

Global Governance Initiative


Annual Report 2004

WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM

COMMITTED TO
IMPROVING THE STATE
OF THE WORLD

Global Governance Initiative

Annual Report 2004



DEZA
DDC
DSC
SDC
COSUDE



The views expressed in the articles in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Economic Forum.

© 2004 World Economic Forum

ISBN 0-9741108-3-3

Designed, edited and produced by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, D.C., with Grundy Northedge, London

Global Governance Initiative



Developed in partnership with

Expert group chairs and members

Peace and security

Chair: Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group (Australia)

Ellen Laipson, President, Henry L. Stimson Center (USA)

Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Sudan (Algeria)

Andrew Mack, Director, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia (Australia)

Jane Nelson, Director, Business Leadership and Strategy, Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, and Fellow, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University (UK)

Ramesh Thakur, Senior Vice Rector for Peace and Governance, United Nations University (India)

Education

Chair: Christopher Colclough, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, and Director, Education for All Monitoring Report, UNESCO (UK)

Anne Jellema, Director, Campaign for Education (South Africa)

Amina Ibrahim, Coordinator, National Education for All (Nigeria)

Gene Sperling, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Universal Education, Council on Foreign Relations (USA)

Marcela Gajardo, Director, Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas (Chile)

R. Govinda, Senior Fellow and Head, School and Non-Formal Education Unit, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (India)

Environment

Chair: Jonathan Lash, President, World Resources Institute (USA)

Achim Steiner, Director General, World Conservation Union (Germany)

Mark Halle, European Representative and Director, Trade & Investment, International Institute for Sustainable Development (Switzerland)

Christiana Figueres, Founder and Executive Director, Center for Sustainable Development in the Americas (Costa Rica)

Ashok Khosla, President, Development Alternatives (India)

Health

Chair: Alfred Sommer, Dean, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University (USA)

Lincoln Chen, Director, Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University (USA)

George Alleyne, Director Emeritus, Pan American Health Organization, and Adjunct Professor, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University (Barbados)

Mahmoud Fathalla, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Assiut University (Egypt)

Cesar Victora, Professor of Epidemiology, Federal University of Pelotas (Brazil)

Rick Steketee, Chief, Malaria Epidemiology Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USA)

Tom Coates, Professor of Infectious Diseases, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles (USA)

Human rights

Chair: Robert Archer, Executive Director, International Council on Human Rights Policy (UK)

Chidi Odinkalu, Senior Legal Officer for Africa, Open Society Justice Initiative (Nigeria)

Rachel Brett, Human Rights Representative, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (UK)

Janek Kuczkiewicz, Head, Department of Trade Union Rights, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Poland)

Aron Cramer, Vice President, Business for Social Responsibility (USA)

Marcia Kran, Professor, University of British Columbia (Hungary)

Hunger

Chair: Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Professor of Food, Nutrition and Public Policy, Cornell University (Denmark)

Ruth Oniang'o, Professor of Food Science and Nutrition, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, and Member of Parliament (Kenya)

Jikun Huang, Director, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences (China)

Sartaj Aziz, Former Finance and Foreign Minister (Pakistan)

Joachim von Braun, Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute (Germany)

Ray Offenheiser, President, Oxfam America (USA)

Poverty

Chair: Nora Lustig, President, University of the Americas, Puebla (Mexico)

Nancy Birdsall, President, Center for Global Development (USA)

Kwesi Botchwey, Director for African Research, Center for International Development, Harvard University (Ghana)

Reema Nanavaty, General Secretary, Self-Employed Women's Association (India)

Lu Mai, Secretary-General, China Development Research Foundation (China)

Gary Fields, Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University (USA)


Steering committee

| | | | |
|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|
| James Balsillie | Chairman and Co-CEO, Research In Motion | Strobe Talbott | President, The Brookings Institution |
| Carlos Bulgheroni | President, Bidas Corporation | Yu Yongding | Director, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences |
| Mirai Chatterjee | Coordinator, Self-Employed Women's Association | | |
| John English | Executive Director, Centre for International Governance Innovation | Robert Archer | Chair, Expert Group on Human Rights Executive Director, International Council on Human Rights Policy |
| Walter Fust | Director-General, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation | | |
| Francois Heisbourg | Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique | Christopher Colclough | Chair, Expert Group on Education Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, and Director, Education for All Monitoring Report, UNESCO |
| Yotaro Kobayashi | Chairman, Fuji Xerox Ltd. | | |
| Christine Loh | Founder and CEO, Civic Exchange | Gareth J. Evans | Chair, Expert Group on Peace and Security President, International Crisis Group |
| Simon Maxwell | Director, Overseas Development Institute | | |
| Mark Moody-Stuart | Chairman, Anglo American Plc | Jonathan Lash | Chair, Expert Group on Environment President, World Resources Institute |
| Kumi Naidoo | Secretary-General and Chief Executive Officer, CIVICUS | Nora C. Lustig | Chair, Expert Group on Poverty President, Universidad de Las Americas, Puebla |
| Moisés Naim | Editor-in-Chief, Foreign Policy Magazine | | |
| Youssou N'Dour | Artist and Chairman, Youth Network for Development Foundation | Per Pinstrup-Andersen | Chair, Expert Group on Hunger Professor of Food and Nutrition Policy, Cornell University |
| Njongonkulu Ndungane | Archbishop, Anglican Archdiocese of Cape Town | Alfred Sommer | Chair, Expert Group on Health Dean, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University |
| Sadako Ogata | President, Japan International Cooperation Agency | | |
| Surin Pitsuwan | Member of Parliament, Royal Thai Parliament | | |
| Mary Robinson | Executive Director, Ethical Globalization Initiative | Klaus Schwab (ex officio) | Executive Chairman, World Economic Forum |
| John G. Ruggie | Director, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University | José María Figueres (ex officio) | Chief Executive Officer, World Economic Forum |
| Ismail Serageldin | Director, Bibliotheca Alexandrina | Richard Samans (ex officio) | Managing Director, Global Institute for Partnership and Governance |
| Maurice F. Strong | President, University for Peace, and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, United Nations | Ann M. Florini (ex officio) | Project Director, Global Governance Initiative Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution |

Table of contents

| | |
|----------------------|------|
| Preface | vi |
| Executive summary | viii |
| Introduction | x |
| Peace and security | 1 |
| Poverty | 22 |
| Hunger | 38 |
| Education | 48 |
| Health | 66 |
| Environment | 86 |
| Human rights | 102 |
| For more information | 122 |





Preface

The World Economic Forum is pleased to issue the first annual report of the Global Governance Initiative.

Over the past year the Initiative brought together some of the world's leading experts on the most pertinent issues of global governance—security, human rights, environment, poverty, hunger, health and education—to assess the level of effort that humanity is putting into achievement of the goals of the United Nations Millennium Declaration and numerous international agreements. The chairs and members of the Expert Groups are to be commended for their original and thought-provoking analyses, and for their commitment to shedding light on new approaches to overcoming complex problems.

The Initiative is guided by a distinguished international Steering Committee. Not all Steering Committee members necessarily agree with all of the analysis and assertions in the report, but they broadly endorse its approach, conclusions and call to action.

The Initiative starts from the premise that the Millennium Declaration goals are too large and complex for governments to achieve alone. Governments may bear primary responsibility, but a broader response will be required for the international community to have any prospect of realizing the Declaration's ambitious expression of the global public interest. So the Initiative is also attempting to assess what role the private sector, civil society and international organizations can be expected to play in achieving common objectives. Even after accounting for the efforts of such diverse actors towards a common purpose, the warning is clear: the world community is devoting less than half of the effort necessary to meet any of the

goals. Yet, the positive results of numerous innovative programmes from all sectors also give reason to be cautiously optimistic about our ability to overcome these “solvable problems”.

This report represents only the first stage of the initiative, which continues to expand the reach of its expert networks. Further refinements in the methods and analysis in future reports are likely. The Initiative complements other efforts to draw attention to and develop strategies for confronting poverty, illiteracy, hunger, environmental degradation and other challenges to building a safer, more prosperous world.

The Initiative is an example of the World Economic Forum's portfolio of initiatives engaging business with other stakeholders in work on global, regional or industry issues. The many initiatives are being pulled together in a new Global Institute for Partnership and Governance to build upon the Forum's capacity to serve as an informal, independent platform for multistakeholder partnership in three dimensions: stimulating action, improving governance and expanding understanding through dialogue.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada. We are also grateful to many in the United Nations system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme and its head, Mark Malloch Brown, for their willingness to provide information and share ideas.

The Initiative has benefited enormously from the leadership of Project Director Ann Florini, Senior

Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Parag Khanna, on secondment from the Forum, as well as their staff, including Anil Bhargava, Maria Mallo and Hajra Zahid. We also appreciate the cooperation of the Brookings Institution.

The Forum would like to thank all Steering Committee and Expert Group members of the Global Governance Initiative for their dedication. We hope that their work will indeed generate faster movement from aspiration to action on the world's shared goals.

Klaus Schwab
Executive Chairman
World Economic Forum

Richard Samans
Managing Director
Global Institute for
Partnership and
Governance
World Economic Forum

Executive summary

From aspiration to action

In September 2000, at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, the world's leaders gathered to commit themselves and their countries to a vital global agenda. In the Millennium Declaration adopted that month, and in a host of other widely accepted treaties and declarations, nearly every government pledged to devote serious efforts to ending the scourge of war, reducing the dire poverty and hunger that afflict hundreds of millions, stabilizing the global environment and ensuring the basic rights of all. Such steps are not mere pious aspirations. They are the fundamental building blocks of global stability in what has become a tightly interconnected world.

But too often the governments are scarcely trying. And the “non-state” actors on the international scene—businesses and civil society groups—are neither able nor willing to compensate for the inadequacies of government efforts. Across the board the world is failing to put forward even half the effort needed to meet the world's basic goals. The time has come to demand better. It is now time to hold all of us—governments, business, civil society and international institutions—more accountable for this egregious gap between aspiration and action.

The Global Governance Initiative promotes such accountability by monitoring humanity's attempts to deal with the problems on this global agenda. It looks broadly at a wide range of actors across the full range of security, human rights, development and environmental issues that are fundamental to global peace and prosperity. This comprehensive approach makes it possible to spotlight opportunities and shortcomings in today's patterns of global governance.

To carry out this project, seven groups of some of the world's leading experts gathered over the past year to assess how hard the world is trying to achieve its goals for peace and security, poverty, hunger, education, health, environmental protection

and human rights. They evaluated how much progress the international community has been making and whether the individual and cooperative efforts of the key actors are commensurate with what is needed to achieve those goals. In most cases they consulted with a wide range of experts from around the world to gather a broad set of perspectives on the events of 2003. Their assessment has been reviewed by an international Steering Committee, in whose name this report is released.

The assessments, as summarized here, take the form of a numerical score on a zero to 10 scale, backed by an explanatory narrative that describes trends and initiatives and spotlights dramatic successes and failures. A score of 10 indicates that the world—that is, national governments, businesses, civil society and international organizations taken together—essentially did everything needed during 2003 to be on track to reach the goals. A 5 indicates that the world did roughly half of what it should have done in 2003 if it were serious about achieving the goal. A 1 reveals little or no meaningful effort. A zero signals retrogression: that the activities of the international community during calendar 2003 actually made the problem worse.

For all of its most important goals, the world is failing utterly to put forward the needed effort

This evaluation is not scientific truth, nor could it hope to be. There are no objective standards to measure exactly what types of efforts will bring about exactly what degree of progress towards the goals. So the assessment is subjective, based on widespread consultations with knowledgeable people, filtered through the judgements of some of the world's top experts. The process gives a good sense of whether today's level of effort corresponds to what is needed.

And the answer is clear: it doesn't. The dismaying finding is that in no case do global efforts merit even a 5. In other words, for all of its most important goals, the world is failing utterly to put forward the needed effort.

But a much more positive answer is within our grasp. The evidence that led the experts to award scores better than 1 shows what could be done on a larger scale, often at relatively little cost. Authorities in all parts of the world have widely and publicly accepted the goals, and in some cases are taking meaningful action. The private sector and civil society have already shown themselves capable of helping to devise and implement global rules that serve the broad public interest. In some cases, businesses that started improving their environmental and social practices under pressure from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have come to see partnerships with those same groups as serving their enlightened self-interest. Corporations and civil society organizations are beginning to join governments in setting transnational agendas, negotiating and implementing agreements (formal or informal) and monitoring and enforcing compliance with the standards of behaviour set by those agreements. And these nongovernmental actors are joining with intergovernmental organizations in a variety of innovative efforts, such as the UN Global Compact involving business, unions and NGOs.

Efforts in 2003 were less than half of what is needed

Here is how the world scored in seven major issue areas for 2003 on a zero to 10 scale:

- Peace and security—3.
- Poverty—4.
- Hunger—3.
- Education—3.
- Health—4.
- Environment—3.
- Human rights—3.

Most of these efforts are so recent that it is not yet possible to judge their long-term effectiveness. It is not clear whether they represent a permanent shift in how humanity will try to solve its problems, or whether they are merely stopgap measures taken in the desperation of inadequate governmental action.

It is the hope of everyone involved in the Global Governance Initiative that the reasoning behind these scores will point the way towards doing better. Cynics may dismiss the goals as mere rhetoric, as hopeless ideals that governments espouse to placate activists who refuse to accept bitter realities. In reality, the goals point to achievable and necessary steps towards a more stable and prosperous world. World leaders publicly agreed to them because the problems are so real, the moral arguments for action so powerful.


History is likely to judge all of us more for our progress towards these goals than for marginal changes in GDP or the rise of stock indices. Given the record in 2003, history's judgement is unlikely to be flattering.

Introduction

No one doubts that there is something fundamentally wrong with a world in which hundreds of millions go to bed hungry, ecosystems are disintegrating under the onslaught of human activity and some regions are losing whole generations to untreated AIDS. And increasingly people have recognized that such problems have causes and consequences extending far beyond national borders. Terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and armed conflicts have seized the current headlines, but many other dangers also threaten global stability. Environmental degradation is undermining the capacity of the planet to sustain human civilization. New and resurgent infectious diseases increasingly have no cure due to the widespread emergence of strains resistant to antibiotics. Permeable borders create unprecedented economic opportunities but also allow financial volatility to ricochet around the world. Even longstanding ills, such as the poverty that still afflicts nearly half the world's people, now portend global consequences, as those who are suffering are unlikely to contain their misery neatly within national borders.

It is the inescapable reality of such mutual vulnerability that has led humanity, in the form of the national governments that represent almost everyone on the planet, to adopt a set of common goals aimed at setting the world in better order. These include several specific promises (known collectively as the Millennium Development Goals) to reduce poverty and hunger, ensure universal primary education and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and other catastrophic illnesses, all by the year 2015. In a range of agreements from the Millennium Declaration to the Johannesburg Summit Declaration, the world's governments have also agreed upon broader environmental, security and human rights aspirations. The legitimacy of the

The longer the delay, the harder it will become to get on track to meet the goals



Source: Global Governance Initiative.

goals thus put forward flows from their acceptance by virtually all of the national governments that collectively represent the world's people.

The new official consensus is not purely rhetorical. From time to time, governments and others have shown themselves willing to commit real resources and make real policy changes. Development assistance from rich to poor countries is inching its way back up after years of decline, and is arguably becoming less politicized and better designed than ever before. Corporations and civil society groups are adopting codes for their own conduct and joining with governments in widely touted new "public-private partnerships". A few individuals have made enormous contributions, including donations in the billions of dollars by a new generation of global philanthropists. Such steps can and do lead to measurable progress towards the goals.

But rhetoric still far outpaces reality. Despite expert plan after expert plan showing that living up to most of the global goals is feasible, progress towards a more stable, just and prosperous world has been at best spotty. No matter how daunting the challenges may seem, they can be met. Until now, however, governments have largely gotten away with promising to do the right thing but failing to mobilize the necessary response in their societies to accomplish it. The other groups that play an enormous role in shaping the world—corporations and civil society organizations—cannot be expected to compensate fully for governmental negligence, but they could do a great deal more than they have done.

The Global Governance Initiative aims to promote greater accountability among all of us—governments, business, civil society, and international institutions—by monitoring attempts to

Across the board, the world is putting forth roughly a third of the effort needed into achieving these very fundamental goals

deal with the problems on this global agenda. It takes a comprehensive perspective on who is doing what across the full range of security, human rights, development and environmental issues that are fundamental to global peace and prosperity.

In this initial report, there is clear evidence of just how wide the gap remains between aspiration and action. Perhaps the greatest surprise is the chilling consistency of the appraisals. Across the board, the world is putting forth roughly a third of the effort needed into achieving these very fundamental goals.

In part, the gap exists because of differing conceptions in different parts of the world about what deserves priority. In the peace and security area, most notably, some see the threat of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the possible connections to organized crime as the greatest threat. Others assign that priority to civil wars and the cumulative murder and maiming of millions by small arms and landmines.

But in very large part, the gap exists because too many people are simply not paying attention. Indeed, even among the activists most concerned with these issues, an alarmingly large number of people are unaware that the world's governments have overwhelmingly adopted a set of serious and achievable goals. And even where people are aware, their actions are inadequate. The repeated failures to take seriously the minimal goals of the Millennium Declaration threatens to create a norm of cynicism.

Throughout this report there are cases in which some national governments have strongly committed themselves, in deed as well as in word, to meaningful action—but far too many cases of

governments remaining incapable or simply uninterested. Some corporations are trying, working with governments and civil society groups, to rein in the trade in “conflict diamonds” that can fuel civil wars or carrying out community development programs in areas where they operate. But these represent at most a few hundred of the world's more than 60,000 multinational corporations, to say nothing of the smaller enterprises that employ the bulk of the world's workers. A vigorous community of nongovernmental organizations is involved in everything from advocacy to delivering humanitarian relief to monitoring the implementation of global treaties. But the vast majority of the world's citizens, even the literate and prosperous, contribute little or nothing of their own time and money to such efforts. And the much-touted partnerships among governments, business and civil society are so new that it is not clear how well they will work.

The Global Governance Initiative is intended to complement efforts under way elsewhere to promote progress towards global goals. For the most part, these other efforts focus on the Millennium Development Goals, which are a subset of the Millennium Declaration's broad agenda addressing poverty, health, hunger and education. The United Nations has launched several initiatives related to the Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Project, under the direction of UN Special Advisor and Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs, is convening 10 Task Forces over three years to recommend strategies for achieving the goals. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has appointed former Netherlands Development Minister Evelyn Herfkens as Executive Coordinator of a Millennium Campaign to mobilize political support for the Millennium Development Goals. The UN Development Group is monitoring country-level

This project assesses not what humanity should be trying to do, but whether it is in fact making a sufficient effort to do what it claims it wants

progress towards achievement of the goals. All are laudable undertakings, and the Global Governance Initiative has benefited from consultations with them.

The goals

The starting point for this assessment is the Millennium Declaration, signed at the United Nations Millennium Summit by the leaders of 189 nations, nearly every country. The Millennium Declaration represents a broad consensus on a global agenda, bringing together the whole range of issues the world confronts, from poverty to environmental degradation to the scourge of war. In several cases, however, the international community has since made significant progress in refining pieces of that global agenda through such forums as the Millennium Development Goals, the Monterrey meeting, and the Johannesburg conference. Where appropriate, the project has used the goals espoused in later documents as the benchmark against which to evaluate global efforts. But in all cases, the goals we are examining are those set by humanity's official representatives in the form of national governments, which have almost universally adopted the goals. This project assesses not what humanity should be trying to do, but whether it is in fact making a sufficient effort to do what it claims it wants.

For calendar year 2003, the Global Governance Initiative focused on seven overarching categories of goals covering a broad spectrum of the most important issues:

- **Peace and security:** free all peoples from the scourge of war, both within and between states, seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, take concerted action against international terrorism and end illicit traffic in small arms

- **Poverty:** halve the proportion of people living in poverty by 2015
- **Hunger:** halve the number of people suffering from hunger by 2015
- **Education:** ensure universal primary education and gender parity in primary and secondary schooling by 2015
- **Health:** stop and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate and by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio, by 2015
- **Environment:** stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, implement conventions related to the conservation of biodiversity and halve the proportions of people without access to water and sanitation by 2015
- **Human rights:** uphold international human rights standards, with particular attention to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, protection of the rights of migrants, employment and labour rights and the rule of law and access to information.

The goals are couched in global terms, not broken down by region or nation. But the clear intent of the signatories, not to mention common sense, argues that no one nation's or region's successes should be allowed to mask dramatic shortcomings elsewhere. China's astonishing progress in reducing poverty, Uganda's success in battling HIV/AIDS and Latin America's achievements in universal primary education are enormous accomplishments and deserve our admiration. But clearly, when whole regions are seeing more people sink into destitution or suffer the ravages of

**Achieving the global goals
clearly requires the joint efforts
of both developed and
developing-country governments.
That is why the Millennium
Development Goals speak of a
“Global Partnership for
Development”**

untreated disease, we are not making the kind of progress towards the more stable and humane world the goals are intended to elicit.

The actors

Evaluations of global problem-solving efforts usually focus on governments and international organizations, and do not incorporate the vast financial and human resources of the private and nongovernmental sectors. This report, in contrast, evaluates not just governmental and intergovernmental actions, but also the important contributions from the private sector and civil society. That is because, while much will depend on the performance of governments and the intergovernmental institutions they control, new opportunities for progress are emerging from the growing roles of corporations and civil society groups. The international circuit is abuzz with talk of innovative approaches to dealing with the world's problems: new types of international institutions, public-private partnerships, border-crossing networks of activists and bureaucrats and corporate social responsibility initiatives.

But this focus on nongovernmental as well as governmental actors raises important questions and serious concerns about these new and different ways of doing things. Who can reasonably be expected to do what? Can and should governments, intergovernmental organizations, the private sector and civil society work together and if so how? What is the appropriate division of labour?

Governments. National governments bear the overwhelming share of responsibility for achieving the goals. The reason governments exist, after all, is to solve exactly the kind of public goods problems the goals address. Governments are the rule-setters.

They are the ones that can legitimately regulate the behaviour of their citizens and can, through taxation, require those citizens to provide the resources needed to achieve the goals. And they are the ones who have set the goals for humanity.

Beyond these broad generalities, the roles of developed- and developing-country governments differ vastly.


Rich-country governments dominate the making and implementation of the rules governing the global economy. And by virtue of their military capabilities, these countries set the agenda on issues of peace and security as well. With their power comes significant responsibility to ensure that the rules are fair to all. In too many cases, however, they are not meeting that challenge. Their policies create obstacles to the fulfilment of global goals across the spectrum of issues covered in this report. U.S. and European trade policies hinder the growth of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in the developing world. Rich-country arms sales flood the world with the weapons that help fuel civil violence. The lack of coordination among bilateral donor agencies creates excessive administrative burdens for recipient governments already stretched thin. And despite repeated promises to contribute financially to the achievement of the world's goals, those with most of the money are continuing to demonstrate shortsighted miserliness. Official development assistance has leveled off over the last decade to slightly more than \$50 billion annually, and new commitments since the Monterrey High-Level Dialogue on Financing for Development in 2002 would only add \$16 billion, far short of reasonable estimates of the needs—even if, as is none too certain, those commitments are fully honoured.

This report evaluates not just governmental and intergovernmental actions, but also the important contributions from the private sector and civil society

Whereas rich-country governments are pressured to play fair and to deliver greater financial and technical resources, developing world governments face the challenge of building infrastructure in their absence. But even with greater capital transfers to poor countries, solutions cannot simply be bought. Many poor countries have governments that lack sufficient qualified people, that are corrupt or that simply are not well organized to achieve the global goals. Thus the resource question is not merely financial, but also human and technical. The challenge for these countries—one that too often is not met—is to provide a supportive environment both for economic activity and investment and for the empowerment of poor people.

Achieving the global goals clearly requires the joint efforts of both developed and developing-country governments. That is why the Millennium Development Goals speak of a “Global Partnership for Development”, and why the recent United Nations Development Programme *Human Development Report’s* “Millennium Development Compact” calls upon rich and poor nations to work together to increase market access and trade capacity for poor countries, agree on sustainable debt servicing schemes and increase accountability in the use of bilateral and multilateral donor assistance. On the broader agenda encompassing peace and security, human rights and the environment, rich and poor governments similarly have joint, if sometimes differentiated, responsibilities. Environmental treaties often explicitly take into account the differing capabilities of rich and poor, but it is clear that both must do their part if environmental disaster is to be avoided. And provision of security and protection of human rights are fundamental responsibilities of all governments.

Membership in the United Nations Global Compact is up



Source: United Nations Global Compact.

Intergovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization are not wholly independent actors. They are mainly creatures of their member governments. Blaming these organizations for failures to address global problems is like blaming an auditorium for a bad concert: maybe the acoustics need tweaking, but the primary responsibility clearly lies with the performers.

That said, there are some responsibilities accruing directly to the secretariats of intergovernmental organizations for which they can be held accountable. First and foremost is their ability to call attention to issues. The UN Secretary-General in particular commands moral authority on the global stage, but over the years the heads of many other international agencies have helped to shape the global agenda. Second, the organizations can be held accountable for the performance of their programs and staff (at least to the degree that member governments allow staff to be recruited on grounds of merit rather than political connections). Within the (usually very limited) means available to them, are they providing the services their member governments have mandated them to provide? Are they following through effectively on the multilateral commitments entrusted to them to carry out?

Business. Because there is good reason to doubt that governments and their intergovernmental organizations will move swiftly to implement the global goals, many eyes are turning to the private sector, given its enormous resources and increasingly global scale of operation. Indeed, the private sector is already deeply involved in global governance. It has long lobbied governments and provided philanthropy. In small (though growing)

If the private sector wants to assure itself a legitimate place in global society, it has to be seen as a responsible citizen

numbers, it is adopting standards of corporate social responsibility, handling the negative spillovers of business activities even in the absence of governmental requirements. No assessment of progress on the global environment, for example, would be complete without reference to the growing number of major corporations now implementing strategies to reduce carbon emissions. Farsighted business leaders are even devising new business models that find profitable ways to alleviate global ills, from new technologies that clean up rather than pollute the environment, to production methods that make goods affordable to the very poor who badly need those goods, to innovative applications of information technology.

But there is no consensus about what roles the private sector should play in dealing with global issues. This report's assessment has considered a wide continuum of arguments about the standards against which corporate activities should be measured. At one end are those who say that the role of the private sector is to create wealth for society, including the provision of jobs, within the context of whatever laws the legitimate government of the area has chosen to enact. And the creation of wealth and jobs is undeniably crucial to any hopes for achieving the goals. Demographic realities make clear that hundreds of millions of new jobs will need to be found over the next several years for the expected entrants into the world's work force. Yet many corporations have long accepted that they have a larger role to play as good citizens.

At the other end of the continuum are arguments that business, especially in the form of large corporations, must go very far beyond what governments require, to the point of acting as quasi-governmental providers of essential services

for the societies in which they operate. And in some cases, where governments are utterly incapable and particular corporations are the dominant local actors, it seems clear that dependence on such corporate engagement is the only hope of seeing progress towards the goals. But few business leaders would accept such an expansive definition of their social responsibilities.

