte in the valley, did not like the coming and the settlement of this particular fraction of the Ait Atta in their neighbourhood. The Iqabline of El Hart Niaamine decided to enter into a *liff*<sup>54</sup>, an alliance system, with the inhabitants of Achdad. This alliance was remarkable because the inhabitants of Achdad belonged to the same tribe Ait Atta as the villagers of Tadafalte. The members of Achdad agreed with the *liff* because they had lost a war against members of the same fractions, who lived in Tadafalte, in the Draá valley<sup>55</sup>. Out of revenge the inhabitants of Achdad decided to fight against the fractions living in Tadafalte. An incidental circumstance for their help was that Achdad would gain one-third of the land of El Hart Niaamine as payment of the closed *liff* between Achdad and El Hart Niaamine. The ancestors of Tadafalte lost the war against this overwhelming military power and they withdrew to the mountains.

It took the members of Tadafalte a couple of years, to invent a plan to re-conquer their land. They decided to send a man of their fraction, an alleged 'crazy' man, to live among the inhabitants of El Hart Niaamine. This particular man would report to the inhabitants of Tadafalte when the villagers of El Hart Niaamine would harvest. After all, during harvest, everybody is unarmed in the fields and an easy target to attack. A bloody war of 14 years followed<sup>56</sup>. The confederation of the Ait Atta decided to end the war by making a proposal to solve this lasting problem. As first proposal, the confederation suggested that each tribe could make its territory by buying land. The members of Tadafalte rejected this first proposal because they feared that the inhabitants of El Hart Niaamine could buy a lot of land. During that time, El Hart Niaamine was famous for their pottery, and they gained good incomes from this. The next solution was implemented: From a certain point, which the confederation of Ait Atta had determining, a donkey was released. The border between El Hart Niaamine and Tadafalte would be the road, which the donkey would follow<sup>57</sup>. Tadafalte lost a lot of land because of this solution. If one sees the border (see paragraph 3.4), it was obviously already determining before the donkey was released that Tadafalte would not gain water from the river anymore. The reason for this decision was not clear.

The border between El Hart Niaamine, Tadafalte and Achdad still exists as in those days. In addition, the conflict has determined that Tadafalte have no access to surface water of the Todgha river. This situation founds the figuration-thought of Elias that people's interactions change the configurations, which can be still influence present configurations.

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<sup>54</sup> A *liff* is an alliance system between two parties, which resulted often in a payment of one party to another party. In return for the payment, the paying party obtained protection. It appeared that the *liff* alliance system was matters of little importance to the Ait Atta and they were most significant for their markedly ad hoc character. Ait Atta preferred rather three different forms of protection, the *tazttat*, *tada* and *tafargant* to the *liff* alliance system. The *tazttat* is more suitable for this situation. *Tazttat* was a pact of protection, which involved a payment by the client (El Hart Niaamine) to his protector (Achdad) (Hart 1981: 183-185).

<sup>55</sup> See previous paragraph 3. For the Arab proverb to understand the motives of the inhabitants of Achdad to fight against their 'relatives'.

<sup>56</sup> Probably, the villagers of El Hart Niaamine are helped by the inhabitants of Achdad due to their previous closed *liff* alliance. I assume this because it is noticeable to the relations between members of Achdad and of Tadafalte, see further information in this paragraph.

<sup>57</sup> The border is marked in map 3.1.

Today, the three parties disagree about pieces of land, which are situated in the area of the *khettaras* of Tadafalte. El Hart Niaamine and Achdad claimed this land as theirs about two years ago. Before this period started, people from Achdad and Tadafalte could intermarry (with the black population of El Hart Niaamine intermarriage is impossible). After the claim, intermarriage was forbidden. For Achdad-people living in Tadafalte and Tadafalte-people living in Achdad it became difficult to visit their relatives in the other villages. Due of the claim, the ancient feelings of the previous described war came up again, resulting in open and sometimes violent hostility against each other. Tadafalte tried to solve the problem with Achdad by making a council with them. This was futile. After a stone-fight (1998) between villagers of Tadafalte and of El Hart Niaamine<sup>58</sup>, and the destruction of the access road from Tadafalte to Taghzoute, the *caid* interfered. His interference did not solve anything, only a temporary cooling of the situation (Fieldwork, File Interview *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 1 1999). One can still witness the hostile attitude back and forth. I occasionally eyewitnessed small slinging-matches between both parties.

This implies, in Elias' view, that configurations between Tadafalte and its neighbours are alive. The power balance of people on one side constantly determines this process. The stone-fight and the small slinging-matches are not done for nothing. On the other side, both parties claim the land on opposing facts (process of meaning systems). The different claims indicate that they give a different meaning to the situation. The meaning of being a descendant of the tribe Aït Atta is an important element in the way of life in Tadafalte. For this reason, the relation between Aït Atta and Tadafalte's inhabitants is explained in the next paragraph.

### 3.3. Aït Atta & Tadafalte

*'We are one happy family'*

Repeatedly, I was told that the inhabitants of Tadafalte were 'one happy family'. They gave as reason for this phenomenon that all villagers of Tadafalte, except for one family, were descendants of the mighty tribe Aït Atta, and specifically they all descended from one ancestor. This means no families of other lineages, except for one, was living among them. This situation resulted and stills results in a strong group identity. The Arab proverb, which is outlined in chapter 2.3.4., reflects most the situation in Tadafalte and their strong feelings of 'one happy

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<sup>58</sup> It seems if Achdad did not play a major role in this conflict but it is also possible that the respondent deliberately left out their role in their stories because the inhabitants of Achdad are in a way "family".

family'. To understand the composition of Tadafalte's 'one happy family', in this paragraph I outline the single outsider family and the segmentary social structure of the Aït Atta related to Tadafalte's inhabitants.

The Aït Atta is a Berber tribe with a segmentary social structure. The social structure of this tribe originates from the 'Five Fifth'. The 'Five Fifth' are descendants of the ancestor Atta. The 'Five Fifth' are Aït Wahlim, Aït Wallal/Aït Unir, Aït Isful/Aït'Alwan, Aït Unibgi and Aït 'Aïsa Mzin. Each Aït have several segments or lineages. Each segment has several sub-segments or sub-lineages. The villagers of Tadafalte are chiefly descendants from the 'grandfather' Wahlim. Aït Wahlim is segmented into Aït Zimru and Aït Hassu. Then, Aït Zimru is divided into Aït Bu Iknifen, Aït 'Aïsa, Aït Ilimshan and Aït Ignawen. Aït Ignawen is segmented into several fractions like Aït Ali and Aït Said (Hart 1981: 29-39).

All Tadafalte's inhabitants, except one family, are descendants of the sub-lineage Aït Ignawen. The exceptional family belongs to the group *shurfa*. The *shurfa* is an ethnic group which claims direct lineage from prophet Mohammed. In the past, the villagers of Tadafalte believed that these (holy) people could play a religious role in the community. As the respondents said: '*They expected that those people could bring peace to their village*'. By offering them a house and a piece of land, Tadafalte's inhabitants wanted to attract the *shurfa* families to come and live in Tadafalte. The families Moulay Brahim and Moulay Ahmed actually came to live in Tadafalte (Fieldwork, File Dairy March 9th-16th 1999). In Elias' perspective, the configuration of Tadafalte was extended on religious grounds.

Several years ago, the religious role of *shurfa* declined. My respondents argued that more people could read and peoples' belief in the religious role of the *shurfa* weakened. For this reason, many of the *shurfa* families decided to return to their place of birth. Some of the *shurfa* families sold their land to inhabitants of Tadafalte. Others abandoned it. As I said earlier, only one family stayed in Tadafalte. This family does not have a religious role anymore. Their religious role has been taken over by the *marabout*<sup>59</sup> (Fieldwork, File Dairy March 9th-16th 1999, File Interviews *amghar & aiyans*, respondent 3 1999).

One can find five fractions in Tadafalte, namely Aït Ichou, Aït Ali, Aït Hsaine, Aït Said and Aït Bourbratine. The five fractions are again divided in sub-fractions and families. Aït Said and Aït Bourbratine are the smallest fractions and Aït Ichou is the largest fractions of the village. The five fractions together are responsible for the organisation of the village. In the village, they perceive Aït Said and Aït Bourbratine as one fraction. This has several implications on the organisation of water (see further in dialogue) (Fieldwork, File Dairy March 1th-7th 1999).

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<sup>59</sup> Comparable with a minister



According to Tadafalte's inhabitants, it is exceptional that in one village most villagers are of one lineage. Frequently, fractions of different sub-lineage live in one village. This can cause tensions and conflicts because fractions will choose the side, which is most next of kin. Elias also calls this process a social constraint, which is developed throughout the years and has become virtually automatic for the users. For example, the Aït Atta was a warlike nomad tribe in the past. They have a long history of wars with other tribes and among each other. The latter happened often. The Aït Atta had a lot of success during the wars. Many people feared them during that time (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999, Hart 1981). According to Elias, the configurations of the five fractions in Tadafalte are less in flux because the inhabitants of Tadafalte apply predominantly the same process of meaning system to events.

The kinship determines not only the mutual relations with other groups in the valley but it also has other lasting influences, like the way Tadafalte is organised. The kinship created some specific features of Tadafalte's organisation, which still have major impact on the control over water. For this reason, the next structural features of Tadafalte's organisation around water are explained. First, the different possessions of land and the way, in which the land is divided, are reviewed. Then, the system of water rights is explained. The paragraph is enclosed by a paragraph over the essence of these features for Tadafalte's social organisation of water.

### 3.4. Land & Water in Tadafalte

Until the day I left Tadafalte, the system of water rights connected to land in the traditional zone remained a subject of discussion between my respondents and me. The respondents, especially the elder of Tadafalte, explained to me many times how the division of water, related to land possession operates, but it remained puzzling to me. To its practitioners it was not.

As in all oasis settlements, land and water are two important interrelated elements for the way a village is organised. Without water, the villagers cannot cultivate their land and without land, the peasants can use water only for drinking. The two elements are interrelated, otherwise one cannot survive in such surroundings. Together they form a powerful tool. If one element is not present, the other element loses its value because only the possession of both elements is of any use in those surroundings. In general, the person who possesses the scarcest resources is the most powerful one in the social relations. The scarcer the resources, the bigger the dependency, and the more important it becomes to gain and keep control over the resources in order to exercise influence in the social relations (Pfeffer 1992: 38-41).

For this reason, in the next paragraph the basis elements land and water, of Tadafalte's organisation are explained. The information is mainly derived from formal and informal interviews during my stay in Tadafalte, underlined by the information of the Hart study (1981).

### *Land possession & Taggourte*

In Tadafalte, four kinds of land possession are found: the *bled milk* (private land), the *bled kharadj* (collective land), the *habous* (religious land) and the land that was given to the *shurfa*. The *bled milk* is private land (Lentjes 1981: 78). According to the villagers of Tadafalte, the lineage of Aït Ignawen bought land from the first people in the valley, about four centuries ago. This land became predominantly private land, and had to be divided among the families of the lineage's five fractions. The lineage consisted of 216 families. Each family of the lineage should receive a plot of land of the same quality. To obtain plots of land of the same quality, Tadafalte's ancestors evaluated the surface areas, nature of terrain, water points and aquifer depth. Then, they divided the traditional zone in variable stages: usually an upstream zone, an intermediate zone and a downstream zone. Through this, every family received several plots of land in one zone (Hart 1981: 107, Fieldwork<sup>60</sup>). These plots of land were named *taggourte*. The total surface of the plot of land (one *taggourte*) was on average 1152 square meters. The amount of *taggourtes* became 216 equal to the amount of families that would establish originally in Tadafalte. The name *taggourte* was connected to possession of land and the additional water right in the traditional zone. Water rights and possession of land could hardly be seen separately (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

This prevented that only one family obtained a plot of land near the water source, the *khettara* or the *segua*, where as the other family's plot was situated far from the water source. This explains the existence of a stage of the traditional zone far from the irrigation system. The land in question could only be irrigated by a lot of rain or a high water level (see map 3.1. for its location). All families obtained a plot of land in this area (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999). Through this division of land, one can say in the light of Elias' perspective that the organisation of lineage tried to prevent unequal relations in the configuration of the lineage. This did not succeeded due to moves in the configurations, which were not predicted.

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<sup>60</sup> From the interviews with the *amghar* and *aiyans* it appeared that the new zones were divided according to the same system as applied in the past. One of the features of this system is that every family has to obtain a plot of land of the same value. This was one of the reasons that every family had more plots of land than one (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 2,4 & 8 1999).

Not all families of the lineage's five fractions decided to stay in Tadafalte. Some of them settled somewhere else and often sold their land to relatives. The move of the families had consequences for the proportion of the five fractions. For example, the fraction Aït Said is a small fraction in Tadafalte but in Timadrouine, Aït Said is the biggest fraction of that village (Fieldwork, File Diary 9-16 February 1999). In addition, the move of the families and the sell of their land to their relatives explain why some families in Tadafalte have more *taggourte* than other families have nowadays (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999). As mentioned in my theoretical framework, the configuration in Tadafalte changed and dependency relations were created around the possession of *taggourte*. The person, who possessed the most of this resource, was often also the most powerful in the social relations.

The consequence of peasants having several plots of land in the traditional zone was, and still is, that irrigation water from the *khattara* had to circulate over long distances in order to irrigate all the plots. The plots are generally not situated next to each other but, as I explained before, scattered over the whole traditional zone. The irrigation water has to be transported from one plot to another. As a result, it is not easy irrigating all the fields the peasant owns. In addition, it creates also water loss because it remains in the *seguia* when it has to be transported from one plot to another (Fieldwork 1999<sup>61</sup>).

The *bled kharadj* is land that can be used for collective purposes, for example for building a mosque. At the time I left Tadafalte, the villagers were building a new mosque at a piece of this land. The *amghar* and *aiyans* appoint a specific person who controls the land, called *amghar n-igran* (more information, see next chapter). *Habous*<sup>62</sup> land belongs to the mosque. In the past, Tadafalte's inhabitants had given a plot of their land to the mosque in the religious persuasion that it was a good deed. As the respondents formulated the good deed: "*We hoped this gesture would bring us closer to Paradise*". The *habous*-land was occasionally given without the water right belonging to this land. Nevertheless, these plots of land were frequently situated near the irrigation channel, the *seguia*. As a result, even without irrigation, the plots of land were provided with water via underground leakage from the irrigation channel due to water loss (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999).

In the past, sometimes the villagers rented the *habous*-land out of religious obligation. The rent and a part of the harvest went to the mosque. Today the mosque possesses about five *taggourte* (the surface of five *taggourtes*, not the water right belonging to the five *taggourtes*) Only olive- and almonds trees grow on this land. It is for this reason that villagers do not want to rent the land anymore: it is not productive (too many trees and no sun). The *amghar* and

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<sup>61</sup> I observed the process of water transportation and water loss during my walks through the fields.

<sup>62</sup> *Habous* is in principle a religious foundation, which its possession cannot be divided or alienated. Its yield was intended for religious or humanitarian purposes (Driessen 1997: 349).

*aiyans* maintain and control the *habous* land. They harvest the land and sell the harvest to the highest bidder. The reason villagers want to buy the harvest, is that they see it as their religious duty. The profit is used for care and maintenance of the mosque. As I remarked earlier, Tadafalte's inhabitants had given land to the *shurfa* for their religious role. The possession of this land included the right to the water on the plot of land (Fieldwork, File March 9th-16th 1999).

After the villagers of Tadafalte bought the land several centuries ago, the villagers claimed two other zones in 1960 and 1970. These two zones were not claimed at once by the villagers, for they did not consider the need for land. The different zones were not sub-divided among the families in one time either. Instead this was done in three (second zone) or four (third zone) stages. The additional plots of land were adequate for Tadafalte's population. In addition, the traditional village council wanted every family to obtain a plot of land of the same value. This means the former (ancient) system of dividing land was applied in the newly claimed zones. The respondents of the traditional village council gave the following argument for this way of dividing the land: "*It was once done this way. That was good, now we do it again this way.*" (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). In Elias' view, Tadafalte's figuration legitimated their actions by giving meaning, the previous named argument, to the way that they divided the land.

A necessary condition for peasants to obtain land in the new zone was to own a *taggourte* and correspondingly the right to the water. The villagers decided that the *shurfa* and the land for the mosque (*habous*) were not taking along by the division of the new claimed land. In other words, no land was reserved for the mosque or for the *shurfas*. Although the *shurfa* owned *taggourte* (land and water right), they did not obtain the right to land in the second nor in the third zone. The villagers did not want to give more land gifts to the *shurfa* anymore. Their religious role had lost its value and along with it their right on land in the second and third zone (Fieldwork, File Diary April 1999). This player, based on its religious grounds, was played out in the game of the interrelated issues of water and land.

The *amghar n-igran* had a different reason for the *shurfa*-family not obtaining land in the newly zones. "*The shurfa obtained land in the past from our grandfathers on the condition that they have no rights to obtain more land in any following division.*" (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran* 1999). No plots of land were reserved as *habous*-land was created in the new zone. In the point of view of the *taggourte*-owners the *habous*-land was given without the right for water and without this right one could not obtain a plot of land in the new stages. For the same reason, villagers who did not possess *taggourtes* or the right to water did not gain a plot of land in the new zones. In the new zones the traditional village council did reserve land for collective purposes, a new *bled kharadj* was

created. This land could be used for future collective purposes. Whether the new collective land was equally to the amount of *taggourte* (and the water right) the *bled kharadj* consisted of before, did not become clear. Probable, in the view of the traditional village council, only worthless land was reserved for collective purposes because the purposes for the land were for example a school, and not for agriculture work (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

The division of a stage of a newly claimed zone was as follows. First the land of the stage was measured up. After a small calculation, the surface of one *taggourte* was determined. The total surface of the stage was divided into four sections, because two fractions were seen as one in the village. The four fields were equally divided to the total amount of *taggourtes* owned by the fraction. The fraction divided the surface of land among the (fraction-) families into plots of land. The plots of land were equal to the amount of *taggourte* a family possessed. Therefore, if a family owned three *taggourtes*, the family obtained  $3/216$  part of the surface of the claimed stage in one zone. This occurred several times in every zone. A consequence was that every peasant owning *taggourte* had several plots of land spread out over the three zones (about ten pieces in total) (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). Shortly: A person who possessed many *taggourtes* in the traditional zone, obtained much land in the new zones. To irrigate the fields, the peasants need water. The next paragraph explains through what kind of system the water is divided.

### ***Water rights***

Water rights and water division numerically corresponds to land rights and land division. The water right is based on possession of *taggourte* in the traditional zone. The possession of one *taggourte* also offers the right to water of the traditional irrigation system, the *khattara*, for a certain time. Nowadays one *taggourte* corresponds with, on average, one hour and twenty minutes of water from the *khattara*. This irrigation system is also called time management because the owner is free to use the allotted time to irrigate anywhere he or she wishes (Findlay 1994: 133). In the past, they used a different time-measure, the *tanast*<sup>63</sup>. One *tanast* corresponded with circa seven/eight minutes. For one *taggourte* the peasant obtained on average ten *tanasts*. After the French introduced the clock to Tadafalte's villagers, they used (clock) time as measure in stead of the *tanast* (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, May 1999).

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<sup>63</sup> A *tanast* is like a little dish with a tiny hole. The dish was put in a bucket filled with water. The time until the little dish sank, was the time of one *tanast* (Fieldwork, Diary May 1999).

The exact amount of *tanasts* or the exact time of irrigation depends on the season and hour of receiving the water. Irrigation is a continuous process. It takes place day and night, and is calculated in months, days, hours and minutes. A day of twenty-four hours is divided in a day and night. A day starts with the sunrise and ends with the sunset. Both the day as well as the night contain nine *taggourtes* each. In twenty-four hours this makes eighteen *taggourtes*. Therefore, it takes twelve days before all *taggourte*-owners have had their right on water ( $12 \times 18 = 216$ ). This is also called the water turn. In the past, all villagers of Tadafalte agreed over the indicator of water turn of 12 days. As experience, in that time they changed the water turn once into 18 days<sup>64</sup>. This means the amount of time of the *taggourte* became longer but the time between each irrigation also. The experience did not become a success. Especially in summer, the harvest failed because the land was not sufficiently irrigated. For this reason, they reversed the water turn into 12 days again (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

In the old days, in Tadafalte, the water turn of twelve days followed a fixed pattern of succession of fractions, which lived in the village. Reason for the fixed pattern is that the all plots of land of one fraction are situated next to each other (see previous paragraph for the way land is divided). In a way, the villagers prevented water loss, otherwise the water had to circulate over long distances in order to irrigate the fields of the given fraction. Today, through the sell of *taggourtes*, the patterns of irrigation series have changed. There are peasants, which have several irrigation series. The irrigation series are not only with families of the same sub-fraction the peasant belongs to, but also with other. Despite this fact, every peasant knows precisely with whom he has the irrigation series (Hart 1981: 108, Fieldwork, Dairy March 1th-7th 1999, May 1999).

Depending on the season, a day or night may be longer or shorter. The only two days when every *taggourte*-owner receives the exact same time of water are on March 22 and September 21. After March, the days become longer: after September they turn shorter. The supplementary (in March, during the day) or less minutes or hours (in September, during the day), will be divided among the *taggourte*-owners. Then a *taggourte*-owner can receive one-hour and twenty-one minutes instead of one hour and twenty minutes. The amount of minutes can increase to the maximum of one hour and thirty four minutes. The other irrigation series (the opposite series) obtain less and less minutes. This system does not cause any problems because every villager for all *taggourte*-owners is well informed about this system (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

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<sup>64</sup> A water turn of 18 days means that it takes 18 days before a peasant gains his time of irrigation (the amount of *taggourte* he possess) water after the day he last irrigated (18 days ago).

As I mentioned before, the pattern of irrigation has changed because people sold their land and water rights in the past. When land is sold, generally the associated water right is also sold. Today, it happens that people only sell their land or their water rights (see the case of El Hart Niaamine in chapter 2.4.). The last situation does not occur often because the value of land declined. Water rights, most of the time, are linked to rights to land. The declining happens because, as mentioned in the introduction of this paragraph, both elements are essential to survive in surroundings such as the Todgha valley. Without water, the land cannot be cultivated and so on. Losing one of the two elements means declining of the value of the other element.