Between these extremes is a robust, evolving debate over how to define the responsibilities of the private sector. Hundreds of corporations (as yet a tiny fraction of the business sector and often acting under pressure from activist groups) have signed on to a plethora of corporate codes of conduct laying out labour, human rights and environmental standards the signatories agree to meet. Increasing numbers of firms both large and small are coming to the view that corporate citizenship is an issue of core business strategy and practice, not simply philanthropy or other beneficence. Somewhat separate but no less important is the call for new business models to harness the incentives of capitalism to the solution of the world's problems.

The business community has good reason to respond constructively to this debate over its appropriate role in a globalizing world. The private sector's search for profits is unlikely to prove fruitful in a world destabilized by failure to meet the modest targets the world has set itself. And beyond this, if the private sector, especially the large corporations that are the easiest targets for disgruntled citizens, wants to assure itself a legitimate place in global society, it has to be seen as a responsible citizen.

Civil society. Civil society, that amorphous "third sector" of human associations that are neither

It is becoming clear that both effective local governance and good global decisionmaking will require the combined efforts of governments, business and civil society

governments nor profit-seekers, is likewise experiencing a growing and controversial role in global governance. At their best, NGOs can provide needed expertise, analysis of long-term challenges and channels for voices that otherwise go unheard. Most important, civil society groups often shine the spotlight on governments, corporations, international organizations and even one another in ways that can help to shame all actors into behaving in the global public interest.

Civil society groups are linking up across borders to an unprecedented degree. The growing transnational networks can provide a powerful addition to the arsenal of instruments the world has available for managing global problems. In areas ranging from human rights to multilateral arms control to anticorruption efforts to poverty reduction to the environment, such networks are providing a badly needed global perspective. Their increased influence stems from a host of trends, from democratization to the spread of information technology, making it likely that their numbers and influence will continue to grow.

Many civil society organizations have a reasonable claim to legitimacy, either through democratic representation of the interests of large groups, like labour unions or membership-based structures in self-help grassroots organizations, or due to acknowledged expertise in some issue. But there are vast differences among them. Just as there are irresponsible and even illegitimate businesses, there are dubious civil society organizations. And even well-intentioned groups can undermine the development of governmental capacity to address problems through more institutionalized and sustainable means.

Partnerships: towards a more systemic response

Many of those involved in addressing the world's problems see new hope in the emergence of partnerships among these various types of actors. It is becoming clear that both effective local governance and good global decisionmaking will require the combined efforts of governments, business and civil society. The private sector and civil society have already showed themselves capable of helping to devise and implement global rules that serve the broad public interest. In some cases, businesses that started improving their environmental and social practices under pressure from NGOs have come to see partnerships with those same groups as serving the enlightened self-interest of the corporations. Corporations and civil society organizations are beginning to join governments in setting transnational agendas, negotiating and implementing agreements (formal or informal) and monitoring and enforcing compliance with the standards of behaviour set by those agreements. And these nongovernmental actors are joining together with intergovernmental organizations in a variety of innovative efforts. Examples include the Global Reporting Initiative, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization and the UN Global Compact involving business, unions and NGOs.

Most such efforts involving civil society groups and especially corporations are so recent that it is not yet possible to judge their long-term effectiveness. It is not clear whether they represent a permanent shift in how humanity will try to solve its problems or whether they are merely a set of stopgap measures undertaken in desperation in the face of inadequate governmental action. Whatever the future holds in this respect, it is clear that the promise of broader multistakeholder cooperation is stretching our

By providing a numerical rating of the effectiveness of global problem solving and cooperation in the most crucial issue areas, the Global Governance Initiative focuses much-needed attention on the wide gap between goals and performance. By spotlighting specific examples of good and bad practices, it spreads awareness of what models should be emulated—or avoided

traditional understanding of global governance as the product of official, intergovernmental arrangements.

Conclusion

Prospects for the world are bleak without a transformation of global governance. To date, the international community has made significant progress in setting rules of the road for global commerce and in facilitating all manner of international transactions. But much less attention has been paid to dealing with the negative consequences of those interactions or to seizing new opportunities to redress age-old ills.

That transformation is within our grasp. Legitimate political authorities in all parts of the world have publicly accepted a wide range of goals and principles. Cynics dismiss these goals as mere rhetoric, hopeless ideals that governments espouse to placate activists who refuse to accept political realities. In reality, however, the goals are a fairly minimal set of quite achievable steps towards a more stable and prosperous world. It is the means that are lacking, not agreement on the legitimacy of the ends.

The Global Governance Initiative is meant to be very different from the plethora of weighty assessments of global issues regularly published and just as regularly ignored. It focuses on efforts at solutions, not merely diagnoses of the problems. It evaluates not just governmental and intergovernmental actions, but also the important contributions from the private sector and civil society. Its numerical rating of those efforts and prominent positioning in World Economic Forum events is designed to attract widespread media and public attention. Such prominent spotlighting is an essential step towards the creation of a

consensus for action that can solve the problems we share, anticipate the dilemmas we will face and spring back from the crises we fail to foresee.


If the world is to manage global problems more effectively and equitably than it has to date, we will need strengthened intergovernmental institutions and the best combined efforts of governments, business and civil society. In almost all issue areas, such cross-sectoral partnerships are beginning to occur, but they tend to be awkward, scattered and ad hoc. No mechanism exists to enable people working in one global issue area to learn from experiences elsewhere. And few mechanisms are in place to ensure adequate accountability of multilateral institutions, the private sector or civil society.


The Global Governance Initiative aims to provide such a mechanism. By providing a numerical rating of the effectiveness of global problem solving and cooperation in the most crucial issue areas, it focuses much-needed attention on the wide gap between goals and performance. By spotlighting specific examples of good and bad practices, it spreads awareness of what models should be emulated—or avoided. And by publicizing ideas about what governments, intergovernmental organizations, businesses and civil society organizations can do to meet specific goals laid out in such documents as the Millennium Declaration, it will help bring about the realization of those widely shared goals.

This is the first in what is intended to be an annual series of such assessments. It makes no claim to be scientific or complete—instead, it is a serious but necessarily imperfect first effort. It is the hope of all who have participated in the project that it will spark debate, and comments on the project's findings and methodology are invited.

1 Peace and Security

Score
3





Score

3

Goals

- **Free all peoples from the scourge of war, both within and between states.**
- **Seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.**
- **Take concerted action against international terrorism.**
- **End illicit traffic in small arms.**

Peace and security

The Millennium Declaration is clear in its commitment to peace and security—but much less precise in articulating specific goals than it is for poverty, health and education. The goals used in compiling the assessment here have solid foundations in the Declaration’s language:

- Eliminate wars between states: “free our peoples from the scourge of war... between States” (*Declaration*, II.8). Eliminate wars within states: “free our peoples from the scourge of war... within States” (*Declaration*, II.8).
- Eliminate international terrorism: “take concerted action against international terrorism” (*Declaration*, II.9).
- Eliminate weapons of mass destruction: “seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction”, “strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons” (*Declaration*, II.8, 9).
- Reduce the availability of small arms: “take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures” (*Declaration*, II.9).

In evaluating progress towards these goals in 2003, we took as our benchmark in each case “what would be the maximum achievable outcome, assuming full competence and will of all relevant parties”. Put simply, what could the world have done this year if it were really trying?

The efforts of the international community in 2003 to prevent and resolve conflict, stop terrorism and contain weapons proliferation were on balance slightly positive. But they fell far short of the intensity needed if all the world’s people are to be


freed from fear of war and major violence. The world did best on curbing war within states. It did less well on stopping international terrorism, on eliminating the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and illicit small arms and on preventing war between states.

Contrary to general perceptions, there has been decline in the number of conflicts between and within states, in the number of terrorist incidents and in the number of people killed in battle. This trend, evident since the end of the cold war, appears to have continued into 2003—though not all the data are in. As bad as conflict and mass violence continue to be, they are significantly less bad than they were a decade ago. Governments and international organizations, with much help from civil society and some from business, are getting better at conflict prevention and resolution. There are grounds for believing that new conflicts can be prevented and old ones resolved by political and diplomatic means.

But the remaining security problems are very big indeed. The growth of international terrorist networks with deeply frightening agendas and capacities. The risk of nuclear proliferation and accompanying fears of weapons or fissile material being supplied to terrorists. The continuing existence, and emergence, of too many fragile, collapsed and internally warring states threatening their people and—through the messes they export—people in many other countries.

Compounding these problems is the reality that our capacity as a global community to deal with them doesn’t seem to be improving. There is an evident weakening of confidence in the international rules to govern the use of force. There is little confidence

Violent conflict at lowest level since 1960s



in the institutions, starting with the United Nations, that are supposed to make and enforce such rules. Nor is there much consensus about the strategies for dealing with the great risks of terrorism, weapons proliferation and failed and failing states.

The performance of governments and international organizations

Eliminating wars between states

In a major setback for collective and cooperative security, the international community failed to prevent—or endorse—war in Iraq. Elsewhere, hostilities continue in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains dangerously unresolved and relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between India and Pakistan remain very fragile. Much remains to be done to consolidate the decline in interstate war, one of the most encouraging trends of global security in recent decades.

The context. For most of the past 200 years interstate wars have been the major killers, with the first and second world wars responsible for most combat-related deaths. But the pattern of global warfare is changing. Interstate wars have declined in number and in relation to civil wars. There were only five interstate wars between 1989 and 2002, accounting for fewer than 10% of all armed conflicts.

Changes in the international system appear to have reduced the incentives for war. The end of the cold war removed a major source of ideological and great power conflict. It also freed the UN to play the global security role that the founders intended—as became immediately apparent with the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Accompanying global democratization, there has been a decline in

hypernationalism and “bellicism”—and a willingness to end wars through negotiated peace agreements rather than victory.

The resort to war, once seen as an acceptable instrument of statecraft, is now universally proscribed except in self-defence—or with the authorization of the UN Security Council. In no case since the end of the second world war has a state's sovereignty been extinguished by force. A growing (though not universally accepted) global norm appears to favour mediation over force to resolve international conflict. Because interstate wars are, by definition, threats to international peace and security, they are more likely to be addressed by the Security Council than civil wars are. Mediation is more likely, and more likely to succeed.

But the risk of countries going to war cannot be excluded in readily imaginable contexts. Consider unresolved territorial claims, as in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Or strikes against the nuclear, biological or chemical weapons capability of rogue states. Or strikes against states seen as supporting or hosting terrorists. Or unilateral interventions to change the regime in states seen as putting their own or others' people at risk. Or escalations of conflicts over scarce resources, most likely water. Or attacks to gain access to resources (a major motive for neighbours to join the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Or beggar-thy-neighbour fallout after a major breakdown in the international trading system.

2003. Dominating global attention: the war against Iraq, launched without UN Security Council approval by U.S.-led coalition forces on 20 March. Combat operations, declared officially over by U.S. President George W. Bush on 1 May, killed 201 coalition soldiers and up to 15,000 Iraqis, an

The conflict in Iraq has strained the international institutions governing the use of force and the rules that underpin them

estimated 30% of them noncombatant civilians. Since then a sophisticated and lethal guerrilla campaign against the occupying forces has continued, claiming the lives of many more coalition soldiers than in the war. International and humanitarian agencies are also being targeted—with 22 UN staff killed in a suicide attack on UN headquarters in August and 12 members of the International Committee of the Red Cross staff and Iraqi civilians in another suicide attack in October.

Beyond the immediate toll, the conflict has strained the international institutions governing the use of force and the rules that underpin them. Was the war justified by Iraq's presumed possession of undeclared weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein's asserted links to terrorism or the tyranny of his regime towards his own people? What is clear is that no single argument for military intervention has majority international support. There may have been universal agreement on verified disarmament in compliance with the UN resolutions, but there was utter disagreement on how best to achieve it. The handling of the situation must be counted as a failure for the international community.

In Afghanistan the reduced fighting in 2002, as major combat operations wound down, reversed in 2003. Anxiety centres on the regrouped Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the southeast border regions (where the U.S.-led "Operation Enduring Freedom" continues) and on warlord-driven faction fighting and generally poor local security elsewhere outside Kabul (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization now has the primary operational role in Kabul).

In Africa the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, though apparently resolved, threatens to reignite. The border war that broke out in 1998 claimed

more than 70,000 lives and was largely resolved in 2000 with the intense engagement of the international community. But the unstable peace has become even more so in the second half of 2003. The arbitrated new border has yet to be officially demarcated, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission remains crucial.

Relations between India and Pakistan remain fragile, poisoned by the continuing violence in Kashmir, which claimed more than 1,000 lives in 2003. Both countries tested missiles during the year. Although they came no closer to addressing the substantive issues in dispute, they significantly improved in the political environment towards the end of the year with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf committing themselves to confidence-building measures.

Iraq apart, the most violent interstate conflict (albeit not technically "interstate" in this instance) continued to be that between Israel and the Palestinians. Terrorist and retaliatory violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories claimed nearly 200 Israelis and 500 Palestinians. The Road Map—launched by the U.S.–EU–Russia–UN Quartet in April 2003, laid out directions to a two-state solution. But weak in its incremental, sequential character—making progress hostage to extremists on both sides—it could not survive suicide bombings, Israeli killings of senior leaders from Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, the security fence, the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and myriad other pressures. After an October suicide attack in Haifa, Israel launched an air strike against Syria, targeting an apparently abandoned training camp near Damascus. The strike marked the first direct hostilities between the two states since 1973, signalling a dangerous escalation in the conflict.

By the end of the 1990s wars and lesser armed conflicts had declined by a third to a half—and their cost in lives declined even more

Eliminating wars within states

No new internal wars broke out in 2003, and some devastating conflicts (including those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan) seemed well on their way to resolution. That made the year successful in many respects, for the countries and for the international community. But more efforts are needed to eliminate wars within states.

The context. During the 40-year “Long Peace” of the cold war, the number of armed conflicts within states increased each decade until the 1990s. In the new climate of the early 1990s much attention focused on the apparent explosion of ethnic conflict around the world. But the number of armed conflicts began to drop.

By the end of the 1990s wars and lesser armed conflicts had declined by a third to a half, depending on the definitions and dataset. Not only did the numbers of wars decline, their cost in lives declined even more. In the 1990s the toll was hundreds of thousands a year, in the early 2000s fewer than 30,000 a year.¹

The causes of this decline—paralleled by dramatic declines in genocides, massacres, international terrorist incidents, international crises and refugee numbers—appear to be twofold. First the end of East-West hostilities stopped the flow of resources to warring parties in proxy wars in the developing world and to authoritarian regimes of left and right. Second, there has been an extraordinary upsurge in conflict management and prevention activities by the UN, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, donor states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other international actors. The much-maligned UN—despite inappropriate mandates, inadequate resources and

insufficient political commitment—seems to have made a real difference in reducing the risk of war.

The last decade has seen:

- Much more reliance on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking with a big increase in negotiated peace agreements. In the 1990s the number of wars ending in peace agreements exceeded the numbers ending in victory for the first time. There seems also to have been some shift in the global norms for secession, with states more willing to grant autonomy and rebels more willing to accept it.
- An equally dramatic increase in complex peace operations, mostly run by the UN, helping to stop armed conflicts and prevent their reoccurrence.
- The Security Council’s greater willingness to authorize the use of force, deterring aggression and sustaining peace agreements.
- The greater willingness to challenge the “culture of impunity”, demonstrated by the proliferation of transitional justice mechanisms, including peace and reconciliation commissions.
- The greater emphasis on development policies that address the underlying causes of political violence, including economic inequities and poor governance.

2003. Despite the ongoing wars within states, some “internationalized” by foreign forces, 2003 was a fairly successful year for the international community. No new wars erupted, and there was good progress in resolving long-standing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia (box 1.1) and Sudan. The Sudanese government and Sudanese People’s Liberation Army signed a security agreement for a six-year transition period

2003 was not a good year for international efforts to eliminate international terrorism by nonstate actors

Box 1.1 International intervention in Liberia

A chain of events led to the forced departure of former President Charles Taylor on 11 August 2003, to take up an offer of asylum in Nigeria.

During the year's first half the rebel groups LURD and MODEL overran much of the country, and by midyear LURD was camped on the outskirts of Monrovia, indiscriminately shelling the city centre. Other factors came into play: evidence of Taylor's business connections to al Qaeda; U.S. President George W. Bush's visit to Africa in July; the Sierra Leone Special Court's unsealing of its indictment of Taylor for charges relating to responsibility for the war in that country; and international media attention.

In August the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed about 2,000 Nigerian peacekeepers in Monrovia, and the United States positioned three ships off the coast, with 2,300 marines in reserve. The ECOWAS peacekeepers brought some control to Monrovia, and on 1 October a UN peacekeeping mission took over from ECOWAS, to reach 15,000 peacekeepers in 2004, the UN's largest mission anywhere. A National Transitional Government of Liberia, inaugurated on 14 October, will be in power until the elections in 2005.

in September, potentially ending a 20-year long civil conflict that claimed perhaps 2 million lives. Momentum was also maintained in the Burundi peace process. And the two coups in Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe were at least bloodless. In the Solomon Islands a 2,225-strong Australian-led multinational force brought a degree of peace for the first time in five years.

On the downside were the renewed outbreaks of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal,

no sign of diminution in the ugly conflict in Chechnya, a major setback to the peace process in Sri Lanka and very little progress in resolving such long-standing conflicts as those in Colombia, the Philippines and Uganda. The international intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates that there is not much occasion for self-congratulation in either the speed or effectiveness of handling the harrowing situation there, particularly in the country's east and northeast (box 1.2).



In Côte d'Ivoire the Economic Community of West African States is trying to revive the peace process that began in 2002. In Chechnya, fighting has intensified between Russian soldiers and Chechen rebels, while suicide bombings continue. More than 1,000 lives were lost in 2003 in the ongoing conflicts in the Aceh and Sulawesi regions of Indonesia, as well as in renewed fighting between Maoist rebels and the government in Nepal, where a ceasefire collapsed last summer.

Eliminating international terrorism

2003 was not a good year for international efforts to eliminate international terrorism by nonstate actors. Despite massive ongoing efforts by the United States since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and much international cooperation, al Qaeda and its associated groups continued to cause much loss of life. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to provoke Palestinian suicide bombers. And the invasion of Iraq unleashed new problems.

The context. Despite the impression generated by the media and western governments, acts of international terrorism by nonstate actors have been declining for nearly 20 years—from around 650 incidents in the mid-1980s, to some 200 in 2002.

Terrorist attacks trending down in recent years, but fatalities way up in 2001



Source: U.S. Department of State 2003a.

Box 1.2 Mixed performance: responding to genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo

More than 3.3 million people are estimated to have died over the last four and a half years as a result of the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Northeastern Congo has seen the worst fighting. Neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda have fought proxy wars there, seeking to control the region's natural resources and supporting ethnically aligned militias. The government in Kinshasa has also supported assorted militias to gain supremacy over the region. Tens of thousands of civilians have been forced from their homes, and many have been killed, raped or forced to join the militias. Much of the slaughter is ethnically driven.

It took the international community a long time to intervene to curb the horrors of this war. After the UN-brokered Lusaka Accord in 1999, the Security Council established a small UN observatory mission in Congo (MONUC) on 6 August 1999. But it lacked the means and authority to facilitate the peace process: 90 UN observers were expected to monitor a fragile ceasefire in a country four times the size of France. Even with added troops in February 2000 and

December 2002, MONUC had no authority to use force, and its troops were unable to intervene as civilians were slaughtered before them.

Only as the atrocities in Ituri province increased in early 2003, receiving worldwide coverage, did the international community send a robust force of 1,400 EU peacekeepers under French leadership to restore security in Bunia, the Ituri district capital. Although limited in duration and objectives, the ability and willingness of the peacekeepers to use force restored a degree of security to Bunia and its immediate vicinity. Thousands of displaced Congolese citizens returned home, and political authorities were re-established.

The Security Council later authorized the deployment up to 10,800 UN peacekeepers in the Ituri province in July 2003, with a mandate permitting the use of force. The reinvigorated MONUC took over on 1 September, slowly bringing some stability to the region—though massacres continue in areas not yet under MONUC control.

But the human cost has been going up, in large part because of an increase in suicide bombings and a greater reliance on powerful car bombs.

The direct death toll from international terrorism was around 700 a year on average in the 1980s and 1990s, with just over four times as many injuries. Compare that with the tens of thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of war deaths each year. Also compare that with the toll from national terrorism (much in ongoing civil wars). But the indirect costs of international terrorism can be very high: 11 September 2001 induced a global slowdown that pushed millions deeper into poverty and significantly increased child mortality.

The primary concern in the West is not the relatively insignificant threat that domestic terror groups pose in western democracies, or their far more deadly counterparts fighting their governments in the developing world. It is international terrorists—with al Qaeda and its affiliates, including the damaged but by no means destroyed Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah.

Defeating the loose al Qaeda terror network will be difficult. The organization has access to ample funds—not just Osama bin Laden's personal fortune, but also donations from supporters all over the world. Its ideology has a deep appeal in parts of the Islamic world. And its dedicated

The right response to terrorism has to be multilayered, with addressing and redressing political and other grievances given a higher priority to neutralize support for terrorists in their communities and to generate the will and capacity of local governments and authorities to act against them

cadres are willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause.

Just how great a threat international terrorism will pose in future is impossible to determine. Worst case scenarios see terrorists using weapons of mass destruction to kill hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions. Nobody anywhere is confident that the “big one” can’t or won’t happen—an attack combining the sophistication and ruthlessness of the attack on the Twin Towers with the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

There are some grounds for a little less pessimism in the short and medium terms. No terrorist group has the competence to build nuclear weapons. And despite concern about “loose nukes” in the former Soviet Union, there is no evidence to suggest that any nuclear weapons, or even enough fissile material to make a single small bomb, have been transferred to terrorist organizations—or to rogue states. There is a reasonable probability of a successful attack sometime with a crude “dirty bomb”—a regular explosive device used to scatter radioactive material. But such radiological weapons, while generating great popular concern, are not even remotely comparable to nuclear weapons.

Chemical attacks have not used agents capable of causing mass casualties, with the overwhelming majority employing low-tech chemicals like arsenic and chlorine. Biological weapons in terrorist hands present the greatest threat to the greatest number of people. But the manufacture, weaponization and effective dispersion of biological agents is, again, far more difficult than popular accounts suggest. The main threats appear to be conventional weapons and 11 September-type attacks.

Western strategies to combat international terrorism at its source since 11 September have tended to focus on military options (bombings, targeted assassinations), with support from criminal detection (disrupting resource flows, finding, arresting and trying suspects and the like) and some desultory attempts—mainly through aid budgets—to address root causes.

The right response has to be multilayered, with addressing and redressing political and other grievances given a higher priority. The object is not to obliterate the motives of every individual terrorist. It is to neutralize support for terrorists in their communities, and above all to generate the will and capacity of local governments and authorities to act against them.

2003. Iraqi resistance fighters, Palestinian suicide bombers and Islamist extremists all stepped up their attacks in 2003. In Iraq, where Saddam’s possible terrorist connections were the least widely accepted of the various reasons for war, terrorist violence—primarily by Baathist loyalists—has become the most harrowing of its consequences. Suicide bombings and other attacks have killed more than 300 coalition soldiers, 20 UN officials and staff and several hundred Iraqis. There have been a host of attacks against humanitarian workers.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there were a series of horrifying terrorist attacks earlier in the year. The conflict continues to take a heavy toll of noncombatants on both sides. Elsewhere, al Qaeda and related Islamic terrorist groups continued to target Western interests around the world, including major attacks in Casablanca, Istanbul and Jakarta.

Cooperative efforts continued to counter al Qaeda and other terrorist groups:

The nuclear programmes in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could lead to changes in thinking among their neighbours about their own nonnuclear status. The international community thus needs to worry about the next tier of countries that could reconsider their own policies

- Orders were issued to freeze the assets of terrorists in 173 countries. Terror networks have lost access to nearly \$200 million, frozen or seized in more than 1,400 terrorist-related accounts around the world. More than 100 countries have introduced new terrorist-related legislation, and 84 have established financial intelligence units.
- More than 30 nations belong to all 12 international antiterrorism conventions and protocols (up from two on 11 September 2001). Many more have become parties to most of the conventions and protocols and have passed implementing legislation to put them into effect.
- The Counterterrorism Committee of the UN Security Council has taken on, under UN Resolution 1373, the role of coordinator of UN member states in efforts to increase global capability and cooperation in counterterrorism.

Eliminating weapons of mass destruction

2003 saw potentially serious, but for the time being contained, new challenges to nuclear nonproliferation goals from Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and an end-of-year nonproliferation breakthrough with Libya. With little support for multilateral initiatives from the United States, however, arms control and disarmament efforts generally remained in a holding pattern, suffering from insufficient attention and political support.

Nuclear proliferation concerns. There were growing threats to nonproliferation goals in 2003, and only modest success in maintaining the international instruments to manage and reduce those threats. The nuclear programmes in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could well lead to changes in thinking among their neighbours about their own nonnuclear status. The



international community thus needs to worry about the next tier of countries that could reconsider their own policies. In addition, U.S. policies at developing more unilateral and assertive means to confront new threats have added to the uncertainty and turmoil in the international system.

Concerns about Iran's nuclear programme heightened with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) discoveries of additional research sites, more advanced activities in uranium conversion and centrifuge enrichment and highly enriched uranium particles found at Natanz. Iran has explained those particles as contamination from imported centrifuge components, further complicating the proliferation aspects of the story.

The IAEA concluded in September 2003 that Iran had not fully complied with its reporting requirements and has been slow and inconsistent in providing information. But in an important diplomatic breakthrough led by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Iran later committed to abiding fully by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signing the Additional Protocol with its more stringent safeguard obligations and suspending its enrichment programme—at least temporarily.

The presumed status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme, believed to be significantly more advanced than Iran's, did not change as dramatically over the year. In apparent efforts to restart negotiations with the United States and the international community, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asserted its nuclear status and defiance of the nonproliferation regime, only to later offer more ambiguous explanations of its position. Experts believe the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could have a small number of

Nuclear stockpiles have been decreasing—especially in Russia



Source: Norris and Kristensen 2002, 2003.

crude devices not fully weaponized. But there is no doubt that the country has technical ability to produce weapons grade fuel.

At year's end, the government of Libya announced its intention to permit UN inspectors into all its unconventional weapons facilities and to dismantle them. The Libyan decision was the result of several months of secret diplomacy led by the United Kingdom with U.S. participation. It appears linked to Libya's desire to end any remaining economic and political sanctions imposed after the Lockerbie terrorist act of 1988.

The United States raised the prospect of testing its nuclear weapons and developing newer smaller weapons. Either development would have serious consequences for the policies of states that are not Non-Proliferation Treaty-declared nuclear powers (India, Iran, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Pakistan) as well as additional nuclear aspirants. But these trial balloon proposals, still subject to change, do not pose an imminent threat to the international system. Nor are there current or pending changes in the nuclear arsenals of France or the United Kingdom. But China is presumed to be modernizing its advanced systems that could enhance the quantity and quality of its nuclear force.

On the reduction front, the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma have ratified the Moscow Treaty, which binds both states to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, but they are not required to complete implementation until 2012. Many consider this bilateral agreement to fall short of a major arms reduction treaty.

Iraq is no longer viewed as a weapons of mass destruction threat to its neighbours and to regional

stability, but it will take time to understand whether and how Iraq reduced its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. By year's end coalition forces had found no significant caches of prohibited arms.

Agreements and treaties. Arms control and nonproliferation as core concepts are under challenge, and we have witnessed an erosion in both the norms (abhorrence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction) and the treaty-based arrangements (in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention). The international community did demonstrate some enduring commitment to international treaties as a means to manage weapons of mass destruction through modest steps to keep members engaged. But without official U.S. attention and energy, there was little new activity.

The Chemical Weapons Convention held its review conference in April 2003. Five new countries joined, and a budget sufficient to fund all scheduled inspections was approved by member states, but with no significant progress.

The Biological Weapons Convention and the attempts in 2001 and 2002 to convene a meaningful Review Conference were harmed by the U.S. rejection of efforts to achieve a verification protocol. Signatories did convene the first annual meeting on a technical subject (biological agents), thus creating a forum for states to work on issues of common concern. But this does not provide enough political momentum to resolve deep problems of enforcement and U.S. disinterest.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty brought six new signatories on board, but the treaty remains unlikely

The challenge of finding ways to engage nuclear states that are not part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains daunting

to come into force because of the refusal of the United States and other nuclear states to ratify it.

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty remains stalled in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, its negotiation unable to proceed. A small number of states (including China and Russia) will thwart consensus unless the treaty is linked to further disarmament or circumscribed in other ways. And the lack of enthusiasm by the other declared nuclear states (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) for real progress would draw attention to their own nuclear policies. The challenge of finding ways to engage nuclear states that are not part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (India, Israel and Pakistan) remains daunting.

The Conference on Disarmament, the UN's designated disarmament negotiating forum, has had some extremely useful results in the past (including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). But it has achieved little or nothing of any practical value since 1998. Because the Conference on Disarmament operates on a consensus basis, the resistance of key states has created a stalemate. Given the significance of the issues, this is a standing reproach to the international community.

Funding for relevant agencies is moving in the right direction:

- The Chemical Weapons Convention parties agreed to increase funding for the Office for Prevention of Chemical Weapons by 10%.
- The U.S. Congress released funds for the Russian Shchuchye chemical weapons destruction facility.

- The G-8 Global Partnership is on track to provide \$20 billion over 10 years for cooperative threat reduction activities.

Other initiatives. The most significant new activity in enforcement is the Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by the United States in May 2003, to interdict by sea, air or land trade suspected of containing illegal weapons of mass destruction components. Eleven nations have joined the initiative. Exercises have been held at sea. And members of the "activity" held four meetings in 2003.

The initiative can be seen as an operational step in support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group. It reflects the will of like-minded states to find new techniques to manage proliferation threats, particularly from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But its legal status is controversial: most members prefer to work within existing constraints, but the United States believes new norms must be set that would permit interdiction. Asian states are concerned that the initiative could work at cross purposes with the Six Party talks on Korea.

Central Asian states moved to implement the treaty concluded in 2002 establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone. Central Asia will become the fourth such zone, after those in Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga) and Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok). African countries have also agreed to prohibit nuclear weapons on their continent, but the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba has not entered into force.

Reducing the availability of small arms

Reducing the availability of small arms and light weapons, both legally and illicitly traded and

Key international initiatives, such as the UN Conference process, focus on the illicit trade while incorporating many of the broader measures needed to tackle small arms—important because most of the world’s guns and ammunition start out as legally produced and traded, but at some point are diverted into illicit spheres


stockpiled, is daunting.² The gains—to the extent they can be calculated—have been extremely modest. The news is better on landmines, but stockpiles remain enormous. And although the overwhelming majority of countries have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, the key players—including China, Russia and the United States—have refused to sign it.

Small arms and light weapons. Some 10 years after small arms and light weapons received international attention, multilateral efforts to address the issue are shifting into higher gear. The goal is to reduce the harmful impacts of these weapons on individuals and societies. Key international initiatives, such as the UN Conference process, focus on the illicit trade while incorporating many of the broader measures needed to tackle small arms. The legal trade in small arms is especially important. Most of the world’s guns and ammunition start out as legally produced and traded, but at some point are diverted into illicit spheres. So the illicit trade cannot be examined in isolation from the legal trade.

Since July 2001, when agreement was reached on a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, there has been a process for addressing most aspects of the problem at the global level under UN auspices. Participation in the July 2001 conference and its July 2003 followup has been high. Even more important, some 40% of states—quite a high proportion for voluntary commitments—are reporting seriously on national implementation of the UN Programme of Action.

International legal instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons are few and far between. Participation lags for the only global small arms

Companies in Europe and North America lead the way in small arms production



treaty, the UN Firearms Protocol, to combat the illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms and ammunition. As of August 2003 it had 52 signatures, but only 5 ratifications—well short of the 40 needed for the treaty to enter into force.

The two key regional treaties are faring better. All states of the Organization of American States, except one, have signed the 1997 Convention against illicit firearms manufacture and trafficking, with 20 having ratified it as well. This pioneering instrument has been in force since 1 July 1998. And the Firearms Protocol of the Southern African Development Community has been approaching the ratification threshold to enter into force.


Recently a UN Group of Governmental Experts recommended the start of negotiations on an international instrument “to enable States to identify and trade, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons”.

Sweden was the first country (in 1985) to publish a report outlining its arms exports. In 2003 more than 20 countries produced annual export reports, including some of the biggest producers—such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. But several other producers, including Brazil, China, Israel and Russia, still do not.

Landmines. The campaign to ban landmines is a success story for the international community, particularly for civil society. In a decade there has been significant international action to ban or restrict landmines, pushing down the trend in fatalities.

International efforts to ban landmines are underpinned by the 1997 Convention on the

China and Russia have the largest stockpiles of landmines



Source: International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2003.

Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction—otherwise known as the Mine Ban Treaty. During 2003 Burundi, Cyprus, Greece, Guyana, Lithuania, São Tomé and Príncipe and Sudan all ratified the treaty—bringing the total number of ratifications to 144 in December.

These ratification figures are misleading. The 43 countries that have not signed it include some of the largest landmine producing or using countries—including China, Russia and the United States—with a combined stockpile of some 200 million landmines.

The *Landmine Monitor Report* for May 2002 to May 2003 indicates some improvement over previous reporting periods.

The performance of business

Although the focus here is on legally established companies, it is important to emphasize the threat to peace and security from the operations of international criminal networks and the links between the drug trade, natural resource exploitation, money laundering, corruption and the trade in small arms. Many of these links are facilitated by private enterprises operating through complex ownership structures and participating in diffuse and opaque global supply chains. In some cases, legal and respected companies participate in these supply chains, both wittingly and unwittingly. Increased vigilance and cooperation are required on the part of governments, civil society, the media and the legal business community to investigate such linkages in order to tackle the illegal and illicit business activities that undermine prospects for peace and development in many countries.

Increased vigilance and cooperation are required on the part of governments, civil society, the media and the legal business community to investigate illegal and illicit business activities that undermine prospects for peace and development in many countries

During 2003 governments and commercial banks renewed international efforts to tackle money laundering. There are new collaborative initiatives to understand and in some cases to monitor the global supply chains of such primary resources as diamonds, coltan and timber. Joint public-private initiatives are increasing transparency and tackling corruption. NGOs, sometimes with direct business engagement and support, are investigating the linkages between conflict and natural resource exploitation.

The World Bank's multistakeholder Extractive Industry Review raised awareness and potentially new frameworks to govern the role of business in zones of conflict. The World Bank also worked with the government of Chad to develop a framework to manage oil revenues (box 1.3). The UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo set a precedent by publicly reporting on connections between atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo and companies

Box 1.3 Chad's oil revenues

In October 2003 Chad's president officially inaugurated the start of oil production there. He also launched a prototype for revenue management from the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project (www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj). Working with the World Bank, major oil companies and NGOs, Chad's government has created a framework for putting revenues into an escrow account subject to public disclosure and audit and with specified percentages agreed for debt repayment, future generations and development projects. The process will be monitored by an oversight committee including government officials and civil society organizations.

Individual business leaders or business groups can also support the dialogues and engagement processes needed to resolve conflicts, as demonstrated in the past year by private sector leaders in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka

operating in Asia, Europe and North America. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced in September 2003 his intention to “work together with national investigators and prosecutors in order to determine the contribution, if any, that these businesses are making to the commission of crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Although some of these connections have been strongly disputed by the companies in question and by their governments, such actions put pressure on legal businesses to demonstrate that their operations are not creating or exacerbating conflict.

Four broad areas of business impact relating to peace and security are particularly worthy of assessment:

- Ensuring that business operations are not themselves a direct cause of conflict.
- Contributing to conflict prevention, containment and resolution.
- Investing in post-conflict reconstruction.
- Controlling arms and the role—which is controversial, but has some potential to be positive—of private military and security companies.

Doing no harm

Some of the main ways in which legal business operations contribute to conflict include the use of resource revenues gained by governments or rebel groups to fund wars or sustain repressive regimes; negative impacts of major resource and infrastructure projects on human rights and the environment; sales of arms, communications equipment and other products that are used against citizens by repressive regimes; and the use of ill-disciplined or abusive public and private security forces by companies to protect their assets.

Investigative reporting, litigation and NGO campaigns have made the business community aware of the risks. Some of the largest foreign investors in Burma divested or ceased operations in the past year. International Alert, in partnership with the International Institute for Sustainable Development and a group of extractive sector companies and other specialists, is developing a Conflict Risk and Impact Assessment toolbox—to assist extractive sector companies in addressing the causes of conflict and contributing to peace. The approach builds on the work of the UN Global Compact’s Business Guide on Conflict Impact Assessment, complementing such processes as environmental and social impact assessments and political risk analysis.

The NGO Publish What You Pay campaign and the government-sponsored Extractive Industries Transparencies Initiative aim to promote transparency in revenues and expenditures. The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry has produced guidelines for its corporate members on Responsible Engagement in Conflict Zones. Some of the most promising developments have been new multistakeholder governance mechanisms to increase corporate transparency and accountability in zones of conflict.

Contributing to conflict prevention, containment and resolution

In addition to ensuring that a company’s operations, the products it produces, the funding it provides and the revenues it generates are not a direct cause of conflict, the private sector can prevent and resolve it (box 1.4). Individual business leaders or business groups can also support the dialogues and engagement processes needed to resolve conflicts, as demonstrated in the past year

**Biotech and chemical companies
have an important responsibility
in improving their security to limit
the risk of deadly materials falling
into the wrong hands—and in
developing detectors, vaccines
and other products that can be
used to respond to chemical and
biological weapons**

Box 1.4 Funding of major resource and infrastructure projects

Commercial and development banks lend billions of dollars each year in project finance, often for major infrastructure projects that can create or exacerbate conflict if their social and environmental impacts are not managed well. In mid-2003 the International Finance Corporation and a group of leading commercial banks launched the Equator Principles, under which banks commit to require their borrowers to meet social and environmental criteria before approving project finance loans over an agreed level. See www.equator-principles.com.

by private sector leaders in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka.

Investing in post-conflict reconstruction

Over the past year the awarding of contracts for Iraq's reconstruction (mostly to American companies) has dominated the headlines, resulting in calls for more transparent competitive bidding processes by the United States and other donors. Public-private cooperation has been effective in Afghanistan's and Mozambique's reconstruction efforts. But attracting private investment to post-conflict countries remains a major challenge.

Contributing to arms control

Few governments provide accessible and comprehensive information on their arms industry to the public, and the voluntary provision of information by individual private companies and their industry associations is even more limited. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute points out, "The top layer of the world arms industry is made up of large corporations...these provide a large amount of information on financial performance as well as

nonfinancial aspects of their activities—such as measures taken to ensure environmental and social 'sustainability'—in their annual reports, company profiles and press releases. However, scant information is provided on the value and volume of arms production".

Biotech and chemical companies also have an important responsibility in improving their security to limit the risk of deadly materials falling into the wrong hands—and in developing detectors, vaccines and other products that can be used to respond to chemical and biological weapons. In post-conflict situations companies can also play a role in the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants—and in weapons collection and destruction programmes.

Private military and security companies

There has been a dramatic rise in private military companies offering a range of military planning, training, construction and other services to government armed forces—and private security companies providing defensive security services to companies, humanitarian agencies, government embassies, aid workers and individuals. It is estimated that private military contracting is a \$100 billion business globally, with the United States deploying 1 private military worker for every 10 soldiers in Iraq—a 10-fold increase since the 1991 gulf war.

The shortage of mainstream troops available for peace enforcement purposes, including mainstream UN-mandated peace operations, is generating renewed interest in the hitherto taboo topic of the direct engagement of private military companies for combat. The growing role of private services raises important questions about the industry's organization,

To simply inject international military and police forces into conflict-riven situations, organize and conduct elections and then leave is less an exit strategy than a recipe for an unsustainable peace

regulation, transparency and accountability. Some were addressed in a U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper in 2002, "Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation". These questions call for greater attention from governments and increased stakeholder engagement and openness by the companies.

Performance of civil society

One of the most important of all recent civil society initiatives could be the draft agreements to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hammered out over many months of negotiations and announced late in 2003 by two separate groups of prominent citizens from both sides, led respectively by Yossi Beilin and Yassir Abed Raboo (the "Geneva Accord") and Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh. The work of these groups has demonstrated what most Israelis and Palestinians, and most in the wider international community, have long known: with the right leadership, focusing on the endgame rather than small incremental steps along the way, a fair and just two-state solution is achievable. The need now is for this bottom-up approach to win top-down support from the players that can make the crucial difference, starting with the United States.

Impact on war between states

A very large number and bewildering variety of civil society actors in peace movements around the world are trying to prevent, reduce and end interstate wars. Although pockets of resistance sprang up in opposition to the U.S. war on Afghanistan's Taliban regime, the real impetus to mobilizing the peace movement in 2003 came in relation to Iraq. The U.S.-U.K. call on the UN Security Council to authorize war against Iraq ignited an unprecedented worldwide debate on the merits, wisdom, legality and legitimacy of war. The worldwide coalition against the

Iraq war in 2003 was a heady revelation of the capacity of "civil society without borders" to articulate its views on war and peace. But even the largest demonstrations failed to stop the war.

Impact on war within states

Civil society organizations are providing early warning of impending crises and advising governments and international organizations on strategy. The International Crisis Group, for example, highlighted very early on the regional nature of the ostensibly civil war consuming Liberia. It led the calls in 2003 for international (particularly U.S.) intervention in Liberia to stop a devastating humanitarian crisis.

The knowledge and contacts of civil society organizations are also important for peace-building, instilling the rule of law and creating the institutions of law, order and criminal justice systems. To simply inject international military and police forces into conflict-riven situations, organize and conduct elections and then leave is less an exit strategy than a recipe for an unsustainable peace.

Creating or rebuilding a vibrant civil society is a crucial long-term element in establishing and consolidating democracy. It is also important in preventing violent conflict between groups, and organizations like the Open Society Institute, Search for Common Ground and International Alert have been particularly effective in this.

One answer to the Hindu-Muslim killings in a well-established democracy like India is to note the role of civic associations, rather than governmental policy, in forestalling deadly riots. Hindu-Muslim relations in India, especially in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, show that the lines between random sectarian violence, internal armed

**Hindu-Muslim relations in India,
especially in the Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan, show
that the lines between random
sectarian violence, internal armed
conflict and interstate conflict—and
between human rights protection
and conflict prevention—can
sometimes be very fine indeed**

conflict and interstate conflict—and between human rights protection and conflict prevention—can sometimes be very fine indeed.

Civil society groups promote dialogue and Track 2 diplomacy. For example, in 2003 the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize, focused on tensions between India and Pakistan, bringing together senior figures to strengthen political dialogue. It did the same with the Middle East peace process, holding workshops for senior figures in Tehran and Amman.

Civil society groups also address the problem of child soldiers. Their efforts are concentrated on norms by stigmatizing the recruiting of child soldiers, lobbying for legislative and operational bans of the practice and monitoring abuses of global norms by the various parties in armed conflict. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers works to prevent the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, to secure their demobilization and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. In 2002 the Coalition was instrumental in negotiating the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. In 2003 it continued to draw attention to the use of child soldiers worldwide—and to lobby governments to adopt the protocol.

Impact on international terrorism

International terrorism by nonstate actors has not attracted much attention from civil society groups beyond research institutions and think tanks. Some groups like Amnesty International have begun to record atrocities by domestic terrorist groups and state security forces. In some respects, the “war on terror” waged in the aftermath of 11 September was a setback to the growth—and a challenge to the legitimacy of—civil society in many parts of the

world. Encouraged by the curtailment of civil liberties and political freedoms in the United States, many other regimes appropriated the language of the war on terror to settle scores with any number of inconvenient dissidents in their own countries.

Impact on weapons of mass destruction

Civil society has been very active in assailing weapons of mass destruction. These include subgroupings of such professional associations as physicians, physicists, lawyers and economists. Other civil society actors are networks and coalitions formed from existing NGOs. The Hague Appeal for Peace brings together separate civil society actors to delegitimize war and have violent conflict publicly acknowledged as illegal, illegitimate and unjust. It also works to strengthen human rights and international humanitarian law, promote peaceful resolution of disputes and disarmament, alleviate the root causes of war and create a culture of peace. The Middle Powers Initiative, a programme of the Global Security Institute, brings together eight NGOs to target middle-power governments. It encourages nuclear weapon states to take immediate practical steps to reduce nuclear dangers and, in the longer term, eliminate nuclear weapons.

2003 was bleak. Civil society groups were active but largely ineffectual on both nonproliferation and disarmament. Having a greater impact will depend not so much on changes of tactics and strategy as on getting more citizens active in these causes and applying pressure at appropriate entry points within their own national decisionmaking processes. Large numbers of Indians can change Indian nuclear policy more easily by working through the Indian political process than can large numbers of non-Indians working from outside the country. The same is no doubt true elsewhere.

Impact on small arms

Civil society actors have been among the most active and effective supporters of international action to reduce the availability of small arms—and, as mentioned earlier in this report, to secure a global ban on land mines. The International Action Network on Small Arms is the main umbrella organization for the pro-gun control NGOs. Starting with some 160 NGOs in 60 countries in 1999, it had more than 540 members from 110 countries by the time of the 2003 UN Biennial Meeting. The World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, established in 1997 to represent the interests of hunters and sport shooters and those with commercial interests in these activities, had 33 member groups and associations in 14 countries in mid-2003.

Endnotes

1. The trends referred to here which, as the text notes, are somewhat at odds with popular perceptions, will all be fully documented in the first annual *Human Security Report*, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2004, produced by the University of British Columbia Human Security Centre, directed by Andrew Mack.
2. We acknowledge the assistance of Peter Batchelor and his team at the Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurvey.org/) in the preparation of this section of the report.

References

- Agha, H., and R. Malley. 2003. "Ditch the Road Map. Just Get There, Already." *The Washington Post* 7 September.
- Amnesty International and Oxfam. 2003. *Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control*. London.

- Anderson, Mary B., and Lara Olson. 2003. *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.
- Arms Control Association. [www.armscontrol.org]
- Atran, S. "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism." *Science* 299: 1534–39.
- Benner, Thorsten, Wolfgang H. Reinecke, and Jan Martin Witte. 2002. "Shaping Globalization: The Role of Global Public Policy Networks." In Bertelsmann Foundation, ed., *Transparency: A Basis For Responsibility and Cooperation*. Guetersloh, Germany.
- Collier, Paul. 2001. "Conflict and Development." World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, D.C.
- Conetta, Carl. 2003. "Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict." Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph. The Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, Mass.
- Cooper, Andrew F., John English, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. 2002. *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards New Diplomacy?* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Department for International Development. "The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative." London. [http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_intro_a.htm]
- Department of Peace and Conflict Research. "Uppsala Conflict Data Program." Uppsala University, Sweden. [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/UCDP_toplevel.htm]
- Donnelley, Ceara, and William D. Hartung. 2003. *New Numbers: The Price of Freedom in Iraq and Power in Washington*. New York: World Policy Institute.
- Friedman, Thomas. 2003. "The Humiliation Factor." *New York Times* 9 November.

- Gallup International. 1999. *Millennium Survey*. London.
- Gates, Scott. 2002. "Empirically Assessing the Causes of Civil War." Paper presented at annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 24–27 March, New Orleans, La.
- The Global Compact. 2002. *Business Guide on Conflict Impact Assessment*. New York.
- Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. 2003. *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hassan, N. 2001. "Talking to the 'Human Bombs.'" *The New Yorker* 19 November.
- Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. [www.stimson.org]
- International Action Network on Small Arms, London. [www.iansa.org]
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 2003. *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*. Washington, D.C.
- Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 2003. "Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month." Jerusalem.
- Krueger, Alan B. 2003. "Poverty Doesn't Create Terrorists." *New York Times* 29 May.
- Krueger, A., and J. Malecova. 2002. *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Connection?* NBER Working Paper w9074. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Mack, Andrew, ed. Forthcoming. *Human Security Report*. University of British Columbia, Centre for Human Security, Vancouver.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Ted Robert Gurr. 2003. "Peace and Conflict 2003." University of Maryland, College Park, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, College Park, Md.
- Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, Calif. [www.miiis.edu/rcenters-cns.html]
- Moreno-Ocampo, Louis. 2003. "The Prosecutor on the Co-operation with Congo and Other States Regarding the Situation in Ituri, DRC." Press Release 26 September. International Criminal Court, The Hague.
- Nartker, Mike. 2002. "Radiological Weapons: 'Dirty Bomb' Attack Is 40 Percent Probability, Expert Says." *Global Security Newswire* 18 November.
- The Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. [http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/default.ASP]
- Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. 2002. "Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2002." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 58(6): 103–04.
- . 2003. "Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear Pursuits." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 59(5): 71–72.
- OAS (Organization of American States). 1997. "Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials." 14 November, Washington, D.C.
- Pew Research Center. 2003. "Views of a Changing World 2003." Washington, D.C.
- Pillar, Paul R. 2001. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- SADC (Southern Africa Development Community). 2001. "Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region." 14 August, Blantyre, Malawi.
- Saleh, B. 2003. "Socioeconomic Profile of Palestinian Militants from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs." Graduate Research

- Forum, 4 April, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kan.
- Sarkees, Meredith, Frank Wayman, and J. David Singer. 2003. "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816–1997." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(1): 49–70.
- Saur, K. G. 2002. *Yearbook of International Organizations: Guide to Global Civil Society Networks 2002–2003*. Munich: New Providence.
- Scholte, Jan Aart, and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2002. *Civil Society and Global Finance*. New York: Routledge.
- Spyros, Demetriou. 2002. "Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia (1989–2001)." Occasional Paper 6. Small Arms Survey, Geneva.
- Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2003. "Transparency in the Arms Industry." Military Expenditure and Arms Production Project. TI (Transparency International). 2003. *TI Corruption Perceptions Index*. Berlin.
- Turnbull, Wayne, and Praveen Abhayaratne. 2003. *2002 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials*. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, Calif.
- U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2002. "Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation." Green Paper. London.
- UN (United Nations). 2000. "General Assembly Resolution on the Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict, Breaking the Link between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict, as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts." A/RES/55/56, 1 December, New York.
- . 2001a. "Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime." A/RES/55/255, 8 June, New York.
- . 2001b. "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." A/CONF.192/15, 9–20 July, New York.
- . 2001c. "Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." A/CONF.192/15, 9–20 July, New York.
- . 2002. General Assembly Resolution on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." A/RES/56/24, 10 January, New York.
- . 2003a. "Final Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC." S/2003/1027, 15 October, New York.
- . 2003b. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization." A/58/1, New York.
- . 2003c. "Report of the United Nations First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects." A/CONF.102/BMS/2003/1, 18 July, New York.
- UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2003. *World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives*. New York and Geneva.

Union of International Associations. 1976. *Yearbook of International Organizations 1974*. Brussels.

United Nations Treaty Collection. "Conventions on Terrorism." [<http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>]

U.S. (United States) Department of State. 2003a. *Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2003*. Washington, D.C.

———. 2003b. "Progress Report on the Global War against Terrorism." 10 September, Washington, D.C.

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General). 2003. *Annual Report*. New York.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

World Bank. "Extractive Industry Review." Washington, D.C. [<http://www.eireview.org/eir/eirhome.nsf/englishmainpage/about?Opendocument>]

WRMC (World Market Research Centre). 2003. *Global Terrorism Index*. London.

Methodology

The Expert Group met in Washington, D.C., on 2 April 2003 to discuss its approach to the report and devise a detailed workplan. It met again on 2–3 September 2003 to review draft inputs.

Group members consulted a full range of government and nongovernment experts in their area of expertise. Peter Batchelor's Small Arms Survey team offered particularly significant and useful

input on small arms and landmines. Andrew Mack's team at the University of British Columbia and those producing the *Human Security Report* provided information on trends in conflict and terrorism. And Nicholas Grono of the International Crisis Group and its monthly *CrisisWatch* bulletin supplied information on tracking 2003 developments. The group acknowledges and thanks them all.

The final draft of the report was settled by the chair after additional collaboration and consultation by email and telephone and submitted on 17 November 2003. Minor edits and updates were made to the report by the chair on 31 December 2003.

Expert Group members

Chair: Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group

Ellen Laipson, President, Henry L. Stimson Center

Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Sudan

Andrew Mack, Director, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia


Jane Nelson, Director, Business Leadership and Strategy, Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, and Fellow, Center for Business and Government, Harvard University

Ramesh Thakur, Rector, United Nations University

2 Poverty

Score
4





Score

4

Goals

- **Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day (in purchasing power parity) between 1990 and 2015.**

Poverty

At the end of the 20th century, 2.8 billion of the world's 6 billion people lived on less than \$2 a day, 1.2 billion on less than \$1 a day. Achieving the poverty goals requires reducing the proportion of extremely poor people from 29% of humanity to 14.5%. That would leave nearly 900 million people living in extreme poverty. The percentage of people living on less than \$1 a day is falling, but too slowly to meet the goal for 2015.

The regional variations are enormous. China and (to less extent) India have seen dramatic progress—indeed, the world could come close to meeting the goal solely on success in the world's two most populous countries. But it surely is not humanity's goal to leave vast numbers in other regions living in destitution. Indeed, in many regions, the number of people living on less than \$1 a day has risen.¹

Assessing efforts to attack poverty requires attention to an extraordinary range of issues and actors. Rich-country governments affect poverty levels abroad through policies on trade, aid, migration, global environment and the international financial architecture. Developing-country governments need to be assessed for good governance (avoiding corruption and promoting empowerment) and pro-growth and pro-poor economic policies. Civil society has responsibility for pro-poor advocacy, service delivery, domestic rootedness and accountability. Multinational corporations have responsibility for disavowing rent-seeking through abusive lobbying, avoiding corruption, adhering voluntarily to core labour standards, minimizing environmental and social harm, being a responsible actor in the local community and providing leadership in setting the agenda for poverty reduction. Intergovernmental organizations have a role in agenda-setting and emphasizing poverty reduction, civil society

representation (voice) and transparency in their programmes.