In Tadafalte, the inhabitants did not sell much land of traditional zone, which were linked to the water right (the *taggourte*). If a peasant decide to sell his *taggourte*, he will lose both the land and the right on water from the *khettara*, and some other rights. Predominantly, the villagers only sold land from the second and third zone. With that land, the water right was not sold as well because with this land no new water rights were connected. Some of the pieces of land in these zones were of no use for peasants because the water from the *khettara* could not reach the fields (Hart 1981: 108, *Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999*). The rights and the essence of the possession of the *taggourte* are explained in the following paragraph.

#### ***The essence of the taggourte-system***

A *taggourte* exists of part water and a part land. It is of variable dimensions and volume, depending on its location and the annual rainfall (Hart 1981: 116). In Tadafalte, the water rights are linked to possession of land, the *taggourte*, in the traditional zone of 216 *taggourtes*. Possession of *taggourte* in the traditional zone is extremely important for it determines the social relations in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. This determined element for Tadafalte's organisation of water underlines Pfeffer's ideas in the beginning of this paragraph. Through possession of the scarce resources one can influence the social relations (Pfeffer 1992: 38-41).

The first point of the importance about *taggourte*-possession is the emotional link to ancestors. As the peasants put it over and over again: '*That land, we obtained it from our ancestors, and what one obtains from the ancestors, remains in our possession*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). They ascribe a high value to possession obtained from ancestors. The importance of the *taggourte* can be indicated by the selling of the *taggourte*-possession. In Tadafalte, this is only done when there is no other solution for the situation (see the example of El Hart Niaamine, in chapter 3.4.). As a peasant put it: '*Selling your taggourte is no question in our village.*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasant, respondent 11 1999).

In Pfeffer and Salancik's view of the emotional alliances to the ancestral lands indicates a constraint, whose basis is religion. The constraint can have great influence on the actions of individuals, like not selling their *taggourte* even though people live and work in another city or country. Then, constraints can withhold development processes of Tadafalte's organisation.

In addition, the amount of *taggourte* determine for example the time of maintenance of the irrigation system *khattara*, how much money a *taggourte*-owner needs to pay for the *marabout* or maintenance of the irrigation system<sup>65</sup>, whether they will be chosen for the traditional village council, the *amghar* and *aiyans* and their plot of land in the new claimed zones. The general way to obtain *taggourtes* is by inheritance, which is governed according to the rules of the Muslim Law. A peasant will not sell his *taggourte* easily. If the peasant does sell, he will prefer, often out of social obligation, to sell it to its relatives or people of the same fraction (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

The *taggourte*-owner can treat his possession just like shares, like he also obtained the amount of *taggourte* through inheritance. It is possible to obtain or sell only a third of the *taggourte*-possession. Some *taggourte*-owners possess only one-sixteenth of *taggourte* in the traditional zone. Along with the selling, the peasant will lose any future advantages, like a part of land in newly claimed zones (Hart 1981: 116-119, Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999). The following example clarifies the importance of owning *taggourte* for one's position in Tadafalte's organisation:

*One family of Tadafalte owns the biggest plots of land of the village. They make the best profits of Tadafalte. The CMV visits the family, personally, every fifteen days while other farmers of the village are not of interest for the CMV (They visit them much less). One will expect that the traditional village council will ask the head of the family for example for advice on agriculture because this family has good agricultural yields. However, this is not the case. The problem is that the family does not own any taggourte in the traditional zone. They only own land in the second zone. Land that they have bought from the amghar and aiyans (collective land) because the traditional village council thought it was useless (see previous paragraph). Although the family is successful in their agricultural policy, the family does not obtain the same rights from the amghar and aiyans as other farmers, like the protection of the fields<sup>66</sup>. The family protects its own fields against the small children who run through their fields or steal fruits from them. In return, the family is not obligated to help or to pay anything that is related to taggourte-possession but they will also never be chosen for the traditional village council. Contradictory, the family has to obey the general rules, which are made by the traditional village council. For example, if one of the members of the family has a fight with another villager, this person has to pay a fine to the traditional village council (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants respondent 36 1999).*

<sup>65</sup> For these activities the same calculation is made as described over the division of land. For more information see also next paragraph.

<sup>66</sup> The protection of the *amghar* and *aiyans* for the land is a right for a peasant who owns *taggourte*. The protection concerns mostly that little children are punished for stealing products from the fields.



The above described case shows that the importance of the condition ‘*taggourte*-possession’ in Tadafalte. The determining condition seeks to that this family works individually in the village, ignored by the traditional village council. In return, the family is free of any social obligation connected to *taggourte*-possession, but not released from the general rules, which apply in the village and are made by the traditional village council. Shortly: peasants without *taggourtes* seemed to be unimportant for peasants who do possess *taggourte(s)* and for the traditional village council. The social relations are unequal. This is especially noticeable for the fact that villagers without *taggourte*-possession will never be chosen for the traditional village council regardless of whatever these villagers carry out good agriculture policy or do other good things for the village (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, File Interviews landless people).

All three paragraphs were about land and water and their importance for Tadafalte’s organisation related to the interrelated issues of water and land. What kind of influences and determined factors both elements have on the social relations between the players related to Tadafalte’s organisation of water in, is explained in the next chapter. However, this chapter did not review the function of the irrigation systems in Tadafalte, and what sort of changes they underwent. The following paragraph is about this subject because it is important for the reader to imagine how the systems came into being and how they operate. The current irrigation system(s) transports, water, the subject of this paper, which influence Tadafalte’s organisation.

### 3.5. The Irrigation Systems of Tadafalte

This paragraph deals with the different irrigation systems, found in Tadafalte. In addition, this paragraph reviews the changes the irrigation systems underwent, the interfering players related to the changes in the irrigation system, and the consequences of the changes on the water supply and on Tadafalte’s organisation of water. First, Tadafalte’s traditional irrigation system is outlined. The second paragraph describes the changes in the traditional irrigation system. The introduction of the water pump and its consequences are reviewed in the third paragraph. To clarify the irrigation systems, a drawing is added to this paragraph.

### *Tadafalte's traditional irrigation system*

In Tadafalte one can find the traditional irrigation system, the *khettara*. In the past, people from another region (experts) built the *khettara* for the villagers of Tadafalte. To build and dig such a system was, and still is, dangerous work. The villagers of Tadafalte were obligated to build a *khettara*, because they did not obtain intermittent surface water from the Todgha river. Their first series of connected water wells is one kilometre long and starts in the desert close to the Saghro Mountains. The first well in the series is about 40 metres deep. When the channel reaches the field, it is attached to the *seguia* system, which contains two main veins. These two main veins are used to channel the water and to reduce water losses (Fieldwork, Drawing 12 March 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran* 1999).

The village also obtains abundant water from the Saghro Mountains since Tadafalte is situated at the foot of the Saghro. Abundant water reaches the village as an overwhelming mud stream. The floods can happen several times a year but also not once during drought years. A long time ago the overwhelming stream created several riverbeds in the desert and in the fields, which are only filled with water when it is abundantly available. The rest of the year the riverbeds are dry. Two main riverbeds run throughout the fields, which are called the *azzif* and the *izif* (respectively the big and small river). The *azzif* and the *izif* are also the borders of the three zones, except for one piece of traditional land situated in the second zone (see map 3.1.). In the past, this piece of land could only be irrigated when the overwhelming stream of water reaches Tadafalte. For this reason, the peasant cultivated mostly grains on these plots (Fieldwork, Drawing March 12th 1999, File Diary May 1999).

To channel the water, one tries to maintain the riverbeds in the fields as well as in the open area where the river (and water wells) originates. In the past, the villagers built a separate *khettara* to use this water by channelling it into the fields via this *khettara*. In this way, everybody could irrigate his fields at the same time. This separate *khettara* still exists. The villagers maintain the riverbeds to prevent land erosion because the stream can sweep away pieces of land, which often occurs (see plate 3.7. for such flood in Tadafalte) (Fieldwork, Drawing 12 March 1999, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999). The next paragraph, along with other changes in the irrigation systems, deals with how Tadafalte solved the dangerous erosion of the streams.

### *Changes in the traditional irrigation system, the khettara.*

Sometimes it happens that the mud stream in the river destroys the *segua*. In 1960, the traditional village council, the *amghar* and *aiyans*, decided that, as a result of this problem, the *segua* had to be braced. The traditional village council also claimed land during that period. This newly claimed land was dependent on the *segua* for its water supply<sup>67</sup>. To prevent the destruction of the water supply, the two main veins of the *segua* were braced with concrete. In addition, the villagers built an underground tunnel at places where the river met the *segua* (sort of aqueduct, see plate 3.5.). The costs of this project were divided among all villagers who owned *taggourte*. The *taggourte*-owners also had to help with the project. The amount of money or work to be contributed by the villager was dependent on the *taggourte* he owned. Therefore, if the project had cost 20.000 dirham, first 20.000 dirham is divided into 216, the total amount of *taggourtes* of the traditional zone. By doing so, the price per *taggourte* is settled. Then, every *taggourte*-owner has to pay the price per *taggourte* times the number of *taggourte* he possesses. This means, a person who possess nine *taggourte*, has to pay nine times the *taggourte*-price of that project, and someone who possess only one-sixteenth, has to pay 1/16 of the *taggourte*-price. The work and all kind of other matters like the payment of the *marabout* were divided in a similar manner. Tennekes defines the system of this division related to *taggourte*-possession as an element of the organisation-as-a-structure. This way of dividing has become a fixed mechanism, which determines the outcome of people's actions. The work of bracing the *segua* was finished in 1967. The advantages of the braced *segua* and the underground tunnel were less maintenance and less water loss. In addition, the peasant had the possibility to irrigate the second and third zone with water from the *khettara* (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999)

Later, it appeared that the water of the *khettara* was not sufficient to irrigate the newly obtained land. In Tennekes view, this is the result of the interaction between the actions of the members of the organisation of Tadafalte, claiming new land and the objective realities of the structure, the water supply of the *khettara*. In addition, the population of Tadafalte grew and there was more need for drinking water from the *khettara*. These factors made the population of Tadafalte decide to submit a request to the agricultural organisation, the ORMVA. The request contained a purpose to build a new series of water wells, which were connected underground by a channel, to bring the groundwater to the surface (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Interviews peasants respondent 22 1999).

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<sup>67</sup> The two main veins already existed before the second zone and third zones were claimed. The two main veins supplied water to the traditional zone, which could only be irrigated, by abundant water (see previous chapter).

Based on a social-economic study the ORMVA granted the request and paid all costs of constructing the new *khettara*. A social-economic study becomes positive<sup>68</sup> when the costs of the project balance the yields. A second condition of the granting is that many people have to profit from the investment (Fieldwork, Interview ORMVA 1999). The position of the ORMVA is relatively strong in the relation to the villages, which submits a request. Pfeffer and Salancik also call such a relationship, from the village's point of view, a competitive relationship. Many villages want to benefit from the ORMVA, but only some requests are accepted because of a small budget. The villages will compete by trying to influence the decision-process of the ORMVA because they need some transactions with their context to survive.

Before a decision about the request is made by the OMRVA, an engineer from Ouarzazate visits the spot. The role of the sub-division CMV in Tinghir is minor in the decision process over accepting requests. The CMV is always obligated to send *all* requests to the ORMVA. The main office in Ouarzazate is the final decision maker over the granting of requests. The engineer of the ORMVA gathers data for the social-economic study. In addition, he takes measures and acquires knowledge to solve the problem. For his solution, the engineer takes also into account the villagers' ideas because they have experience with the situation, which caused the problem. After this visit, the engineer writes a report of the problem and of the costs. If from the rapport appears that the request still has high priority, the request will be discussed in a council. In this council, the governor, people of the ORMVA and members of the House of Agriculture<sup>69</sup> have a seat. They make the final decision over the request. But, as said by the respondent of the ORMVA, other factors, like political influences of the governor, personal preferences, a natural disaster like a flood and so on, can also have great impact on the decision of the council (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

Pfeffer and Salancik also call these influences the organisation context of Tadafalte. The political influences and the natural disasters are events, which have effect on the outcome for Tadafalte. The outcome for Tadafalte is affected when their request is rejected because of an event, like personal preferences. Tadafalte can also try to control its context by reacting to events. A respondent from Tadafalte told me by a gesture such reaction after I asked him the reason for the granting of the request for Tadafalte. He did not answer my question but only showed one hand full with imaginary money (Fieldwork, Diary May 1999, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 12-14).

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<sup>68</sup> The social economic study is positive if the request will be accepted.

<sup>69</sup> The House of Agriculture is an organisation for peasants. The people who take a seat in this organisation are chosen by their district and usually have as profession farmer (the Todgha valley has two representatives in the council). Their function in the council is predominantly to inform the agricultural institutions about the present situation in their district from the point of view of the peasant. They do not earn any money, only their travel costs are repaid.

People from another region (from the Draâ Valley I was told) built the second *khettara*, like in the past. These people finished their work in 1982 or 1983. The new series of water wells are built at the south-western side (seen from the village). It has a length of two kilometres. The old *khettara* has a length of one kilometre. Both end at water well. From this water well, a channel transports the water from both *khettara*-supply pipes to the fields (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Interviews peasants respondent 22 6/4/99).

The new *khettara* gave more water, but had negative side effects on the water level of the old *khettara*. The water level of the old *khettara* sank. Today two-third of the total series of the water wells of the old *khettara* are dry (see map 3.2.). In spite of this negative effect of the new *khettara*, both *khettaras* supply more water than the old *khettara* did. In addition, Tadafalte is one of the best-endowed *khettara*-villages in its surroundings. In Taghia and El Hart Niaamine, the *khettara* does not provide as much water as in Tadafalte. Some of their *khettaras* 'died'<sup>70</sup> (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Interviews peasants respondent 22 1999, El Ghanjou & De Haas 2000).

The water that streams during violent floods from the mountains occasionally destroyed several parts of both *khettaras* over and over again. Because of this, Tadafalte's inhabitants had less drinking and irrigation water, while the population was still growing. In the nineties, the villagers represented by the traditional village council, decided to submit a request about this problem to the ORMVA<sup>71</sup>. The request was to cover the *khettaras* (see plate 3.6.). The ORMVA had granted most part of the request because the conditions for implementing the request had changed. The villagers had to pay between 10 and 40 percent of the total costs of the solution. The amount of the investment could be paid in money or in work force<sup>72</sup>. Since 1996, this condition for implementing a request became valid because the agricultural organisation noticed that villages did not take any responsibility for an implemented project. If the agricultural organisation built a new *khettara* for the village, the villagers did not maintain the *khettara* as they did previously. In the province, there was a growing attitude of "we do not have to repair the *khettara*, the ORMVA is obligated to do that". By creating of the condition of paying 10 to 40 percent of the total costs, the ORMVA expects that people take some responsibility for the implemented project in their village. In addition, the budget of the ORMVA is not sufficient for the amount of requests the ORMVA receives. By setting this

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<sup>70</sup> The term 'died' indicated that the supply of water from a *khettara* is of vital importance to people in these surroundings. Without the water supply, no life is possible.


<sup>71</sup> The traditional village council tried to submit a request to the ORMVA every year. The request was almost always about the *khettara*. These two requests are mentioned for they were granted by the ORMVA.

<sup>72</sup> The distribution code of the 10-40 percent did not become clear (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent ORMVA 1999).

condition, the agricultural organisation can accept more requests. On average ten percent of all requests are accepted today (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

The result of the implemented request in Tadafalte was that most parts of the (right) *khettara* and the collective channel until the fields were covered in 1996. Only the parts of the *khettara* were covered, which were always ruined by the water streams. However, many people believe that more wells have to be dug. According to them, there is still not enough water for irrigation and daily use. This problem increases because the villagers are dependent on the *khettara* for their drinking water. In 1998, their other source for drinking water, a solar-powered water tower<sup>73</sup>, was destroyed by inhabitants of El Hart Niaamine. The inhabitants of Tadafalte did not make the attempt to renovate this system. They gave me as reason that they have no money and they believed the water this system would bring was too expensive. In the past, they did not even use this system in order to save money. 'The water of the *khettara* was free, why pay?' (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

The land's surface increased throughout the years but the water supply in proportion did not, with as a result less water for irrigating more land. Some people of Tadafalte solved this problem by buying a water pump for the land or for the house. The next paragraph deals with the reasons for the sale of the water pump and the effects of water pump on its surroundings.



Map 3.2. The map of Tadafalte's *khettara*

<sup>73</sup> The Canadian International Association of Development had made and paid the water tower and solar panels in Tadafalte (Fieldwork, File Diary March 1th-7th 1999).



Plate 3.3. Harvesting the alfalfa



Plate 3.4. The *khattara* is covered



Plate 3.5. The underground tunnels of the *segui*a



Plate 3.6. The mud stream from the Saghro Mountains



### *The introduction of the water pump in Tadafalte.*

The information for this paragraph is a summary of the interviews with peasants who own water pumps in the fields or in the house<sup>74</sup>. If the information is not from these interviews, it will be explicitly reported.

The first water pump in the Todgha valley made its entry in 1973. As a result, many peasants decided to purchase a water pump because by using it the peasants acquired more water for irrigation. In Tadafalte, one can find 16 water pumps. Most of these water pumps were bought after the villagers claimed land (the second and third zone). The water pumps are located especially in the third zone due to the third zone being situated far from the *khettara* (see map 3.1.). It takes a long time before the water of the *khettara* reaches the plots of land. Consequently a lot of water is lost. Some people cannot afford to buy a water pump, nor can they afford the water loss when the water is transported to the land in the second and third zone. Therefore, they decided not to cultivate these pieces of land at all. Some peasants that use a water pump exchanged plots of land with each other. As a consequence, the water pump can irrigate one big plot of land. Little green islands arose in the bare plains (see map 3.1. and plate 3.2.).

In the second and third zone, the water is pumped up from the ground water level. The water circulates by a self-made *segua* system (the green islands) or the old *segua*-system so one can channel the water to other plots of land. The fields obtain water in the same way as in the old system. Therefore, irrigation by water pump has almost the same disadvantages as the *khettara*: evaporation and water loss, only the water does not have to be transported over long distances like from the *khettara* to the third zone.

The cost of a water pump is high, about 30.000 dirham<sup>75</sup> (3055 dollars) just for the motor pump. In addition, a peasant has costs such as petrol (five dirham a litre). Some peasants find it too expensive to buy a water pump. Instead of a water pump in the field, these people decided to buy one for domestic use. This water pump is smaller and cheaper (1250 dirham). These kind of water pumps irrigate the garden at the house, provide drinking water so that the women do not have to carry water from the *khettara*, and sometimes they use it during their irrigation series. During the time of irrigation from the *khettara*, they add water from their water pump at the house to the *segua*. By means of an underground channel or pipe (such as a garden hose) the water is transported from their house to the *segua*. Unfortunately, the house-water pump does not have a great capacity, so that not much water can be added to the *segua*.

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<sup>74</sup> One can find the interviews at Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants respondents 1, 13, 14, 24, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, and 45 1999.

<sup>75</sup> During my stay, the exchange rate was US\$1=Dr9.82.

One can add on average one hour to two hours of water to the *seguia*, depending on the capacity of the water pump.

Most (field) water pump-owners believe the water pump is effective. The peasants who own a water pump in the field obtain a better harvest and have a small additional income by letting the water pump to villagers. The agricultural production of the peasants owning a water pump is better than that of peasants who do not possess a water pump because they can irrigate their fields whenever it is needed. Other peasants depend on the amount of water the *khettara* gives, which is not regular and most respondents cannot irrigate their fields every irrigation series. The general opinion of all peasants on the water pump is that it is good for the development of the village. Everybody can, often against payment, use the water pump once or twice for irrigation when they need it. The peasants assume the water pumps will not bring harm to other water sources, like their water supply, for they are situated too far from the *khettara* (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). Tadafalte's traditional village council will also never permit an inhabitant to install his water pump near the *khettara* (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 5, 8 1999).

In the past, people were not obligated to ask for permission to install a water pump in their field. Today, it is different, although not many peasants are well informed about the change. The change is that a peasant has to ask for permission at the CMV before he installs his water pump. After the submission, the CMV carries out a little research, and the peasant has to visit several institutions, like the *jamaa* of its district and the *caid*. If these institutions are positive about the installation of the water pump in the valley, the peasant obtains permission. This is also called the constraints in Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective. Organisations like the organisation of water in Tadafalte are affected by constraints. In this case, the constraint is the government, which try to assert influence by creating permission.

The rules are part of the law of water<sup>76</sup>, which is created by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The law of water proclaims that everything under the soil belongs to the state. This law is particularly aimed at people, who are able to obtain a lot of water out of the soil, what is the situation at the other side of the Atlas. These people are obligated to pay taxes for the amount of water according to the respondents of the CMV. In addition, the government wants to prevent conflicts between villages (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

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<sup>76</sup> The exact contents of this law, and when this law came into being was not clear (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

In the Todgha valley, this law is valid to protect people for water shortage. For example, it is forbidden to dig a well around Taghzoute because water pumps can affect the water supply for all Taghzoute's inhabitants. In this case, the public interest goes above the individual interest. Although the law becomes effective, not many peasants are well informed about this law. As the members of the CMV stated: '*We are in the Todgha valley to develop the agriculture, not to proclaim the law.*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent Boulmane 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 5 1999). This means that the government constraint has not as great influence on individuals' actions as it was intended. The next example shows the law, the constraint from the government, is not really applied:

*The overwhelming water stream from the Saghro Mountains does not only threaten Tadafalte, also some water pumps form a danger to the village. These water pumps are situated several kilometres from Tadafalte, in the area near Tiliouine. According to some sources<sup>77</sup>, these water pumps affect the water level of Tadafalte and its neighbourhood. A tribe claimed this area, which was previous pasture land. Tadafalte and some other villages took the matter to court. The result was that the lawsuit stated that the tribe was not allowed to claim and cultivate the land. For some reason, the tribe still cultivates and irrigates the land by means of water pumps despite a lawsuit and the previously named law (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, *amghar n-igran*, respondent 6, 8 1999).*

This case also well found Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective on organisations. When the context of the organisation changes -the installation of water pumps in the Saghro Mountains- the supply of the resource water becomes less. Tadafalte has reacted on this contextual change by undertaking actions -proclaiming a lawsuit- to stop the problem the changed context caused.

In the previous paragraphs, all determined conditions for the agricultural life in Tadafalte were dealt with. What is missing are the cultivation methods and its influences on everyday life in Tadafalte. This is explained in the next paragraph.

### 3.6. Agriculture & the Peasants

About eighty percent of Tadafalte's inhabitants own *taggourtes*. They mainly cultivate their land for subsistence life. This plays a crucial role in the (traditional) agriculture of Tadafalte. Agriculture in the traditional zone in Tadafalte is mostly dominated by mixed crops underneath a permanent tree crop (associated crops). Mixed crops means that two or more crops are planted in the same field. In actual practice in Tadafalte, the land is cultivated with one dominant crop such as alfalfa. At the borders of the field, the land is cultivated with vegetables

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<sup>77</sup> The sources are the *amghar n-igran*, and respondent 6 and 8 from the File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999.

like onions. Usually these two crops grow under a permanent tree. Permanent trees can be date palms, almond trees, olive trees and sometimes an apple tree (Casley & Lury 1991: 195). According to Hamza, orchard-cultivators are in such (oasis) societies a sign of modernisation (Fieldwork, File Articles Aït Hamza (b): 83, Fieldwork, Diary February 15th 1999). In other words: the cultivation of almond, olives and apple trees is only made possible through the usage of a modern technique the water pump. Trees need more water than other agricultural products and they have to be irrigated during the summer. In the second and the third zone, the fields are much more open. This means the crops can grow in open spots and not so many trees as in the traditional zone are withholding the sun. Reason for the open areas is that the land is cultivated just as of recently in comparison with land in the traditional zone (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999).

The opinions of the peasants about which zone is most productive differ. The general opinion is that the harvest depends on the available amount of water, the amount of sun, and the time of work that is put in the cultivation of the land. Most peasants explained these arguments by telling that land in the traditional zone is most productive because it is situated next to the water source, the *khettara*, and the land was already prepared for cultivation in the past. Other peasants had a different view. They substantiated that the land in the new zones was most productive because the land was new and not worn out like the land of the traditional zone. In addition, there were not so many trees as in the traditional zone to withhold the sun. The only disadvantages of land in the new zone were that it is situated far from the *khettara*, and it takes a lot of work to prepare it for cultivation. The land had to be cleaned of stones, ploughed, and one had to apply small irrigation channels to drain water from one of the veins of the *segui*a to the field. This implies that the water pump-holders, if they put a lot of work into it, benefit most of the land of the newly zones because they have the ability to irrigate the fields regularly. Other peasants are not able to irrigate their fields whenever they want (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999).

The *khettara* does not contain enough water to irrigate all plots of land in all three zones. The consequence is that a peasant, who is dependent on the traditional irrigation system for its water, cannot irrigate his total surface land every twelve days when it is his water turn. Most peasants decide to irrigate their plots every twenty-four days if the crop does not need more water to grow. The land in the second and third zone is often too far and too small for the use of irrigation by means of the *khettara* or the water pump. Then, most peasants decided to abandon the plots of land because water transportation from the *khettara* to these plots was useless. Before the water reaches the plot via the irrigation channels, the *souagui*, it will evaporate. There are some people who have land but do not cultivate it because they work or live somewhere else. If a peasant owns a water pump in the field, he does not have these

problems because he can irrigate his fields anytime he wants. Most water pump-owners located their water pump in the third zone due to the above-described reasons (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999)

In Tadafalte, the main crops peasants cultivate are alfalfa, wheat, corn and vegetables. Vegetables usually grow at the borders of the land, or they are cultivated in the gardens near their home. People cultivate vegetables near the house for they fear vegetables-thieves. Alfalfa, which is an important crop to feed the livestock, is becoming increasingly important. It is important because it is more profitable to feed the livestock the harvest of a piece of land than to sell the yield of the other crops on the same surface. A peasant can buy more grain through the sale of the livestock than he will ever cultivate grain on the same piece of land. Animals bring more than agricultural products on the market. In addition, a cow gives milk and butter, besides its meat. The average livestock consisted of sheep, donkeys, goats and a few cows (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999, File Interviews ORMVA, Boulmane 1999, File Interviews peasants, incomes & costs 1999).

Wheat is important for it is the basis for dishes. Almonds, and perhaps also olives in the future, are an important crop, since this product gains most profit on the market nowadays. With this profit, the peasants can buy wheat, meat, clothes or vegetables (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999, File Interviews peasants, incomes & costs 1999). The cultivation of the almonds, which were introduced by the French, indicates a capitalistic penetration. Local products were replaced by the cultivation of almonds or olives because the peasant was told he could gain more profit with these products on the market. The consequence is that the peasant becomes more dependent on the prices of the world market, which fluctuate regularly. In addition, it indicates that Tadafalte's villagers are becoming more dependent on money because without money they cannot buy products at the market, while before they were self-supporting (Kloos 1991: 38/39). In Elias' view, the length of the networks of Tadafalte's inhabitants has grown to an international level and become complicated. Tadafalte's inhabitants became more dependent on the economic terrain through the changes in their agricultural production throughout the years.

Pfeffer and Salancik indicate that through the growth of the networks, Tadafalte's inhabitants became more dependent on other resources, like money. The value of water and land in comparison with other new resources declined. The context of Tadafalte's organisation has changed from a seemingly self-supporting agricultural organisation into an organisation, which depends on other players to survive its context. Today, the peasants spend on average one-third to half of their income on cultivating the land. This pattern of expenditure indicates the growing importance of money. The expenditures are dependent on several factors, such as: the surface of the land, the necessity to hire workers, whether one bought insecticides, and the

size of the family. A peasant hires workers if he has no sons who can help him, or it is too much work. Usually these workers are hired three days per year, in October. Most of the time the workers are from the village but it is not always an easy task to obtain workers during this time of year. Many people are busy with the preparation of their land for the winter (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, incomes & costs 1999).

The agricultural year starts at the end of September, and the beginning of October. This is the period when the peasants prepare the land for winter. On average ninety percent of the land is cultivated during winter although this depends on the amount of water the peasant has access to. In summer, less land is cultivated because the groundwater level decreases and evaporation increases as a result of the heat (temperatures can rise above forty degrees), resulting in less water supply in the *khattara*. During this period, only the most important crops such as alfalfa, date palms and fruit trees continue to be irrigated. Peasants who own a water pump, can irrigate more plots of land for they are able to obtain water. However, usually they do not irrigate all of their land because using a water pump to obtain water is expensive for the peasant and evaporation is high in summer. Thus, the costs of the water pump use do not diminish the harvest's yield. Like other peasants, the water pump owners only irrigate the most important crops. The only difference is that the water pump owners irrigate the crops more frequently than the average peasant does. Some peasants rent their water pump to other peasants (usually neighbours) against payment. The payment is often for compensating a part of the costs, like fuel, the water pump-owner has to make to put the water pump in action. The other part of the payment is profit. Whether the water pump-owner includes profit in the payment depends on the relation with the other person, who wants to use the water pump. Money is generally the measure to lend the water pump to other peasants. It also can happen that a peasant lends the water pump for a lower amount to a peasant or for nothing if they are under an obligation. The next case indicates another relation between a person and a water pump holder.

*Respondent A is young man, who works on a regular basis in the fields for a man, a returned migrant. Often, the young man takes care for the man's irrigation series during its turn in the night, he helps during the harvest and helps prepare the land when the agricultural year starts. In return, the young man obtains clothes, sometimes money, some fruit and candy from the market. He even sometimes gets some gifts from the man's sons who live in France. In addition, his family is allowed to use the water pump for a reduced price. This way, he is not the only one who benefits from this man.'* (Fieldwork, File Diary May 1999).

In total, there are sixteen water pumps in Tadafalte. Of these water pump-owners, some borrowed the money from a wealthy person who used to live in Tadafalte but has moved to Marrakech. Other gained money to buy the water pump through migration, by which they obtained enough money in a foreign country, or their sons (who usually work outside the village) give them money. Predominantly, people bought water pumps in order to irrigate more land than one can do if one is dependent on the water supply of the *khattara*. Irrigating more land leads to larger productivity (Fieldwork<sup>78</sup>).

Although the peasants obtain (natural) income out of their agricultural activities, this income is, depending on the size of the land, generally not sufficient for most peasants. Most households have members who gain income outside of agriculture. Some of them are butchers, shopkeepers, barbers or construction workers. Other people, mainly the elderly, receive money from their children (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants incomes & costs 1999). The agricultural income of households will decrease in future due to the system of inheritance according to the Coranic laws. When the head of the households dies, his sons divide their father's land equally. Their sisters only inherit half as much as them. Usually the custom is that the women give up their land right, since women have no need for land. When she marries her husband will support her, as is as written in the Coranic laws. Sometimes the women do not give up their right to land. Then, women often sell the land to their brothers and buy jewellery from the money obtained (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999). The disadvantage of the inheritance is that the people want to preserve their plot of land irrespective of how small it is. The (grand-) father (s) gave the land to them and that is holy. In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, these constraints, based on religion, restrict agricultural development and outcome of Tadafalte's organisation of water.

In the past, it has occurred that a peasant exchanged several plots of land (of different zones) to obtain one bigger plot of land at one place. Unfortunately, most peasants did not want to exchange land for they were afraid to obtain a non productive piece of land. The land of the second and third zone is far from the traditional irrigation system. Through this, more water loss could occur than normally. If one did not have a water pump in the new area, an exchange to have a bigger plot in the new land would not be effective. In addition, the peasants were afraid they would not obtain the same surface and quality of land when exchanging the plots (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999).

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<sup>78</sup> File Interviews peasants, respondent 1, 13, 14, 24, 16, 31, 32, 34, 41, 42, 43, 45 1999

## Chapter Conclusion

The organisation of Tadafalte came into being after some disappointing events. In Tennekes' view, Tadafalte's ancestors decide to organise themselves on a certain spot with as objective to prevent such events in the future. Initially, Tadafalte was established around the scarce resource of water, like most oasis settlements in those days. Pfeffer and Salancik indicate this action of Tadafalte's organisation as an activity, which cannot be excluded if the organisation wants to survive in its context. Through the changes in Tadafalte's configurations, a war and a *liff*, Tadafalte's members were forced to move to another place, the place where Tadafalte is located today. These changes have lasting influence in its configurations. In Elias' view, the lasting influence actually became automatic in the dependency-relations between Tadafalte and its neighbours, which is based on a constant flux between the process of power and the process of meaning systems.

After settling on this spot, Tadafalte's villagers started to organise the village. The result was the organisation of Tadafalte, which had as objective to survive in this area. Through building a *khettara*, Tadafalte could obtain water for irrigation. In Tennekes' view, an essential element of Tadafalte's organisation structure was realised. The organisation structure was mostly aimed to survive in its environment. The interrelated issues of water and land, the *taggourte*, formed thereby an extremely important element in the development of Tadafalte's organisation structure. In the light of Elias' perspective, the number of *taggourte* a person possessed became, and still is, a determining factor for the 'relative' strength of a player in relation to other players in the game of water. In general, more *taggourtes* means more land and water, more rights and often more influence in the organisation of water. As Pfeffer said, the scarcer the resources, the bigger the dependency, and the more important the influence become in the social relations.

By owning a *taggourte*, peasants are able to cultivate agricultural products. Agriculture is still one of main activities in the village, although it is probably not the main source of income anymore. Through changes in the organisation context, like the French Protectorate and migration, the source money reduced the value of *taggourte*-possession. People could buy water pumps to gain water in stead of only obtaining water from the *khettara*. The purchase of water pumps shrank the value of the *taggourte*. Through the decline of the value of the *taggourte*, the figurations in Tadafalte changed. In Tennekes' view, the interaction between the actions of the organisation members, the purchase of water pumps by inhabitants, and the elements of the organisation structure, the *taggourte*-system caused internal changes in the organisation of water. The current interrelations between the different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte are discussed in the next chapter.



One player in the relations to Tadafalte's organisation of water was already discussed in this chapter, the agricultural organisation ORMVA. Tadafalte depended on this player for *money*. By submitting request, the management, the traditional village council, tried to draw the attention of the ORMVA to reconstruct the *khettara*. A competitive relationship, in Pfeffer and Salancik's view, was created. Through process of power and meaning systems, political connections and the personal preferences of the members at the agricultural organisation, Tadafalte's requests were accepted by the ORMVA. Through the construction of the new *khettara* and later the embrace of the *khettara* at several places, Tadafalte gained more water supply and lost less. Despite the benefits of the embraced *khettara*, the yields of the fields per family decreased. This is mainly caused by constraints based on religion. By having other jobs, the members still try to gain a good income, but with a good income and no access to water a human being will never live long in these areas. To prevent such a situation in Tadafalte, the players of the organisation related to water in Tadafalte and their game of water are outlined in the next chapter.




Plate 4.1. Elderly clean the *khettara*



Plate 4.2. Relatives of Brahim Moujane

# Chapter 4

## The Players of Tadafalte & the Game of Water

*'All villagers are my friends, I need their friendship<sup>79</sup>.'*

### 4.0. Introduction

This peasant's answer to one of my questions<sup>80</sup> in a questionnaire indicates that the 'one happy family' feeling, explained in the previous chapter, seems not to apply completely to the social relations between the different players in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. From all the answers of the peasants and the observations during my stay it seemed to me that the practice of the so-called 'one happy family' was different from the villagers wanted me to believe. The 'one happy family' feeling seemed to apply more to the relations between Tadafalte and other villages in the valley. In the last-mentioned situation, Tadafalte's villagers can form one bloc against intruders, institutions from outside or other hostile villages. Not a surprise if one considers, as Elias already argued in chapter 1, that people have relations with other people in order to guarantee or improve one's moral, social and psychological progress. Out of the social relations, social forms develop, which have clearly described structural features. In this thesis, as mentioned in chapter 1, these social forms are called the 'players'.

The players related to Tadafalte's organisation of water are, according to my view, based on structural features such as *taggourte*-possession, reciprocity or the amount of control a person can exercise in the village. All these players are connected in one way or another. The assumption of my fieldwork was that the different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte influence each other and form dependency relations. Through the interactions

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<sup>79</sup>Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 27 1999.

between the players, their relations related to Tadafalte's organisation of water changed. By knowing the specific structural features of each player related to Tadafalte's organisation of water in and their interactions, the present-day social relations between the different players becomes clear.

For this reason, during my fieldwork (1999) I made a distinction between groups of people, who have a certain structural feature in common. This means, all players who live in Tadafalte, and the players who live outside it but still have a direct connection to it are included in this distinction. Two players represent a larger unit in Tadafalte's organisation of water. In one case, the other members of this group only interfere in Tadafalte's affairs in extreme situations. A general overview of those players is outlined in paragraph 4.2. Hereafter, all players are each dealt with separately in the following paragraphs. In paragraph 4.8. the game of water is discussed. Some other factors, like those described above, are dealt with in the next paragraph. The chapter ends with the conclusion.

#### 4.1. Other Factors of Influence.

Although it is in the habits of Tadafalte's villages to help each other<sup>81</sup>, it seemed to me that the bases of the social relations between people there are mainly pragmatic or motivated by social obligation. Most peasants maintain relations with fellow-villagers who might be able to help them in the future (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, these actions of the peasants are constraints. Constraints have great influence on the behaviour of an individual and his interaction with others. No individual is free from constraints as the next case shows:

##### Case

*If a person dies in the village, all the villagers visit the relatives of the deceased to condole them for their lost. People who live outside Tadafalte, but are connected to Tadafalte, like migrants, and women who married and moved to a different village, also try to visit the family in question or send a card to offer theirs condolences. When a person does not visit or send a card, it is not a good sign. When a villager from Tadafalte neglects to visit the family, then he is criticised. In other words, a villager is obligated to visit the family if he wants it or not (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 16 1999).*

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<sup>80</sup>The question was: Who are your friends in the village? And what is the basis of the friendship (Fieldwork, File Questionnaire Peasants 1999).

<sup>81</sup> Probable this habit is derived from religious conviction. In the Coran one can find many texts, which are over helping the poor. This way, Mohammed pointed the people on their social responsibility (Borghuis 1998: 22).

The case illustrates the constraint of social obligation, which dominates in Tadafalte. The social obligation can turn into a social pressure, which can weigh heavily on people. That the social pressure is high in Tadafalte is indicated by the answers of most respondents. They did not dare tell me which persons in Tadafalte were their 'enemies'. Most respondents always answered that they did not have enemies in the village, only outside the village. Then, people from El Hart Niaamine and Achdad were mentioned (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). One respondent literally said to me: *'I have enemies in the village but I do not dare to tell you who they are.'* (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 8).

Another form of social obligation is that villagers shop in shops and eat at restaurants which are owned by Tadafalte's villagers. In Taghzoute and Tinghir, these shops and restaurants can be found. Despite of better selections at other shops or organisations, the villagers of Tadafalte kept buying their goods or other things at shops owned by fellow villagers. According to Pfeffer and Salancik, the constraint has effect on the relation organisation-context in Tadafalte. In this case, people of Tadafalte exclude offers from people from other villages or organisations. This means they do not always get the best sale. People of Tadafalte buy mainly at the shops of their fellow-villagers because it has some advantages. One knows the person, and if one cannot pay at the moment, one can pay later always<sup>82</sup> (Fieldwork, File Diary March 9th-16th 1999).

Another factor that determines the social relations within Tadafalte, is the fraction's membership. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in Tadafalte there are five fractions, which are not all of the same size<sup>83</sup>. All five are descendants of the ancestor Ignawen. It is from this 'fact' that the Tadafalte's inhabitants obtain their 'one happy family' feeling. However, the membership of a particular fraction can give a person a specific status. If a villager is member of the biggest fraction, the members of this fraction know they can have much influence on making decisions concerning the whole village. Members of a small fraction have less influence on these decisions because they are in the minority. It was said by one respondent: *'All people are good, although some people believe their own fraction is better than the other one.'* (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 24 1999). This arrogance of the fraction in question<sup>84</sup> can cause tensions in the social relations between the players in Tadafalte, the respondent of this pronouncement told me.

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<sup>82</sup> It is said to me that it is also possible in other shops to pay later. If I brought up this argument to eat or shop elsewhere, then the respondents argued that these shopkeepers were relatives. I got the feeling that they were obligated to eat or shop there.

<sup>83</sup> The size depends on the number of families living in Tadafalte.

<sup>84</sup> All five fractions suffered a little of this arrogance but the biggest fraction, of which one of my assistants was a member, suffered the most of it. I witnessed his bragging many times.

Tennekes explains the tensions in Tadafalte as the result of interactions between members of the organisation, which all have different interest and personal preferences. In other words: to be in the majority gives a peasant a certain feeling of power related to decisions concerning the village or his fraction, because the inhabitant knows he can rely on other members of his fraction. For Elias, this is the typical situation result of the interaction between process of power and the process of meaning systems. A fraction gives to its position a certain meaning, which has a relation to the other fractions.

In general, these factors are more or less an integral part of the way of life for Tadafalte's inhabitants. Most of the inhabitants are influenced by these factors and apply them in their communication with other villagers. According to Elias, the constraint has become an automatism for the villagers of Tadafalte throughout the years. Another feature, which people have in common, can also influence the social relations between the players related to the organisation of water. Different players are the result of the distinction made on the basis of one common structural feature. These players are set out in the next paragraph.

#### 4.2. The Different Players

The different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte are based on one structural feature. Through this structural feature a player is formed. The players related to Tadafalte's organisation of water are the people without land, inhabitants who possess *taggourte*, migrants, the government represented by an official, the *moqaddem*, a juridical traditional institution represented by the *kadi al-orf*, and an opposition party. These groups are ruled over by the traditional village council, the *amghar* and the *aiyans*, whose members besides the *kadi al-orf*, are derived from the previously mentioned groups. The groups of *taggourte*-owners and the group of migrants are also divided into sub-groups. The group of *taggourte*-owners consists of people who own less than one *taggourte*, people who own between one and four *taggourte* and people who possess more than four *taggourtes*. It appeared from some informal interviews that more than one third of Tadafalte's inhabitants possessed less than one *taggourte*, one-third between one and four *taggourtes* and about ten to twenty percent owned more than four *taggourtes*. Consequently twenty percent of Tadafalte's inhabitants did not own any *taggourte*. As I mentioned in the previous chapter (3.1.), migrants also live in Tadafalte. These migrants returned to Tadafalte after working somewhere else for several years, or are still working in other places and visit Tadafalte occasionally. The last mentioned group is the sub-group of migrants who try to return to their village for a holiday every summer.

The traditional village council controls the inhabitants of Tadafalte to regulate daily life by means of fines and sanction. They also manage the irrigation system and solve problems in the fields. If the traditional village council did not succeed in finding a good solution for people, these people go to see the *kadi al-orf* at the *jamaa* Taghzoute. The *kadi al-orf* solves matters by enforcing the customary laws of the Aït Atta, which were drawn up by a Supreme Court of Appeals in the past. The *kadi al-orf* is only present in districts, like district Taghzoute, where the majority of the population are descendants of the tribe Aït Atta. During the time of division of land in the 1960S and 1970S, some Tadafalte's villagers were against the policy of the traditional village council, *amghar* and *aiyans*. These people formed an opposition party. The official, the *moqaddem*, is present in Tadafalte because the *caid* appointed him to be the representative of the government. First, the group traditional village council, the *amghar* and *aiyans*, is outlined because this institution is the basis of Tadafalte's social organisation.

#### 4.3. The Traditional Village Council

The traditional village council has important influence on the way Tadafalte is organised today. As one respondent explained: '*Without the existence of the village council, there would be chaos in Tadafalte*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 8 1999). This means that this institution had great influence on the social relations between the players in the organisation of the interrelated issues of water and land in Tadafalte. In Tennekes' perspective on organisations, this institution can be viewed as the management of Tadafalte's organisation, which is constructed consciously in the past to realise the objectives, set by the organisation.

Through all kind of factors, described in the previous paragraphs, their influence on Tadafalte's organisation of water is declining. To understand their former status in Tadafalte and the impact it once had on Tadafalte's organisation of water, the traditional village council is outlined in the following paragraphs. First, the foundation of this institution is dealt with. Second, the election procedure of the Tadafalte's management-team is set out. Third, the duties and rights of the traditional village council are explained.

### *The foundation of the village council, the amghar & aiyans*

Since the founding of Tadafalte several centuries ago, the system of *amghar* and *aiyans* was the basis of its' social political organisation. This kind of political organisation was already applied in other (Aït Atta-) villages in Morocco. That time, villages needed a high degree of social organisation to build and to keep the traditional irrigation systems, and to prevent chaos (Agnew & Anderson 1992; 145). In Tennekes' view, Tadafalte needed structure to realise their objectives, like keeping the community together. Tadafalte's inhabitants decided to implement the social political organisation of the *amghar* and *aiyans* in their village. In other Aït Atta ethnic groups the system worked very well because in the organisation structure the division of tasks and the co-ordination were arranged well (Fieldwork, Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondents 1 & 4 1999). Elements of the organisation structure controlled people through a system of sanctions and fines, maintaining the irrigation systems, solving problems in the field and maintaining relations with other villages and ethnic groups. By applying these elements constantly, the social political organisation of the *amghar* and *aiyans* preserved peace and stability in Tadafalte and its surroundings. Through this, one of the objectives of Tadafalte's organisation is affected (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondents 5 & 7 1999).