Rich-country governments

Trade


Three-quarters of poor people live off or depend on agriculture, which remains heavily protected in international trade (particularly by European nations). At the World Trade Organization ministerial meeting in Cancun in September 2003, the most important negotiations dealt with expectations that Europe and the United States would reduce farm subsidies and open their agricultural markets to the developing world. They did not. This was a failure of leadership by the powerful economies, revealing the weaknesses of an unfair global governance system.

On the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), there was a little progress with the agreement on compulsory licensing for medicines—but not much. One problem is that the procedures imply a cumbersome bureaucracy for both the importing and the exporting country. So, in practice, poor countries are unlikely to realize the benefits because of the enormous difficulties in complying with the agreed requirements.

Development aid

In the past two years, promises of increased development assistance have flown fast and furious. But rhetoric remains far ahead of reality. As long ago as 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution defining for the first time a clear commitment for the industrial nations to grant a net sum of 0.7% of GDP as official development assistance for developing countries. Almost a quarter of a century later, only Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have met or

1.2 billion people still live on less than \$1 a day—with numbers on the rise in four regions



exceeded that target. The European Council in Barcelona in March 2002 reached an important agreement, maintaining the target of 0.7% and undertaking to reach a European average of 0.39% by 2006.

The U.S. government proposed two major initiatives: the Millennium Challenge Account and the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. But actual spending in 2004 will be smaller than announced. To be consistent with President George W. Bush's commitment in Monterrey (to raise U.S. foreign aid by an additional \$5 billion in 2006 and thereafter), the budget request for 2004 should have been \$1.7 billion—instead, it was \$1.1 billion. Expected actual spending in 2004 is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at just \$250 million, or about 20 cents per poor person a year.

The story for the HIV/AIDS initiative is similar. Funding for international HIV/AIDS programmes drew new attention after Bush called for a \$15 billion, five-year crusade against the disease in his January State of the Union address. A law passed in May to implement Bush's landmark initiative authorized up to \$3 billion in HIV/AIDS funding for the fiscal year that began 1 October. But he sought only \$2 billion for the year, arguing that more money could not be spent efficiently as the programme begins. The U.S. House of Representatives agreed. In mid-October the administration repeated its strong opposition to any funding beyond \$2 billion. But in October the U.S. Senate voted an amendment to raise annual spending for international HIV/AIDS relief to \$2.4 billion.

Multilateral assistance has fared a bit better. The initiative to reduce the crushing debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) is continuing.


The HIPC Initiative, proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was agreed to by governments around the world in the fall of 1996. It was the first comprehensive approach to reduce the external debt of the world's poorest heavily indebted countries, an important step in placing debt relief within an overall framework of poverty reduction.

It was estimated that the net present value of public debt in the 33 countries likely to qualify (approximately \$90 billion) would be reduced by about half after HIPC and traditional debt relief. Twenty-seven countries are part of HIPC, one more in 2003 than in 2002. Although there is a heated debate on the actual benefit provided by HIPC, the fact that both multilaterals and rich-country governments agreed to reduce the debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries is a welcome turn of events, especially when contrasted with the debt crisis of the 1980s.

At the Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the IMF in September 1999, it was agreed that nationally owned participatory poverty reduction strategies should be the basis for all World Bank and IMF concessional lending and all debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. The initiative requires the preparation of country-driven proposals, known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), for actions, funding and results. As of January 2003, 21 countries had presented strategies to the World Bank-IMF boards. It is still too early to assess the impact of the approach. But the fact that the two multilaterals are tying (at least part) of their credit programme to efforts to reduce poverty deserves praise.

But the broader picture remains gloomy. As described in chapter 7, migration is simply not on

Poverty is declining—except in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS



a. Based on \$1 a day poverty line for all regions. b. Changes measured using \$2 a day poverty line. Source: UNDP 2003a.

the table in Europe or the United States. That lack of progress impedes poverty reduction efforts because migration from developing to industrial countries often raises the wages of those who migrate and the workers who stay behind. On environmental issues of direct consequence to the poor, such as safe drinking water and climate change, progress is distressingly slow (see chapter 6). The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Fast-Track Initiative on Education for All show some promise, but rhetorical support for these initiatives still outweighs tangible support (see chapters 4 and 5).

International financial architecture

There was progress in 2003 in IMF-led surveillance and reporting. But the effort on sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF failed because of a lack of support among industrial countries. The Basel standards may turn out to be very onerous for local banks in emerging market economies, possibly reducing the incentives to provide microfinances. There has been no progress on creating arrangements to detect illegal capital flight.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean, with the highest average income among developing regions, was on track in the 1990s to achieve the poverty reduction goal.² But progress has since stagnated. The proportion of poor people living on less than \$1 a day declined in the 1990s from 17% to 15%, although their numbers rose. This slow progress resulted from modest economic growth in GDP per capita—about 1.6% a year. Between 1999 and 2002 the incidence of moderate poverty fell by only 0.4 percentage points, from 43.8% to 43.4%.³ In 2003 there were roughly 220 million people living in poverty, 95 million in extreme poverty.


This lack of progress can be attributed primarily to the region's lack of economic growth in the majority of countries. GDP grew at 0.3% in 2001 and fell by 0.7% in 2002. As a result, moderate and extreme poverty have remained practically unchanged since 1997.⁴

Severe economic crises in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela led to a much bleaker picture. In urban Argentina moderate poverty rose from 23.7% to 45.4% between 1999 and 2002, while extreme poverty rose from 6.7% to 20.9%, vividly demonstrating the great impact of economic crises on poverty. That is why sound macroeconomic policies on the domestic front and crisis prevention and crisis response by multilateral organizations (the IMF in particular) are such crucial elements in reducing poverty. For Argentina the multilateral organizations (particularly the IMF) share a large part of the blame for neither preventing the crisis nor acting quickly enough to prevent its deepening and spreading to other countries. Uruguay was also hit hard, with moderate poverty increasing from 9.4% to 15.4%. In both Argentina and Uruguay people in extreme poverty were affected most.

Only Mexico and Ecuador show perceptible reductions in moderate and extreme poverty. From 2000 to 2002 Mexico saw reductions of 5.4 percentage points in moderate poverty⁵ and 3.9 percentage points in extreme poverty,⁶ even though GDP per capita fell by more than 2.5% in 2001/02. Most of Mexico's reduction was in rural areas, consistent with agriculture growing while the rest of the economy was contracting or stagnating.

If GDP growth proceeds at its pace in the 1990s (excluding the years of crises), about nine countries, together including 70% of the region's

Increasing numbers of poor people in Latin America and stagnating rates of moderate and extreme poverty



a. Projections.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, based on household survey data.

people, will reach the goal of reducing extreme poverty by half by 2015. If the distribution of income becomes more equal, the results could be obtained faster and cover more countries.⁷

In 2003 Latin America showed few signs of economic recovery. So it is expected that moderate and extreme poverty will both rise slightly. The exceptions might be Argentina, where economic recovery will probably reduce both moderate and extreme poverty, and Venezuela, where poverty might rise significantly due to the bad economic performance. The economic price of the recent political crisis in Bolivia, ending with the resignation of its president, is not yet known.

The region's governments substantially increased the funds for social spending in the 1990s, from 10.1% of GDP in 1990/91 to 13.8% in 2000/01, and social spending per capita increased by 58%, though the increases slowed after 1997. Importantly social spending for health and education increased relative to that for social security, showing that the region is trying to put more resources into sectors with a greater redistributive impact. Governments have also promoted economic growth, launched or strengthened pro-poor policies and improved governance, particularly in fighting corruption (box 2.1).

What follows are case studies detailing the experiences of Argentina and Mexico, two of the region's larger countries. (Chapter 3 has a case study of Brazil's antihunger programme—and its strong antipoverty implications.)

Argentina—democracy survives trying times
Argentina is emerging from one of its worst economic crises. Its GDP per capita contracted

Box 2.1 Pro-poor participatory initiatives in Porto Alegre, Brazil

Involving people from neighbourhoods, Porto Alegre shifted resources to the most needed spending lines with good results: 98% of the households now have drinkable water, 80% have sewerage, and 30% of the roads have been paved. The coverage of education was also increased, including a new programme of adult education. And the participatory process made resource allocation more transparent and budget execution easier to control. The programme also improved tax collection and deepened fiscal equity—while reducing the opportunities for corruption and clientelist relations.

12.1% in 2002, causing extreme poverty to triple and moderate poverty to double.

This is not the place to discuss the causes of the crisis or to assign responsibilities. But it is important to stress that the Argentine financial debacle coincided with the hard-line stance of the U.S. government and the IMF on financial rescue packages in dealing with crises. They argued that financial rescue packages created the wrong incentives: governments would not follow prudent policies because they were assured, if their financial systems failed, that help would come their way—a “moral hazard”. Given the view's predominance, there was no assistance to Argentina in 2002, deepening its crisis and increasing its poverty rates. The approach contrasted starkly with the ones that helped Mexico in 1995 and East Asia at the end of the 1990s to recover more quickly. Preventing and responding adequately to economic crises is one of the most important antipoverty initiatives that both governments and intergovernmental organizations can follow.

Social spending for health and education increased relative to that for social security, showing that Latin America and the Caribbean is trying to put more resources into sectors with a greater redistributive impact

In 2003 both the U.S. government and the IMF softened their stances. Whether this occurred because of a “coming to senses” or because Argentina stopped its payments to the international financial institutions is unclear. The important fact is that in early 2003 the IMF and Argentina reached a preliminary agreement, with a full agreement signed in September.

The World Bank kept a low profile on macro policy and the IMF's stance. It was very active in trying to channel resources to the social sectors. At the beginning of the crisis, its efforts were geared to restructuring the lending programme with Argentina so that \$200 million could be reallocated towards the social sectors. It later put together a \$600 million loan to support the Heads of Households programme, a workfare effort implemented by the Argentine government.

The Inter-American Development Bank also restructured debt to free resources for the social sectors. It also put together a fast-disbursing social emergency loan, which provided liquidity quickly but had a short maturity and was more expensive. So in two years Argentina will once more face a bundling in debt servicing.

The Argentine government managed the crisis better than anticipated. The most important achievement is that despite the big economic and financial mess, it did not succumb to inflation—particularly to hyperinflation, which international financial institutions in Washington feared. For a country where inflation was endemic in the 40 years before the convertibility plan of the 1990s, this is a remarkable accomplishment. And although the social costs of the crisis have been enormous in unemployment and falling incomes, avoiding an

inflationary spurt is the basis for the recovery that Argentina enjoyed in 2003. If the government used inflation to deal with the financial crisis, its credibility would have suffered yet another blow. Because the Argentine economy stabilized rather quickly—much more quickly than anybody expected—the reputation of its government improved and paved the way to the agreements with the IMF.


The new government that took office in 2003 continued the pro-poor path of the previous government. It maintained the Heads of Households workfare programme and continued a maternal and childhood health insurance programme for poor people. Supported by a World Bank loan for \$750 million, these activities will protect poor households' income during a health shock and improve the health status of the poor.

The new government seems to be trying to mark a departure from the past in its anticorruption initiatives. The previous government was a transitory government that took office after the Argentine president resigned at the end of 2001 in the midst of a deep political and social crisis. Several people died in riots. Government institutions in Argentina were bankrupt.

The new government came into power in 2003 with substantially fewer than half the votes. But to the surprise of many observers, it quickly gained popular support, probably due to the recovery economy and to the anticorruption initiatives. It fired key figures in the police and the judicial system and eliminated forms of amnesty enjoyed by the military involved in the “dirty war” of the 1970s.

These are welcome but fragile moves—to make the changes sustainable will require far-reaching

In Latin America, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela have lost ground on achieving the Millennium Development Goals for poverty



institutional reforms. The country is not yet out of the woods, however. GDP growth in 2003 was positive and high (about 6%), but this is primarily a “bounceback” effect. The problem is that Argentina has not reached an agreement with its international creditors and so will not have access to private lending. When the bounceback peters out, Argentina might not be able to grow, something that will affect its performance in 2004.

Mexico

Mexico maintained its price and financial stability in 2003. Inflation is low, and the risk premium on its debt is at its lowest. But GDP grew at only 1.7%, close to zero in per capita terms.

One cause of Mexico’s lacklustre performance: the recession in the United States. But there are also domestic causes. For the first time in Mexico’s modern history, the executive branch is in the hands of an opposition party. But the party does not have the needed majority in Congress, and it has not been able to generate the political consensus to pass key structural reforms.

A blatant example is the failure to pass a needed fiscal reform in December because so many members of Congress from the main opposition party rejected it. The fiscal reform is essential to diversify government revenues (more than 20% of those revenues are related to oil production and exports). It is also essential to expand tax revenues, which are quite small compared with other countries.

Another important pending reform is to allow for private investment in the electricity sector. Experts claim that this reform is necessary to have supply keep up with demand. Reforming labour standards and regulations is also indispensable to introduce

more flexibility, particularly because Mexico now faces more competition in the global economy.

There is also concern that the fast recovery of the U.S. economy in the third quarter did not result in faster growth in Mexico. The problem is that Mexican exports in the U.S. market are being displaced by exports from China, dampening the effect of U.S. growth on Mexico’s economic performance. If the pending structural reforms do not pass and if Mexico does not implement the changes needed to increase its competitiveness, the country might lose its ability to peg its economic recovery to the U.S. economy. This is particularly sobering because exports have been Mexico’s engine of growth.

Federal spending on programmes to reduce poverty fell slightly in real terms in 2003, to 1.2% of GDP from 1.3% a year before. The reduction, however slight, does not bode well.

Several significant pro-poor initiatives were launched or strengthened in 2003. One of the most important was a new law on health insurance in May.⁸ Illness, particularly catastrophic illness, is a major cause of poverty. The main objective of the new law is to provide social protection for health-related shocks to the Mexican people, particularly poor people not affiliated with the formal social security system (self-employed workers and the unemployed). The insurance will help poor families cover their medical expenses and provide income protection when illness strikes a breadwinner. The law aims for more equitable financing of public-based health insurance so that there can be cross-subsidies to the poor from the nonpoor.

The government also increased funding for one of its flagship programmes, Oportunidades, by more than

India's GDP growth was more than 6% a year in the later 1990s—and 4.4% in 2000, 5.6% in 2001 and 4.4% in 2002—thanks to more open policies for trade and industry

27% in real terms.⁹ This programme improves the health, nutrition and education of the children in the poorest households. A cash transfer goes to the most relevant female member of the household. In exchange, the household commits to keep children in school and take them to health clinics for preventative care. In 2002 4.2 million families received transfers that averaged about 20% of their household income. The programme has the double benefit of reducing poverty today and creating conditions for a better living for the next generation. A rigorous impact evaluation by international experts has shown that the programme led to statistically significant improvements in the levels of education of children from poor families, reducing child labour and school dropout levels and morbidity of children and pregnant women.¹⁰ The programme empowers women because they receive and administer the transfers.

The government also launched Hábitat, targeted to poor people in the slums in large cities. The programme offers different kinds of grants for social services—to foster community development initiatives and to improve infrastructure and services. In 2003 it operated in 32 cities.

To fight corruption, the government launched an initiative to protect the use of Oportunidades for electoral purposes. This initiative independently certifies the process followed to select beneficiary families, strictly monitors of the programme's operation and strengthens the training of beneficiary families and individuals. It thus tackles the clientelist relationships that existed for decades between the previous ruling party and the people, particularly the poor.

Asia

Many countries in Asia, especially East Asia, have maintained high growth rates over extended

periods, sharply reducing the number of people in poverty). Between 1990 and 1999 the proportion of people living on less than \$1 a day fell from 30% to 15%. East Asia is well positioned to achieve the poverty reduction goal.

South Asia remains home to about 522 million people, 44% of the world's poor. Progress in reducing poverty there has been slow. (The region's economic growth is estimated at 5.5% for 2003.) Poverty has risen in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka—and fallen in India. Since 1990 the incidence of extreme poverty has fallen from 44% to 40%, making the achievement of the 2015 target doubtful.

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal led to a near halving of foreign investment in tourism, services and construction, and to spiralling unemployment. Sustained progress in the peace process in Nepal and Sri Lanka is critical to reducing poverty, and the political backdrop for reforms in Bangladesh and Pakistan remains fragile.

In India the incidence of poverty declined from 36% to 26% between 1993/94 and 1999/2000, with the number of poor people falling from 320 million to 260 million, in part due to impressive economic growth.¹¹ GDP growth was more than 6% a year in the later 1990s—and 4.4% in 2000, 5.6% in 2001 and 4.4% in 2002—thanks to more open policies for trade and industry.

The Indian government's strategy to reduce poverty emphasizes education, healthcare, potable water and sanitation. The Tenth Five Year Plan for 2002–07 specifies that social spending will rise by 80%. It has four basic themes: fast growth (8% a year), equitable growth, human development and reform.

The Indian government's haphazard cooperation with nongovernmental organizations to raise awareness and education on family planning will have to be much more coherent and comprehensive if economic gains are to outpace population growth and reduce poverty

Technology, population control and agricultural development have also figured in South Asia's poverty reduction strategies. The Indian government has claimed to be working on a set of incentives directed at population control. But its most recent (undemocratic) policy of freezing the electoral representation of rapidly growing states is unlikely to have the desired impact. And today's haphazard cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to raise awareness and education on family planning will have to be much more coherent and comprehensive if economic gains are to outpace population growth and reduce poverty.

Pakistan's economic growth, averaging 3.2% a year since 1999, has been far too low given its 2.1% annual population growth rate. Its macroeconomic indicators have started looking up mainly because of external factors—compensation for supporting the United States in the war against terrorism, debt relief from international financial institutions and remittances from expatriate workers.

Agriculture and agro-based exports have been important for jobs and incomes in most parts of South Asia. India's food production has increased at almost 10 times the world's average. But lower external demand pushed down prices and reduced export earnings for several commodities and agricultural products in 2003. Since most of the poor live in rural areas, they lack social protection and are more vulnerable to conflict, flood and drought. Broad-based poverty alleviation requires increasing agricultural productivity and ensuring equitable growth (box 2.2).

China

A fifth of humanity lives in China, which has 9% of the world's poor. Its economy has grown eightfold since the late 1970s, with average annual growth of

Box 2.2 Domestic civil society

India's Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA), registered as a trade union since 1972, organizes poor, self-employed women workers. Of India's female workers, more than 94% are in the informal sector.¹²



SEWA has more than 700,000 members, 4,500 self-help groups, 101 cooperatives and 11 federations throughout India. It has trained more than 60,000 women in leadership, management and technical skills. More than 75,000 members participate in savings and credit activities. And the cooperative SEWA Bank has more than \$70 million in working capital. Through its Trade Facilitation Center, SEWA promotes access to global markets for its members, developing international sales and marketing channels for SEWA member products.

In 2003 SEWA proposed opening doors to global markets for poor producers through the Grassroots Trading Network for Women, which in 2004 will hold consultations with producer and trader organizations in several parts of the world.

9.3% from 1978 to 2002, thanks to the switch to the market-oriented system. Official statistics indicate that the number of poor people fell from about 490 million in 1981 to 88 million by 2002, corresponding to a decline in the incidence of poverty from 49% to 6.9%.¹³

With the pace of reduction slowing in the early 1990s, the government implemented protective policies to raise crop prices and support agriculture. Later in the decade the government increased spending to reduce poverty and upgrade transportation and electricity networks in rural areas.¹⁴ The government also began to promote the development of western China.¹⁵

Sub-Saharan Africa is far from reaching the Millennium Development Goals for poverty, but East Asia and Pacific will reach the goal early



Source: World Bank 2003d.

It will not be easy for China to continue this rate of progress. Among the existing 88 million rural poor are about 28 million people in extreme poverty. Another 60 million have volatile incomes and are on the borderline of extreme poverty. Two-thirds of the rural poor live in the mountains and arid highlands of western China, 7 million of them in areas that lack water and arable land.

The Chinese government is taking measures to control rising income inequality. The Ministry of Finance implemented the National Nine-Year Education Fund to cover the cost of textbooks and accommodations for impoverished students. The government is also increasing expenditures for potable water and public health in the rural areas.

Urban poverty, once very low, is rising. Urban residents, once protected by high employment and the enterprise-based welfare system, began losing their jobs in the market economy. In mid-2003 the registered unemployed reached 8 million, and another 6 million have been laid off. About 20 million people in cities live under the poverty line. In response, the government has been building social safety networks. By June 2003 about 22 million urban poor people (almost all of the urban poor) were receiving relief that ensured a minimum standard of living. Spending on the programme was about \$860 million in the first half of 2003. But the amount of monthly assistance is still small.

China's poverty reduction programme is very much home-grown and government-led, but foreign organizations and domestic NGOs have also helped. Microcredit programmes, often effective in reducing poverty, were introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Ford Foundation and the World Bank in the 1990s, with

an alphabet soup of intergovernmental organizations helping implement them. And the World Bank, UNDP and British and Canadian governments supported education and public health relief projects in rural areas, encouraging farmers to participate in their design and management.

Many of China's NGOs manage poverty relief programmes. Numerous poor children can attend school thanks to the Hope Project. And city community organizations and villagers' committees do much to identify and support the poor.


Chinese enterprises have donated money and materials to the poverty-stricken. But for some enterprises, philanthropic activities are part of their marketing.

Africa

With average economic growth recently of about 3.3% a year, few countries in the region will achieve the poverty reduction goal for 2015, and the number of the poor is likely to increase.¹⁶ But 14 countries had annual growth of more than 5% between 1995 and 2001. Although they are unlikely to achieve the poverty goal, they can, on present trends, be expected to make substantial progress towards it. At the other extreme are countries facing persistent conflict, HIV/AIDS, severe governance problems and rising poverty rates.

Africa faces the most daunting development and poverty reduction challenges of all regions. Despite widespread adjustment efforts in the last two decades, income growth barely kept pace with population growth. Roughly half the region's people live on less than \$1 a day, and roughly half lack access to safe water. UNDP estimates that the number of poor people increased by about a quarter

Foreign direct investment is unevenly distributed



Source: World Bank 2003b.

between 1990 and 1999, or about 6 million people a year. Africa also has one of the world's worst income distributions.¹⁷ Poor households, concentrated in deprived regions, have poorer nutrition, shorter life expectancies and lower literacy rates.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) became the condition for access to official development assistance at the end of the 1990s, and about 25 PRSPs are now supported by the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Emphasizing macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform, poverty strategies also stress empowering the poor and targeting expenditures to have a direct impact on their well-being. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), in adopting the economic policy orientation of the PRSPs, aims to "help eradicate poverty in Africa and place African countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth".¹⁸

Macroeconomic conditions have improved thanks to tighter fiscal and monetary policies. Overall GDP growth, after averaging 4.3% in 2001 and 3.2% in 2002, was expected to climb to 4.2% in 2003. But only five of the region's countries achieved the 7% growth rate required to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. Inflation has slowed to single digits in much of the region, and current account balances stabilized somewhat.

It is too early yet to determine the impact of these new strategies, given the lags in data availability. In surveys by the Economic Commission for Africa, respondents generally agreed that poverty reduction has indeed become the most important focus of development policies and programmes. The commission gave the highest approval rating to policies aimed at promoting gender equality in access

To achieve the estimated 7% annual growth rate needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals, Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12% of its GDP, or \$64 billion a year, with the bulk coming from outside

to education, health and employment—and agreed that PRSPs are broadly pro-poor. But it was not quite as sanguine about the effectiveness of implementation and the likelihood that the poor will actually benefit from pro-poor programmes.¹⁹ In Ghana, one of the countries that reduced poverty in the 1990s, a recent survey by the Ghana Statistical Service reported that only a quarter of respondents said they were better off while half said they were worse off.²⁰


Fewer than a fourth of the region's countries were on target to meet the Millennium Development Goals for poverty in the 1990s, and conditions have deteriorated in many countries since then. The World Bank estimates that even if the region reversed the protracted fall in per capita income and achieved annual increases of 1.6%—higher than in the last two years—the percentage of people living in poverty will be 42.3% in 2015 instead of 24%. NEPAD recognizes that to achieve the estimated 7% annual growth rate needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals—particularly the goal of reducing by half the proportion of Africans living in poverty by the year 2015—Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12% of its GDP, or \$64 billion a year, with the bulk coming from outside.²¹

Civil society organizations in Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda have been active in human rights and environmental protection and are becoming more involved in consultations with government for policymaking and monitoring, especially at the community level. International NGOs have worked with countries on debt reduction strategies, PRSPs and trade issues.

NGO relations with governments remain tense in many Sub-Saharan countries. Some governments are nervous about the invasion of their previously

The goals of poverty reduction will be achievable if the modest commitments at Monterrey are met for aid flows, market access and African debt

More official development assistance pledged—but not yet delivered



Source: World Bank 2003b.

uncontested space and the full transparency of their policymaking. But much of the anxiety is founded on legitimate concerns about the competence, legitimacy, accountability and transparency of the NGOs. An added problem is the uneven capacity and resources of national and global NGOs.

In countries surveyed, the private sector's efforts to reduce poverty have been limited to policy dialogues with governments and with workers. Beyond employee welfare, there is little direct support to reduce poverty.

At Monterrey donors pledged to increase official development assistance, which if implemented would add about \$12 billion a year to current aid flows to developing countries. In the Africa Action Plan the G-8 countries stated: "Assuming strong African commitments, and given recent assistance trends, we believe that in the aggregate half or more of our new development assistance could be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom."²² If the Monterrey pledges are met and half of the additional official development assistance pledged is committed to Africa, this will obviously be an improvement. But as most analysts note, this will still be far short of the \$68 billion in additional assistance (now \$12–14 billion a year) to help Africa reach the target 7% annual growth in real GDP.²³

Nor is there any guarantee that the additional resources would translate into actual transfers of the same magnitude. The World Bank estimates that in 2001, \$35 billion in bilateral aid translated to a mere \$15 billion in actual receipts for countries, after deductions for interest and administrative charges, debt forgiveness, technical assistance and emergency relief. Missed deadlines and the failure

of the Ministerial Conference in Cancun scuttled an important source of income to the poor in many countries. U.S. subsidies to cotton growers reached \$3.7 billion, about three times the U.S. aid to Africa in 2001/02.

Cotton subsidies generally shave about 10% from cotton prices, depriving poor African farmers of valuable income. In Benin where cotton accounts for 7% of GDP and 40% of exports, a percentage point increase in world cotton prices would reduce poverty by 1.5 percentage points!

As daunting as the challenges may be, the goals of poverty reduction will be achievable if the modest commitments at Monterrey are met for aid flows, market access and African debt. Clearly there is an urgent need for stronger efforts by the international community to support African initiatives.