In Tadafalte, the traditional village council consists of nine people, one *amghar* and eight *aiyans*. Two fractions of the five existing in Tadafalte, Aït Said and Aït Broubtine, were too small to be counted as separate by the traditional village council. Two persons of each fraction have a seat on the village council. Therefore, eight *aiyans* are present in it ( $4 \times 2 = 8$ ). The function of the *aiyans* is to assist the *amghar*. The *amghar* can be described as the chairperson of the village council. He is the person principally responsible for the safety of the village. Each year Tadafalte's villagers elect by means of rotation, a new *amghar*. The *amghar* chose its *aiyans* with approval of certain elder men. One particular person is not elected each year, the co-called *amghar n-igran*. The *amghar n-igran* is the official Tadafalte's spokesman for government institutions. The *amghar n-igran* is chosen for life (Fieldwork, Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). More information of the *amghar n-igran* can be found in appendix 7.

The election of the traditional village council is an age-old system, which has not changed since it was introduced in Tadafalte. The election shows certain features, which seek to keep the social relations between the players in Tadafalte's organisation of the interrelated issues of water and land as in the former days. For this reason, the next paragraph outlines the election of the traditional village council.



### *The election*

The *amghar* is elected annually. Each year, one fraction must provide an *amghar*. If the fractions are numbered from one to four, then if fraction one has its turn this year, next year fraction two will have to provide an *amghar*. After fraction two, it's fraction three's turn. The members of the fraction, which provides him, are not allowed to elect the *amghar*, otherwise the electors can elect themselves. Another advantage of the system of rotation is that it prevents any abuse of power. If it appears one *amghar* is getting too powerful, his position is already taken over because he is only chosen for one year. A disadvantage of the system is that the *amghar* has his position for too short a time to carry out long term planning concerning, for example, agriculture. In addition, the next *amghar* can annul the decisions of the last *amghar* (Hart 1981; 76, Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

In Tennekes' view, the elements of this election system can be seen as a mechanism for the organisation to survive in its context. Otherwise someone can abuse its position in the organisation of Tadafalte. On the other hand the next management, the new *amghar* and its *aiyans*, is busy re-adjusting the actions of the previous management according to his view and interests. The management itself is also part of the organisation and they have their own light on the organisation. The re-adjusting cause tensions between players of the organisation but through this feature of the organisation structure no abuse of power is possible.

Most of the time, the election of the *amghar* takes place at the beginning of the new agricultural year in September or October. His appointment is for one year, equal to the duration of the agricultural year if the *amghar* performs his duty well. If the *amghar* does not perform well, he can be replaced. For the procedure of the election I refer to appendix 8. Today, Tadafalte's villagers usually wait until the next election to replace him. In the past, the replacement of the *amghar* could happen when Tadafalte had lost a war due to the *amghar*'s decision. Presently, this does not happen often due to the declining role of the *amghar* (Hart 1981: 79, Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). The next case illustrates that the *amghar* is not replaced quickly.

*During my stay, many people complained about the current amghar. The current amghar was not present in the village for a long time because he went on pilgrimage to Mecca for four months. In their view, the village and the fields became chaos. In addition, the aiyans could not solve the problems. The village needed a strong leader, but he was gone. Despite the dissatisfaction with this amghar, the villagers did not decide to dismiss him. Probably because they feared to become the next amghar otherwise, and that was not one of their priorities (see further in dialogue) (Fieldwork, File Interviews amghar & aiyans 1999).*

In the former days, the large *taggourte*-owners were predominantly chosen for the traditional village council. A person, who does not possess any *taggourte*, has no chance to be elected for the traditional village council. For example, the family described in chapter 3.4, will never be chosen for the traditional village council even though, in my view, they purchase a good agricultural policy. They could probably add a different and refreshing light on the organisation of the traditional village council. The condition of possessing many *taggourtes* to be chosen for the traditional village council is decreasing. Possession of *taggourte* still plays an important role but it is fading due to the inheritance system. Through the inheritance system, the *taggourte*-possession of most villagers is shrinking. This means, in the light of Tennekes' perspective, that between the organisation structure of Tadafalte, in which *taggourte*-possession has an important place, and the actual results of the organisation, less *taggourte*-possession by the members, tension are created. These tensions result eventually in adjusting the structure and the objective of the organisation of electing only large *taggourte*-owner for the traditional village council.

Eventually, this situation results in more equal relations between large *taggourte*-owners and villagers who possess fewer *taggourtes*. This means, in the near future small *taggourte*-owners will be elected for the traditional village council as well. During my stay, the village council already had some members who owned less than three *taggourtes*<sup>85</sup>. In other words; the gap between large *taggourte*-owners and small *taggourte*-owners is narrowing (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). Currently other problems arise for this institution, namely the lack of interest in being elected.

People dislike to be elected for *amghar* as for *aiyan*. The offices are not paid, and most villagers dislike the members of the traditional village council because the *amghar* or *aiyans* regulate the daily life in Tadafalte (see next paragraph for more information). In addition, the youth does no longer listen to decisions of the traditional village council. And within the council, there exists a big generation gap causing a lot of problems. The elders ignore the young people, and the other way around; young people do not show respect for the elders. All respondents I interviewed in the village agree on one thing: The former prestige of the traditional village council is decreasing. Besides other processes, the previously mentioned arguments have contributed to this decreasing effect (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999, File Interviews peasants 1999). The next case illustrates the present position of the traditional village council in Tadafalte:

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<sup>85</sup> Today, more than half of the *taggourte*-owners possesses less than four *taggourtes* (see introduction of this paragraph).

*A person was chosen to be the amghar for the coming year. He did not like that he was chosen because he had been amghar or aiyans already many times. The people wanted him for this function, so he accepted it. After fifteen days, he made public the new sanctions and the height of the fines for breaking the rules the new traditional village council drew up. This announcement apparently created bad blood with some young people of the village. This youth went to the fields of the amghar. There, they threw stones to the water pump, cut his alfalfa, snapped his trees, ran through his fields, and destroyed his palm trees. The result of their actions was a broken pipe of the water pump and failed harvest for the new amghar. The following happened. The amghar took the broken palm leaves with him to the mosque. There, he showed the broken palm tree and he said to his fellow-villagers:*

*"The amghar and aiyans cannot carry out this job alone. You all have to help us. Teach your children to do something like this never again." (Fieldwork, File Interviews amghar and aiyans, respondent 7 1999).*

This *amghar* was not compensated for this action and the children were not punished. This way, it is imaginable that the villagers are not eager to fulfil this function. The functions of the *amghar* and its *aiyans*, and how they changed throughout the years, are described in the next paragraph.

### ***The duties of the traditional village council***

In the past, during the time of *Siba*, the traditional village council had many responsibilities, like the responsibility to start a war or to solve problems with other ethnic groups, safety within the village and taking care of the irrigation systems. The traditional village council lost their war duty since the French defeated them (1930). Before the French came, the *amghar* had the responsibility to make a strategy for the war whether a war was started or not. If a war was unsuccessful, the *amghar* was dismissed (Hart 1981: 79, Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999, File Interviews peasants, respondent 22 1999). This is typical a situation, in which the concept regime of Elias can be applied to the organisation of Tadafalte. In that time, Tadafalte's regime had an organisation structure that was aimed on control 'to inside' -the responsibility of the safety within the village- and a defence 'to outside' -the war function of the traditional village council-. Throughout the years, new players were added to Tadafalte's regime. This way, the regime changed, and the chains of mutual dependence widened.

Tadafalte's regime lost the juridical function to the government after independence (1956) of Morocco. A traditional judge was placed under the authority of the government. He applied the ancient laws of the Supreme Court of appeal in the Aït 'Atta capital of Igharm Amazdar for problems in the fields (for more information see further in dialogue). In addition, after independence, an official courthouse was installed which had jurisdiction over all inhabitants of Morocco (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 22 1999).

Tadafalte's villagers particularly regret the loss of this function of the traditional village council. In the past they had their own local court (Hart 1981). Today, they are not allowed to banish or to punish a fellow-villager if this person breaks the general rules of the village. Presently the rules of the courthouse apply to all citizen of Morocco (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants, respondent 22 1999). New players, the courthouse and the traditional judge, were added to the regime of Tadafalte, which caused new developments in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The new players became part of Tadafalte's regime, although their participation then was not major. The general tendency in the valley is that people prefer to visit the traditional judge over a visit to the courthouse, which is situated in Ouarzazate. This way, they preserve their own jurisdiction.

In spite of the decline of its function, the traditional village council still has some principal responsibilities although the government does not recognise the institution of *amghar* and *aiyan* officially. The government tolerates this institution as long as it works well. As soon as the institution does not follow the general rules of the government, the social and political organisation of the *amghar* and *aiyans* can be abolished. As the *caid* of the Todgha valley told me in informal interview:

*'As long as the relations between the villages in the valley are good and the villages can solve their problems internally, the government does not have to interfere in their problems. Then, there is peace in the valley. If the relation between the villages are bad and the villages cannot solve their problems, then the government will interfere and take over the duties and responsibilities of the amghar and aiyans.'*

Today, the duties of the *amghar* and *aiyans* in Tadafalte are;

- to settle division of land and water and to instigate any irrigation project,
- to take care of the maintenance of the *khattara* and *segua*,
- to collect money for the *marabout*, and collective interests (such as bracing the *segua*<sup>86</sup>)
- to implement sanctions and fines,
- to take care of the *habous*-land and the collective land; the *bled kharadj*<sup>87</sup>
- to collect money from the punishments,
- to take care of the election procedures,
- to maintain the relations with other villages (Hart 1982: 92, Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

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<sup>86</sup> In chapter 3.5.2, the calculation of collecting money for the embracing thesegua is outlined. According to this system, the sum a villager has to pay is related to the number of *taggourte* the peasant owns. Almost everything is calculated according to this system.

<sup>87</sup> See previous chapter; paragraph 3.4.1. for more details about this land.

The first three duties of the traditional village council are related to the number of *taggourte* villagers possess. The calculation-system is explained in chapter 3.5.2, and in chapter 3.4.1.. The same system is applied to the maintenance of the *khettara*, only in this matter the work is counted and related to half days. The day-system maintains that by possession of one *taggourte*, the peasant has to work on the *khettara* a half day each time there is work. When a peasant possesses 1/4 *taggourte*, he only has to help once of the four times the *khettara* need to be maintained. And by a possession of five *taggourtes*, the peasant has to help maintaining the *khettara* five half days each time the traditional village council decides that is time to do so. The *amghar* makes this decision in mutual agreement with the *aiyans*. Then, the traditional village council will announce the time and date of working on the *khettara* at the front of the mosque on Friday. On Friday most men are present at the service of the mosque. Therefore, the traditional village council also makes public all kind of other announcements, which are important for all villagers to have knowledge of. This way, most villagers are informed about the decisions and announcements of the traditional village council (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999, File Diary May 1999).

One of the first duties of the new *amghar*, after the election, is to announce the height of the fines. Thus, every year the height of the fine can change. The fines play an important role in Tadafalte's daily life. Many fines and sanctions are created and are related to specific situations. For example, a villager can be punished if he makes too much noise near the mosque, or he can be fined for stealing fruits in the fields, or if a *taggourte*-owner does not help to clean the *khettara*. The received money of the fines is used to maintain the mosque or to buy materials for the maintenance of the *khettara* and *segua* (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). This situation shows the dualistic thought that Tennekes has on organisations. The dualistic thought means that the punishments and rules, co-ordinated by the traditional village council (the management) regulate the daily life in Tadafalte (the organisation-as-system). Every year, these rules change as a consequence of the yearly rotation of the members of the traditional village council or through other external influences. The newly elected members can have a different view on the policy related to Tadafalte's organisation of water.

By walking through the fields and the village, the *amghar* and *aiyan* try to control the villagers whether they break a rule or not. Respondent 6 of the file *amghar* and *aiyans* illustrated this function by saying: 'Then, we function as police officers'. If people other than the *amghar* and *aiyans* see a person stealing their fruits, the thief will not be punished because the *amghar* and *aiyans* have not seen the 'crime'. The different tasks are carried out by all members of the traditional village council. There is only a small difference between the *amghar*, the

chairperson, and the *aiyans*, his assistants (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

The difference between an *amghar* and an *aiyan* is that people can come to the *amghar* when they have problems in the field, or with other villagers. When a problem arises, the concerned persons usually go to the *amghar* to explain their problem. Often these problems are about borders in the second and third zone. Problems also arise when trees from the neighbours' field keep out the sunlight or a peasant opens the gates of his field while it is not his turn for irrigation (he obtains free water). The *amghar* listens to the problem of the person. After listening he decide whether he wants to arrange a meeting with the *aiyans* or not (Fieldwork, File *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). Usually the *amghar* calls for a meeting. In this meeting he and the *aiyans* discuss the problem. For a solution, the vast majority of the traditional village council (five of nine) have to agree with each other, otherwise a new meeting has to be arranged. This meeting is for two weeks later. During this time, the members of the traditional village council can obtain new information to make a final solution. Often the *aiyans*, who do not agree with the solution of the *amghar*, are influenced by other people to change their opinion about the problem. These people can be friends of the *amghar*, the *amghar* himself or the fraction in question. After two weeks, most *aiyans* agree with the solution of the *amghar*. If the concerned person disagrees with the solution of the traditional village council, they usually go to the traditional judge. The peasant presents the problem to the traditional judge and asks for a solution. Some persons go to the *caid* or the courthouse in Ouarzazate, but that seldom happens (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999, File Diary May 1999).

The *amghar* can also give the *aiyans* the order to collect money for the *marabout* or to collect the fine. Usually the *aiyan* will be sent to his own fraction because the members of this fraction are his relatives. If the *aiyan* wants, he can put pressure on the person of his fraction if the person does not want to pay. Not all people fulfill their tasks adequately (for example, cleaning the *khettara*) or want to pay their fines (for stealing fruit). When someone does not want to pay the fine, often his family will it because it is too shameful for the family. If the person (and his family) still refuse to pay, the *amghar* and *aiyans* can contact the *caid* or the traditional judge at the *jamaa* Taghzoute, to obtain government support to force the person to pay. The traditional judge has the authority to make a final decision in these matters. To prevent any problems, it is better to accept the solution of the traditional judge. Otherwise one can be sent to the *caid* or this courthouse in Ouarzazate to explain the situation and the reason why one did not accept the solution. This costs a lot of money and time, and in the end, it happens frequently that the peasant does not obtain his right (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, the context of Tadafalte's organisation of water has changed through the coming of the new players the traditional judge, the courthouse and the *caid*. They affected the activities of the organisation, namely the loss of the juridical function to these institutions. However, the impact of the effect is minor. Through using the feeling of resistance towards the government, people will not go voluntarily to the courthouse or the *caid*. With the traditional judge, the traditional village council co-operates, because they like to apply their ancient laws. This way, the traditional village council buffered themselves against the influence of the coming of new players.

Another responsibility of the traditional village council is to submit requests about irrigation or agricultural projects to the governor, the CMV, *jamaa* and other (government) institutions. The village council can decide whether something important has to be done for the village, such as bracing a *segua*. In the former days, the members of the traditional village council submitted requests about the irrigation systems each year. Nowadays it happens less. The government forces all villages to organise themselves into official institutions if they want to realise applications for their villages at government institutions. A co-operation can solve its own problems and is able to search for sources other<sup>88</sup> than the ORMVA to collect money. Besides, the government acknowledges this institution, by which for example a village gains more authority at the courthouse of Ouarzazate. Village requests unrepresented by an official institution, are immediately rejected (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, Boulmane 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 8 1999).

Pfeffer and Salancik indicate the condition the ORMVA dictates for granting requests, as a symbiotic relationship. The input, the condition of the ORMVA, is the output for Tadafalte. Tadafalte has to organise into a co-operation if they want the ORMVA to grant any requests. The co-operation can have positive effects for both organisations. For Tadafalte recognition by the government, and for the ORMVA fewer submitted requests.

In Tadafalte, the villagers have not organised themselves into an official institution yet. They have the intention to do so but this takes a lot of time for two reasons. First, few people are well informed about this regulation. Second, some elders find it hard to understand the rules and wonder how to reconcile this regulation with the organisation structure of traditional village council (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 8 1999). As Tennekes remarks, an interaction between Tadafalte's organisation structure and the members' actions - the wondering over the implementation- of Tadafalte's organisation are put into action.

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<sup>88</sup> The director of the sub-division Boulmane told me in the interview on 17 May 1999 that there was a co-operation in a village, which raised a fund from a Japanese organisation. With this money, the inhabitants of the village in question built a well in order to have water during the summer months (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, Boulmane 1999).

The *kadi al-orf* is named several times in this paragraph. I will explain his function in the next paragraph.

#### 4.4. The *Kadi al-orf*

As mentioned in the introduction, the *kadi al-orf* judges cases related to water and land by enforcing the ancient laws of the Aït Atta. Four “vice”- *kadi al-orf*’s help him with this duty by collecting information and taking over his job during periods of absence. All five people are chosen through an election, held every six year. When it is time for the election, the *caïd* warns every traditional village council of the district, which have a *kadi al-orf*. Twenty people from each village in the district are allowed to choose a person for this office. Often, the twenty people consist of previous *amghars*, *aiyans* and people who are familiar with the ancient law of the Aït Atta’s. They choose one person, who they believe can take responsibility for this duty. In addition, the twenty people list, in order of ranking, four other candidates who can function as the vices of the *kadi al-orf*. The person, who obtains most votes from all villages in the district, will be the new *kadi al-orf* for six years. The vices are classified in order of ranking, according to the amount of votes a person obtains. For instance the person, who obtains the most votes after the chosen *kadi al-orf*, will be the vice-*kadi al-orf* number one. After the election, the coming *kadi al-orf* is sent to the courthouse in Ouarzazate for fifteen days. In these fifteen days, he has to learn some articles of the law of Morocco. After the short study period, the present *kadi al-orf* has to take an oath in front of the governor, the secretary of the tribunal and the president of the tribunal. Thereafter, he is allowed to start with his activities as *kadi al-orf* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent traditional judge 1999).

Predominantly, the activities of the *kadi al-orf* consist of solving problems which the traditional village council cannot solve and the courthouse has difficulties with. The problems are mainly cases that occur in the field, like a conflict about borders between two plots of land, disagreements about the judgement of the traditional village council, the *khettara*, the division of an inheritance and other cases related to ancient laws of the Aït Atta. The courthouse has little knowledge about these matters, and especially little about the centuries-old law of the Aït Atta. The government preserved this institution because for this particular group it can solve problems of descendants of the Aït Atta in a satisfying way. This way conflicts between people, and even between villages can be prevented. The next statement of Tadafalte’s villagers underscores this: ‘*he (the kadi al-orf) knows our laws, the government does not understand us.*’ For this reason, the *kadi al-orf* only exists in regions, which are inhabited by Aït Atta and other



Berber groups, whom in the past had a *kadi al-orf* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent traditional judge 1999).

Every fourteen days, the *kadi al-orf* is present at the building of the *jamaa* to see people with complaints. On other days, people can come to his house. Often the *kadi al-orf* solves problems by means of discussing them with the traditional village council of the concerned village. Predominantly, the *kadi al-orf* agrees with the solution, which is previously made by the traditional village council. In his opinion, the *amghar* and *aiyans* make good decisions because they have great knowledge of the ancient laws of the Aït Atta. If the solution of the traditional village council is not a good one, the *kadi al-orf* will find another. This does not happen often because the traditional village council and the *kadi al-orf* support each other to preserve the authority of the *amghar* and *aiyans* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representatives, respondent traditional judge 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

When the *kadi al-orf* cannot find a solution, even after a meeting with his vice-*kadi al-orf*'s, he refers the plaintiffs to the courthouse in Ouarzazate. The courthouse can take over the case. Few people decide to go to the courthouse or they have to be persuaded of being within their right. The main reason for not going is that the costs of the journey are too high. Although the general tendency in the district Taghzoute is that most people visit the *kadi al-orf*, there is a growing tendency to go to the courthouse immediately following a short visit to the *caïd*. The short visit to the *caïd* is only meant to informing him of the steps. The people tend to go to Ouarzazate believe that the authority of the *kadi al-orf* has little value. They assume that his judgements are not legally based. They prefer to go to the courthouse in Ouarzazate to solve their problems. A judge in Tinghir confirmed this statement. In addition, this judge claims that the *kadi al-orf* will probably disappear in the future. People deciding to go to the courthouse in Ouarzazate indicates in Elias' view that in the configuration of Tadafalte's organisation of water, and the perspectives and actions of the different players in Tadafalte are changing. The two most dominant players of Tadafalte are outlined in the next paragraph.

#### 4.5. The Dominant groups in Tadafalte

This paragraph deals with the two majority groups in Tadafalte. The element of *taggourte*-possession, which makes the distinction between the groups, is a determining element in the social relations between Tadafalte's inhabitants. In the past, *taggourte*-possession was the 'resource' the villagers competed over. With this resource, one could become the 'strongest' player in relation to his opponent, who owned fewer *taggourtes*. In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, these are the ingredients for asymmetrical relationships. This paragraph is about whether the ingredients for such a relationship have changed.

It was clear that the *taggourte*-owners still had access to water today, but how the landless inhabitants obtained water and for what reason they stayed in Tadafalte was unclear. For these reasons, this group is also included in the research. This group is described in the paragraph following the one at the differences in the group of *taggourte*-owners and its effect on Tadafalte's social organisation.

##### *The taggourte-owners*

In Tadafalte, the inhabitants are predominantly peasants. Except for one family<sup>89</sup>, is a peasant in Tadafalte if one possesses a *taggourte*, which consists of part water and part land. The vast differences between the sub-groups of *taggourte*-owners are not as important as they were in the past. In the old days, the number of *taggourtes* a peasant owned was a significant factor for a person's position and the social relation with fellow-villagers. A peasant who owned many *taggourtes* had more say in matters of the village, was frequently chosen for the village council and occasionally employed people (from the village) for cultivating land. Therefore, the big *taggourte*-owners were like the patrons in a client-patron relationship. A client-patron relationship is an exchange relationship by which the client did the patron a service in exchange for harvest, land, work or water (Lentjes 1981; 77, 87). The clients were the peasants who owned few or no *taggourtes*, and the patrons were the large *taggourte*-owners (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasant 1999).

Today, these relationships have changed. Small *taggourte*-owners can be elected for the traditional village council as well, although I was told that these were predominantly people who thought in a similar way as the large *taggourte*-owners. The main difference between the big *taggourte*-owners and the small *taggourte*-owners is that most big ones can sustain their family with the harvest and the profit their land and livestock provide. For peasants who own few than four *taggourtes* this becomes more difficult. Most informants who possess less than

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<sup>89</sup> The family described in chapter 3.4.

four *taggourtes* have another job to sustain their family. Some receive money from a relative who is wealthier<sup>90</sup>. That people having another job is not surprising because according to the statistics, about twenty people are forced to live off one hectare. The harvest of one hectare is not enough for twenty people to sustain (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, Boulmane 1999). Examples of the jobs of these peasants are construction workers, traders or lorry drivers. This indicates that money becomes an important factor in the life of the Tadafalte's inhabitants. The remittances the migrants send partly caused this process, which happened in many communities, which were influenced by the outside world (Moujahid 1992: 387/388). The remittances cause the migrants' relatives to obtain a certain sporadic income while peasants who do not have a migrant relative are totally dependent on agriculture or their work (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). First, a first ingredient for changes in the asymmetrical relations between *taggourte*-owners in Tadafalte is money.

A problem for the peasants who own few then one *taggourte* is that cultivation is difficult. Usually only one crop can be cultivated on their land since the pieces of land are small. As one respondent told in an interview, on April 7th 1999: '*That piece of land is too small even to feed a mouse*<sup>91</sup>.' The small plots of land also make the exchange of land with other peasants difficult. The big *taggourte*-owners had the same problem. They also found it hard to convince people to exchange land with them. The disadvantage of their land is that their plots are too big and too scattered over the three zones. People who own fewer than four *taggourtes* generally have more luck with exchanging land (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). By doing this, they can produce more agricultural products and perhaps even sell more. Then, they earn more money but it is unlikely for their first priority to be sustaining their family. The exchange of land is not an ingredient for changes in the asymmetrical social relations.

In general, the three groups' *taggourte*-owners have a common view concerning the existence of the traditional village council and the functioning of the government. The general opinion about the *amghar* and *aiyans* is that this institution is necessary for the functioning of Tadafalte. The traditional village council takes care of the inhabitants and Tadafalte's fields. '*Without them, Tadafalte is not organised.*' they told me in interviews. To make such pronouncements is, of course, in their own interests. It underlines Elias' thought that people only form relations with other people to guarantee, or to improve one's own moral, social and psychological progress.

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<sup>90</sup> This person sees it as his duty to give money to his relatives.

<sup>91</sup> Fieldwork, Interviews peasant, respondent 38 1999.

All *taggourte*-owners regret that the authority of the traditional village council is decreasing. Fewer people listen to the decisions of the *amghar* and *aiyans*. On the one hand the *taggourte*-owners blame the government for not helping the village council. On the other hand, the youth is blamed, and along with it the process of individualisation. People are becoming increasingly individualistic. Money becomes a more important factor than tradition. Also, the youth knows that the government does not officially recognise the traditional village council. Furthermore, the youth of Tadafalte is not interested in agriculture. They do not see any future or profit in it. Many of them prefer to emigrate or take in another profession (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999). This indicates more ingredients, the migrants and the influence of the government, for causing changes in the asymmetrical relationships between the *taggourte*-owners. The asymmetrical relationship between the *taggourte*-owners has become equal due to the introduction of money, the influences of the government and the lack of interest of the youth in agriculture. All *taggourte*-owners are in the same boat regarding their dependency on water for irrigation. Only some of them could afford a water pump, but the water pump does not make such a difference for their agricultural production, which remain small. With the plots of land becoming smaller, many *taggourte*-owners have to find a second job to sustain their family. Many of them already did so by doing sporadic work.

### ***People without land in Tadafalte***

The cause for not owning any *taggourte* in Tadafalte is usually that their ancestors did not own any, or have sold it themselves. In addition, some inhabitants do not own *taggourte* due to the fact that their father is still alive. They will inherit *taggourte* due in the future. The other group will never obtain *taggourte*. The only option they have is to buy one. As previously remarked in chapter two, the situation has to be extremely bad if a person wants to sell his *taggourte* (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people 1999).

A villager who does not own a *taggourte* is not allowed to take a seat in the traditional village council of Tadafalte. However, a landless person can be punished by the traditional village council just like the *taggourte*-owners. Often the fines of villagers without land are remitted because these people are too poor to pay. It is also the duty of religious people to help the poor in society (see chapter 4.1.) (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people 1999).

For a few years now, the landless also have to pay for the services of the *marabout*. The *marabout* receives a sum for his delivered services. Before, the amount of *taggourte* a person possessed determined the amount of money he had to pay for *marabout's* services. According to the *taggourte*-owners, it was not fair they were the only group in Tadafalte who had to pay for

them while the landless people also enjoyed his services. They stated: '*People pray, not land*<sup>92</sup>'. Today, each man above the age of 18 has to pay 50 dirham for the services. Often, the landless people are spared this payment for the same reason as described as above (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people 1999). The 'sudden' obligation for the landless people to pay for the *marabout* indicates that Tadafalte's organisation has changed. In Tennekes' view, a previous mechanism of the organisation structure, the rules for the payment of the *marabout*, is changed as a result of tensions between the different interests of the members and the organisation structure. The outcome of this tension is clear, landless people also have to pay.

People without *taggourtes* do not feel connected with the traditional village council because they only have obligations to it and do not obtain any privileges in return. The traditional village council considered this group less important than the *taggourte*-owners. Contrary to most *taggourte*-owners, the landless people will not turn to the traditional village council if they have personal problems or problems with other villagers. Instead, they go to the 'official' authorities like the police, the *moqaddem* or *jamaa*. This lack of confidence in the traditional village council indicates that the mutual social relations are not as harming as the relations between the *taggourte*-owners and the council. In addition, this group argues that the authority of the *amghar* and *aiyans* is losing its value and this institution will disappear in the future. They are much more negative than the groups of *taggourte*-owners who claim that this institution cannot disappear. According to them, the traditional village council is the pivot of Tadafalte. (Fieldwork, File Interview landless people 1999, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). In Tennekes' option, the landless people have a different view and personal preferences the organisation of Tadafalte than their fellow-villagers who own *taggourtes*. The different views between the players of Tadafalte's organisation of water result into interactions. The interactions cause finally changes in the social relations and the organisation structure of Tadafalte's organisation.

Tadafalte's inhabitants who do not own *taggourte* are authorised to obtain drinking water from the *khattara*. Sometimes they can also use their neighbours' well. The neighbours permit this because they consider it as their religious duty: As a Muslim, a person is obligated to help people who are not well off. Many people without *taggourte* make a living in different ways. They can help with the cultivation of the land of other villagers, work as builders, or own a small shop in Tadafalte or other villages. Most people who do not own any land hope to settle in another place or country in the future. However, they are often not able to do so due to a lack of money (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people 1999).

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<sup>92</sup> Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people, respondent 7 1999.

If a person has a chronic illness a heart disease for example and does not own *taggourte* in the village, he and his family are more obligated to stay in Tadafalte because they are totally dependent on the gifts of the villagers (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people, respondent 3, 5 1999). In other words: landless (poor) people in Tadafalte are dependent on the *taggourte*-owners in many ways, although the relation between *taggourte*-possession and dependency is decreasing a little, and along with it, their relation with the traditional village council. Money is becoming a more determining factor in the everyday lives of Tadafalte's inhabitants than the possession of *taggourte*. The basis of the asymmetrical relations between the inhabitants is shifting. More emphasis is put on the possession of money than on *taggourte*-possession.

In the past, between 1970 and 1980, some people left Tadafalte to earn money elsewhere. These migrants were a cluster of big and small *taggourte*-owners and of landless people. They often earned a reasonable amount of money in contrast with landless people who stayed in Tadafalte. In the eyes of Tadafalte's inhabitants, the migrants were the rich people of their village. The people, who now leave Tadafalte to earn money elsewhere, often make more money than the stay-behinds but as much as the previous group migrants. In this group of migrants are both *taggourte*-owners and landless people (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people 1999, File Interviews migrants 1999). The next paragraph deals with the group of migrants, their motives to go to a foreign country, and what kind of effects their stay has on the social relations in the village.

#### 4.6. The Migrants

Obtaining data about this group was not easy. The group of people who migrated first to Europe showed a hostile attitude towards me. Later, it appeared that before my arrival, a research was conducted which affected their incomes, which they still gained from the foreign country they previously worked in. The people, who left Tadafalte to work in Europe in a later period, were nice and open with me but I had to be lucky to interview them. Most of the time, they were working in Europe. This resulted in minimal information about the group of migrants. The information of the villagers about the migrants is added to this paragraph so to gain a more complete image of their present position in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. First, the group of migrants is dealt with. Later, the attitude of the villagers towards migrants is outlined. Lastly, the effect of the migrants on the social relations in Tadafalte is explained.

### *The different migrants*

In the past, many Tadafalte's villagers wanted to work elsewhere to earn money. Both *taggourte*-owners and non-*taggourte*-owners left Tadafalte in search of it. Some of the villagers went to Algeria. Later on, others were recruited to go to France for several years. Some villager even went to the Netherlands, and since 1990, Spain is the country to migrate to. Last years, it became difficult to obtain a work visa for western countries. Some villagers saw their only way out through illegal migration, which was not always successful. The first group of migrants still work abroad and come to visit their relatives every summer. Other people in this group have returned to their village after having worked in a foreign country for a particular period of time. Most people who went to Spain are still working in that country and visit Tadafalte whenever they can. Most migrants encourage other people to go to Europe as well. A respondent said in an interview that: *'It is better to be productive than to be unproductive in Morocco.'* (Fieldwork, File Interviews migrants, respondent 5 1999). To illustrate the differences and the similarities between migrants from the different periods of departures, two cases are described below.

#### Case 1

*In 1970, the respondent left Morocco to go working in France. His motive was that there was no work for him in Morocco. In addition, he had not obtained land from his father yet. He wanted to earn money. A Frenchman was visiting a lot of places in search of Moroccans, who wanted to work for a period of 18 months in France. Before one was approved for the work in France, one underwent a selection. After the man passed the conditions of the selection, he went to France leaving his family behind in Tadafalte. In France, he heard from other Moroccans about a company in Holland. To avoid an insecure future, he went to work at this company. There, he stayed until 1985. In that time, the factory closed and enabled him to return to Tadafalte because he could maintain his wage. He still obtains its wage as in those days. He divides its money among all members of its family and the poor in Tadafalte, as he did when he was in Holland. He invested in a water pump, of which many people can use for a reduced tariff, and he bought some land. I got the impression that he still lived in the same house as before he left. A little difference with other houses is the interior of the house. There are couches, and nice teacups, but one can also find these elements in other households of Tadafalte. Everybody in Tadafalte consider him as a nice generous person. Another returned migrant from Holland is not so generous, and not so friendly. From his son, I heard that this man invested in water pump for the fields in Tadafalte, and made some investments in Khenifa (a house, a shop and some land). He was also the person who really showed that he did not appreciate my staying in the village. (Fieldwork, Interviews migrants, respondent 1 1999)*

#### Case 2

*In 1992, the respondent went to Spain. He had accumulated a lot of debts through his trading activities. For him, the only solution was to go illegal to Spain to earn money, otherwise he would not leave Morocco in these days. In a tiny boat he crossed the Strait of Gibraltar. Arrived in Spain, he did not find a job quickly. He expected to find a 'Paradise', where work was in abundance and life was good, but he only found sporadic work. In 1994, the situation changed in Spain. He found a good job at a farm. Most of the earned money*

went to his creditors until the debt was paid off. After 1996, he obtained a visa through documents his employer provided him. His employer considered him a hard worker and he wanted to keep him. Today, of his earned 5000 dirham<sup>93</sup>, he need 1500 dirham to live in Spain, and the other part of his wages goes to Morocco for the construction of a new house for his family. He sometimes helps other people but only when he is back in the village. He likes working in Spain. He even considers moving his family to Spain, although he believes the influences of western society are not good for them. Despite this, he will never sell his *taggourtes*. His father wanted to sell it once, but he forbids it. As he said: 'There has to be a very good reason if you want to sell your piece of land. We obtained it from our grandfathers, remember that!' (Fieldwork, File Interviews migrants, respondent 3, 1999).

The two cases described above gives an impression of the differences and similarities between migrants who left in different periods. Nearly all migrants of both periods went off to Europe out for a shortage of money and no job in Morocco. In general, they intended to return to Tadafalte. Through building new houses and to retain their *taggourtes*, they express this feeling. The migrants, who went between 1970S and 1980S, gained better wages then the last migrant. The 'Paradise'-idea, respondent 2 imagined when he went to Spain, is more or less created by the migrants who went to Europe before him. They gained good wages and expressed their wealth through building new houses, buying water pumps or land and generous gifts to other villagers. In Elias' perspective, this group literally caused the enlargement of the networks of Tadafalte. The basis of the networks is economic, namely earning money. Through this basis, the power balances between the stay-behinds and the migrants and their families changed. The migrants gained more the position of the relative 'stronger' player in relation to his opponent and the basis of the relation was economic. Despite the last group of migrants not earning as much money as the first group, they are still satisfied that they work in a foreign country. This way, they can support their families better, which would be much harder if they stayed in Morocco. The way the villagers perceives the group of migrants is explained in the next paragraph.

### ***The attitude of the villagers towards the migrants***

According to Tadafalte's villagers, two different groups of migrants are present there. The migrants who returned to Tadafalte are in general better persons than the migrants who visit every summer. The summer migrants are predominantly the people and their families who left between 1970S and 1980S. Most people who belong to the group are seen as 'good' people for good. According to the informants, the definition of a 'good' person is a good Muslim who takes care for all people in the village. This means that the returned migrant shares his earned money with the villagers who need it the most. In addition, the villagers believe that a migrant

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<sup>93</sup> This sum is estimated after a small calculation of the respondent.



who returns to Tadafalte becomes a normal person again. '*Normal (and poor) people like them*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999, File Interviews landless people 1999).

If the migrant does not share his wealth with other villagers but only spends the money on himself and his relatives, Tadafalte's inhabitants label this person 'bad'. Most summer migrants are counted in this group, only this group is even worse than the 'bad' returned migrants, according to the villagers. Most of them show their wealth through their clothes, cameras and other material things. The villagers call this group '*camels, high in the sky*'. This means that these people are arrogant, do not help the villagers and look down on the way of life of the villagers (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999, File Interviews landless people 1999).

The opinion of the villagers also depends on the year in which a person left Tadafalte. In addition, the situation in the foreign country plays a role in forming the attitude towards the migrant. For the villagers, these two factors play an important role in the development of the view about the migrant. If someone just left Tadafalte a relatively short time ago, most villagers will be eager to see him again. Another factor is the Moroccan community in the foreign country. Is the migrant alone in the foreign country, or does he enter a small Tadafalte community? For example, a respondent told me that in Spain, there is a small Tadafalte community, which means that one continue communicating with people from Tadafalte, not losing their identity. However, in their contact with migrants, Tadafalte's villagers are generally friendly and they maintain relations with them. *You never know if the migrants are of any help for the villagers*, for example for a visa, some goods, money or a little drive in their car. This is a typical relation, which underlines Elias' thought that people form relations out of their own interests.

The migrants who returned to Tadafalte for good do not feel the particular distinction of the villagers. Most of them feel at home in Tadafalte and they only want to enjoy the rest of their lives. Perhaps the summer migrants feel it more because some villagers express for example their opinions about their clothes and their manners. Shortly, the way the villagers of Tadafalte think about migrants is opposite from the way villagers act (Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants 1999, File Interviews landless people 1999, Informal interview family in Holland, November 25th 1999). The next paragraph deals with the effects of the group of migrants on Tadafalte's organisation.

### *The effect of the migrants on social relations*

Although many villagers have negative thoughts about the migrants, it is this group which becomes more important in the Tadafalte. They bring money and luxury goods into the village. As one of three shopkeepers of Tadafalte stated: *'During the summer, I have more turnover than the rest of the year. I like the summer migrants.'* (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people, respondent 2 1999) Another contribution of the migrants is that more houses can be built in Tadafalte or Tinghir. These houses can be build by Tadafalte's villagers, which provides the villagers work and a better income. As one of the landless persons said in his interview: *'I like the migrants. They want to build new houses. Then, I have work. Without them, there would be nothing in Tadafalte.'* (Fieldwork, File Interviews landless people, respondent 5 1999). This process is also called the 'multiplier-effect'. If one person invests in a house, other people can the house and earn money by doing so. These people (construction workers) have more spending power, so the small shop owners also profit from the investment of one person (Fieldwork, File Interviews migrants 1999, File Interviews landless people 1999). In Elias' view, the current situation in Tadafalte is determined by previous moves, like the poor work situation in Morocco causing the migration of Tadafalte's inhabitants. Tennekes explain the internal changes in Tadafalte's organisation as a result of the interactions between the activities of its members and the organisation structure, through which tensions are created. Then, some features of the organisation structure have to change.

A side effect brought on by the group of migrants, who generally have more money than the other villagers, is that they can have more say in matters related to money. Eventually this can result in more voice in matters concerning the social organisation of Tadafalte. For example, during my stay a new mosque was built (see map 3.1.). In Tadafalte, the mosque is one of the responsibilities of the traditional village council but this one was built under the guidance of a (rich) man who lived in Marrakech<sup>94</sup>. This is the same person who lent money at low interest, to the villagers for a water pump to irrigate their fields. Through these agreements, he already created an economic connection to some of the villagers (Fieldwork<sup>95</sup>). In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, this man provides resources, money and trucks, but is not tightly bound to the organisation. His extent of interference is high but the organisation of Tadafalte has not great influence on him. He lives in Marrakech.

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<sup>94</sup> This is the same man who possesses the house in pompous style (see chapter 3.1.)

<sup>95</sup> Fieldwork, File Interviews peasants respondents 1, 13, 14, 24, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, and 45. File Diary May 1999.

To build the mosque, this man donated money<sup>96</sup>, lent some trucks from his business and made a work plan. Some other villagers were also involved in this plan. These people were predominantly former migrants. The rich man appointed one former migrant as leader of the project. Together with other villagers, of which some were also former migrants, the leader tried to co-ordinate the building of the mosque. In a short time, part of the mosque was finished. There were two main reasons for the pace of work. On the one hand, it was a religious project. Everybody wanted to work or felt religiously obligated to do some work. On the other hand, a lot of money ensured that the work could be finished quickly. Families in Tadafalte often cannot finish a house due to lack of money. Then, they wait until the family has enough money to finish the work. In this case, money was not the problem (Fieldwork, Diary May 1999).

Shortly; the (wealthy) migrants gain more influences on the decision process within the village but the extent of the traditional village council's interference with them is low. In the past, there has been another party in Tadafalte that tried to influence the decision process. I called this party the 'opposition' party of Tadafalte. The interview I had with the leader of this opposition was mysterious because the man in question did not want the villagers to see him interviewed. So, my assistant, the respondent in question and I hid behind the school. The result of his interview is outlined in the following paragraph.

#### 4.7. The Opposition in Tadafalte.

The opposition party came into being in 1960 when the village council decided to divide the claimed land (second zone) according to the *taggourte*-system. To illustrate the social relations between the players of Tadafalte's organisation of water during the time of the formation of the opposition party, its story is described as a case. The interpretation follows afterwards.

*In 1960, some villagers rebelled against the amghar and aiyans. This group contained about 35 people and consisted of people who did not own taggourte or owned only one. This group claimed that the land should be divided equally among all male inhabitants of Tadafalte instead of among the taggourte-owners only. The traditional village council heard of the plans of the opposition party, they tried to restrain these plans. During that time, the membership of the village council was determining mostly by taggourte-possession, which was more than the average peasant in Tadafalte owned. Therefore, it was in their favour if the land would be divided according to the taggourte-system. The big taggourte-owners would obtain big pieces of land in the claimed zone.*

*In a short time, the big taggourte-owners bribed or threatened the members of this opposition party. They could lose their job at the big taggourte-owner, and loss their income. Only five members remained. These remained five people decided to start a lawsuit to gain rights. To prevent this, the big taggourte-owners proposed a solution. In the mosque,*

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<sup>96</sup> Every Tadafalte's villager wanted (or was pressured) to donate money for the mosque (religious duty) but the share of the rich man was abundantly clear more than the average Tadafalte's villager.

*they swore on the Koran that the land would be divided equally among all male villagers of Tadafalte. The "five" believed the big taggourte-owners and abandoned the lawsuit. In addition, the opposition party wrote a letter to the caid. The caid was informed beforehand of the situation and problems about the claimed land in Tadafalte. In this letter the "five" explained that the problem was solved internally. After this letter, it was not possible to submit a complain about the same problem at the caid again. The caid could otherwise take legal actions against the "five" for giving wrong information to him. Eventually, it appeared that the big taggourte-owners did not hold their word.*

*At the announcement of the division of the claimed land, the village council said that the land was divided according to the taggourte-system. The explanation of their decision was that the possession of taggourte was developed during time, and what was shaped by time could not be changed. It was God's will that it happened this way. For example, people who had sold their taggourtes in the past had no right to a piece of land in the second zone. Aiyans, who disagree with the pronouncement, were put under pressure by the big taggourte-owners (Fieldwork, File amghar and aiyans, respondent opposition leader 1999).*

The case reflects well the social relations between the different groups in Tadafalte at that time. At that time, it was clear that the big taggourte-owners had more say in the social organisation than people who owned less or no taggourtes. There were two reasons for this. First, the big taggourte-owners were repeatedly chosen for the traditional village council, which ruled the village with their system of fines and sanctions. Second, they employed villagers to cultivate their land, which created an economic connection. The ancient system of division is persevered by the big taggourte-owners. They could pressure the traditional village council, in which many big taggourte-owners had a seat, and they could use the economic bondage as mean of pressuring the small taggourte-owners. In addition, the big taggourte-owners used the regulation of the government system that one cannot complain to the caid twice about a problem after one has said to the caid the problem was solved. In my view, the big taggourte-owners did a dirty trick.