Summing up

The world's low grade in efforts to achieve the poverty reduction goal reflects poorly primarily on governments. Governments of the rich countries deserve censure for the collapse of the Doha Trade Round meetings in Cancun in September 2003, for their failure to deliver on promises on aid, for allowing the international agenda to be dominated by security concerns and the situation in Iraq and for failing to make progress on the international migration agenda—all of which should be reversed.

Intergovernmental organizations should devote a large part of their effort to preventing, managing and solving economic and financial crises, endemic illnesses and civil conflicts and wars. Developing-country governments need to do a better job of adopting and implementing policies that contribute to stable and sustainable growth, strengthening their anticorruption efforts and adopting participatory pro-poor policies.

Endnotes

1. World Bank (2002).
2. Extreme poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean is not measured using the \$1 a day poverty line. The extreme poverty line is determined for each country and calculated using the cost of a basic basket of foodstuffs. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has decided to use this poverty line, rather than the \$1 a day line, to monitor the region's performance.
3. This section is based on the analysis presented in CEPAL (2001).
4. In a study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, moderate and extreme poverty are defined using the cost-of-basic-needs method, which is based on poverty-line calculations. Poverty lines represent the minimum income required for members of a household to meet their basic needs. The extreme poverty line represents the cost of the food basket. People who are extremely poor are those who live in households whose incomes are so low that even if they spent all their money on food, they would not be able to meet the nutritional needs of all their members. The value of the moderate poverty line is calculated by multiplying the value of the extreme poverty line by a constant factor that takes into account basic nonfood spending. In urban areas this value is 2 and in rural areas it is about 1.75.
5. In Mexico extreme poverty is defined officially as food poverty.
6. In Mexico moderate poverty is defined officially as capabilities poverty.
7. Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the highest levels of economic inequality, with Gini coefficients ranging from (approximately) 0.45 to 0.65. The closer the Gini coefficient is to 1, the more inequality there is. The lowest Gini coefficients in the world are between 0.2 and 0.3. The highest are more than 0.6.
8. The Sistema de Seguro de Protección Social en Salud (Social Protection in Health Insurance System).
9. This programme was called Progresá under the previous government.
10. IFPRI (2000).
11. Based on Asian Development Bank (2003).
12. Information from www.sewa.org.
13. World Bank (2003a).
14. From 1998 to 2001 the total fund contributed by the Chinese central government for poverty reduction was 95.4 billion yuan (\$11.5 billion). And in 2002 it increased remarkably to 29.1 billion yuan (\$3.5 billion), more than 20% compared with the average of 1998 to 2001. In 2003, it rose another 3%. This fund consisted of three parts: state poverty alleviation loan funds, Ministry of Finance grant funds and food for work funds.
15. Since 2000 the Chinese government has used the Great West Development Project to put more investment in infrastructure construction and energy development and to improve the environment of the western areas.
16. African Development Bank in collaboration with World Bank (2002).

17. With a Gini coefficient of 0.51.
18. <http://www.nepad.org>.
19. UNECA (2003), p. 57.
20. Ghana News Agency, 18 October 2003.
21. The New Partnership for Africa's Development, October 2001, para. 144.
22. The New Partnership for Africa's Development, October 2001, para. 9.
23. World Bank (2002).

References

- African Development Bank and World Bank. 2002. "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Progress, Prospects and Policy Implications." Washington, D.C.
- Argáiz Parra, Adriana, Ricardo Fuentes Nieva, and Andrés Montes Runau. 2003. "El aso de México: Metas de desarrollo del milenio." *Cuadernos de Desarrollo Humano* 8. Sedesol, México.
- Asian Development Bank. 2003. "India: Country Strategy and Program 2003–2006." Manila.
- CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe). 2001. "Panorama social de América Latina 2000–2001." Septiembre, Santiago.
- . 2002. "Panorama social de América Latina: 2001–2002." Noviembre, Santiago.
- . 2003. "Panorama Social de América Latina: 2002–2003." Agosto, Santiago.
- CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe), IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) y PNUD (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo). 2003. "Hacia el objetivo del milenio de reducir la pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe." Febrero, Santiago.
- Khan, A.K. 2002. "An Evaluation of World Bank Assistance to China for Poverty Reduction in the 1990s." Washington, D.C.
- Khan, A.K., and Carl Riskin. 2001. *Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Presidencia de la República. 2003. "Tercer informe de gobierno del C. Presidente Vicente Fox." Quesada, México.
- SEWA (Self-Employed Women's Association). 2002. "The Grassroots Trading Network for Women: Expanding Market Opportunities for Grassroots Producer Organizations Worldwide." Draft GTNW Strategic Planning Methodology Brief, Version 2. Ahmedabad, India.
- State Council of China. 2001. "The Development-Oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China." Beijing.
- UN (United Nations). 2002. "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General." July, New York.
- . 2003. "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General." September. New York.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2002. *Human Development Report 2002*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2003a. *Human Development Report 2003*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2003b. "An Integrated Approach to Reducing Poverty in China." UNDP China Policy and Advocacy Papers, Poverty Reduction, Microfinance. Volume I. Beijing.
- UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). 2003. *Economic Report on Africa 2003: Accelerating the Pace of Development*. Addis Ababa.
- World Bank. 2002. *World Development Report 2001/2002: Attacking Poverty*. Washington, D.C.

- . 2003a. “China: Promoting Growth with Equity.” Report 24169-CHA. Washington, D.C.
- . 2003b. *Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance*. Washington, D.C.
- . 2003c. *Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda*. Washington, D.C.
- . 2003d. “Millennium Development Goals: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.” [<http://www.developmentgoals.org/Poverty.htm>]
- . 2003e. *World Development Report 2004*. Washington, D.C.

World Bank, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and the Leading Group for Poverty Reduction of China. 2001. “China: Overcoming Rural Poverty.” Washington, D.C.

Methodology

The report used qualitative rather than quantitative information to assess effort. The Expert Group selected several actors and for each of them a set of “rough indicators”, as follows. *Rich-country governments* were evaluated on trade, aid (quality and quantity), migration, global environment and international financial architecture (macro policy and contribution to collective efforts). *Developing-country governments* were assessed on governance (corruption), participation and sensible pro-poor economic policy. *International civil society* was evaluated on pro-poor advocacy, domestic rootedness, service delivery and accountability. *Corporations* were evaluated on whether they engaged in “abusive lobbying” or disavowed rent-seeking, avoided corruption, adhered voluntarily to core labour standards, minimized environmental and social harm, behaved responsibly in the local

community and provided leadership on agenda-setting in poverty reduction. *International organizations* were evaluated on their role in agenda setting, emphasis on poverty reduction in their programs, civil society representation and transparency.

Outside networks of experts were consulted in evaluating the various indicators. The group assigned weights and grades to the actors and their indicators. The overall score was calculated by taking the simple average of the scores by member. It is important to mention that the “don’t know” answers were not counted in calculating the averages—they were not treated as zeros.

Expert Group members

Chair: Nora Lustig, Rector, University of the Americas, Puebla

Nancy Birdsall, President, Center for Global Development

Kwesi Botchwey, Director for African Research, Center for International Development, Harvard University

Reema Nanavaty, General Secretary, Self-Employed Women’s Association

Lu Mai, Secretary-General, China Development Research Foundation

Gary Fields, Professor of Labor Economics, Cornell University

Key informants


López Calva, Wanda Engels, Luis Felipe

3 Hunger

Score

3





Score

3

Goals

- **Halve the number of people suffering from hunger by 2015.¹**

Hunger

Some 800 million people around the world do not get enough to eat, a devastating figure. The problem is not a shortage of food—there is enough to go around. The problem is that the available food does not get to people who lack money, healthcare, clean water and adequate sanitation.

The consequences are dire: millions of deaths and many more children who grow up to be stunted and intellectually impaired, perpetuating poverty and hunger into the next generation, with the attendant reductions in labour productivity and increases in health costs. Yes, there has been abundant rhetoric on the international conference circuit, rehearsed in the many strategy papers by national governments and international institutions. But in most parts of the world, little serious effort has gone to cutting hunger by half. We can only hope that new initiatives, some mentioned here, will change this.

Context

Some 800 million people, about one in six in developing countries, are undernourished, or “food insecure,” suffering protein and energy deficiencies. Micronutrient deficiencies contribute to their undernourishment and malnutrition, with iron, vitamin A and zinc deficiencies affecting more than 2 billion people. The hungry are undernourished people, as defined and estimated by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and underweight preschool children, defined as those whose weight falls two or more standard deviations below normal weight for age. The accuracy of data on the prevalence of undernourishment and malnutrition is not good, and the data should be interpreted as approximations.

About 40% of the hungry are in South Asia, 25% in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Central Africa, more than 50%

of the population is undernourished, in East and Southern Africa, more than 40%. Between 150 million and 160 million preschool children are underweight for their age, or about one of every three preschool children in developing countries. About half of them are in South Asia, and a fifth in Sub-Saharan Africa.


The lack of access to food, healthcare, clean water and good sanitation is at the core of the problem. What’s needed to improve things? Better infrastructure and government policies that target the poor and hungry, and greater investment in clean water, primary healthcare and primary education. It is action on these fronts that this report monitors.

Since 70–75% of the people who suffer from hunger and malnutrition live in rural areas of developing countries, action that would affect rural people is of particular interest. Agriculture is the biggest source of income for most of the rural poor—for farmers, farm workers and providers of good and services. So increasing farm incomes, particularly for poor farmers, can have powerful effects on hunger and malnutrition. And not to be forgotten are the rapidly rising hunger and malnutrition of urban children.


Of 34 countries with more than 90% of the world’s undernourished people, China has already cut the proportion of hungry people in half (from 1990 levels).² East Asia and Latin America are likely to do that by 2015. But 11 countries saw the proportion of hungry people increase in the 1990s, and 5 have seen serious deteriorations in recent years (Burundi, Republic of Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rwanda and Tanzania). If current trends continue, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa will not achieve this modest goal.

Nearly 830 million people are hungry in developing and transition economies—with prevalence growing in Africa and the Middle East

Number of people consuming less than minimum level of dietary energy, 1998–2000



Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)



Source: FAO 2001, 2003a.

Governments of developing countries

Too many national governments in poor countries accord the fight against hunger a high priority in rhetoric but not in action and resources. In most countries, investments in sustainable solutions to hunger are seriously lacking.

China

China's remarkable success in reducing hunger shows what good national policy, or intertwined policies, can do:

Land reform. China's most effective policy to alleviate hunger: its land reform policy. Reforms in the early 1980s dismantled the communes and contracted agricultural land to households, mostly on the basis of the number of people in the household's labour force. By 1984 China had given land to every rural household, on average about 0.6 hectares of land, with the sizes varying across regions. Several studies show that agricultural output and yields grew in the early 1980s as a direct result of decollectivization.

Technology change. Technological change, the primary engine of agricultural growth, contributed directly to alleviating hunger. After the 1960s China's research institutions grew rapidly, from almost none in the 1950s, to produce a steady flow of new varieties and other technologies. China was the first country to develop and extend hybrid rice. Chinese-bred conventional varieties of rice, wheat and sweet potatoes were among the best in the world, even before the reforms. China's farmers used semi-dwarf varieties several years before the release of Green Revolution technology elsewhere.

Better irrigation. The proportion of cultivated area under irrigation increased from 18% in 1952 to about 50% in the early 1990s.

Market development. As China changed, so did the food economy—and nowhere has the change been more noticeable than in access to food. China now has one of the most commercialized rural economies. The average shares of marketed products in total production range from 54% for grain to more than 90% for fish.

Cheaper foods. The price of food is now significantly lower than it was 25 years ago, and the share of income that the average family needs to devote to food has fallen dramatically.

Diversification. The opportunity to diversify into cash crops and other noncrop enterprises (livestock and fisheries) and the opportunity to get a job in the nonfarm sector has helped to increase incomes and reduce risk. The poor have been among the greatest beneficiaries of the rise of off-farm opportunities. Today more than 85% of households have at least one person working off the farm.

Improving health situation. The Ministry of Public Health strengthened health work in rural areas, particular in western China (the poorest region). In the late 1970s and early 1980s it established rural village and township clinic stations, county hospitals and systems of disease prevention and control.

Coping with shocks. When farmers in China are hit by adverse shocks, they borrow from family members, though friends and acquaintances also play a role. Emergency consumption needs are also available from formal sources. And if a farm family cannot tap these sources, they can go to the local government for help. But local government supports mainly those at the bottom of the income scale. Local leaders are more than

Fome Zero's main objective is to bring together dispersed initiatives in different ministries and secretariats of the federal, state and municipal governments in Brazil, as well as initiatives by civil society—and to fight hunger in a coordinated and rational way

likely to coerce family, relatives and friends to help a food-stressed farmer than provide direct cash or food subsidies.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Other parts of the world have also seen progress, if slower. In Latin America and the Caribbean more than 55 million people are chronically hungry, about 12% of the population, and more than 10 million children under age five wake up hungry. Ambitious plans are under way to do better.

The World Food Program and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Hunger Initiative. The World Food Program and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean have joined forces to draw attention to hunger issues in the region by jointly undertaking three regional studies and holding regional meetings to raise the profile of hunger and put hunger at the front of political agendas.

The regional studies will first consider Central America and Belize, next the Andean countries of South America and then the Caribbean. A regional hunger forum in mid-2005 will give governments and donors an opportunity to strengthen commitments to eradicate hunger.

Brazil. Food production in Brazil increased by 112% in the past two decades, cereal yields per hectare by 89%. So most production growth has been generated by increases in farm productivity, not frontier expansion.³ Supporting this contention are the 134% leap in agricultural value added per worker and the steady drop in the relative prices of food. In the last decade alone, the proportion of undernourished individuals declined from 13% of the country's population to 10%, and between

1989 and 1996 the prevalence of child chronic malnutrition dropped from 15% to 11%.

But food insecurity and malnutrition are still remarkably high for a country with a per capita income of about \$7,000 a year and an average of 3,000 calories per capita per day. Brazil's prevalence of child stunting is more than five times higher than Chile's, a country with per capita income just 25% higher. And while Jamaica's per capita income is less than half of Brazil's, its prevalence of stunting is about a third of Brazil's.

Income inequality in Brazil may explain these discrepancies. About 15 million Brazilians (9% of the population, similar to the share of undernourished people), survive with incomes below the average income in Nigeria, a country with a tenth of Brazil's GDP. And the prevalence of stunting among the 22 million extremely poor Brazilians is 29%, almost as high as the average in Nigeria.

President Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva pledged to end hunger and malnutrition in Brazil by the end of his term in 2007. He created the Ministry of Food Security and launched Fome Zero, the Zero Hunger programme. Fome Zero's main objective is to bring together dispersed initiatives in different ministries and secretariats of the federal, state and municipal governments, as well as initiatives by civil society—and to fight hunger in a coordinated and rational way.

One of the first actions was to unify three large conditional cash transfer programmes implemented by the previous government into the Bolsa Família programme, one of the largest such programmes ever implemented in the developing world. It targets the 6 million Brazilian families with per



The dominant disappointment of 2003 in the fight against hunger was the failure to make progress on trade liberalization for agricultural commodities at the World Trade Organization meeting in Cancun in September

capita incomes under R\$50 a month and another 5 million families with schoolage children living in poverty and per capita incomes under R\$100 a month.

Six million families earning less than R\$50 per capita a month will receive R\$50 per month regardless of their demographic composition. For each additional child ages 0–15, the programme will add R\$15, up to a maximum of R\$95 per month. Families earning more than R\$50 per capita a month but less than R\$100 will be entitled to R\$15 per child, up to a maximum transfer of R\$45. They get password-protected magnetic cards to use in all banks, stores and supermarkets around the country.

The programme also has incentives for the poor to invest in preventive healthcare and schooling. To stay eligible for the transfers, beneficiary families with children under age six will have to keep their vaccination cards up to date and bring them to health centres every other month for health and growth checks. Families with children ages 7–15 have to ensure that they are enrolled in school and attending at least 85% of classes. Pregnant women need to show that they received at least five prenatal exams during pregnancy. Adults in families without children have to participate in job training and literacy classes.

Fome Zero will also carry out specific disaster prevention and emergency management actions, some already implemented, but most still on the drawing board.

Africa

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision, to come up with a programme of

action to redevelop Africa. Agriculture is to deliver broad-based economic advance through food security, income generation and diversified export growth.


The first Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the African Union, held in Maputo on 2 July 2003, examined the food security and agricultural challenges facing Africa. The meeting recommended that the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme guide African governments in their agricultural development. The Ministers decided to establish an African Common Market for basic food products—and to continue to address the root causes of the weakness in agriculture and the inadequacy of managing water and rural infrastructure. They also agreed to adopt fair policies and increase budgetary resources for agricultural development.

The Summit of the Heads of State and Governments, also held in Maputo on 10–12 July 2003, adopted a Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa. The Heads of State resolved to:

- Revitalize the agricultural sector through special policies and strategies targeted at small and traditional farmers in rural areas.
- Implement, as a matter of urgency, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. African Union member states agreed to allocate at least 10% of national budgetary resources for implementation within five years.
- Ensure the establishment of regional food reserve systems, linked to Africa's production, and develop policies and strategies to fight hunger and poverty.

One possibility for additional financial support would be to create an international fund for hunger eradication, similar to the Global Environment Facility

Foreign aid for agriculture has fallen by half over the last 20 years



Source: OECD 2004.

- Accelerate the process of establishing the African Investment Bank, which would give priority to investment in agricultural production.

Rich countries and intergovernmental organizations

For 2003 the governments of the world's rich countries deserve harsh criticism. The dominant disappointment was the failure to make progress on trade liberalization for agricultural commodities at the World Trade Organization meeting in Cancun in September.

That failure means that they will continue agricultural and trade policies that blatantly discriminate against the poor—and severely reduce investments in developing countries' agriculture and rural areas, where most of the hungry live. Development assistance continues to be inadequate as well, with far too little aimed at agricultural and rural development.

It would not require vast resources to halve the number of hungry in the world—only \$24 billion a year, according to FAO, which suggests the following allocation:

- *\$2.3 billion to raise farm productivity in poor rural communities.* The key policy issue is strengthening the ability of rural communities, especially that of the poor and vulnerable, to organize themselves and be active in matters that affect their livelihoods. This should lead to the improved availability and adoption of technologies appropriate to the needs of the rural poor.
- *\$7.4 billion to promote sustainable use of natural resources.* With few exceptions, the scope for bringing additional natural resources into

agricultural production is limited. The only viable option is sustainable intensification—increasing the productivity of land, water and genetic resources in ways that do not compromise the quality and future productive capacity of those resources. The policy environment must ensure that intensification is indeed sustainable and beneficial to the populations involved.

- *\$7.8 billion to cover investments in rural infrastructure and market access.* A critical policy problem is to address the neglect of poor rural communities. While the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure construction and servicing may increase efficiency and respond better to overall needs, poor farming regions continue to be underserved. The public sector should maintain an active role in infrastructure provision that benefits the poor—such as secondary and rural roads. The policy approach should encourage decentralization and community participation to ensure demand-driven sustainable service delivery, with various forms of public-private partnerships.
- *\$1.1 billion for agricultural research and extension and for nutrition education.* Policy action should aim at ensuring that the poor share the benefits of technological progress, particularly for areas with poor agro-ecological potential, usually sidestepped by private commercial research. Public funding is required for the development and adaptation of relevant technological options.
- *\$5.2 billion for programmes that enhance access to food by the neediest.* A key policy prerequisite is the existence of information that identifies accurately who the hungry are and where they live. FAO and the World Food Programme can assist governments in effective



Both the resources and the knowhow to reduce hunger are available. What is missing is the political will of most developing-country governments to mobilize. Less rhetoric and more action could eliminate hunger for millions

targeting, through the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems and the Vulnerability and Mapping System.

The funds might come from focused international development assistance, changed priorities in developing-country budget allocations and voluntary contributions by multinational corporations. One possibility for additional financial support would be to create an international fund for hunger eradication, similar to the Global Environment Facility.

FAO is initiating activities to help eradicate hunger—a new antihunger strategy, a new initiative for hunger reduction and national food strategies within Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Its initiatives take a two-track approach. The first is sustainable agricultural and rural development aimed at enhancing the livelihoods of the poorest and most vulnerable groups. The second is targeted programmes to enhance direct access to food and nutrition for the neediest. One creates opportunities for disadvantaged people to escape poverty and hunger; the other provides adequate nutrition so that they can take advantage of these opportunities.

One of the most exciting international hunger-related research initiatives during the last year is the Harvest Plus Program, under the leadership of two Future Harvest centres—the International Food Policy Research Institute and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture, within the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. This programme is focusing on research to increase the content of iron, vitamin A and zinc in staple foods consumed by low-income people in developing countries. Reducing deficiencies in these micronutrients (the hidden hunger) could have major impact.

Civil society

Concern Worldwide and Valid International have a research programme to develop a new approach to alleviating malnutrition during humanitarian emergencies. The approach, community-based therapeutic care, aims to increase coverage rates, build on existing capacities in the community, equip communities to deal more effectively with future periods of extreme vulnerability and increase the use of locally purchased food. Crucially, the approach aims to treat the majority of people suffering from severe acute malnutrition in their homes—not in therapeutic feeding centres. Those centres are often slow, costly and difficult to establish. They fail to achieve an adequate coverage of the target population. And they undermine the coping capacity of the surrounding community. Community-based therapeutic care combines a newly designed “ready to use therapeutic food” for the outpatient treatment of severe malnutrition with techniques of mobilization and education drawn from development thinking.

Ethiopia and Malawi achieved coverage rates of up to 75%, far higher than the 15–20% under a more traditional therapeutic feeding programme. The programme in Malawi shows that it is possible to treat uncomplicated severe malnutrition (no oedema or underlying infections) in an outpatient environment. Community-based therapeutic care is also faster to set up, increasing the chances of catching malnourished children before their malnutrition becomes severe.

Conclusion

The number of people suffering from hunger can be reduced by half by 2015. Both the resources and the knowhow are available. What is missing is the political will of most developing-country governments



to mobilize the required action—including policies to promote agricultural and rural development and to guide globalization and science for the benefit of the poor. Also missing is meeting the commitment of rich countries to provide 0.7% of their national income to aid. Clearly, less rhetoric and more action could eliminate hunger for millions.

Endnotes

1. This goal is from the World Food Summit. The Millennium Declaration goal is somewhat different—it calls for reducing the proportion of the population that suffers from hunger by half by the year 2015. Because populations are growing, reducing the proportion that suffers from hunger can be done even if the absolute number suffering from hunger remains the same (it is projected to do). Neither goal is likely to be met.

2. An exhaustive assessment of the action relevant to the hunger alleviation goal was not possible. Instead, the Expert Group on Hunger collected information from nongovernmental organizations, international organizations and the private sector as well as two groups of countries: those with the largest number of people suffering from hunger and those with the highest prevalence. Twenty countries were chosen from each group. Six countries were in both groups. Thus, the resulting list of countries consists of 34 countries covering 72% of people in developing countries, 92% of the world's undernourished people and 66% of undernourished preschool children. The 34 countries are: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, the Russian Federation,

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3. World Bank (2003).

References

- Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. 2003. "Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit." Paper 2996. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- CNSB (China National Statistical Bureau). 2001. "Rural Household Survey." Beijing.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2001. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World*. Rome.
- . 2003a. "Assessment of the World Food Security Situation." Committee on World Food Security, 29th Session, 12–16 May, Rome.
- . 2003b. "The Anti-Hunger Program." Committee on World Food Security. Rome.
- ILO (International Labour Organization). 2002. *A Future without Child Labour*. International Labour Organization Report. Geneva.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2004. *OECD Development Cooperation Report 2003*. Paris.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2003. *Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- World Bank. 2003. *World Development Indicators*. Washington, D.C.

Methodology

The Expert Group members undertook extensive consultations with a large number of people, many of whom are now members of two new networks of experts developed specifically for the group's work. The group also reviewed other assessment

documents. On the basis of these consultations and documents and the knowledge of group members, the group conducted extended discussion of the actions taken during the last one to two years that are likely to influence hunger. The discussion was divided into four parts: intentions, implementation, actions taken and whether actions during the last one to two years were stronger or weaker than those taken earlier. In other words, was there a trend towards more or less action? These issues were discussed for each of the four groups of actors: the national public sector, civil society, the private sector and international agencies. Each member then scored each of the four issues and actors. Intentions received high scores but implementation and resulting action received low scores. The overall score of 3 implies that only about 30% of the actions needed to achieve the goal were in fact implemented.

Expert Group members

Chair: Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Professor of Food, Nutrition and Public Policy, Cornell University

Ruth Oniang'o, Professor of Food Science and Nutrition, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, and Member of Parliament

Jikun Huang, Director, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Sartaj Aziz, Former Finance and Foreign Minister, Pakistan

Joachim von Braun, Director, International Food Policy Research Institute

Ray Offenheiser, President, OXFAM America

Key informants


Iqbal Noor Ali, John Ambler, Klaus Ammann, Tom Arnold, Lars Attrup, Lennart Bage, Andrew Bennett, J. Larry Brown, Lincoln Chih-Ho Chen, Martha Chen, A. Mushtaque R. Chowdhury, David Cohen, Kel Currah, Hernan L Degado, Bill Fiebig, Brian Hinman, Humaira Islam, Brian Jenns, Urban Jonsson, Alice A. Kaudia, Nick Langton, Karim Mahbubul, Richard Mawer, Savitri Mohapatra, Eugenia Muchnik, Joseph Mukiibi, Kumi Naidoo, David F. Nygaard, Afoakwa Emmanuel Ohene, Omo Ohiokpehai, Aniche Okechukwu, Margaret Oluremi, John Omiti, Keijiro Otsuka, Eliseo Ponce, Paroda Raj, Isatou Jallow Semega-Janneh, Rehman Sobhan, N. Soekirman, Fitigu Tadesse, Eugenia Takavarasha, Tobias Takavarasha, Jennifer Thomson, Frank Tugwell, Subramanian T.C. Venkat, Vyas Vijay, Albert Webale, Margaret Zeigler.

Assistance: Walter Middleton, via Alan Whaites; John Seaman.



4 Education

Score
3



Score

3

Goals

- **Ensure that by 2015 children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.**
- **Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.**

Education

Education for all children is a human right that almost all countries accept, most enshrining it in national legislation. The benefits are substantial. Education is instrumental for faster economic growth, greater human security and broader participation in political and community life. And it helps to alleviate household poverty. Gender parity in education is particularly important. More than men, educated women improve the health and well-being of their families, lower their fertility and educate their children. That is why achieving the education goals, known collectively as Education for All, is central in the attempt to reduce world poverty (box 4.1).