Today, fewer people are dependent on the big taggourte-owner, simply because there are few big taggourte-owners due to the inheritance system. There are still people who work for the taggourte-owners but this is not their main job. Usually, they only work for the big taggourte-owners one-week a year. Some people also regret that they were scared of the big taggourte-owners in that time. In addition, the traditional village council does not contain only big taggourte-owner but also some peasants owning few taggourtes. These small taggourte-owners are mainly chosen because they agree with each other, according to the 'opposition leader'. People who were in the opposition in 1960 are still seen as a danger and will probably never be chosen for the traditional village council. In addition, the opposition has not real a future in Tadafalte because the claimed land is already divided. Therefore, they are not active in the village but they are still feared by the previous big taggourte-owners and the group of five (and their sons) will not be asked for the traditional village council. If in the future land is claimed, then many interviewees are convinced that the land will be divided equally among all

the male villagers of Tadafalte, as is done already in other villages in the valley (Fieldwork, File *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent opposition leader 1999, File Interviews peasants 1999).

Only one player who lives in Tadafalte has not been outlined in this chapter yet. That is the player who represents a government institution, the *moqaddem*. He is part of a larger institution, the *caid*, which is not directly related to the organisation of water. For the *moqaddem* applies the same reason, only he is connected to a more powerful institution, the *caid*, which can interfere in the affairs of Tadafalte. For this reason, the government representative, the *moqaddem*, is outlined in the next paragraph.

#### 4.8. *The moqaddem, the government representative,*

There is one government official in Tadafalte, the *moqaddem*. The *caid* appointed the current *moqaddem* in Tadafalte in 1968. During that time, the *caid* asked several people of Tadafalte who would be good for this job. The villagers chose the present *moqaddem* because he had previously had a seat in the traditional village council. When the *caid* offered this office to the current *moqaddem*, he could not refuse to accept the responsibility otherwise he insulted the wishes of his village and the government (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representative, the *moqaddem* 1999).

The task of the *moqaddem* is to represent the government in the village. By reporting the affairs of the village to the *caid*, the *moqaddem* was like a police officer for the government. The villagers called him the 'spy' of the government. Predominantly, the *moqaddem* has to report the *caid* the situation in Tadafalte and its relations. The *moqaddem* can decide, which information is important to report but he can also ask for the opinion of the *amghar* and *aiyans*. With small problems, such as a discussion about a border between two plots of land, and an insignificant fight in the village, the *moqaddem* discusses the problem with the members of the traditional village council. Problems with other villages about borders between two villages for example, the *moqaddem* reports to the *caid* immediately. The members of the traditional village council can also ask the *moqaddem* to report a defaulter<sup>97</sup> to the *caid*. To report a defaulter the village council hopes the *caid* will take action against him. By notifying the *caid* of the decisions of the *amghar* and *aiyans*, about an application to the ORMVA for example, the *caid* is well informed about the present situation in Tadafalte. This can prevent any miscommunication between the traditional village council and the *caid* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representative, the *moqaddem* 1999).

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<sup>97</sup> A villager who refuse to pay his fine of the village council.

In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, the traditional village council also 'uses' the *moqaddem* as a safety device to protect the organisation from external influences. By sending the *moqaddem* to the *caid* with small problems and with the *moqaddem* filling in the traditional village council with the information the *caid* provides, the safety device operates.

Every Monday, the *moqaddem* is obligated to go the *caid* to report the situation in his village. At this meeting, all *moqaddems* of the district are present. Thus, the *caid* can obtain a general image of the situation in the villages and the relations between all the villages of the district. Also, the *caid* can inform the *moqaddems* about current decisions of the government, new laws, developments in the valley (for example a new researcher is spotted), particular messages for people<sup>98</sup> and so on. In addition, the *moqaddem* can ask the *caid* for certain documents villagers request. The delivery of documents is, besides the responsibility to supply mail to villagers, one of the *moqaddems* duties. The present *moqaddem* does not like his office because it takes a lot of time, is paid poorly and villagers are not always as friendly to him because he can pass bad news on to the *caid* (Fieldwork, File Interviews government representative, the *moqaddem* 1999).

#### 4.9. The Game of Water

The players related to Tadafalte's organisation of water are outlined in the previous chapters. According to Elias' game model, players are different figurations people form with each other on economic, government, social political grounds, and on the basis of *taggourte*-possession. In connection with Tadafalte's organisation of water, the interaction between the players who play a role in the game of water are outlined below.

The traditional village of council in Tadafalte is a player in the game because this institution manages the organisation of water, which is one of the previously set objectives of the organisation of the village. This player is connected on a social political basis to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. It forms an essential structural element in Tadafalte's organisation of water.

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<sup>98</sup> An example of a particular message of the *caid* by means of the *moqaddem* was that during my stay in Tadafalte the members of my host family were regularly asked about my well being and they were also warned that they had to take care of me.

To realise the objectives of Tadafalte's organisation of water, the organisation needed structure. One of the structural elements of Tadafalte's organisation of water was the *taggourte*-possession. *Taggourte*-possession became the social basis for the asymmetrical relationships between the different players of Tadafalte's organisation of water. The asymmetrical relationships produced into players, among whom some gained more relative strength in relation to their opponents through *taggourte*-possession. The strongest players also gained seat in the traditional village council through their relative strength.

Owing different reasons, some Tadafalte's people migrated to other countries. They earned a lot of money in comparison to the stay-behinds, which they sent to their relatives in Tadafalte. Through the 'multiplier-effect' this player caused, he gained more influence in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Throughout the years, money gained more importance in Tadafalte. The migrant had control over his economic tool. Therefore, the power balances between the players related to Tadafalte's organisation of water shifted from the big *taggourte* owners to the migrants. The construction of the new mosque shows the position of the migrants especially well.

As Pfeffer and Salancik stated, the migrants provide resources, and money to support the functioning of the organisation. Through this process, the migrants gain influence in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Otherwise the organisation cannot control the activities of the migrants. While the traditional village council manages Tadafalte's organisation of water, it has little ability to provide resources for something constructive for the village. For this reason, the traditional village council has to tap new sources to develop Tadafalte's organisation of water. By submitting requests to the ORMVA, the traditional village council hopes to develop the organisation of water. The player, ORMVA, is a government institution and developing agriculture is one of its objectives. This objective is limited by an assigned budget. The ORMVA has to choose between the different requests. The basis on which a request is granted is not totally correct. The gesture of the respondent in chapter 3.5. made that perfectly clear.

The restricted budget and the lack of interest in agriculture caused that the ORMVA to put conditions before a request could even be submitted. These conditions impact the organisation of water in Tadafalte because they depend on the water supply of the *khattara*. In other words: according to Pfeffer and Salancik a symbiotic relationship is created. The output of the ORMVA, the conditions for a request, effect the organisation of Tadafalte, which has to adjust its organisation structure if they want the ORMVA to grant any request in the future.

Tadafalte's organisation also has some activities to control its context instead of only being influenced by its context. To control its context, the traditional village council 'uses' the two players of the government. The role of *kadi al-orf* and of the *moqaddem* are different in the game of water in Tadafalte. Both are government representatives, but with totally different job descriptions. From the government's point of view, the activities of the *kadi al-orf* are predominantly aimed at solving conflicts in a satisfying way for people of Aït Atta kinship. The *kadi-al-orf* and the traditional village council use this juridical system as a tool to preserve the basis of the age-old organisation structure, -the traditional village council. The traditional village council also uses the appointed *moqaddem* in this way. This institution can function as an intermediary between an official government institution and the officious institution, the traditional village council. Both parties use the *moqaddem* as a safety device to get a grip on the actions their context can take. In return, the traditional village council takes advantage of this official by using the villagers' hostility towards the government. In worse cases, like not paying a fine or if people do not agree with a solution, villagers are frightened by the thought that they will be sent to this official.

In brief: the main players in Tadafalte's game of water are the *taggourte*-owners, migrants, villagers with more money, Tadafalte's traditional village council and the ORMVA. The once powerful position of the traditional village council has declined due to a variety of circumstances. The ORMVA and the migrants reinforce this process. The ORMVA can put conditions on the organisation of Tadafalte. Due to this, the organisation structure of water has to be adjusted. The positions of the traditional village council will change in the adjustments. Along with those processes, the position of the big *taggourte*-owners have lost the advantage over the smaller *taggourte*-owners. The powerful positions are taken over by the migrants. Formally the traditional village council manages the organisation but the migrants and sometimes the ORMVA provide the resources through the organisation can function. In creating a safety device, the traditional village council tries to control its organisation context by means of the *moqaddem*, who plays the role of intermediary. Through him, the traditional village council tries to be well informed about all moves the *caïd* makes so as to be prepared for any changes in its organisation context. The *kadi al-orf* is no danger for the traditional village council. Both institutions have the same objective, and that is the preservation of the age-old traditional village council.



## Chapter Conclusion

In the old days, the big *taggourte*-owners were in charge of Tadafalte's organisation of water. Factors like the autonomous position of the village, the orientation towards the traditional irrigation system, agriculture, the Aït-Atta inheritance, the integrated part of social obligation in the people's lives, the created economic connections between smaller *taggourte*-owners and the big *taggourte*-owners, and the way the traditional village council was, and still is organised, contributed to and kept the superior position of the big *taggourte*-owners. In Tennekes' view, objective realities of the organisation structure of Tadafalte's organisation of water were created. Through their superior position and the need for them by the people from the lower positions (landless and small *taggourte*-owners), dependency relations between the players remained in Tadafalte. The dependency-relations between the big *taggourte*-owners are mainly pragmatic, but also created social obligation towards each other. These elements can be seen as constraints. As Elias writes: societies are peopled by people. Therefore, they have to interact with each other in order to realise or guarantee their own needs.

After Morocco's independence (1956), when the traditional village council had to decide which system they should apply for dividing the claimed land (1970), the position of the big *taggourte*-owners was under discussion. At that time, the Tadafalte's inhabitants became more aware that government institutions could support them in gaining more rights. This indicates, in Tennekes' view, that the members of the organisation gained different interests. The different interests result in interactions between the big *taggourte*-owners and the small *taggourte*-owner and landless people. These interactions cause tensions between the objectives of the organisation, the division system, and the actual results of the organisation, the opposition. Changes in the organisation structure can be the consequence.

Before the arrival of the opposition party, there was no subject or situation to doubt the position of the big *taggourte*-owners. Via the economic connections of most villagers to the big *taggourte*-owners, and the dirty trick played by the big *taggourte*-owners, the change of the age-old system of division did not occur. The social relations in Tadafalte remained intact, although the agitators would not acquire a seat in the traditional village council quickly anymore. As Tennekes sees it, in that time, no structural changes in Tadafalte's organisation of water were realised.

In that period, the migration of villagers to Europe also started. Emigrants gained good wages in foreign countries. Most of them shared their wealth with their fellow-villagers. In addition, they took care of their families by constructing new houses and purchasing water pumps for easing fieldwork. Only a few among them invested in other parts of Morocco, but most migrants invested their money only in their native-village. Through these investments, the migrants maintained their emotional connection with the village. Side effects of the connection

are that their wealth attracted other people to go to Europe, and they acquired a more important position than the previous big *taggourte*-owners. The configurations in Tadafalte changed.

At the moment, through the multiplier-effect the group of migrants takes care of villagers by giving them work and income. This means in Elias' view that the power balance in the relations between the big *taggourte*-owners and the other Tadafalte's villager has shifted to relations between migrants and all villagers. As result, Tennekes argues, tensions are created in the organisation. These tensions cause changes in the organisation structure. In other words, the migrants are gaining a superior position in the organisation of water in Tadafalte, due to the assumption that they contribute to the developments of their native village out of social duty towards their relatives.

# Summary & Conclusion

*'Inshallah'<sup>99</sup>*

Water, the Essence of Life, is the theme of this thesis. Around this scarce resource, many players are formed. A game is created. These players play and compete with each other in order to take hold of the scarce resource. Dependency relations are the result. Water is a scarce good in arid zones because without it, one cannot survive. The village Tadafalte, where I carried out my research to collect data, was situated in such an area.

In this thesis, I have discussed the present-day social relations between the different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, and in what context these relations have evolved. The first part of my central question is answered partly in chapter three and in chapter four. The changes, which preceded the present situation of the relations between the players, are outlined in chapter two and partly in chapter three. The theories that were applied in this thesis were those developed by Tennekes, Pfeffer and Salancik, and Elias. The combination of the three formed my theoretical framework, which is outlined in chapter 1.

The three theories supplement each other in aspects where each one of them alone is weak. On some points, the theories had similarities. All three approach reality not as something that is 'frozen' or a given fact. They realise that in society, constant movements and activities take place. In their opinion, these movements are caused by interaction between people. All three have a similar explanation for the reason people want to interact.

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<sup>99</sup> This means 'God will know'.

In both Tennekes' view and in Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective the interaction is explained by each human being, or what Pfeffer and Salancik called 'participant', who has different interests, needs and perspectives. In Elias' figuration perspective, people's intention to interact is that people *have* to interact with each other in order to guarantee or to improve one's own moral, social and psychological progress. This fact causes changes in the social forms, which people form on the basis of clearly described structural features. Elias explains the constant dynamic in the social forms through the power balance between people on one hand, and the process of meaning systems on the other hand. Pfeffer and Salancik also speak about power balances and meaning systems. These processes are in relation to scarce resources. This way, an organisation, defined as a coalition of participants and interests, can diminish the uncertainty of the organisational context. These processes result in dependency relations between one or more participants. The dependency relations create possibilities for an organisation to achieve its desired objective, namely surviving. In Pfeffer and Salancik's view to support the objectives of an organisation, the activities of an organisation are predominantly aimed to acquire the scarce resource the organisation needs to survive. For Elias, people form dependence relations *just for the simple fact that people have to live together*.

The 'outcome' of the interactions, causing changes between players, is approached differently by the theorists. Tennekes believes that the changes in the organisation context mainly affect the internal organisation structure (the organisation-as-structure). The changes are caused by tensions, which result from interactions of the members of the organisation. The tensions result in the readjustments of the organisation structure. The player, who is occupied with the readjustment-process, is the management of the organisation. The management is an element of the organisation-as-structure, but it also takes part in the social bonds the organisation consists of. Related to the case, Tadafalte's 'management' is the traditional village council. Tennekes' view was helpful to understand the features and adjustments in the organisation structure of Tadafalte's organisation of water. It showed the effect of an external event like the loss of a structural feature as the judicial function, on Tadafalte's organisation structure. Due to loss, the authority of the 'management' declined and changed elements of the organisation structure.

As causes for the changes, Pfeffer and Salancik emphasise the influence of the context on the organisation and *visa versa*. Pfeffer and Salancik believe that an organisation can react on changes from its context, and not like Tennekes, who indicate that the organisation is more at the mercy of its context. By applying Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective, the relations between the context and Tadafalte's organisation of water became clear. People's aim to acquire scarce resources, cause the changes in and between organisations. Through the competing over the scarce resources asymmetrical relationships come into being.

In the past, Tadafalte's villagers competed over water, today more over money. Depending on the sort of asymmetrical relationship the organisation has with its context, the organisation can react or buffer itself against the influences of the 'outside' players. This way, the organisation tries to control the dependency relations. Throughout the thesis it became clear that the organisation of Tadafalte was not at the mercy of its context, but it had build in some safety-devices, like 'using' the *moqaddem* as intermediary. The organisation of Tadafalte had more strategies and manipulation-techniques against the 'outside' world than I initially suspected. However, the reactions of the organisation –the safety device or buffering- always lead to changes in and between the organisations. Pfeffer and Salancik only explain the changes in terms of asymmetrical relationships. In that situation, the Tennekes' perspective was of more value. Tennekes showed the effect of changes on the structural features of Tadafalte's organisation related to water.

Elias sees the reaction or the buffering of the organisation to control the influence of its context more in terms of balances of power between the players. Balances of power are an integral part of human relationships, and can only be understood in relation to the social forms in which they are entangled. The members of the opposition's party are still feared by the big *taggourte*-owners because of what happened in the past. For as long as the big *taggourte*-owners are the relative strongest players in relation to this group, they will not choose the opposition-members for the traditional village council. This way, they retain the 'power'.

Elias introduced 'figuration' -a group of people connected to each other by relations of power and dependency- to overcome the dichotomy between the individual and the society. In the terms used by Tennekes, Elias overcomes the constant interaction between the organisation-as-structure and the organisation-as-life-world. In addition, Elias states that all figurations are determined through previous moves. Thus, present figurations make continuous movements through activities of other interwoven figurations. The moves result into an ongoing dynamic process of changes in the figurations. The structural features, which are created by these processes, can still have impact on present-day situations. By using the historical dimension of Elias, I could determine the present structural features between the players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. In Elias' view, attention and knowledge about the past is indispensable if one wants to gain a good insight into the present.

The theories formed a guideline for analysing the empirical material described in the previous chapters of this thesis. By using Elias' game model, which emphasizes people's mutual dependence, the different perceptions, objectives and means of different of each player in the game of water became clear. Throughout the thesis, it became evident that the players use different meaning systems to 'justify' their actions. Like the big *taggourte*-owners who use the centuries-old system to maintain their control in Tadafalte. The meaning systems are strengthened or restricted by constraints, which develop over the years. Some of the constraints have even become virtually automatic for the figurations in which people are entangled. Like the resentment towards the central government resulting in that people dislike to see the government representative, as the *caid*, by problems or to go the courthouse. On the other hand, the traditional village council kept the constraints alive in order to keep their relative strong position in the balance of power in relation to the other players.

The movements which caused the constraints in Tadafalte's organisation of water is what this thesis was about. By analysing each chapter against the theoretical framework, the movements and its effect on Tadafalte's organisation of water became clear. This way, I gained an answer on the central question of this thesis: *How are the present-day social relations between the different players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, and in what context have the relations evolved?* The results of these chapters are summarised on the next page.

In the time the caravan routes passed through the oasis settlements near Tinghir, the ancestral inhabitants of Tadafalte were transhumance. This lifestyle was adjusted to the conditions of the arid zone put for people to live in such area. Pfeffer and Salancik see the physical conditions as determining elements of the context for people who want to settle in this zone. The physical features of the arid zones impose conditions for competition between people. People competed with each other in order to get property of the interrelated scarce resources water and land. These resources were worth competing over otherwise, survival was impossible.

Before the Aït-Atta came to the Todgha valley, the competing over the scarce resource - the Todgha river- resulted in a symbiotic relationship between the Ahl Todgha and Aït El Hart. According to Pfeffer and Salancik, this was a typical situation. The water use by the relative strongest player Ahl Todgha -the output- determined -the input- the amount of water Aït El Hart could use. In order to hold its superior position in the valley and out of religious duty -a constraint-, a division of water in the Todgha valley was institutionalised. Pfeffer and Salancik indicated the division of water as a strategic move of the Ahl Todgha to deal with and manage their context. This way, they diminish the uncertainty of losing control over the scarce resources. Their strategy succeeded, even after a sub-lineage Aït Ignawen of the feared warmongering nomad tribe Aït Atta decided to settle in the Todgha valley.

Before the decision of the sub-lineage Aït Ignawen to settle at a certain spot in the Todgha valley, Arabs converted the ethnic groups to Islam because of the *jihad*. The easy acceptance of this religion framed the starting point of Elias' figuration perspective. The newcomers disturbed the 'old' figurations, but created simultaneously new dependency relations. The Moroccan people accepted the new condition, Islam, but not the condition of total domination by the newcomers. The oppressors wanted to unite all regions in Morocco in order to make the collecting of taxes easier. The notoriously aggressive Aït Atta fought hard against the idea of one central idea. Along with other tribes, they resisted the oppressors. In this light, Elias views the nomadic tribe as a secular regime that carried out a policy of 'community building'. The idea of one nation does not fit this policy. Many dynasties resorted to violence to unite Morocco as one nation. No dynasty succeeded until the French around.

In Elias' view, the introduction of Islam broadened the chains of mutual dependency and changed the power positions. A good example of Islam's impact was that the configurations of Tadafalte after they established were extended on religious grounds. Tadafalte's inhabitants attracted the *shurfas* to come and live in their village on the assumption that these people could bring peace to their village. This action of Tadafalte's inhabitants reduced the power difference between them because the *shurfas* gained a position in the social organisation of Tadafalte as well.

Islam also changed other elements in the daily life of Tadafalte's inhabitants. Islam proclaims a judicial framework and religious rules such as helping the poor. In Elias' view, these elements have become social constraints, based on religion. The judicial framework and religious rules became virtually automatic for these people. This automatism is an ongoing process, which still manifests itself in the organisation of Tadafalte. The situation, in which Tadafalte's inhabitants applied themselves diligently to construct the new mosque, made the influence of the constraints very clear.

In addition, the Arabs introduced a new kind of trading system, enabling the tribes to connect to other parts in the world. Elias sees this move as a widening of the chains of dependency in the figuration of Tadafalte. In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, the context of Tadafalte's organisation of changed. In that situation the organisation has two options to survive its contexts: making internal adjustments, or dealing with and managing the context. Both options are done by the organisation of the Aït Atta-tribe. They made internal adjustment by accepting the religion, and dealt with the oppressor's idea by refusal. The Aït Atta-tribe managed the new trading system, an element of the new context, by 'using' the markets of others to sell and exchange products. In this manner, the arrival of the Arabs affected the outcomes -the wars- and activities -'using others markets'- of the Aït Atta. The concept tool of determining the degree of dependency of the organisation on its context is hereby determined.

The Aït Atta in that time could be interpreted as a secular regime, as defined by Elias. The tribe had an organisation structure, which was aimed on control 'to inside' and a defence 'to outside'. The dynasties, which attempted oppressing the tribe, were opposed. The organisation structure in Tadafalte of that time still has influence on the present one. The strong group identity of the Aït Atta, created in that time, is still alive in Tadafalte. The 'one happy family'-feeling and the hostile attitude towards Arabs shows the presence of the features of the organisation structure -'community building'- from the past. The feelings have become an automatic for the inhabitants of Tadafalte. Therefore, Elias calls the feelings 'constraints'.



The resistance of the tribe towards the oppressors –a move- caused changes in the power balances within Morocco. This was the 'beginning' of social economic inequality in Morocco, which has lasting influence on the organisation of water in Tadafalte. 'Beginning' is put in quotation marks because as Elias states, every move is determined by a previous move. Therefore, the beginning of the social inequality cannot be determined. Through the 'bad' name the regions in the South obtained, the dynasties and later the French invested less in this area. The socio-economic inequality reinforced the feeling towards the oppressors. Through this, the constraint of Tadafalte towards oppressors, which can be seen as government institutions, was intensified. The negative attitude towards the governments is still present in the organisation of Tadafalte. Today, its inhabitants do not like to go and see the *caid* when they have problems, because of this constraint.

After some unclear events, the sub-lineage Aït Ignawen of the Aït Atta-tribe decided to settle on a certain spot in the Todgha Valley. Through a *liff* with Aït El Hart and a war, the sub-lineage settled finally at the end of the Todgha valley. To organise the 'settled' life, the village needed structure. In Tennekes' view, the 'settled' life was organised by the establishment of a social structure, which consisted of a traditional village council, procedures, responsibilities and authority relations. Through this, the division of the tasks and the co-ordinations in Tadafalte were arranged. One of the arranged tasks was that the traditional village council would manage the irrigation systems.

Due to the borders the donkey had made by the resolution of the war between El hart Niaamine and Tadafalte, the inhabitants of Tadafalte had no access to intermittent surface water in the Todgha river. They had to construct a *khattara* for their water supply. The way the water of this irrigation system was organised, the *taggourte*-system, became one of the essential elements in the organisation structure of the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Beforehand, the *taggourte*-system was meant to create equal opportunities for the inhabitants of Tadafalte in order to survive the context of the organisation. Because of the fact that families decided to settle elsewhere in Morocco, the 'equal' relations in the organisation of water in Tadafalte turned into asymmetrical relations between the different groups of *taggourte*-owners.

In Pfeffer and Salancik's perspective, the big *taggourte*-owners –they obtained most of the scarce resource- could exercise the most influence in the social relations between the players related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte. One of the conditions of having a seat in the traditional village in that time -to possessing many *taggourtes*- contributed to the maintenance of the power positions of the big *taggourte*-owners for a long time. In Tennekes' view of, this group became the management of the organisation of water in Tadafalte. The management itself is also part of the social groups the organisations consists of. This can cause tensions between the members of the organisation due to the different interests people have. However, in that time, the traditional village council consisted predominantly of big *taggourte*-owner, which aimed to keep their superior position. The other members depended on the big *taggourte*-owners. For this reason, there was little tension in the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

For Elias, this is a typical example of an unequal power balance, in which the actions of the powerful minority can only be understood in relation to the figurations in which they are entangled. The configurations of Tadafalte were still small and simple. The chains of dependence were not complicated and relatively short. In that time, in Tadafalte, there were only relations between *taggourte*-owners and relations of Tadafalte to its neighbours. In Tadafalte, the control was carried out by a few people -the traditional village council-, which controlled a small area with a few constants, like the way the water was divided in the valley.

The coming of the French in 1912 extended the chains of interdependency in Tadafalte. The French defeated the Aït Atta-tribe in the Bougaffer war of 1933. Through the establishment of a central government structure, all villages in Morocco came under the supervision of the French. The appointment of a government representative in each village, the *moqaddem*, contributed to this direct control. The presence of the *moqaddem* was a visible representation of the widening of the chains of dependence in the organisation of Tadafalte. Theoretically, the local institutions like the traditional village council had to turn in their authority to the government representatives, the *caïd* and the *pasha*. In activity, this institution kept managing the organisation of the village, even with the help of the French. The help of the French by disobedient inhabitants of Tadafalte compensated the loss of their 'war' function. Chapter 2.6. outlines the preferences of the inhabitants of Tadafalte for the French. The French also put the villagers of Tadafalte in contact with the value of the medium of exchange: *money*. The villagers were encouraged to cultivate other agricultural products, whose yield would be tremendous in the near future (see chapter 2.6.).

Through this idea of the future, some villagers changed their modes of cultivation. In Elias' view, an economic chain to the world economy was added to the configuration of Tadafalte. In the beginning, this chain did not change much. The big *taggourte*-owners retained their positions and the same structural features of the organisation of water in Tadafalte were still applied, but the first steps towards more complicated and larger chains of dependency were taken. After Morocco's independence in 1956, the widening of the chains of dependence in Tadafalte continued. The government influence in the small villages remained visible in the preservation of the *moqaddem*. This administrator installed by the French gained also a place in the new government structure. Because the *moqaddem* is seen as a 'spy' for the government, the constraint towards the government came up well in Tadafalte. Until today, the *moqaddem* suffers from this constraint. Since his appointment many villagers ignore him.

Today, the traditional village council of the organisation of water in Tadafalte 'uses' the *moqaddem* as safety device. In Pfeffer and Salancik's view, this safety device has developed throughout the years, since the independence. The traditional village council determined the degree of dependence to the larger unit the *moqaddem* represent, the *caid*. To see the position of the *moqaddem* as intermediary between the traditional village council and the *caid*, the traditional village council of Tadafalte deals with and manages its context. Also, the traditional village council of Tadafalte hereby creates acceptability for itself and its activities. With the activities I aim on the threat of the traditional village council of Tadafalte to refer villagers to the *caid* when these villagers do not pay their fines. Pfeffer and Salancik also call this situation the strategy of the traditional village council, which is aimed on manipulation of its context.

The new government structure, interwoven with the patronage-client system, made the traditional village council lose its 'judicial' function. This function was taken over by an official courthouse, which was situated in Ouarzazate, and a traditional judge. In Tennekes' view, this external action of the government caused changes in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. A fundamental feature of its organisation structure was taken over by other institutions. The management of Tadafalte -the traditional village council- had to adjust the organisation structure of the organisation of water and the activities of its members to the loss of this element. In Tennekes' view, an external event, the decisions of the government caused interactions between the members of the organisation, which the management is part of. These interactions resulted in tensions between the different actions, the removal of this function, and the objectives of the organisation, which were based on the laws of the Aït Atta.

The traditional judge, the *kadi al-orf*, took over the laws of the Aït Atta to solve problems in regions where these laws were applied in the past. This way, the jurisdiction of the Aït Atta was preserved. However, it also created a new dependency relation in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Another player was added to the game of water in Tadafalte. On one side, this player wanted to preserve the age-old institution, the traditional village council of the Aït Atta. On the other side, people are 'forced' to become *kadi al-orf*. For this reason, as Elias writes, the present relations between Tadafalte and the *kadi al-orf* can only be seen in the figuration they are entangled in.

The official courthouse strengthens the constraints of the past. Since people already dislike the interference of the government, the courthouse's function was uncertain. The interwoven patron-client-system, which results are not always correct, contributed to this feeling. This is the effect of the constraints from the past, which are mentioned before. As I said before, Elias states that each move is determined by a previous move. The resentment towards the government caused the villagers of Tadafalte to have a negative view of this institution. The removal of their judicial function contributed to this feeling.

The government also established an agricultural organisation, the ORMVA. With this institution, the government hoped to change the feelings of resentment of the peasants. Through carrying out all kinds of activities and accepting requests, this agricultural institution intended to develop the agricultural sector. In Elias' view, the configuration of the water in Tadafalte was extended through this institution. This player can help develop the agriculture in Tadafalte because they have the means. To get the means, conditions are made by the organisation. In the beginning, the condition was only to write a request. In that time, the relations were competitive, according to Pfeffer and Salancik. Two or more villages competed with each other over the same resource, namely the attention of the ORMVA to grant their requests. The competition resulted in the influencing of the ORMVA's decision process. The manner of influence could and can be adjusted by knowing which interest groups had discretion over the resource allocation. The mean, which is used by the influencing process, is made clear by the gesture of a respondent. The gesture also indicates that Tadafalte's organisation of water in reacted to the conditions the ORMVA established.

The position of the ORMVA was relatively strong in the relations of water in Tadafalte. Today, that position is strengthened further through the conditions the agricultural organisation put to the submission of requests. The present conditions can have great impact on the organisation structure of Tadafalte's organisation of water. In Pfeffer and Salancik's ' view, the organisation can react in two ways. One way is it makes the adjustment -to become a co-operation- and retains this relationship. Through this relationship, the organisation can acquire the resource it needs to survive. The other manner is ignoring the condition and searching for other players who can replace the offers of this institution.

The players who can replace the influence of the agricultural organisation are the migrants. According to Pfeffer and Salancik, migration is due to previous events in the context on the organisation of Tadafalte, the organisation effectiveness. After independence (1956), the organisational effectiveness resulted in the traditional village council of Tadafalte not being able to meet the demands of various groups in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. Several events, the introduction of money by the French and the changed social and political circumstances in Tadafalte created the circumstances, in which the traditional village council gained the inability to seek agricultural opportunities for future generations. This inability resulted in numbers of people leaving Tadafalte to seek urban employment or to work in other countries. In this case, the traditional village council of Tadafalte was at the mercy of the created circumstances of the context.

Through the emotional alliances to Tadafalte, caused by the strong group cohesion developed in the past -the constraint- many migrants supported the stay-behinds with remittances. The means of exchange, *money*, already had an important effect on the organisation of water in Tadafalte, as the villagers of Tadafalte were connected to the world economic system. They had changed their modes of cultivation in order to gain more yields. In Tennekes' view, this situation shows that an external event, the interference of the French, caused interactions between members of the organisation. These interactions resulted in an adjustment in the organisation-as-structure. One of the factors, the method of cultivation, changed in order to meet the demand from the outside.

The remittances of the migrants strengthen the role of money. Villagers of Tadafalte with money could buy more products and water pumps. Through the purchase of the water pump, these villagers were not as depended on the *khattara*-system as other were In Pfeffer and Salancik's ' view, the first signs of changes in the asymmetrical relationships between the members of Tadafalte's organisation of water were created.

The remittances also gave villagers more spending power. The migrants built houses in Tadafalte, shared their wealth with the poor and during the summer the shops had more turnover than in other periods of the year. In addition, the presence of the migrants in Tadafalte, just for the summer or permanently, and the display of their wealth, caused Tadafalte's villagers to become more aware of their position in the village and in Morocco.

As Tennekes sees the situation, the members of the organisation started to interact with each other through the 'external' event of the migrants, thereby causing tensions in the organisation. The establishment of the 'Opposition Party' in Tadafalte as a reaction to the division of the land in the second and third zone, illustrates these tensions. In Elias' view, the traditional village council of Tadafalte, consisting of big *taggourte*-owners, used the constraints 'religion' and 'government' to give meaning to their action to divide the land according to the age-old system, thereby ignoring the sign of the villagers. The tensions remained and minimised the role of the traditional village council. The villagers doubted the authority of the traditional village council and thereby the strong position of the big *taggourte*-owners was under review. According to Pfeffer and Salancik, more ingredients for changes in the asymmetrical relationship between the big *taggourte*-owners and the other villagers were appearing.

Money also gained terrain in the organisation of water in Tadafalte. More people wanted to migrate in search of the Paradise others had described to them. The migrants, which had preceded them, could be of great help. The first shift to other dependency relations was made. In Elias' view, the basis for the relations shifted from socio-political to more pragmatic and economically calculated. The migrants could help the fellow-villagers to Europe or with money; the big *taggourte*-owners could not. The loss of power among the big *taggourte*-owners is specifically noticeable in the building of the mosque. The main power to realise this project is in the hands of migrants. Today, the migrants are relatively the strongest players in the game of water in Tadafalte. Depending on whether the organisation of Tadafalte chooses to give in to the condition the ORMVA places on granting request, this process can be intensified.

Briefly summarised through all mentioned events, money is added to the list of resources the organisation of water in Tadafalte needs to survive in its context. Previously, Tadafalte needed only the interrelated issues of water and land and an organisation to guarantee stable social relations between its members. Through the named events, the objective realities in the organisation structure did not change much until the move of the migrants. The previous events created the conditions to allow the organisation to change, but the constraints developed throughout the years prevented a long time shift in the social relations in Tadafalte's organisation related to water. The big *taggourte*-owners, who wanted to maintain their relative strong position in relation to the other members contributed to this. The constraints are still a hindrance to the development of the organisation related to water in Tadafalte. If I asked how the villagers saw the future of the Todgha valley, they always replied by saying: '*Allah Oualen*'.

After I left the village, Tadafalte's organisation experienced an important change. The player ORMVA had won. The villagers formed a co-operation. The co-operation's structure did not become clear to me. I do know they tried to find foreign funds to invest in their agriculture. This means the chains of dependence are extended deliberately. The changes this process will bring in Tadafalte's organisation, is worth further research. This way, one can look whether the constraints still have such an impact on the social relations related to Tadafalte's organisation of water as I state in this thesis. I assume that by more people migrating to other places, the decline of the agriculture, the shortage of water, and the 'power' of money, the influences of the constraints become less. Processes of globalisation will become predominant. This process is already noticeable by Tadafalte's villagers having mobile phones and the possibility to watch international channels on the TV. In addition, many young people do not want to stay in Tadafalte but want to migrate to 'Paradise'. What the effect of these processes will be on Tadafalte's organisation is worth further research, but as the Tadafalte's villagers say, *only God will know...*





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# Appendices

Appendix 1 Methods of Research

Appendix 2 The Map of District Taghzoute

Appendix 3 The structure of the ORMVA

Appendix 4 The *jamaa*

Appendix 5 The census of Taghzoute

Appendix 6 The Activities of the CMV

Appendix 7 The *Amghar n-igran*

Appendix 8 The Election Procedure of the Amghar and Aiyans

# Appendix 1

## Methods of Research

*'Do not read or write! It is The Feast.'*

This pronouncement made clear that sometimes the villagers of Tadafalte believed I worked too hard. In their view I was the strange 'married' Western woman, carrying her notebook around all the time and writing notes in it. Especially for the women of the village, this was a strange experience. A woman, not wearing a scarf and travelling without her husband to foreign land for such a long time. In the last few weeks, I was not as interesting to them any more. I even had the impression that I was a little feared by the villagers. If I came with my notebook, suddenly the villagers had to go to the fields. By that time, it really became necessary to go.

The research I carried out was aimed on finding the current social relations related to the organisation of water in Tadafalte, an oasis village in the South of Morocco, and under what circumstance the social relations have evolved. I started the research in the first week of February until the beginning of Jun in 1999. I did my research in co-operation with an EU-project named 'Interaction between Migration, Land & Water Management and Resource Exploitation in the Oases of the Maghreb' (IMAROM), of which the University of Amsterdam was the co-ordinator. The other participants of the IMAROM-project were Univerisité Mohamed V Rabat (UMV), Université Mohamed I Oudja (UMO), Institut des Régions Arides Médine (IRA), and Estación Experimental de Zonas Arides Almeria (EZA). The Moroccan-Dutch team investigated two Moroccan oases and the Tunisian-Spanish team the Tunisian oases. The length of time of the research was three years. The main objectives of the IMAROM-project were to examine the effect of investments of migrants on the use of land and water in oasis-areas and how the investments affected social and economic changes. After the co-ordinator of the IMAROM-project, Leo de Haan, approved my research proposal, I could leave to Morocco. After one-week acclimatising in Rabat, I went to the Todgha valley.

The first four weeks, Hein and Hassan, my advisors in the field, showed me the Todgha valley and I was informed over the specific features of the Todgha valley. At the same time, we were looking for the "right" village, where I could carry out my research. Three villages met the conditions, which I set in my research proposal before I went to Morocco. The conditions I set to my research village were

for example: the presence of: working *khettara*, a traditional village council, migrants and water pumps. Practical circumstances decided me to carry out the research in Tadafalte. Tadafalte had, besides all the conditions I needed for my research, hospitable inhabitants of which two spoke English. For that moment I, as researcher, relied on my intuition and perception, not really thinking about the conditions I set in my research proposal for the choose of the *case-study*. This happened to me occasionally in the field. I had to remind myself constantly to keep the research question in mind. Every time -on average once a week- I went to Tinghir to work up my notes, I controlled whether the gathered corresponded to the research's questions (see research proposal). I noticed it was hard to focus only on the research question. In the field, I could not prevent to encounter and observe many other things of the social life of the people of Tadafalte. These elements made my research an experience of a lifetime.

The *case-study* examined, uses several methods. To accumulate the data, I used several methods because each method has weak and strong elements. By using multiple techniques, I could reduce these weaknesses. The main techniques for accumulating the data were:

- Interviews
- Observation
- Documentation
- Drawings & Plates
- Informal interviews

## Interviews

The interviews were my main method. The respondents I divided into several groups like peasants, migrants, traditional village council, and government organisations. For each group, I had made a topic-list. The advantage of the topic-list was that I could add new topics during the interviews. Depending on which group I interviewed or the added topics, I needed one to two hours for interviews. The long length of time was also caused through I needed as assistant to translate the question and the answers. The co-operation with the two assistants was very well. When we started the interviews with the peasants in Tadafalte, I made the mistake to take the interviews outside. The consequence was that a lot of villagers (usually about forty) gathered around us. I noticed that the presence of the other villagers influenced the answers of the respondent. Sometimes the crowd would answer for the respondent. The crowd also inhibited the respondent to answer to personal questions. For this reason, I decided to do the interviewing indoors or in the field if nobody was around.

Furthermore, I was confronted with the fact that my assistants were sometimes embarrassed to ask one of my questions or that they wanted to answer for the respondent. In the first case, I did not always ask the question if the assistants made clear that it concerned a very sensitive subject. In the



latter case, I insisted that the assistant would always ask the question. Despite this, I could not understand any word Berber so he could ask anything he wanted.

In the beginning of my research, I went over the interview with the assistants to make sure I got all the 'right' answers. Later, the assistants became so familiar with my research that I trusted on their ability as assistants did. Perhaps too much but I still believe they were intelligent people who knew that all answers were important for the research.

## Observation

Initially, I wanted to apply the well-known anthropological method called participant observation. This method is narrowly connected to observation, which I believe applies more on my situation. During my stay, I could not participate in the daily life. Especially in the beginning I was treated as a guest. Everywhere I went people saw me and invited me in their house. Because little children or women called my name when they saw me (I felt like a celebrity), all people were alarmed of my coming. The only observations I could make were during my walks through the fields and the village without my 'big' notebook. I always had a small notebook with me to write down situations I did not recognise or wanted to know more about. These situations I translated into questions for my assistant to use. The many questions sometimes annoyed my assistants. Despite this, they were always patient to explain me situation -as the complex system of water rights and land division- over and over again.

I believe this method has had great value for my research because by eye witnessing these situations I was confronted with issues, which did not correspond with the answers I gained from the respondents. Sometimes I even confronted my assistants with questions, they themselves did not understand. Usually then, we had to find an old (er) man who could tell us the information.

## Documentation

During and previous to the period of fieldwork, I collected and studied documents. The documents consisted of books about Morocco, the Todgha valley and the Aït Atta-tribe, articles over the organisation of oasis settlements and the annual reports of Hein de Haas and Hassan El Chanjou for the IMAROM-project. In addition, I obtained some government letters and charts from the villagers of Tadafalte. The collected information was to answer the central question of this thesis, water and oasis settlement. Therefore, the information was about the history of Morocco, the Todgha valley and its inhabitants. In addition, I wanted to present some physical characteristics of the arid zone to familiarise the reader with the scarcity of the resource water in these areas.

## Drawings & Plates

During my walks through the fields, I made some drawings of the fields and of the *khettara*. This way, I obtained some essential information over these two subjects. For example, by making the drawings, I

noticed that the *khettara* was constructed with concrete at several locations, and that one of the *khettara* was dry for three-fourths (see map 3.2.). The plates formed illustrations for the reader, so that he or she can imagine the situation in the Todgha valley. Without illustrations this would otherwise be very difficult.

### Informal interviews

I held all kind of informal interviews with all sorts of people. The people I interviewed were from the street, or in other public spaces. This way, I collected information to make a picture of the society of Morocco and the Todgha valley.



## Appendix 3

# The Structure of the ORMVA

The structure of this agricultural organisation is discussed with the help of Mintzberg's typology (1983) on organisation structure. In this way, the structure of the agricultural organisation and its specific elements will be clearly for the reader.

### *The foundation of the agricultural organisation, the ORMVA & the CMV*

In 1966, the Ministry of Agriculture founded the agricultural organisation, the 'Office Regional de Mise en Valeur et Agriculture' (ORMVA). The ORMVA is comparable to the main office of the agricultural organisation. Several sub-centre, known as 'Centre de Mise et Valeur' (CMV) implement on the local level the policies of the ORMVA. The ORMVA replaced the national orientated 'Office National Irrigation'<sup>1</sup> (ONI). Before 1966, the ONI and other agricultural organisations organised the agricultural activities for ace of Morocco with this aim to develop the country's agricultural sector. Reasons were that the agricultural sector about composed twenty percent of the gross national product and twenty-five percent of Moroccan exports. In addition, half the population of Morocco depended on agriculture. These two factors explain why the government to invest in the agricultural sector. The agricultural offices, set up by the government, could guide the agricultural development in Morocco. Through the foundation of the agricultural organisation, the ORMVA, the agricultural activities became regionally organised. The advantage of delegating the responsibility to the regional level was that the regional organisations could react to changed situations or requests in their region quicker. (El Caid 1996: 159, Lentjes 1981: 99, Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent ORMVA 1999).

From 1982 onwards, the ORMVA started to reorganise its structure. Before 1982, the office in Ouarzazate controlled all local organisations in its province. After 1982, the ORMVA divided the province into four regions. Today, each region contains to several CMV's and is controlled by a sub-division. As the CMV's to their sub-division, the sub-division always has to give account to the ORMVA. Therefore, the ORMVA is always held responsible for the results of the agricultural organisation (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent ORMVA 1999). The next paragraph

deals with the structure of the agricultural organisation during my fieldwork. By setting out the structure of the organisation, it becomes clear that the main office in Ouarzazate has the final authority in the agricultural organisation.

***The structure of the agricultural organisation.***

The formal organisation chart of the agricultural organisation is divided into a functional and an operational part. The operational part consists of the sub-divisions and their CMV's. The sub-divisions are Boulmane, Tolioun, Saghro and Ouarzazate. The functional part of the agricultural organisation consists of eight departments, which operate in different areas like livestock, the ordnance, or modes of irrigation. The eight departments form the main office of the agricultural organisation, the so-called OMRVA (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

About 600 people work for the agricultural organisation in the province Ouarzazate, 300 at the sub-divisions and CMV's (operational) and 300 at the ORMVA in Ouarzazate (functional). The whole agriculture organisation is supervised by a management, which contains a president, a secretary (2 employees) and an audit structure (2 people). The last mentioned serves particularly to control and verify the information of all departments of the main office of the agricultural organisation. Besides the eight departments, one autonomous department also exists. It is a financial department, which is not under the supervision of the management of the ORMVA, but under the guidance of the ministry of Finances. The eight employees of this financial department control whether the assigned budget of the ministry of Agriculture is spent well. Each year, the ORMVA receives a particular budget from the ministry of Agriculture, which they can spend autonomously on condition that the people of the previously named financial department control the spending of the budget (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent ORMVA 1999).