Context and trends

Many trends in education look good on the surface. Primary enrolments rose from 596 million in 1990 to 648 million in 2000, an increase of 8.7%. Latin America and the Caribbean, after striking gains, are close to achieving universal primary education, with net enrolments similar to the industrial country average of 97%. Sub-Saharan Africa showed the highest relative increase (38%), with smaller but significant advances in South and West Asia (19%) and the Arab States (17%). In these regions the gains in enrolment significantly outpaced the increases in the schoolage population. Some 55 countries had already achieved net enrolment ratios above 95% (equivalent to universal primary enrolment) by 2001.¹

Those broad figures disguise serious problems. The gains over the past decade left an estimated 104 million children of primary-school age still out of school at the turn of the millennium. Three-quarters of them lived in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia. In Africa those out of school increased by about the same percentage over the decade, and the region now has less than 60% of the age

group enrolled in schools. In South and West Asia enrolment expansions brought down the number of out-of-school children to about 20% in the 1990s. And previous success stories are encountering new difficulties. East Asia and Pacific saw its net enrolment ratios drop from 96% to 93%.

Many of the 78 countries that have not yet achieved universal primary education are likely to do so by 2015, based on their rates of progress in the 1990s. But note that 20 of the 41 countries close to the goal have been moving away from it, not getting closer. Countries far from the goal are mainly in Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.


Girls' enrolments increased faster than those of boys in the decade to 2000. Girls make up 57% of all children out of school—down six percentage points from 2000, with the steepest reduction in East Asia and Pacific, where the percentage of girls out of school fell from 71% to 49%. But despite shifts towards greater gender parity, girls continue to face sharp discrimination in access to schooling. Eleven countries, seven in Sub-Saharan Africa, report that only 8 girls go to school for every 10 boys.

Of 128 countries, 54 risk not achieving gender parity in primary and secondary education by 2015, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. And if past trends continue, China will not reach parity at the secondary level by 2015, while India risks not achieving it at both levels.

Asia and the Pacific

Some countries in the region have made substantial progress in the last decade, and half are on the threshold of reaching the education goals, with others far behind.

Most regions are on track to achieve gender parity in primary education by 2005



Source: UNESCO 2003.

Many of the 78 countries that have not yet achieved universal primary education are likely to do so by 2015, but 20 of the 41 countries close to the goal have been moving away from it

Box 4.1 Measuring education

The gross enrolment ratio—expressing all primary enrolments as a proportion of the official schoolage group—had been the leading indicator of progress towards universal primary education. But as countries progress towards universal primary education, more of them have gross enrolment ratios exceeding 100%, their values inflated by the early and late entrants and repeaters.

So they also look at the net enrolment ratio—which counts only those school children who are within the official schoolage group. It too has drawbacks. Where the official entrance age is different from the usual entrance age, the net enrolment ratio underestimated school participation. It does not take into account other children who will eventually complete primary education. So both indicators tell an important part of the story.²

The goal of gender parity is also problematic, for parity does not imply full equality. It is a purely numerical concept: reaching gender parity in education implies that the same proportion of boys and girls—relative to their respective age groups—enter the education system and participate in

different cycles. It is measured by the ratio of the female and male values for enrolment or intake rates—the gender parity index, with parity equal to one.

Gender equality, by contrast, is a more complete notion, but it is more difficult to measure. Full gender equality in education would imply not only that girls and boys are offered the same chances to go to school, but that they also enjoy teaching methods and curricula free of gender stereotypes and academic orientation and counselling unaffected by gender bias. It also implies equal outcomes in length of schooling, learning achievement and academic qualifications—and, more broadly, equal job opportunities and earnings for similar qualifications and experience. This more ambitious agenda, not explicit in the world's education goals, is a necessary part of the global commitment to "promote gender equality and empower women".

Current indicators on educational outcomes and learning achievement allow only a partial assessment of gender equality. More qualitative ones—such as measures of the perceptions of the treatment of girls and boys—would be required to provide a more thorough picture.

In South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan) large and rapidly growing populations continue to place strong demands for school expansion just to maintain present rates of enrolment. Bangladesh and Nepal have little capacity to raise funds for this from domestic sources.

Except for Bangladesh, which has eliminated the gender gap, gender disparities remain high, with only 7 or 8 girls enrolled in primary and secondary schools for every 10 boys. Although there are some significant exceptions, the efforts of governments in South Asia have so far been inadequate to change

the long-term trend of slow progress towards universal enrolment and gender parity).

Some positive policy developments could, if expanded, help the region to achieve universal primary education. India has announced its intention to legislate free primary education as a right in all states, a measure that will undoubtedly boost enrolment growth over the next few years. And the fast pace of governance reforms in some countries is ushering in greater involvement of community through democratic electoral processes and civil society action.

In South Asia one positive development in the last few years has been the emerging partnership between government and nongovernmental organizations in basic education

The countries of Indo-China (Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Vietnam) have suffered from prolonged conflict and political instability. Except for Vietnam, they depend heavily on outside funding and capabilities. Leaders in these countries have shown a new commitment to create the necessary policy environment for achieving the education goals. But progress is hindered by the absence of a comprehensive national planning framework and the lack of dependable data on education systems. These countries are trying to bring in governance reforms to facilitate better planning, but actions are too slow to have much of an impact. Heavy involvement of donor agencies without adequate coordination seems to be hampering well-orchestrated national plans of action. Neglect of secondary and tertiary sectors has further jeopardized the prospect of developing capabilities within the country. If governance reforms receive more attention, better planning could help achieve the goals before 2015.

The Pacific island countries are also vulnerable. Many of their problems are linked not only to their geographically disadvantageous locations, but also to governance, policy planning and technical-managerial issues. Several of them face multiple language and ethnic affiliations, particularly in Papua New Guinea, where more than 600 languages are spoken, creating major problems for language policy in schools, with high cost implications for producing learning materials and preparing teachers. Better planning and strategic interventions are required to step up progress towards universal participation in schooling.

China and Indonesia also risk not reaching the goals. Until recently, China was a world leader in demonstrating how even poor and high-population


countries could provide widespread schooling, but its record has deteriorated, partly because of reductions in public funding. Meanwhile, gender ratios at the secondary level remain low, improving little in the 1990s. China now has to get back on its earlier path towards the education goals. Indonesia's educational progress before the economic crisis in 1998 was phenomenal considering its population and complex ethnic and linguistic composition. But micro studies show slippages in recent years. Primary enrolment ratios fell over 1990–2000.

In South Asia one positive development in the last few years has been the emerging partnership between government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in basic education. Bangladesh and India, in particular, have vibrant NGO sectors. Although NGOs have been traditionally active in nonformal education, new models for the formal sector are also evolving—as in Rajasthan, India, where NGO-led projects are increasing the number of female teachers to boost girls' enrolments.³

The efforts of large NGOs in Bangladesh—such as BRAC, Dhaka Ahsania Mission and Proshika—have also demonstrated that using a more flexible approach to timetabling, basing the curriculum on local issues and problems, training local people (particularly women) as teachers and drawing on community resources for key management functions make it possible to put in place low-cost and effective schooling that delivers as much as the formal system. This approach has contributed much towards the move to universal primary education.

Several international NGOs—such as Action Aid, Plan International and Aga Khan Foundation—have also expanded their primary education portfolios in

Primary enrolment is still short of the goal—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: UNESCO 2003.

Some 44 million children are out of school in Sub-Saharan Africa, more than half of them girls. School-based surveys for many countries show that household and domestic work is a major reason for not attending

recent years in South Asia. They show that special delivery mechanisms can reach otherwise marginal groups.

There is also evidence of greater community participation in basic education beyond the formal sector. The Total Literacy Campaigns in India demonstrate the potential of voluntary action in mobilizing communities. And throughout the region school management committees and parent groups are ensuring fuller participation of children and better functioning of local primary schools. The governments of Nepal and some Indian states have initiated major changes in the legal framework to facilitate this.

But in Indo-China, with a long-entrenched legacy of centralized systems of political governance, civil society organs—both NGOs and community movements—are very weak. In these countries it is unlikely that either a vibrant civil society movement or even a platform of private providers will emerge in the near future.

Although there are no comprehensive data, it appears that corporate sponsors, mainly from the industrial, energy and financial sectors, have contributed close to \$1 million for basic education for the poor. Though small in comparison with overall needs, this may reveal new interest of corporate bodies in responding more to social obligations. Initial indications from India are that the government is keen on strengthening tripartite relationships.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Fewer than 6 of 10 primary-school age children were enrolled in 2000, the lowest rate of any region and far below the 84% world average. Some 44 million children are out of school, more than half of

them girls. Sub-Saharan Africa also has the highest incidence of child labour (41%), a figure that does not count children employed in domestic labour, where girls predominate.

School-based surveys for many countries show that household and domestic work is a major reason for not attending, more so for girls than for boys. In Ethiopia and Guinea between a quarter and a third of school dropouts surveyed indicated that their need to earn money or to work at home or on the family farm were the main reasons for leaving school early.⁴ Half of African countries show gross enrolment rates of no more than 26% for secondary education and 2.5% for higher education.

Gender disparities and inequalities are wide: 11 countries have gender parity indices of less than 0.76 in primary school—Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali and Mozambique. Gender issues are still treated as marginal in some of the poorer states where discrimination against schooling girls remains strong. Without sustained policy changes and resource commitments, it is highly unlikely that these countries will achieve gender parity and universal primary enrolment by 2015.

Progress is also hampered by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and by conflict and emergencies. Of the 17 Sub-Saharan countries with declining enrolment rates in the 1990s, 6 are affected by or recovering from major armed conflicts. The destruction of educational infrastructure is one of the greatest developmental setbacks. In Mozambique some 45% of primary school networks were destroyed, and in Rwanda more than two-thirds of teachers either fled or were killed.⁵

The Total Literacy Campaigns in India demonstrate the potential of voluntary action in mobilizing communities

Almost 60% of those living with HIV/AIDS in the region are girls and women.⁶ Botswana has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world (38.8%). When HIV/AIDS hits a family, girls are often the first to be taken out of school or to take responsibility for their siblings, sometimes as head of household. Education systems are being severely eroded by the loss of teachers. Zambia, for example, lost 2,000 teachers in 2002, twice the number of graduates from teachers' colleges.

Despite all this, some of the poorest countries have slightly increased the proportion of national spending on education in the 1990s. But half the countries with data were spending less than 3.4% of national income on education in 2000—lower than the 4.1% average for developing countries. Some governments and NGOs are taking bold moves to expand the provision of education to all children. The task involves cutting the cost of education to families while acting on the other causes, often deeply embedded in a society's social norms and practices, that deprive children, and girls in particular, of their right to education. More governments are setting specific time-bound targets in their plans and programmes to achieve universal primary education and gender parity.

Several countries have enacted legislation for introducing or strengthening the provision of free and compulsory education, including Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria and Uganda. South Africa's constitution, adopted in final form in 1996, specifies nine years of compulsory schooling, making education for black South Africans compulsory for the first time.

Strong policy frameworks and political leadership are required to translate these legislative commitments into reality. The right to education is

now better understood as a source of hope and opportunity for people who live with poverty, and making education more affordable has been a major talking point in recent political campaigns. In Kenya free primary education was a major campaign pledge during the 2002 campaign of the new president, Mwai Kibaki. Primary school enrolments responded dramatically. In Nairobi in early 2003 many schools experienced a doubling or more of their pupils. In Zambia in 2002, the first school year after the announcement of fee-free schooling, primary enrolments grew by 7%, compared with 2% in the previous year.

None of this is easy. The total costs to government continue to rise. Kenya allocates 36% of its recurrent budget to education, up from 23% before fees were abolished. In Uganda it is projected that for 2002–15, there will be a 58% increase in the number of primary school pupils, requiring more than twice the current number of teachers. National education budgets already go overwhelmingly to teachers' salaries, with very little left for teaching aids, curriculum development and infrastructure.⁷

Sustaining good quality education will be difficult. Primary school fees are still charged in 14 Sub-Saharan African countries unlikely to achieve gender parity in primary schooling in 2005 or even in 2015. Removing them would probably be the single most effective means of raising primary enrolments and reducing gender disparities in the short term. International cooperation will have to help to bridge the resource gaps.

For gender parity, some countries, including Ethiopia and Malawi, have embarked on curriculum reform to reduce biases in subject choices for girls and boys—and to remove gender stereotyping

Countries with the lowest number of female teachers at the primary level are those with the highest gender disparities in enrolments

from textbooks and other teaching materials. Recruiting more female teachers remains a priority: women only hold a third, or fewer, of the teaching posts in 16 Sub-Saharan countries. Countries with the lowest number of female teachers at the primary level are those with the highest gender disparities in enrolments.

The place of civil society in support of education is receiving much more attention, but its contributions to policy and practice are generally weak. Civil society has provided a system of checks and balances to monitor how money is spent. In Ghana a national coalition of NGOs and civil society groups campaigns for basic education of good quality for all Ghanaian children—and acts as a pressure group on the government. In some cases, new democracies have begun a process for civil society engagement in educational planning.⁸ In Burkina Faso in April 2000 the Ministry of Education established committees that included civil society groups and NGOs as part of a nationwide consultation.

Community schools are often more cost-effective and relevant to development needs than public schools. Several studies report that they improve access to schooling, but they can also increase the direct costs for poor households. Mali is fairly typical: communities are expected to meet construction costs and teacher payments in Save the Children community schools.

Most of the innovative work in countering school violence—an important reason for girls to drop out or perform poorly—has been initiated by NGOs, often in connection with HIV/AIDS education. South Africa, working with teachers and students, has programmes to counter sexual violence. The initiatives tend to be small and developed outside


the formal school setting, in part because ministries of education have been reluctant to address gender violence.

NGOs can also raise awareness of the benefits of girls' education and influence policy. The Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), an NGO created in 1992, is an influential network of 33 national groups. It seeks to ensure that girls have access to school, complete their studies and perform well at all levels. It has set up centres of excellence to build the capacity of teachers, including courses on gender sensitization and awareness and on teaching science, mathematics and technology. In response to FAWE's efforts Botswana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia now permit the re-entry of girls into formal education after pregnancy—a frequent reason for dropping out.

Corporate support to education is still young, mostly from the oil community, not all of it voluntary. Nigeria's education tax fund, introduced in 1993, stipulates that every corporate body registered in Nigeria should pay 2% of its annual assessable profit as an education tax, which goes into the fund.

Africa receives the highest proportion of bilateral education aid of any region (approximately 27%), and more than the global average of education aid per capita, per schoolage child and per illiterate person. But it receives less than the global average of aid per child out of school. Aid to education from the African Development Fund fell from \$120 million in 1998/99 to \$41 million in 2000/01.

Two major international initiatives could help Africa reach the goals. The World Bank–International Monetary Fund Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers



(PRSPs) are supposed to include national strategies for girls' education. But these often focus on supply without reference to, or analysis of, the constraints that inhibit girls' full participation in schooling, such as family income, the need for daughters to work and so on.⁹

The Fast-Track Initiative is the world's new effort to match donor resources to effective national policies. Of the 18 countries accepted so far, 10 are from Sub-Saharan Africa—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The reduction of teacher salaries to improve affordability is possibly the most controversial issue in many African countries, jeopardizing efforts to improve education systems. So far, the Fast-Track Initiative has not generated enough resources to close the expected financial gaps in the 10 African countries over the next few years.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Despite progress on enrolments, every assessment concludes that the quality of education is inadequate. Instruction in language, mathematics and science continues to be poor. Few students acquire the life skills critical to success. The high enrolment rates conceal significant inequalities. Many schoolage children have had no schooling or left school before completion. And in some parts of the region repetition and dropout rates are high. The proportion of repeaters in primary education in 2000 was as high as 25% in Brazil, 14% in Guatemala and 11% in Peru, while an estimated 18% of pupils do not complete primary schooling. Despite numerous government programmes meant to redress the persistently unequal distribution of educational opportunities and poor performance in public schools, equity remains the biggest challenge.

Boosting secondary enrolments to the 75% target for 2010 (gross enrolment) set by the region's heads of state at the 1998 Summit of the Americas will be difficult. Just as at primary level, secondary enrolment ratios mask repetitions, dropouts and overage students. For example, 43% of Brazil's secondary school-age students, as well as 23% in Paraguay and 25% in Peru, are still attending primary school. Many studies highlight the small percentage of those entering secondary schools who remain to complete their schooling.

The region has closed the gender gap. Although differences remain in some countries, girls tend to have higher primary and secondary enrolment rates than boys, and they tend to stay in school longer. Inequalities appear to be concentrated in those countries with significant indigenous populations in rural areas.

Government investments per pupil at the primary and secondary levels vary greatly—from under \$200 in Guatemala to nearly \$1,500 in Chile. Roughly a third of the countries with data invest more than \$1,000 per pupil, another third less than \$500. Investment per student is sometimes less than half that in developed countries and at worst as little as 3% in the poorest countries of the region. By contrast, much greater sums go to tertiary education. Since higher education primarily serves the middle and upper sectors of the population, this pattern of spending discriminates against the poor.

Four core deficiencies exist: a failure to improve quality, set standards and evaluate performance; limited school authority and accountability; poorly trained teachers, poorly paid and poorly managed; and inadequate investment in primary and secondary schools.¹⁰

Weak training and incentive systems lie at the heart of deficiencies in the quality of teaching in Latin America. Many countries are working hard to improve training, but few are improving incentive systems—which require fundamental changes in how teachers are recruited and managed

Almost every country in the region has a test to measure the most important indicator of education success—student learning (box 4.2). Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay are developing achievement tests at the provincial or state levels, and several other countries are experimenting with promising new ways to find out what students know and can do—and to use that information to inform policy. A consortium of Central American ministers of education is establishing common standards in language, math and the natural sciences for primary schools.

A few countries in Central America and several states in Brazil have dramatically increased school and community control over many aspects of educational decisionmaking. But the reforms are often concentrated in rural areas, serving communities that previously had no school. Central governments continue to assure that schooling is of high quality and available to all, especially where parents and communities have few resources of their own.

Weak training and incentive systems lie at the heart of deficiencies in the quality of teaching. Many countries are working hard to improve training. But few are improving incentive systems—which are much more controversial, and require fundamental changes in how teachers are recruited and managed. Preservice training is generally of low quality. Short training schedules and highly theoretical curriculums often forgo the classroom practice and subject matter preparation that make for better teachers.

The private sector is providing more educational services, managing public schools and supporting reform programmes. Involvement is higher in sectors where the public coverage is limited, as in preschool and higher education. In Argentina and Colombia nearly 20% of primary school students

Box 4.2 Identifying poorly performing schools

The 900 Schools programme in Chile shows how assessment results can evaluate student achievement and guide policy reforms. It has used scores on the SIMCE (Chile's national assessment) to identify first 900, and now more than 1,200, of the worst performing schools. These schools then receive education materials, books, infrastructure support and in-service training to improve the learning environment. Schools that raise scores get a financial reward.

The results so far are encouraging (scores are improving at participating schools). But concerns remain about the assumption that remedial action should be initiated centrally—and about overestimates of “deprived circumstances” by schools seeking to qualify for the programme.

and more than 20% of secondary students are in private schools. In Chile the government allocates public resources to private schools based on enrolment and attendance. Colombia uses a voucher system to help poor families send their children to quality schools. Trinidad and Tobago awards grants for secondary school students who cannot be accommodated by the public system because of a shortage of places.

Business-education partnerships are growing. Business contributions range from direct support to individual schools to sophisticated efforts to develop new education policies, changing the functions of school or developing innovative curricula or teaching methods. Groups of businesses are working with schools to devise new policies, provide students with work experience, strengthen schools in industrial communities and reform school management.

In Venezuela associations of NGOs and foundations have, with the help of private companies, funded schools as alternatives to poor-quality public schools and expensive private institutions. In Brazil business foundations are involved in policy changes and school-level innovations. In the state of Sao Paulo a coalition of private companies helps public schools raise their students' test scores and lower their failure and dropout rates through an Institute for Improving Teacher Quality.

Educational foundations, research centres and NGOs add a dimension of participation by civil society in educational development. In the 1990s many of the innovations to improve the quality and equity of public education were implemented as public policies when researchers moved to the policy and decisionmaking levels in the educational sector. Nongovernmental think-tanks and private research centres continue to be leading producers of policy research, providing policy analysis, evaluating social programmes and building networks.


At the grassroots level, decentralization and school autonomy in El Salvador (Educo) and Guatemala (Pronade) have involved the participation of national NGOs and parent associations in school management and educational development.

Aid and international initiatives for education

Bilateral aid flows to education declined in the 1990s—from almost \$5 billion at the beginning of the decade to slightly less than \$4 billion in 2001. Multilateral aid also fell.

But of this declining total, a larger share went to basic education. In recent policy statements the bilateral agencies have indicated strong support for

Bilateral aid to education is at its lowest level in 15 years



Source: UNESCO 2003.

education, stressing its role in reducing poverty, with several drawing specific attention to improving the opportunities for girls and women. There have also been some new funding commitments. At the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada (2002), Canada and Japan announced additional funding for basic education. The United States announced a 50% increase in core assistance to developing countries over 2004–06, to result in a \$5 billion annual increase over current levels by 2006. The new fund would be placed in a Millennium Challenge Account, available on a competitive basis to countries that have demonstrated commitment to sound development policies, including those for education. In addition, U.S. support for basic education was expected to have increased 50% during 2001–03, an expectation that seems not to have been met.

The Fast-Track Initiative has also attracted about \$207 million from 10 bilateral agencies for 2003–05. But current support, around \$1.5 billion a year, is a fraction of the estimated additional aid of \$5.6 billion a year needed to reach the major Education for All goals.¹¹

Gender equality is clearly more prominent in the policies of a good number of funding agencies, such as the Partnership on Sustainable Strategies for Girls' Education.¹² Many bilateral agencies have issued policy statements citing gender equality as a major objective. Yet the extent of addressing gender in education projects and programmes is unclear. A study of four PRSPs found that "attention to gender was shockingly limited".¹³ There is weak analysis on what inhibits girls' full participation in schooling. This weakness resurfaces in national Millennium Development Goal reports. A review of 13 country reports by the United Nations Development

The Fast-Track Initiative, after raising high expectations that significant new funding would be mobilized for achieving the goal, has yet to receive substantial and specific international support for its activities

Programme showed that not all provided sex-disaggregated data while three made no mention of gender issues in education.

Education for All's Fast-Track Initiative

The Fast-Track Initiative, designed primarily by the World Bank, was launched in April 2002 as a “process that would provide quick and incremental technical and financial support to countries that have policies but are not on track to attain universal primary completion by 2015”.¹⁴ The Fast-Track Initiative, after raising high expectations that significant new funding would be mobilized for achieving the goal, has yet to receive substantial and specific international support for its activities. Countries with a PRSP and an agreed “credible” education sector plan are eligible to develop proposals to join the Fast-Track Initiative.

Of the 18 countries initially included in the Initiative, seven were endorsed for funding in November 2002 (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, Nicaragua and Niger). Three more proposals were endorsed in March 2003 (The Gambia, Mozambique and Yemen). The remaining eight countries invited to join the initiative are working on PRSPs and sector plans (Albania, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia).

Because the first 18 invited countries have a fairly small proportion of the world's out-of-school children, special attention is going to five high-population countries (Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Nigeria and Pakistan). The aim is to provide technical support to enable them to qualify for the mainstream initiative. In all five cases, discussion seems to have been insufficient with the governments, and

within agencies between headquarters and the field offices. One study estimates that an additional \$820 million a year would be required if the five countries agree to participate in the exercise.¹⁵ Special efforts are also being considered for countries with poor short-term prospects of eligibility for the Fast-Track Initiative but in great need of support. The aim is to have all low-income countries be part of the initiative in the next two to three years.

The Fast-Track process has brought some progress on donor coordination and on the ground. One promising example is Honduras, which has taken advantage of the Fast-Track Initiative's new memorandum of understanding process to lay out in impressive detail a three-year reform plan and lock in support from all donor agencies and from the ministries of finance, planning and education. In Niger all actors on the ground in the education sector have signed a partnership agreement, securing unified support for the national plan and letting the education ministry operate with one common set of reporting requirements for all donor agencies. With more such agreements in Fast-Track Initiative countries, better coordination and greater efficiency could become the standard.

The initiative is at a critical juncture, however. In August 2003 the estimated financing gap for the first seven countries remained at about \$118 million for 2003–05. This gap is small in the context of new aid commitments but large compared with the \$207 million of commitments secured by the initiative so far. Unless more funding is secured quickly, this instrument to help secure Education for All is likely to be at risk. There is also a danger in thinking of the initiative as only a funding mechanism. It needs to be integrated with national

The Fast-Track Initiative needs to be integrated with national reform processes and to help tackle fundamental structural issues of institutional development and reform in education

reform processes and to help tackle fundamental structural issues of institutional development and reform in education.

In its current state the Fast-Track Initiative is far from serving as the “global compact” needed in support of basic education and the Millennium Development Goals. If the lack of high-level financial and political commitment to a global compact continues, apathy and cynicism could increase, and frustration could lead to a loss of hope in the initiative. If that happens, the global community will be back to the drawing board—with even higher hurdles of scepticism to climb.

NGO advocacy and awareness-raising

International NGOs have increased their capacity to mobilize resources and represent stakeholders in education.¹⁶ Global March against Child Labour, Oxfam, Save the Children, Education International and Action Aid, among others, have raised awareness and involved thousands of their supporters in systematically lobbying and campaigning for northern governments to increase aid to basic education and to support the Fast-Track Initiative.

The Global Campaign for Education—a coalition with a small secretariat, rather than an independent NGO—has been the main coordinating vehicle. It has enabled the major players to put aside day-to-day rivalries over profile, funding and prestige to pursue common advocacy goals by pooling resources and efforts. It staged the World’s Biggest Lesson, with some 2 million children learning about universal education in more than 100 countries simultaneously, evidence of the power of united civil society action. The lesson engaged such leaders and celebrities as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, soccer star Mia Hamm, Nobel Laureate

Nadine Gordimer, pop star Ms Dynamite and several African heads of state.

The Global Campaign for Education enables well-connected northern and international NGOs to build genuine advocacy partnerships with developing-country civil society networks. It also allows direct access to international and regional forums and information flows. Although initially dominated by organizations from developed countries, the campaign developed a constitution in 2001 to place all decisionmaking on an open and democratic footing. Each member organization, regardless of its size or its financial contribution, has one vote in electing the board, which steers the campaign and manages staff. The Global Campaign for Education also recently embarked on advocacy training programmes to support southern members. The challenges of ensuring fair and adequate representation for a wide range of civil society organizations and interests remain formidable.

In the United States at least three new efforts have arisen in the last few years: the Basic Education Coalition (a coalition of 17 U.S. NGOs and providers), the Center for Universal Education at the Council of Foreign Relations and a U.S. Chapter of the Global Campaign for Education. The Hewlett Foundation has been instrumental in funding these new efforts. In developing countries, such alliances are even more important because they enable small, resource-poor organizations to act as a bloc and to gain credibility and influence. Consider Tanzanian civil society’s success in advocating for the removal of user fees and that of Kenyan civil society in ensuring that primary education came high on the electoral agenda of all parties. These efforts would not have

**Private involvement, if coordinated,
need not backfire and compromise
opportunities—there is good
opportunity for leadership from the
private sector**

succeeded without strong national networks—and good links to regional and international structures that provided information, lobby backup, media exposure and other support.

NGOs have also been promoting awareness and policy innovations in girls' education. Since 2002, again with some coordination and impetus from the Global Campaign for Education, some of the major NGOs in the field have been systematically engaging with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to define a more dynamic and effective role for the UN Girls' Education Initiative, which UNICEF coordinates.

The Center for Universal Education at the Council of Foreign Relations (with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, or UNAIDS) and Action Aid have sponsored events in the United Kingdom and the United States to focus attention on the connection between education and the prevention of HIV/AIDS. The Global Campaign for Education is assisting UNAIDS and others in pushing developing nation education ministries to include effective HIV/AIDS education as part of their mission.

Private sector involvement

The private sector has provided little leadership in advocacy. Most of its involvement has been in one-off projects, such as school construction or individual philanthropic commitments. Some chief executive officers have expressed an unwillingness to work closely with developing-country governments, preferring to work on their own projects. So, their contributions of financial and physical capital are less than they might have been.

Some governments and NGOs are concerned that more private sector involvement would simply

promote more privatization of public aspects of schooling. But private involvement, if coordinated, need not backfire and compromise opportunities. Indeed, there is good opportunity for leadership from the private sector.

One way to engage the private sector could be to identify a small cohort of chief executive officers willing to become champions for education. They could advocate and lobby for funding to realize the Fast-Track Initiative funding commitments. Belinda Stronach, chief executive officer of Magna, a Canadian auto parts manufacturer, has expressed interest in supporting such a coalition. Another possibility is to form a coalition of companies that each pledge to donate a fixed amount to the Fast-Track Initiative, much like the coalition in the United States is doing for the Global AIDS Fund.

The World Bank has been consulting with major foundations on how to design an effective window for private sector contributions within the Fast-Track Initiative flexible trust fund for (donor orphan) countries that receive no external support. In a parallel move the Nike Foundation recently became a member, and cofunder, of the Partnership for Sustainable Strategies on Girls' Education, an initiative of the U.K. Department for International Development, UNICEF and the World Bank focused primarily on research and policy analysis.

Another vehicle for private leadership is to form a code of conduct on education, which could intersect with existing codes on fair labour practices, among others. Magna, the Nike Foundation, NetAid, the Center for Universal Education and the Global Campaign for Education are discussing ways to expand the private sector's advocacy in donor nations and the assistance for

poor nations implementing Education for All plans. The United States Agency for International Development has also expressed willingness to support initiatives in this area.

Conclusion

Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals for universal primary education and gender parity in education is too slow to achieve the goals by the target dates.

National governments have the prime responsibility for reaching the education goals. The vast majority of children excluded from education are from poor families, living mainly in developing countries. Providing opportunities for them cannot be left to the market, if only because they are too poor to pay for schooling for themselves.

Securing gender parity by 2005 is also a public responsibility, and nondiscrimination in education is universally acknowledged as a human right. Although it now seems certain that many countries will not achieve this goal on time, governments could take much stronger action. One of the main constraints is school fees. Although most governments are committed to fee-free primary schooling (judging by their political statements), such fees are still levied in 26 of the 34 countries unlikely to reach the gender parity goal by 2005. Removing such fees—perhaps with compensatory financial support to national budgets from the international community—would be one of the strongest immediate measures for such governments. Recent examples in Africa and South Asia provide lessons for other countries.

Many governments also need to implement legislation against most forms of child labour—and

improve the resources and teaching environment in schools, so that teaching materials and curricula no longer discriminate against girls.

Decentralization brings opportunities for more corporate involvement in many countries. “Local heroes” in some regions are matching private and state funds, but questions also arise about the extent to which funds come from communities or from private capital. International capital can sometimes be tapped, but it brings cultural risks where it influences the content of the schooling process.

It is difficult to come up with standards for judging civil society’s efforts. There has been much activity around the question of gender parity and achieving universal education. New NGOs dedicated to these goals have emerged over the last few years, but it is not clear that civil society is doing all that it could. Much more aggressive advocacy and coordination are needed for education to be accorded higher national and international priority.

The record of international agencies and policies in education has been particularly disappointing. The Fast-Track Initiative could be useful in implementing a global education compact. But adequate resources for the initiative and the will to use them productively have not yet been evident.

Endnotes

1. For this comparison, countries with a net enrolment ratio higher than 95% are taken to have achieved the goal. Few countries achieve net enrolment ratios of 100%, and differences among countries having values close to this maximum must be treated with caution owing to possible reporting errors. No data on school enrolments (by

age) for the schoolage population are available for the 50 or so remaining countries.

2. For further discussion, see UNESCO (2002), p. 55.
3. Govinda and Diwan (2003).
4. Colclough and others (2003); Cockburn (2002).
5. Machel (1996).
6. UNAIDS (2002).
7. Riddell (2003).
8. UNESCO and IBE (2001).
9. Whitehead (2003).
10. PREAL (2001).
11. UNESCO (2002).
12. A partnership of the U.K. Department for International Development, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank.
13. Whitehead (2003).
14. World Bank Development Committee (2003).
15. Rose (2003).
14. Chabbott (2003).

References

- Bruns, B., A. Mingat, and R. Rakotomalala. 2003. *A Chance for Every Child: Achieving Universal Primary Education by 2015*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Chabbott, C. 2003. *Constructing Education for Development. International Organisations and Education for All*. New York: Routledge.
- Colclough, C., S. Al-Samarrai, P. Rose, and M. Tembon. 2003. *Achieving Schooling for All in Africa: Costs, Commitment and Gender*. Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate.
- Cockburn, J. 2002. "Income Contributions of Child Work in Rural Ethiopia." Working Paper 171, WPS/2002-12. Centre for the Study of African Economies and Nuffield College, Oxford, England.
- Freire, Carolina. 1999. *Education in Latin America and the Caribbean: Does a Gender Gap Exist?* Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue.
- Gajardo, M. *Reformas educativas en América Latina: Balance de una década*. Documento de Trabajo 15. Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe, Santiago.
- Govinda, R., and R. Diwan, eds. 2003. *Community Participation and Empowerment in Primary Education*. London: Sage Publications.
- Machel, G. 1996. "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children." United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), New York.
- Maluwa-Banda, D. 2003. "Gender Sensitive Educational Policy and Practice: The Case of Malawi." Background paper for *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4*. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris.
- McMeeckin, R. 1996. "Coordination of External Assistance to Education in Latin America and the Caribbean." *Bulletin of the Major Project of Education in Latin America and the Caribbean* 39(April): 18–48.

- Mitchell, C. 2003. "Where Are the Youth? Creating Youth Action Spaces for Countering Gender Inequality in Education." Background paper for *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4*. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris.
- Navarro, J.C., A. Verdisco. 1999. "Teachers in Latin America: New Perspectives on their Development and Performance." Report on the Proceedings of the Conference sponsored by the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe, 28–30 June, San Jose.
- PREAL (Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe). 2000. "Tomorrow Is Too Late." Report of the Task Force on Education Reform in Central America. Santiago.
- . 2001. "Lagging Behind: A Report Card on Education in Latin America." Report of the Task Force on Education, Equity and Economic Competitiveness in the Americas. Santiago.
- . "Best Practices Database." [www.preal.org]
- Puryear, J. M., ed. 1997. *Partners for Progress, Education and the Private Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue.
- Riddell, A. 2003. "The Introduction of Free Primary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa." Background paper for *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4*. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris.
- Rose, P. 2003. "Tracking Progress of the Fast Track Initiative: A Review of the FTI and Indicative Framework for Education Reform." Presentation at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group on EFA, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 22–23 July, Paris.
- Schiefelbein, E. 1994. "Characteristics of the Teaching Profession and the Quality of Education in Latin America." *Bulletin of the Major Project of Education in Latin America and the Caribbean* 34(August): 3–17.
- Transitional Government of Ethiopia. 1994. "Education and Training Policy" and "National Policy on Ethiopian Women." Addis Ababa.
- UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS). 2002. *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002*. Geneva.
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). 2002. *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2002: Education for All. Is the World on Track?* Paris.
- . 2003. *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4: Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality*. Paris.
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and IBE (International Bureau of Education). 2001. "Synthesis Report: Involvement of Civil Society in EFA." 46th session of the International Conference on Education IBE, Collective Consultation of NGOs for EFA, 5–8 September, Paris.
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), Institute for Statistics. 2003. "Investments for the Future: Financing Education in Latin America and the Caribbean." Draft paper. Paris.
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), Oficina Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe. 2003. *Panorama educativo de las Americas: Informe regional: Proyecto regional de indicadores educativos*. Cumbre de las Americas, Chile.
- United Nations. 1999. *World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision. Volume II: The Sex and Age Distribution of the World Population*. New York.
- . 2001. "Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific." New York.

Whitehead, A. 2003. *Failing Women, Sustaining Poverty: Gender in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*. U.K. Gender and Development Network, London.

Wolfensohn, James D. "The Challenges of Globalization: The Role of the World Bank." Speech to the World Bank Group, 2 April, Berlin.

Wolff, L. 2003. *Can Latin America Catch Up? An Updated Report Card on Education in Latin America*. Draft Paper.

Wolff, L., E. Schiefelbein, Paulina Schiefelbein. 2002. "La educación primaria en América Latina: La agenda inconclusa." Documento de Trabajo 24. Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe, Santiago.

World Bank Development Committee. 2003. "Education for Dynamic Economies: Accelerating Progress towards Education for All." Washington, D.C.

World Bank Group, Human Development Network, Latin America and the Caribbean. 1999. "Educational Change in Latin America and the Caribbean." Washington, D.C.

Methodology

The Expert Group assessed the efforts of four actors—governments, international agencies, the private sector and civil society—on the Education for All goals for gender equity, using a scale based on gaps in capacity, planning and resources. The score for each actor was the mean of scores assigned to it in each major region of the world by the group. No regional disaggregation was made for international agencies. The score for governments was assigned double weight because of their importance in

achieving the goals at a global level. The scores were then aggregated and divided by five (because government scores were double-weighted) to arrive at a mean estimate of effort for all the actors.

Expert Group members

Chair: Christopher Colclough, Professor, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, and Director, Education for All Monitoring Report, UNESCO

Anne Jellema, Director, Campaign for Education

Amina Ibrahim, Coordinator, National Education for All

Gene Sperling, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Universal Education, Council on Foreign Relations

Marcela Gajardo, Director, Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas

R. Govinda, Senior Fellow and Head, School and Non-Formal Education Unit, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration


Key informants

Inés Aguerrondo, Noel Aguirre, Vicky Colbert de Arboleda, Patricia de Arregui, Beatrice Avalos, Jose Joaquín Brunner, Francisco Cajiao, Claudius Ceccon, Josefina Bruni Celli, Claudio de Moura Castro, Inés Dussel, María Antonia Gallar, Pablo Gonzalez, Maria Helena Guimaraes Castro, Sergio Haddad, Marta Liliana Herrera, Pablo Latapí, Sergio Martinic, Sofialeticia Morales, Juan Carlos Navarro, Pedro Ravela, José Rivero, Ernesto Schiefelbein, Silvia Schmelke, Simon Schwartzman, Rosa María Torres, Juan Carlos Tudesco, Denise Vaillant.



5 Health

Score
4



Score

4

Goals

- **Stop and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria.**
- **Reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate and by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio, by 2015.¹**

Health

Everyone dies one day. But will children routinely die before their parents? Will mothers die unnecessarily during childbirth? In developing countries the answer is too often yes. This need not be so. Health indices across the globe can be dramatically improved by making more extensive use of tools already at hand—by investing more in proven cost-effective technologies and by deploying the basic health infrastructure needed for their delivery.

Context

Health is a complex state of well-being that enhances and extends life and contributes to a productive society. It is the outcome of many factors, not just direct investments in health services.

All the Millennium Development Goals being tracked by the Global Governance Initiative affect health.

- Peace and security—critical to maintaining health services and preventing the violence, hunger, poverty and infections accompanying conflict.
- Poverty.
- Hunger—protein-energy and micronutrient malnutrition reduce resistance to deadly infections.
- Education—particularly of mothers.
- Environment—water and sanitation, breeding grounds for infectious agents.
- Human rights—especially of women.

And ill health affects many of the other Millennium Goals. For example, HIV/AIDS reduces a population's capacity to work, farm and feed itself or care for its children. Having fewer consumers reduces purchasing power and inhibits economic growth, reducing investments in education and in


health. The result: a vicious cycle of poverty, hunger, instability and poor health.

The most common health indicator is life expectancy (at birth), largely driven by infant and under-five mortality, since years lost at a very young age have a greater impact on total life expectancy than does extending the life of the elderly. In medieval times as many as half of all children died before reaching their fifth birthday. Only in the past century did under-five mortality in high-income countries fall below 70 deaths per 1,000 live births (Norway, 1930; the United Kingdom and the United States, 1940; Japan, 1950; the Soviet Union, 1980). Today the rate among industrial nations is less than 1%. But in some developing nations it still exceeds 20%. For Sub-Saharan Africa it fell from 253 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 173 in 2001. But in South Asia it fell from 244 to 98.

Life expectancy and under-five mortality are strongly correlated with economic status. On average, life expectancy rises dramatically as per capita GNP reaches \$2,000 and more gradually thereafter. But in some low- and middle-income countries (Cuba, Vietnam) life expectancy is “disproportionately” long, while in some rich countries (the Gulf States) it is short, reflecting differences in the dispersion of income and investment in basic health services.

Income operates on mortality at many levels. In poor countries, the poorest of the “poor” have higher under-five mortality than the least “poor”. The poorest of the poor are less likely to have adequate housing, nutrition, potable water or sanitation. They also have less access to preventive services (vaccines, micronutrient supplements, insecticide-treated bednets, malarial prophylaxis

Africa's maternal mortality ratio is twice as high as that of the next closest region



Every year more than 11 million children die before their fifth birthday and half a million women die from complications related to pregnancy and childbirth

and skilled birth attendants) and to treatment (antibiotics, rehydration, antimalarial and antiretroviral therapy).

Hunger is particularly damaging to health. It is estimated that nearly half of all childhood deaths are related to poor nutrition (protein-energy and vitamin A deficiency). And iron-deficiency anemia dramatically increases pregnancy-related mortality.

Every year more than 11 million children die before their fifth birthday and half a million women die from complications related to pregnancy and childbirth. Most of these deaths can be prevented. Child and maternal mortality are reduced by spacing births, breastfeeding infants and improving reproductive practices. Family planning—strongly influenced by education and political rights, particularly of women—reduces the risk of unintended pregnancies and thus maternal mortality. Prenatal services, improved maternal nutrition, family planning and access to skilled birth attendants also reduce maternal mortality. Rates in high income countries are less than 25 deaths per 100,000 live births. But in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa they can be 20–40 times that.

Malaria kills upwards of 1 million people a year, mainly young children and pregnant women. HIV/AIDS has already claimed nearly 30 million lives, left 14 million children without their mothers and infected another 42 million individuals (38 million of them in the developing world). Those infected will eventually die unless technology provides a cure and unless exacting (and expensive) treatment regimens are made widely available in the developing world. Massive numbers of new cases are expected over the next few years, particularly in South Asia and in Europe and Central

Asia. Preventing them will require strong political will and dramatic changes in sexual behaviour and substance abuse. It is unlikely an effective vaccine will become available for at least 10–15 years.

Since health is the outcome of many interacting factors, improving one or two of them may not demonstrably change rates of infection or mortality. Droughts, floods, unchecked mosquito populations and reductions in security and nutrition can swamp otherwise beneficial investments.

The score for 2003, 4 on a scale of zero to 10, is based more on the promises of new collaborative structures and declared intentions during 2003 than on actual achievements. Over the past few years there has been a sea-change in perceptions and the assumed responsibilities for global health, with new alliances and bold promises. But it will take time, under the best of circumstances, to ramp up interventions to the levels needed to reach the goals. It needs to be understood that the longer that efforts fall below the required level, the steeper the trajectory of inputs needed in succeeding years to catch up.

The Global Fund focuses on three major infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) rather than just one, so as not to drain resources from one to the others. Even so, it and other (“vertical”) investments have diverted attention and support from equally important health issues. Brazil’s focus on AIDS treatment has cut infant HIV infection rates in half—but depleted local clinics of antibiotics to treat childhood pneumonia. While child survival and maternal mortality benefit from reductions in HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, childhood and maternal health have lost much of the attention and support they once received.


It is equally important that all countries and sectors of society participate in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, not just a few large countries that can move global averages

It is equally important that all countries and sectors of society participate in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, not just a few large countries that can move global averages. Countries with the worst health indices must improve the most.

Dedicated deployments of technology and resources can help in reaching the goals. Look at the way HIV/AIDS has dramatically declined in formerly high-incidence countries, such as Thailand and Uganda. Why? Because of strong political leadership and engaged, supportive coalitions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). And look at other successes:

- Polio has been eradicated from the Americas and much of the rest of the world through national programs assisted by Rotary International, with coordination and technical leadership from the World Health Organization (WHO).
- Public and private partnerships and international agencies, spurred in part by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have developed coordinated strategies to dramatically reduce malaria (Roll Back Malaria) while working to develop more effective drugs (Medicines for Malaria Venture) and a viable vaccine for the future (Malaria Vaccine Initiative)—the first major collaborations to control malaria since the demise of the global efforts more than 30 years ago.
- The pharmaceutical industry has agreed to changes in the World Trade Organization's Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements and developed innovative tiered pricing strategies as a means of dramatically increasing the availability of otherwise prohibitively costly drugs for poor nations.

Still far to go to meet the goal of reducing child mortality



Source: World Bank 2002.

- Nepal has reduced childhood deaths through a nationwide, government-coordinated, NGO-led volunteer delivery system of periodic vitamin A supplementation.
- Kiwanis International has worked with the private sector and local governments to dramatically reduce iodine deficiency and its disorders.
- Haiti has managed to immunize 90% of its children.


Health, a central to the global agenda, has captured the attention and commitment of local governments, international agencies, civil society and the private sector. But speeches, alliances and declarations run far ahead of the funds needed to achieve the stated goals. And funds alone won't make the difference. Personnel need to be trained, retained and motivated to form effective delivery systems. New and innovative management and evaluation systems need to be put in place. Partnerships must be formed and strengthened. And people must be engaged in insuring they make use of services and change behaviours essential to their health and that of their communities.

Child mortality

Every minute, 20 children under the age of five die—nearly all in developing countries.

The Child Survival Revolution, launched in 1982 by the late Jim Grant, then Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),² led to major progress in reducing child mortality in the 1980s and in the early 1990s through simple and effective public health interventions.³ At the World Summit for Children in 1990, 71 heads of state met in New York to pledge their support for a one-third reduction in mortality among children under the age

Coverage of DPT3 vaccine is no higher now than at the beginning of the 1990s



Source: UNICEF 2001.

of five by 2000. Since the mid-1990s, however, that momentum has been lost, and earlier gains in child survival have slowed or even reversed.⁴ And global under-five mortality declined by only a tenth, from 93 deaths per 1,000 in the early 1990s to 83 in 2000. About 60 countries achieved the proposed one-third reduction, but more than 100 failed.⁵

Vaccine coverage is a key indicator of child survival efforts. But immunization rates with a key vaccine against diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus have stalled at less than 70% in South Asia and actually declined in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 60% in the early 1990s to 40% today.⁶ Globally, we were not doing as well in 1999 as we were 10 years ago.⁷

The child survival revolution, for all its gains, largely failed to reach disadvantaged population groups, leading to rising health inequalities. A child born in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 had a 20 times greater risk of dying than a child born in a developed country; by 2000 that risk was 29 times greater.⁸

The experience of the 1980s and 1990s was therefore a mixture of success and failure. At the Millennium Summit in 2000 the member states of the United Nations reaffirmed their commitment to improving child survival. Millennium Development Goal 5 aims to achieve a two-thirds reduction in under-five mortality between 1990 and 2015.⁹

Most countries, particularly the poorest, are not on track for reaching the child survival goal. Of great concern is that child mortality has become more concentrated.¹⁰

A further concern is that several countries may be able to achieve their child survival goals without substantially improving survival of their poorest children. Evidence shows that it is easier to

improve survival of richer children.¹¹ It has been estimated that if all children in developing countries had the same mortality rate as children from the richest 20% of families in the same country, under-five mortality would drop by about 40%.¹²

The leading causes of death for children under the age of five are neonatal causes (deaths taking place in the first month of life due to prematurity, birth trauma, congenital malformations and infections), diarrhoea and pneumonia. Malnutrition contributes to about half of those deaths.¹³


What is depressing is that feasible and cost-effective interventions are available to prevent about two-thirds of these deaths through exclusive breastfeeding, insecticide-treated bednets to prevent malaria, complementary feeding of young children, vitamin A supplementation and clean deliveries, among others.¹⁴ Highly cost-effective curative interventions include oral rehydration therapy for diarrhoea, antibiotics and antimalarials. Immunizations are also important. Polio has been eradicated from the Americas, and there has been only a handful of measles cases in the Western Hemisphere since November 2002.¹⁵

In short, progress towards the child survival goal so far has not been satisfactory. Unless child health is put back onto the international agenda, it is unlikely that the goal will be reached. As one expert consulted for this analysis stated: “We need a renewed global effort in child survival with strong global stewardship and a broad partnership to achieve this goal.”

Maternal mortality

Pregnancy and childbirth claim the lives of an estimated 515,000 women each year—one woman every minute—about 98% of them in developing

Under-five mortality would plunge if the poorest 80% in a country had the same rate as the richest 20%



Source: World Bank, from DHS data.

countries and nearly all preventable. The lifetime risk of maternal death can be 1 in 10 in some of the least developed countries. For developed countries it is one in several thousands.

Maternal deaths, one of the greatest health inequities today, is only the tip of an iceberg of illness and suffering among those who survive. In *World Development Report 1993*, which assessed disease burden measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) lost, maternal conditions ranked as the number one cause of disease burden (accounting for 18%) among women ages 15–44 in developing countries. Several million infants die each year in the first 28 days of life because of maternal complications.

Maternal deaths appear to be declining, in significant part because of declining estimates of the numbers of live births in recent years. The problem varies substantially by region. Although there is a considerable time lag in the data. It appears that total numbers of maternal deaths are falling in Asia and Central America, but increasing substantially in Africa.

Data on births attended by skilled health personnel for 1990–99, monitored by WHO, indicate progress in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the Middle East and North Africa, but little in Asia, excluding China and India (box 5.1). In Sub-Saharan Africa the ratio of births attended by skilled health personnel has declined.

Six countries account for more than half of all maternal deaths (according to WHO estimates): Bangladesh (20,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (20,000), Ethiopia (46,000), India (110,000), Indonesia (22,000) and Nigeria (45,000). According to

Box 5.1 More problems with measurement—maternal mortality

The first step in evaluating global efforts to address maternal mortality is to determine the scope of the problem—something surprisingly difficult. Even in statistically developed countries, where the conventional source of information is the civil registration system, maternal deaths tend to be underrecorded, a result of misclassifying the cause. Most of developing countries, and almost all of those where maternal mortality levels are very high, have no reliable systems of civil registration.

These difficulties have led to the development of proxy indicators that can be more easily measured. The indicators measure access to, use of and quality of services most likely to reduce maternal mortality. One such indicator, adopted for the Millennium Development Goals, is the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel. The target is to increase the proportion of deliveries with skilled attendants to 80% from 58% by 2005.

WHO, it is very unlikely for the target to be reached in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. It may be possible to reach it in some parts of Asia and Latin America. Only countries in Eastern Europe and parts of South America are clearly on track to reach it.

These statistics are all the more appalling given the strong evidence that the goal is reachable. Experience in developing countries shows that political will and adequate resources can sharply reduce maternal mortality in all parts of the world and at all points of economic development. Thailand reduced the maternal mortality ratio from 400 per 100,000 live births to 200 in 11–12 years, halved it to 100 in another 4–6 years and halved it again to 50 in another 4–6 years. Malaysia halved

Many developing-country governments are trying to do better in reducing maternal mortality. But overall, the level of governmental effort is disappointing. For many the problem is not the lack of commitment but the inadequacy of resources

maternal mortality from 200 to 100 in 9–10 years and halved it again in 7–8 years. Sri Lanka halved its maternal mortality ratio from 400 to 200 in 9–10 years and halved it again in another 7–8 years. Honduras halved it from 200 to 100 in 9–10 years, Chile in 4–6 years.

The goal is not only reachable, but it is a smart social investment. As a World Bank report recently found, “A decade of research and experience in addressing maternal health has made it clear that safe motherhood initiatives are a sound investment, promising high social and economic returns at low cost. Interventions to improve maternal health and nutrition are not only cost-effective but also clearly feasible, even in poor settings. The potential benefits are substantial.”

Many developing-country governments are trying to do better. Bolivia increased access and coverage of skilled attendance at birth for poor women by making maternal and newborn care available through a social insurance scheme. Indonesia and Sudan are increasing the number of skilled attendants in villages, ensuring that the village midwife can provide first-line life-saving skills and refer clients to a facility for managing complications. Policy changes in Mozambique allow lower level trained health personnel to perform life-saving procedures, increasing the coverage of services.

Peru reports a significant reduction over the last 10 years, partly by making services culturally acceptable, which required health service providers to change attitudes and practices. Women can give birth in an upright or squatting position, making services more acceptable, and husbands are allowed to be present. Women are also encouraged to monitor and evaluate services.

Egypt reduced the maternal mortality from 174 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1992 to 84 in 2000. The reduction was attributed to improving the quality of obstetric care, increasing access to family planning, educating women and their families about seeking prompt medical care for problems during pregnancy and labour and training village birth attendants to refer women with obstetric complications.


But overall, the level of governmental effort is disappointing. For many developing countries the problem is not the lack of commitment but the inadequacy of resources. Health sector reform may have contributed in some countries to the lack of access to services by the poor. Donor countries and intergovernmental donors are not providing the needed resources or leadership.

Some nongovernmental actors have made important contributions. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provides generous grants. The MacArthur Foundation is making the reduction of maternal mortality a high priority in its population and reproductive health program. Other foundations have not been active. The economic climate in the United States affected the grant-giving capacity of U.S.-based foundations. Very few foundations are providing support to reduce the mortality and morbidity associated with unsafe abortion in developing countries. NGOs have been active in advocacy role, but they are naturally constrained by a lack of resources.

Business is invisible in efforts to reduce maternal mortality, except for a donation by the pharmaceutical company Pharmacia (before its merger with Upjohn) of \$750,000 to the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics to help launch a Save the Mothers

Access to services for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS was virtually universal in Western Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand—but 1% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3–6% in South and Southeast Asia and East Asia and the Pacific and 19% in Latin America and the Caribbean

A comprehensive response would greatly reduce the rate of HIV infection



Source: Stover and others 2002.

Fund. A rare initiative to involve the private sector—a Corporate Initiative for Safe Motherhood launched at a high level meeting at the World Bank in 1998—has gone nowhere.

The Partnership for Safe Motherhood and Newborn Health was launched in 2003, an independent entity housed in WHO. Needed now is a forum for all donors committed to reducing maternal mortality to coordinate their efforts and to focus on countries with the greatest need and the greatest possible impact.