If one see the agricultural organisation starting from Mintzberg's typology (1983), the next image is created; In the decisive and executive line of the agricultural organisation, the strategic top is the management, which controls the whole agricultural organisation. The middle management are the presidents of the sub-division. The operational part of the agricultural organisation are the sub centres the CMV's, which implement the policy of the main office. The staff, which supports the line, consists of a technical and a supporting staff. The technical staff takes care of the strategic planning, the operational research and the standardising of work processes. The supporting staff has tasks like public relations, logistics or an administrative department. Mintzberg distinguish several forms of co-ordination through the organisation functions. These forms are mutual adjustment, direct supervision, and the standardisation of work processes, like the output and skills<sup>2</sup> (Mintzberg 1983:1-17).

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<sup>1</sup> In 1961, this institution was founded with the aim to develop the irrigation possibilities and to insure the return of the high investments (Lentjes 1981: 99).

<sup>2</sup> For the description of the forms of co-ordination, see Mintzberg 1983 3-9.

To make the organisational structure of the agriculture organisation more clear, the organigram of this agricultural institution is added to this paragraph. Hereafter, the functional level and the operational level of the agricultural organisation are set out, and viewed from Mintzberg's typologies.

### *The Functional & Operational Level*

In total, eight departments are at the main office of the agricultural organisation in Ouarzazate: five technical and three supporting ones. In Mintzberg's (1983) view, these are the departments, which form the staff for supporting the line of the agricultural organisation. There are three supporting departments in the agricultural organisation: financial, administrative, and an office that takes care of the logistic matters of this institution. The five technical departments are all specifically aimed at the development of the agricultural sector. Each department of the organisation charts programs for agricultural development (see appendix.. for description of each program) (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

All developed programs and strategies are sent to the sub-divisions what are responsible for sending them to the local offices, the CMV's. A CMV is not obligated to implement the programs of the ORMVA. The experts from the CMV are allowed to make their own programs on condition that they send them to the ORMVA. The main office want to be informed about the situation in its region. In addition, they reserve the right to disapprove the self-made programs of the local CMV. Often, enough experts from the CMV will use information from the programs of the ORMVA in their annual planning. The programs of the ORMVA are valuable, but not adjusted to the particular situation of the district of the CMV. Mintzberg (1983) also call the making of the programs the standardisation of the output. The standardisation of the output means qualitative and quantitative norms are dictated with regard to the presentation of the products part of the organisation has to produce in the end. In this case, the CMV has to produce agricultural development in their region. This objective is a purpose of the ORMVA and all the work in the organisation is geared to this aim (Mintzberg 1981: 6). Besides sending the programs, it also happens that a CMV submits a question to one of the eight departments of the main office about a problem in their district. The department of the main office, which deals with that particular subject, will investigate the problem and make a report for the concerned CMV (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA 1999).

Since 1982, the main office of the agricultural organisation has delegated some of its tasks to several sub-divisions, which are responsible for the functioning of the sub-centres, the CMV's. The sub-division Boulmane has the responsibility for four CMV's. The CMV Tinghir is one of them. In total, 54 people work in the region of the sub-division Boulmane: 12 people at the sub-division and the other persons work at the CMV of Ignouw, Tinghir, Klaa or Boulmane. The number of people who work at a CMV is determined according to the amount of peasants an area accommodates. Therefore,

15 people work at the CMV Tinghir in contradiction with the CMV Klaa where only 2 people work (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV, respondent Boulmane 1999).

The 12 people at the sub-division Boulmane, have different responsibilities. Two persons are responsible for the livestock in their region. Another person gives information to and advises peasants in the villages in the surrounding of the district Boulmane. One employee is an expert in new seeds, products and new plants. He can bring the farmers in contact with other seeds but also with other peasants who have already tried new seeds. The responsibility of the material, which can be used for the maintenance of a *khattara*, is the job of one person. Then, there are two people who carry out the administration and the issue of documents. There are also two drivers, a cleaner and a guard<sup>3</sup>. A general manager controls and manages the work of the people at the sub-division. In addition, he controls the work of the four CMV's. This controlling function predominantly means he and his employees give advice<sup>4</sup> about certain projects to the CMV. He also passes on the general policy of the ORMVA to the CMV. The CMV has to follow the general policy of the ORMVA, which contains laws or changes in the main goal. After some months, the sub-division will control whether the CMV has followed their advice, the general policy of the ORMVA or if the CMV in question made a new programs themselves. These self-made programs are often already sent to the sub-division and to the ORMVA for controlling. The controlling function is to check if the program fits with the main policy of the OMRVA (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent Boulmane 1999).

The CMV in Tinghir employs fifteen people: nine experts in agriculture, four employees who carry out the administration, a cleaner and a guard. One of the nine experts in agriculture also has the responsibility for managing the CMV. This man organises the work, divides the obtained programs from the ORMVA over the experts (including himself), sends the experts to the fields and maintains contact with the sub-division and the ORMVA in Ouarzazate. To make the Todgha valley more survey-able, the valley is divided into four sub-regions. One employee of the CMV is responsible for each sub-region. This way, he gains expertise of the sub-region. Through his expertise, he is able to develop the products of that region best, (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999).

Every year, the experts from each CMV make a program and plan for the coming agricultural year, which runs from September 1th till August 31th, because every region in which a CMV is situated, has its own characteristics. The annual planning program of the CMV in Tinghir states which part of the valley gains the most attention from the CMV the coming year, and what kind of activities the local office is going to undertake to develop agriculture in the valley. By making a new program,

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<sup>3</sup> Between 1955 and 1964, the government had to proceed to extension of several administrative functions (it became on average 200,000) through lack of economic developments. All governmental institutions I visited employed people, who did not have clear job descriptions. In the opinion of Amin (in Lentjes 1981: 207) the action of hiring many functionaries contributed to the extension of a no-productive and largely parasitic administrative sector (Lentjes 1981: 207).

<sup>4</sup> Usually the CMV's already receive information about new projects before they have to ask for advises

the people from the CMV watch, in their own words, the relations between culture, people and agriculture. This means they will look at the conditions of the physical environment, which possibilities are present in the valley<sup>5</sup>, how people in their district are dealing with the agriculture at that moment, and the supply of new programs and techniques from the ORMVA. In the end, the agriculture program is a combination of present factors, like the possibilities in the valley at the moment, and the general goals of the agricultural organisation, which one want to realise in their region. The general goals of the CMV in Tinghir, which are almost the same as those from the ORMVA, are:

- The peasant has to become self-supporting,
- Improvement of the financial position of the peasant.
- Introducing new products (see next paragraph),
- creating new jobs. This is soon as an incentive to retain people agriculture instead of them leaving to look for money elsewhere. (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999).

After the program is written, it is sent to the ORMVA in Ouarzazate to inform them about the developments and coming activities in their region. They have to give their approval before the CMV can implement it. All in all, the structure of this agricultural organisation conforms with. The typology of the division structure exists of conglomerates of organisations. This means that for example an organisation is divided into separate divisions, in this case, the four sub-division and its CMV's. The divisions take over some responsibilities for the strategic top to lighten its load. The strategic top maintains a certain amount of control over the divisions by applying the standardisation of the output (Mintzberg 1983: 215-233). The difference between this case and the typology is that the extent of strategic top, the ORMVA, is greater than is described in Mintzberg's typology. It seemed that the structure control by the of the agricultural organisation is stuck in certain elements of the typology of machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg 1983: 163-170)<sup>6</sup>. In this typology, the controlling function is large and the technical staff fulfill an important role in the organisation because they formulate the program (standardisation of the output). The controlling-function of the strategic top is so great that it restrains the divisions from (Boulmane and CMV's) taking responsibility for their actions. This centralism is a consequence of the centralist and hierarchical governmental structure, in which everybody has to inform their superior of each move they make (see chapter 2.6). To come loose of this system through for example a re-organisation, is hard, because the interwoven patronage-client-system, which exists throughout Moroccan society, persists in this system. An example of informing the superior is that the CMV has to inform the ORMVA about their agricultural program for this next year. This annual agricultural program consists of many activities, which are described, in the next paragraph.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, the region Rhallil is more of interest for the people of the CMV (see chapter 3.5.)

<sup>6</sup> For more background information about the typology of the machine bureaucracy, I refer to Mintzberg (1983), *Structures in Five*, p. 163-199.



## Appendix 4

### The *jamaa* of Taghzoute

Thirteen representatives of the villages in the district Taghzoute form the council of the *jamaa*. They are chosen by election, which is held every four years. Each village chooses its own representative for the council of the *jamaa*. The chosen representative has to be approved by the *caid*. The task of the representative is to localise the need for certain materials and problems in its village. The obtained information can be reported at the council meeting, so the council can submit requests about these matters to the intended institutions (like to the Ministry of Education in case of shortage of schools). Most requests the board develops are about clean water, new schools, electricity, or a new head master for the school. Requests about agriculture and new *khettaras* are mainly sent direct to the CMV. If a request for a *khettara* does not cost much money, the representatives of the villages discuss the matter in their meeting. They may will accept the request and pay for the costs for the improvement<sup>7</sup>. The *jamaa* has a small budget to pay costs of small requests. For a request to the CMV, one needs not the signature of the president of the *jamaa's* council. But the current president of the *jamaa* Taghzoute stated in an interview that, '*it looks better on the request, if you have one.*' With this pronouncement, he tried to imply that he could exercise some influence on the decision process of granting the requests to the CMV (Fieldwork, File Interviews governmental representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999).

The council of the *jamaa* can only approve one-third of the requests they receive. Often it happens that the *amghar* and *aiyans* inform the representative of their village about needed materials and problems in their village. Then, the traditional village council invites Tadafalte's representative for a meeting to inform him about the matter. Most of the time, Tadafalte's representative of is already well-informed about the matter because of the gossip in the village. The representative discusses the matter in a meeting with the other representatives of the *jamaa*. Often the discussion does not result in a solution for the problem (Fieldwork, File Interviews governmental representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999).

Tadafalte's representative has had seat in the council of the *jamaa* since 1982. Every four years, the inhabitants of each village in the district can elect a person, who can perform the duty. The

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<sup>7</sup> I got the impression that the respondent only told this to please me and to make him more interesting.

people who are chosen for this office decide among themselves who will become the president of their board for the coming four years (Fieldwork, File Interviews governmental representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999).

At least once a week, the representative has to be present at the *jamaa*. When the president of the *jamaa* calls the representatives for a meeting, they have to show as well. Tadafalte's representative dislikes his function because as council of the *jamaa*, they cannot achieve many requests, they do not have sufficient budget and the job does pay well. Nevertheless, Tadafalte's inhabitants like him. Under the social pressure of his fellow-villager, he accepts the duty every four years. He has also been the Tadafalte's representative during the time Tadafalte's *jamaa* was still situated in the Saghro Mountains, far from the village. Since 1992, Tadafalte's *jamaa* moved to Taghzoute because a law claimed it has to be near the villages. Before, Tadafalte's villagers had to travel for two hours before they could get one signature at the *jamaa* (Fieldwork, File Interviews governmental representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999).

Certain people at the *jamaa* and from Tadafalte are convinced this institution will become more important in the future. The authority of the *amghar* and *aiyans* is fading away while the authority of the *jamaa* is growing. In addition, they are, as members of the traditional village council, chosen by all male inhabitants of the district. This means, many people in the district feel positively about them because the right persons are chosen for the jobs (Fieldwork, File Interviews governmental representatives, respondent *jamaa* 1999).

In other words: this institution can gain influence in the organisation of water in the future. Today, this influence is minor. The organisation of water is not really the area in which the *jamaa* operates, but they are confronted with the problems, like a conflict between villages, which often is the result of the related issues of water and land. They cannot solve these problems by lack of authority. If the area of *jamaa*'s authority is extended, perhaps they can exercise influence on these matters. Today they only have influence on the organisation of Tadafalte, not specific issues related to water.

# Appendix 5

## The census of Taghzoute

*Made by the jamaa Taghzoute in 1994*

COMMUNE TAGHZOUTE	DE	PERSONE N	HUISHOU DENS	MEAN HOUSEHOL D SIZE
<b>Taghzoute</b>	Aggdime N'Ait Iazza	23	3	7,67
	Aggdime N'Ait Iazza	1429	179	7,98
	Qsar Taghzoute	1645	259	6,35
<b>Ait Aïssa ou Brahim</b>	Akdim	806	126	6,40
	Akdim Ait Aïssa ou Brahim	1996	251	7,95
	Tlout	1363	226	6,03
	Boutaghate*	551	74	7,45
	Tabsebest	1020	139	7,34
	Ghallil N'Aït Issfoul	221	26	8,50
	Tiliouine	525	60	8,75
<b>Achdad</b>	Achdade	461	56	8,23
	<b>Tadafalte*</b>	<b>1062</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>8,30</b>
	Taghia N'Illemchane*	593	79	7,51
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11695</b>	<b>1606</b>	<b>7,28</b>

## Appendix 6

# The Activities of the CMV

These activities are aimed at realising the main goal of the agricultural organisation. The technical services of the ORMVA develop the activities and its conditions. The employees predominantly implement the activities. Members of the CMV sometimes adjust the activities to the unique situation in their valley. Mintzberg (1983) also calls this process the standardisation of the output. The technical services develop the qualitative and quantitative conditions for the activities, and the CMV has to implement them in their region. The activities, which are carried out repeatedly by the people of the CMV in the villages of the Todgha valley, are listed below:

\*The members of the CMV visit peasants and give them information about new developments in seeds, fertiliser, and modes of cultivation. For example they advise the peasant how to cultivate one big plot of land instead of several small ones. Sometimes the people of the CMV arrange a meeting to inform many people about agricultural developments at once.

\*The people of the CMV give this example of cultivating half of a peasant's field with their improved products, which the peasant gains for free, and the other half of the field with the peasant's products. Then, the peasant and other interested people can see the difference between their own modes of cultivating and the one of the CMV. This activity is applied in certain regions, with visible results. Since 1990 for instance, in the Todgha valley some products like almonds are exported to other regions in Morocco due to their changed modes of production. The export implies that the peasants of the Todgha valley can gain some profit by the sale of their almonds, and they can buy other products. In other words, the objective of improving the financial position of a peasant is then achieved.

\*Every year, there is a possibility that some (chosen) peasants visit other districts in Morocco to watch the effect of certain products. The subject of the trip changes every year; one year the subject is tomatoes, the other year corn. Which persons are invited depends on the crop, because not every part of the valley is suitable for the cultivation of certain products. Through this activity, the agricultural organisation expects that the invited peasants will talk about the effect to other peasants in their surroundings. The result is that in a short time everybody will know the effect of the product. Today, the peasants who cultivate their plots of land in Rhallil and Imrir are often invited. These peasants

have bigger plots of land. For this reason, these regions are of more interest for the CMV than other parts of the valley.

\*The members of the CMV assist the peasants in maintaining their *khetaras* and *souagui* by means of giving advice, digging wells, repairing a brace or bracing river beds. Money is usually needed for these activities. Then, a village has to submit a request to the ORMVA to get money for the repair (see next paragraph). A CMV can only help with small problems.

\*Another duty of the CMV is the issue of permissions for installing a Diesel engine in the valley (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999).

The above described activities show that a great part of the attention of the CMV is given to the modes of agricultural production. The CMV has no authority over a budget. For an investment, the CMV depends on the policy of the ORMVA. This means that the CMV cannot influence the organisation of water in Tadafalte.

Before the experts of a CMV depart to a village or a certain region to carry out their activities, they have to inform the *caid*. Even though the *caid* has no connection with agricultural policy, he wants to be acquainted with these matters. He wants to be well-informed about the situation in the valley so he can inform the Ministry of Internal Affairs well. In addition, the *caid* is acquainted with the issues of permissions to install water pump. This obligated visit the CMV to the *caid* shows the after-effects of French government system, centralist and strongly hierarchical system affecting all levels in society (see chapter 2.6.) After the visit, the members of the CMV leave for the village to see the peasants. It also happens that the CMV-men only visit one particular peasant in the village<sup>8</sup>. When the experts of the CMV want to make a general announcement, they usually visit the village on Friday. After the service in the mosque, they have the opportunity to announce the information. All male villagers are present at the mosque during that time (Fieldwork, File Interviews ORMVA, respondent CMV 1999).

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<sup>8</sup> See chapter 3.4.

## Appendix 7

### The *amghar n-igran*

*...The minister of Interior responsible for communal lands according to article 5 (April 27th 1919 renewed in February 6th 1963) allows...(respondent amghar n-igran) to be representative of Tadafalte in any problems between Tadafalte and other villages...*

The above written text is from a letter, dated January 16th 1995, from the secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This letter indicates that the government officially recognises the *amghar n-igran* as spokesman to the government. The government wants such a spokesman, whom they can contact whenever they need to. For example, the *amghar n-igran* of Tadafalte is contacted about the conflict between Tadafalte and El Hart Niaamine. In addition, this person is the only inhabitant of Tadafalte who is allowed to represent the community's interest in court. Every time a new *amghar n-igran* is elected, a letter has to be written to for the approval of the government for the new person for this function. When the government approves this person, the new *amghar n-igran* can perform his duty (Fieldwork, Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran* 1999).

The *amghar* and *aiyans* elect the *amghar n-igran* for life on condition that he does his work well. The members of the traditional village will not put pressure him to accept this function because he has to carry it out for a long time, and not, like the traditional village council for one year. As the *amghar n-igran* said in an interview: *'he only accepted this function because he likes to contribute to development of the collective interests in Tadafalte'*<sup>9</sup>. The responsibility of *amghar n-igran* is to protect the land of Tadafalte's villagers and to be the spokesperson for Tadafalte in court and with other villages. He has an external function. According to the interviewees, the members of the traditional village council choose this person on the basis of his honesty, feelings of responsibility, his stay in the village (all year), his number of *taggourte* and because he has proven to be a good *amghar* or *aiyan* in the past. His duties are to negotiate with other villages, to take care of the sale of the collective land, the *bled kharadj*, and to be present at the discussion over borders between two pieces of land. Before the *amghar n-igran* can make a final judgement over borders or problem with other

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<sup>9</sup> Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran*.

villages, he has to consult the traditional village council. They will discuss the matter together in a meeting. The *amghar n-igran* has to tell the final outcome to a peasant, or to people from another village (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

Today, the *amghar n-igran* is busy setting the exact borders of Tadafalte exactly. From drawings and papers from the French period, the villagers assume that Tadafalte had responsibility over the land near the Saghro (see appendix 2 for the drawing). This meant, for instance, that if someone was shot in this area, the French could accuse the villagers of Tadafalte. Tadafalte's inhabitants still believe they have the right to this land. Inhabitants of El Hart Niaamine and Achdad disagree with the argument because they want to claim this land. The *amghar n-igran* has also been the person who points out the problem of the water pumps in the claimed nomads land, further in the Saghro mountains (see previous chapter 3.9.). The *amghar n-igran* was, and is responsible to take the matter to court. He did so, but after he first tried to solve the matter with other representatives of cheated Aït Atta-villages. The people, who claimed the nomads land were also descendants of the tribe Aït Atta. In other words, Tadafalte and the other cheated Aït Atta villages wanted to keep this matter internally before they went to court (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent *amghar n-igran* 1999). In Tadafalte, the *taggourte*-owners and the villager who depend on the *khettara* for their drinking water experience the most trouble from this action

## Appendix 8

# The Election Procedure Of the *amghar* and *aiyans*

The election procedure in Tadafalte is as follows. Several people from each fraction receive a message from the present traditional village council that a new election is coming. These particular villagers receive it for three reasons. First, they have been *amghar* or *aiyan* in the past. Second, they have good knowledge of the socio-political organisation of the *amghar*, land and water rights. And third, they own more *taggourte* than the average *taggourte*-owner in Tadafalte. The invitees are present at the election meeting to assist the current village council with their choice of *amghar*. In addition, they attend the meeting to put pressure on the newly elected *amghar* to accept his office. On average fifteen to twenty people are present at this meeting. This number includes the members of the current village council (Fieldwork, File interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

When the election begins, the members of the fraction who provide the *amghar* next year are sent away. The contemporary *aiyans* of the fraction in question are also candidates for the election. The remaining members of the three fractions discuss the candidates to make a selection. Before the election, the present village council has discussed the possible candidates. Otherwise the village council could never have invited certain people for the election meeting. To make a final decision, the village council has to wait for the opinion of the invitees. The next *amghar* will be the man who receives the most votes. This person is chosen for his knowledge of ancient laws relating to water and land, his good relations with other villagers, his *taggourtes* and he also has to be present in the village next year. After the members of the election meeting come to an agreement about which person will be the next *amghar*, the members of the providing fraction are allowed to join the meeting. Then the next *amghar* is announced. The elected man will take office for the following year because he cannot refuse this offer. He refuses, all other people at the meeting will convince him or force him to accept this duty (Fieldwork, File Interview *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999). A former *amghar* explained to me the social pressure of his fellow-villagers with the following statement: '*The people want me, who am I to refuse.*' (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans*, respondent 5 1999).



Two days after the *amghar*'s election, the same persons from the meeting have dinner at the elected *amghar*'s house. At his house, the coming *amghar* will announce which persons he chooses as *aiyans* for the village council. A discussion about these people can arise among the members of the election meeting, but eventually the *amghar* has "veto" right. The *amghar* has this right because he has to work with these people next year. According to the interviewees, the new *amghar* chooses the persons if are his friends, they are straight, are always present in Tadafalte, know the ancient laws, possess *taggourte* and they maintain their family well. Fifteen days after the election, the coming *amghar* and *aiyans* start their jobs. Until then, the next *amghar* and *aiyans* are informed about their office and they can generate ideas for the coming year (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).

Usually Tadafalte's inhabitants agree with the decision of the members of the election meeting. The members are the representatives of each fraction and are the oldest and wisest men in Tadafalte. A disadvantage of this system is that often, the same people are chosen for the village council. It is common that someone has been *amghar* or *aiyan* several times. This is a consequence of the "veto" right of the *amghar* and the demand a person have to own to take seat on the board (Fieldwork, File Interviews *amghar* and *aiyans* 1999).