HIV/AIDS

If the HIV/AIDS pandemic proceeds at its current rate, there will be 45 million new infections by 2010 and nearly 70 million deaths by 2020. Of the 42 million people now living with HIV/AIDS, 29.4 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 million in South and Southeast Asia, 1.5 million in Latin America, 1.2 million in East Asia and the Pacific, 1 million in North America, 570,000 in Western Europe, 550,000 in North Africa and the Middle East, 440,000 in the Caribbean and 15,000 in Australia and New Zealand.¹⁶

An estimated 700,000 newborns contracted HIV from their mothers in 2002. The access to services for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission was virtually universal in Western Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand—but 1% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3–6% in South and Southeast Asia and East Asia and the Pacific and 19% in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁷

Because HIV/AIDS is primarily a disease of young adults, it kills people in their prime, destroying the human capital built up over the years of child-rearing, formal education and on-the-job training. HIV/AIDS also destroys the institutions and mechanisms that form human capital. Parents


missing from the home eliminate a major source of human capital formation. Low income due to missing or sick parents reduces income and thus the choices children might have. Children from such homes will not have the resources, and possibly not the motivation, to invest in their own education. HIV/AIDS also reduces a country's tax base and ability to make further investments in programs and institutions to build human capital, making a downward cycle, difficult to turn around.¹⁸

What's needed to tackle HIV/AIDS? Two things. First, deploying available prevention and treatment technologies. And second, accelerating scientific discovery to develop new technologies, especially an effective vaccine, something extremely difficult for this highly variable and inadequately understood infection. Because no promising vaccine has yet reached the stage of widespread human testing, it is unlikely that an effective vaccine will be available in time to help reach the 2015 goal. Even so, new approaches to develop vaccines need to be embarked on, and progress in bringing concepts to trial, often slow, can be accelerated.

In the near term, other technologies may contribute to prevention and treatment. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is sponsoring several clinical trials to evaluate the efficacy of various strategies for reducing HIV acquisition and transmission. These include male circumcision, the use of the female diaphragm and herpes suppression through chronic acyclovir use. Other clinical trials, sponsored by the U.S. National Institutes of Health and other agencies, are under way or planned. These include antiretrovirals for HIV-infected mothers and babies during the breastfeeding period, various microbicide agents, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, novel treatments for

Businesses increase expenditures and lose revenue due to HIV/AIDS

Distribution of increased labour costs due to HIV/AIDS



Source: Robert Lindsay, Coca-Cola.

drugs of abuse, rapid HIV testing in entire communities and antiretrovirals to reduce the infectiousness of HIV-infected individuals. At least \$1 billion a year should be spent on identifying, testing and deploying new prevention technologies and strategies. Leading research organizations should meet annually to discuss progress, priorities and strategy.

On deploying available prevention and treatment technologies, 2003 brought reason for hope. The scene is set for more people to have access to antiretroviral medications. The annual cost of anti-HIV medications has fallen from \$10,000 to \$300, largely as a result of the ability of generic drug manufacturers to produce the drugs cheaply. More money is now available for HIV/AIDS than ever before. Low- and middle-income countries spent \$4.7 billion on HIV/AIDS in 2003, up from \$200 million in 1996. The U.S. Congress is set to approve \$2.4 billion for HIV/AIDS in fiscal 2004.¹⁹

More political leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are speaking up and addressing the epidemic. The government of South Africa, with 5 million infected citizens, announced a major treatment initiative in November. The Chinese government launched a public information campaign to promote awareness and condom use. Dramatic television pictures of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao comforting AIDS patients and pledging government support were a remarkable breakthrough by a government that had previously downplayed the epidemic.

Intergovernmental organizations of many stripes are pitching in. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), under the direction of Dr. Peter Piot, continues to advocate for appropriate resources

At least \$1 billion a year should be spent on identifying, testing and deploying new prevention technologies and strategies for HIV/AIDS

and policies to fight the epidemic—and to coordinate the UN agencies and the world's governments in mounting a response appropriate to the damage.

On 1 December 2003 (World AIDS Day) WHO launched its “3 by 5 program” to get 3 million people on anti-HIV drugs by 2005. The WHO plan involves assisting countries in procuring drugs cheaply and in building healthcare delivery systems so that 100,000 volunteers can be trained to deliver and monitor anti-HIV medication regimens. WHO has also announced its intention to build a global AIDS Drugs and Diagnostics Facility, to help developing countries procure and use good-quality antiretrovirals.


UNICEF is working with governments in several priority areas: preventing new infections among young people; expanding protection and support for orphans, vulnerable children and families living with HIV/AIDS; and assisting children and young people in armed conflict.

The World Bank is working with its partners to prevent the further spread of HIV/AIDS among vulnerable groups and in the general population, promote countries' health policies and multisectoral approaches and expand basic care and treatment activities for those affected by HIV/AIDS and their families. Over the past few years, it has committed \$1.6 billion in grants, loans and credits for HIV/AIDS programs worldwide, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. As of July 2003 the Bank had committed more than \$800 million for HIV/AIDS programs in 23 African countries, though much is yet to be disbursed.

The Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program is designed to dramatically increase access to HIV/AIDS

Many companies provide HIV prevention to employees and families, and more are delivering antiretrovirals and other essential medications to employees and families

HIV is a growing problem among young women in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank 2003b.

prevention, care and treatment programs, with an emphasis on vulnerable groups. The program provides resources to local communities to launch their own HIV interventions. It focuses on encouraging strong government commitment, scaling up what works, increasing community participation and ownership and moving to a multisectoral approach with improved coordination and decentralization.

Wealthy governments are also contributing to the global fight. The U.S. Congress authorized an Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year, \$15 billion initiative which aims, by 2008, to prevent 7 million new HIV infections, treat 2 million HIV-infected individuals and care for 10 million HIV-infected individuals and AIDS orphans in 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. Only \$10 billion of these funds are new funds; the other \$5 billion are being diverted from other accounts. Targeted for these resources are 14 countries, 12 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 2 in the Caribbean.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with assets of \$23 billion, has committed several hundred million dollars to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, research and policy programs domestically and internationally. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation has committed \$50 million over five years to “loveLife,” an initiative in South Africa to reduce HIV infection among adolescents by promoting sexual health and healthy futures through the use of high-powered media coordinated with nationwide outreach, support and clinical services. The Rockefeller Foundation has committed \$15 million over five years for medical studies of cost-effective AIDS care in Africa—and another \$15 million over five years to advance research on microbicides, topical gels and


ointments that can prevent infection with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

In 2001 Bristol-Myers-Squibb committed \$15 million for a new program called “Secure the Future” to develop ways to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS among women and children and to help communities deal with AIDS. To date, it has allocated 60% of these funds to 130 community projects in five Sub-Saharan African countries. In 2001 an additional \$15 million was committed to projects in four West African countries. GlaxoSmithKline has invested about \$50 million in Positive Action, to help people living with HIV play a more visible role in national HIV policymaking and in fighting stigma and discrimination.

Merck launched an initiative in 2000 with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Botswana to improve the overall status of HIV/AIDS care and treatment there. In June 2001 Pfizer announced a program to provide the resources and infrastructure to provide treatment and clinical training at Makerere University in Uganda through the Academic Alliance. Pfizer also announced that it will offer Diflucan, a drug to combat fungal infections associated with AIDS, free of charge to more than 50 of the poorest and most AIDS-affected nations. Boehringer Ingelheim has promised free nevirapine to any country in Sub-Saharan Africa that desires it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission.

Major multinational corporations doing business in HIV/AIDS-affected developing countries are offering care and prevention services to employees. Many companies provide HIV prevention to employees and families, and more are delivering antiretrovirals and other essential medications to employees and families.

Most women in Sub-Saharan Africa attend an antenatal clinic at least once



a. Attended by skilled provider. b. Does not reflect skill level of provider. Source: DHS, 1998–2001.

Despite the flurry of activity, the gap between need and available resources remains immense. Current spending of \$4.7 billion worldwide on HIV/AIDS programs in low- and middle-income countries is less than half what is needed for an effective response to AIDS in 2005 alone.²⁰ Fewer than one in five people at risk for HIV infection worldwide have access to basic prevention services such as HIV counselling and testing or diagnosis and treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, only 6% of people have access to HIV counselling and testing, and only 1% of pregnant women have access to treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission. In Latin America and the Caribbean only 11% of men who have sex with men, who account for the single largest share of infections in the region, have meaningful access to targeted behavioural interventions. Only 1 in 9 injection drug users in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have meaningful access to harm reduction programs, and only 1 in 6 people who need services for sexually transmitted diseases can obtain them.²¹

Only an estimated 800,000 of the 42 million people infected with HIV/AIDS were on antiretroviral therapy as of the end of 2002. Most (500,000) were in North America, Western Europe and Australia and New Zealand. Of the rest 196,000 were in Latin America and the Caribbean (125,000 of them in Brazil), 43,000 in Asia, 7,000 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and 3,000 in North Africa and the Middle East. Only 50,000 of the 29.4 million people with HIV/AIDS in Africa were receiving antiretroviral therapy at the end of 2002.²²

The gap between resources and needs remains enormous. The U.S. initiative, for example, if fully funded, might prevent 15% of projected new

infections. The initiative seeks to treat 2 million people with HIV/AIDS by 2008. By a conservative estimate, some 60 million people will be living with HIV/AIDS in 2008, 20% of whom might qualify for treatment. Thus, at best this initiative will provide treatment only for 10% of those who need it.


Beyond funding, the biggest problem is absorptive capacity and enough staffing in the field to actually run the funded programs. These problems increase dramatically in hard-hit countries, where medical staff and civil servants are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS.

Malaria

Global efforts have fallen demonstrably short in halting malaria. But there are grounds for optimism. Effective interventions exist and are feasible and affordable. And there are key international resources that are mobilizing against the disease: the Roll-Back Malaria program, the Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others.

Malaria has long been a major health burden and leading cause of death, particularly in young children and particularly in Africa. Each year, malaria causes more than 300 million illnesses and 1 million deaths. It is responsible for one in every five deaths in young children in Africa, making attention to malaria a key element of reducing child mortality. The disease places substantial demands on the fragile health infrastructure in Africa, where a third of outpatient visits and a quarter of child hospital admissions may be due to malaria. And a recent evaluation of the economic impact of malaria suggests that there are unmet costs—for households, for health systems and for national economies.²³ Because

Use of insecticide-treated bednets needs to increase in Africa



Source: WHO and UNICEF 2003.

more than 75% of the infections and 90% of the deaths from malaria are in Sub-Saharan Africa, efforts to reduce the malaria burden must focus there.

The global consensus on malaria is clear. At the United Nations in 2001, the world's governments proclaimed a Resolution on the Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, particularly in Africa (A/RES/55/284). By 2005 at least 60% of people at risk should have access to effective prevention techniques and 60% of victims should have access to effective treatment.

The global effort to control malaria has so far been a mix of opportunities seized and opportunities missed. Malaria prevention and control tools are up to the task. And case management tools for prompt diagnosis and effective treatment keep the malaria infection from progressing to death. There is concern about resistance to the insecticides and drugs, but tools are weak, and some research and development is under way to identify new insecticides and drugs for the future.

There are also cost-effective ways to get these tools into the hands of those who need them. In Sub-Saharan Africa most pregnant women do attend antenatal care programs where they could receive important malaria prevention measures.

And there are more funds available to pay for such costs. The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is disbursing significant amounts for malaria (box 5.2). The total approved in the first three rounds of applications for malaria for the initial two years of the proposed support is \$491 million globally and \$372 million for Africa. More countries are mainstreaming malaria control in their

Box 5.2 A new model of global cooperation—the Global Fund

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, created in 2002, finances high-quality programs to fight the three diseases worldwide. A financing instrument, not an implementing agency, it brings together governments, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, the private sector and affected communities. Both public and private entities sit on the board and can submit and implement proposals. As of March 2004 the fund had dispersed more than \$283 million to programs in 76 countries, approved proposals in 123 countries, pledging more than \$2 billion in grants.

Source: www.theglobalfund.org/en/publications/qaen.pdf

health budgets, and bilateral funding for malaria is on the rise.

Despite the proven effectiveness of insecticide-treated bednets, the population and household coverage with insecticide-treated bednets in Sub-Saharan Africa is very low. Some countries have modest household coverage with mosquito bednets, but the coverage with insecticide-treated bednets is less than 5%.

Similarly, intermittent preventive treatment coverage for pregnant women is low (despite high rates of attendance at antenatal clinics), and the coverage of prompt effective treatment for malaria remains low. The Roll Back Malaria partnership fills the void in leadership of the last two to three decades, but much remains to be done. UNICEF and WHO have not fully clarified their respective roles or coordinated strategic planning. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have not

Long-standing committees exist to coordinate UN agencies in areas such as nutrition and child health, but there is little evidence of anything more than policy declarations

coordinated adequately with the other UN agencies in the malaria prevention effort.

Global cooperation

Plenty of studies from UN agencies offer excellent analyses of health status, trends and gaps. They recommend actions for reducing the gaps, and they pay attention to the programs needed to address the gaps.²⁴

The main UN agencies responsible for the health goals are WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). They frame their work in terms of the Millennium Development Goals, the subset of Millennium Declaration aspirations that focus on poverty, hunger, education and health. WHO sees its role as providing technical guidance to country-based programs, monitoring the achievement of the health goals and coordinating the efforts of the other agencies. It recently launched the “global metrics” program for tracking health progress, financed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

The Millennium Development Goals for health do not cover the spectrum of public health issues encompassed in WHO technical cooperation with countries. But they do provide the organization with a framework to deal with interrelated issues and to link health with other development goals. There is no evidence as yet of budgetary or programmatic shifts that give special prominence to the Millennium Development Goals for health.

Long-standing committees exist to coordinate UN agencies in areas such as nutrition and child health, but there is little evidence of anything more than policy declarations. Except for consolidating country UN agencies into teams, still experimental, there are few examples of the joint planning and

programming that would lead to genuine cooperative action at the country level. The exception is UNAIDS, which has made significant progress in achieving some coordination among the cosponsors, by drawing on their individual expertise and adding value in many areas that need a coordinated approach. This is the only UN agency whose total budget is devoted to one Millennium Development Goal (though reducing maternal mortality is a major part of the UNFPA's work).

The UN system contributes no more than 10% of the financial inflows into health globally, and it is unlikely that this will increase, given the growing tendency to channel additional funding for health through other mechanisms. U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans to allocate \$15 billion to HIV/AIDS, but through an independent system. The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria mobilizes funds targeted to specific diseases through a special mechanism. While these efforts mobilize resources for diseases within the scope of the Millennium Development Goals, the mechanisms circumvent global agencies established for this very purpose.

Two-thirds of official development assistance for health comes from national aid agencies, the other third from such multilateral development banks as the World Bank. Health funding from the World Bank has increased, but mostly in loans, some soft, some hard. Combined these outlays are insufficient to meet the resource needs of the developing countries if they are going to reach the Millennium Development Goals.

In terms of global coordination, the World Bank–IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are billed as the action plans for the Millennium

Corporate work on HIV/AIDS shows how the largest companies can immediately reach millions of workers and their families

Development Goals at the country level. But recent analysis of the PRSPs show that few have benefited from an analysis of the Millennium Development Goals, with the two matters treated separately. There is also a lack of congruence between the United Nations Development Programme's coordination of development efforts at the country level and the Bank's PRSP process.²⁵

Several foundations active in global health contribute to reaching the Millennium Development Goals, even though no single foundation has specifically targeted them. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation believes that global health can be improved by scaling up access to existing health interventions and accelerating research to develop better tools. The declared focus areas are infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, reproductive health, child health and global health. The foundation has committed more than \$3 billion in global health grants to various organizations and institutions. One of the more recent is \$200 million for a campaign to identify and attack the greatest problems in international public health—the Global Challenges.

The Wellcome Trust, a major investor in health, supports biomedical research to address problems that in the long term will be relevant to the Millennium Development Goals for health. But its research funding is not related to the health goals. The UN Foundation (financed by Ted Turner) and the Rockefeller Foundation, while important, are not likely to provide the scale of funding.

These philanthropic organizations, led by Gates, are addressing health in their own ways. For philosophical and strategic reasons, they are not focused on the Millennium Development Goals. The private sector, in response to changing perceptions

of corporate social responsibility is doing more on public health issues. It is moving from ad hoc corporate cash philanthropy to integrated programmes based on corporate strengths and long-term shared benefits. Corporate work on HIV/AIDS shows how the largest companies can immediately reach millions of workers and their families. Companies are inducing smaller companies to act, providing them with materials and resources.

Beyond formal workplace programs are truly innovative approaches. The Uganda Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, with its Afya Sokoni partnership, is targeting 45,000 vendors with a daily customer base of 110,000 in the Owino–St. Balikuddembe market, the largest in East and Central Africa. The coalition is training peer educators and disseminating HIV/AIDS information to workers in the market, 70% of them women, typically with low incomes. To deliver HIV/AIDS services in this community, the coalition partners with umbrella organizations, such as the Uganda Market Vendors Association, to build on loose administrative structures. The coalition also works with municipal authorities that licence these informal businesses, to get further commitment and support from the vendors.

The Afya Sokoni partnership is a collaboration of Uganda Business Coalition, the Norwegian development agency, the Uganda Market Vendors Association and the Mayors Alliance. The Uganda Market Vendors Association's members in 56 markets across Uganda providing large opportunities for scaling up, if funding is available. Funding to scale the project up to cover antiretroviral treatment for up to 10,000 patients was announced by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation on 10 September 2003.

Businesses can also reach the mainstream population, their consumers. Coca-Cola uses its expertise in marketing to spread HIV/AIDS prevention messages. The Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Ghana and the Coca-Cola Company have supported the Ghana AIDS Commission and UNAIDS in the fight against HIV/AIDS. They sponsor World AIDS Day and media awareness campaigns on radio, television and billboards.

Very little corporate giving goes beyond the city that houses the corporate headquarters, and even less goes overseas, let alone to public health. In 2001 developed world corporations gave only \$350 million in cash to health programs in the developing world. But in 2002 nine multinational pharmaceutical companies donated some \$778 million worth of medicines for developing-country health programmes administered by private humanitarian agencies.

Conclusion

The single greatest impediment to achieving the health goals is the lack of support and leadership by the governments of affected countries. HIV/AIDS continues to spread most aggressively in countries where leaders refuse to take the threat seriously and put in place effective prevention strategies (China, India and South Africa are looming disasters). Where they have, as in Thailand and Uganda, intensive epidemics have slowed.

The same is so for child and maternal mortality. Child mortality could be dramatically reduced by raising immunization rates to levels reached in the 1980s and early 1990s. But governments have not made the needed investments. Nor has the international community interceded in political chaos to organize the temporary halts in hostilities that once mobilized resources from all sides to immunize children.

Endnotes

1. United Nations Millennium Declaration.
2. UNICEF (1996).
3. Jones and others (2003).
4. Ahmad, Lopez and Inoue (2000).
5. UNICEF (2001).
6. UNICEF (2001).
7. Bryce and others (2003).
8. Victora and others (2003).
9. World Bank Group (2003).
10. Victora and others (2003).
11. Gwatkin (2002).
12. Victora and others (2003).
13. Black, Morris and Bryce (2003).
14. Jones and others (2003).
15. PAHO (2003).
16. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
17. Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2003). UNAIDS (2003).
18. Bell, Devarajan and Bersback (2003).
19. Summers and Kates (2003).

20. UNAIDS (2003).
21. Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2003).
22. WHO (2002).
23. Sachs and Malaney (2002).
24. The WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, chaired by Jeffrey Sachs, argues that heavy burdens of disease retard economic growth and recommends a several-fold increase in health investments, both domestic and international, for tackling major diseases and poverty in poor countries.
25. UNDP's *Human Development Report 2003* is devoted exclusively to the Millennium Development Goals. It links them to human development and identifies (mostly) gaps and lags as well as policies for achieving the desired goals by 2015, including health goals. The *World Health Report 2003* frames global health concerns within the context of the Millennium Development Goals. Special attention is given to the need for narrowing the health equity gap, eradicating polio, vastly expanding HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention and controlling communicable and noncommunicable diseases. It recognizes these can not be achieved without greater overall cooperation and coordination, and in particular, the strengthening of national health services infrastructure, with a focus on primary care as originally conceived at Alma Ata. The World Bank has produced a strategy for achieving the health-related Millennium Development Goals. The strategy paper formed the background for a Bank-hosted donor conference and was further revised following an Ottawa donor meeting in May 2003. The basic thrusts of the strategy to build an institutional

consensus to pursue the Millennium Development Goals, deploy available technologies and methodologies to reach the targets and create a post-Ottawa working group for followup among interested bilateral and multilateral agencies.

References

- Ahmad O.B., A.D. Lopez, and M. Inoue. 2000. "The Decline in Child Mortality: A Reappraisal." *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 78(10): 1175–91.
- Bell, Clive, Shantayanan Devarajan, and Hans Bersbach. 2003 "The Long-Run Economic Costs of AIDS: Theory and an Application to South Africa." Working Paper 3152. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. "HIV/AIDS: Key Facts" [<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/GlobalHealth/HIVAIDSTB/HIVAIDS/RelatedInfo/FactSheetGHAIDS-030922.htm>]
- Black, R.E., S.S. Morris, and J. Bryce. 2003. "Where and Why Are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?" *The Lancet* 361: 2226–34.
- Bryce, J., S. Arifeen, G. Pariyo, C.F. Lanata, D. Gwatkin, J.P. Habicht, and the Multi-Country Evaluation of IMCI Study Group. 2003. "Reducing Child Mortality: Can Public Health Deliver?" *The Lancet* 362: 159–64.
- Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and John A. Ross. 2000. "Rating Maternal and Neonatal Health Programs in Developing Countries." Working Paper 00-26. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Carolina Population Center, Chapel Hill, N.C.
- Gillespie D., M. Claeson, H. Mshinda, H. Troedsson, and the Bellagio Study Group on Child Survival. 2003. "Knowledge into Action for Child Survival." *The Lancet* 362: 323–27.
- Global HIV Prevention Working Group. 2003. "Access to HIV Prevention: Closing the Gap." Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, Wash.

- Gwatkin, D. 2002. "Who Would Gain Most from Efforts to Millennium Development Goals for Health? An Inquiry into the Possibility of Progress That Fails to Reach the Poor." HNP Discussion Paper. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Jones G., R. Steketee, R.E. Black, Z.A. Bhutta, S.S. Morris, and the Bellagio Child Survival Study Group. 2003. "How Many Child Deaths Can We Prevent This Year?" *The Lancet* 362: 65–71.
- PAHO (Pan American Health Organization). 2003. "Towards Measles Eradication." [<http://www.paho.org/english/AD/FCH/IM/Measles.htm>]
- Sachs, J., and P. Malaney. 2002. "The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria." *Nature* 415(6872): 680–85.
- Stover, J., N. Walker, G.P. Garnett, J.A. Salomon, K.A. Stanecki, P.D. Ghys, N.C. Grassly, R.M. Anderson, and B. Schwartzlander. 2002. "Can We Reverse the HIV/AIDS Pandemic with an Expanded Response." *The Lancet* 360(9326): 73–77.
- Summers, Todd, and Jennifer Kates. 2003. "Global Funding for HIV/AIDS in Resource Poor Settings." Kaiser Family Foundation, Menlo Park, Calif.
- UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS). 2003. "AIDS Endemic Update." December, Geneva.
- UNICEF (United Nation Children's Fund). 1996. *The State of the World's Children 1996*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2001. "Progress since the World Summit for Children: A Statistical Review." New York.
- Victora, C.G., A. Wagstaff, J. Armstrong-Schellenberg, D. Gwatkin, M. Claeson, and J.P. Habicht. 2003. "Applying an Equity Lens to Child Health and Mortality: More of the Same is Not Enough." *The Lancet* 362: 233–41.
- WHO (World Health Organization). 2001. "Maternal Mortality in 1995: Estimates Developed by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA." WHO/RHR/01.9. Geneva.
- . 2002. "A Commitment to Action for Expanded Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment." International HIV Treatment Access Coalition, Geneva.
- . 2003. "Millenium Development Goals: WHO's Contribution to Tracking Progress and Measuring Achievements." Geneva.
- WHO (World Health Organization) and UNICEF (United Nation's Children's Fund). 2003. *Africa Malaria Report 2003*. Geneva and New York.
- World Bank. 2002. *World Development Indicators 2002*. Washington, D.C.
- . 2003a. "Millennium Development Goals: Reduce Child Mortality." [http://www.developmentgoals.org/Child_Mortality.htm]
- . 2003b. "Millennium Development Goals: Sub-Saharan Africa." [http://www.developmentgoals.org/Sub-Saharan_Africa.htm]

Methodology

Through surveys and other outreach key informants provided valuable input to the work of the Expert Group members on the quality of implementation of existing programs. The efforts of governments, intergovernmental agencies, the private sector and civil society were assessed according to the human, financial, physical and informational resources devoted to them. Equal weight was assigned to each of the issues considered in determining the aggregate score.

Analysis was informed by formal and informal communication from about two dozen international

informants from diverse institutions, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, CARE, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, the World Health Organization and other organizations.

Expert Group members

Chair: Alfred Sommer, Dean, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University

Lincoln Chen, Director, Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University

George Alleyne, Director Emeritus, Pan American Health Organization, and Adjunct Professor, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University

Mahmoud Fathalla, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Assiut University


Cesar Victora, Professor of Epidemiology, Federal University of Pelotas

Rick Steketee, Chief, Malaria Epidemiology Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Tom Coates, Professor of Infectious Diseases, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles

Key informants


Halida Akhtar, Shahida Azfar, Larry Barat, Yves Bergevin, Zulfiqar Bhutta, Mabel Bianco, Robert Black, Assia Brandrup-Lukanow, Joel Breman, George Brown, Keith Carter, Desmond Chevasse, Mushtaque Chowdhury, Mariam Claeson, John Paul Clark, Umberto D'Allesandro, Herbert Degbey, Andres de Francisco, Grace Delano, Teshome Desta, France Donnay, Christopher Elias, Mary Ettling, Mahmoud F. Fathalla, Richard G.A. Feachem, Stan Foster, Nirman Ganguly, Helene Gayle, Duff Gillespie, Gelila Kidane Goba, Wendy Graham, Richard Greene, Brian Greenwood, Jorn Heldrup, James Herrington, Steven Hoffman, Petra Ten Hoop-Bender, Peter Kazembe, Sue Kelly, Betty Kirkwood, B. Kishore, Ana Langer, Rune Lea, Elizabeth Maguire, Deborah Maine, Vicki Marsh, James McIntyre, Michael Merson, Stephen F. Morin, Hassan Mshinda, Kim Mulholland, Francois Nosten, Brigitte Kini Nsikuy, Juan Ortiz, Ok Pannenberg, Gordon Perkin, Peter Piot, Lutfur Rahman, Mahbubur Rahman, Helen Rees, Linda Richter, Magda Robalo, Khama Rogo, Allan Rosenfield, Jean Roy, Catherine Sanga, Allan Schapira, Bernard Schwartzlander, Pramilla Senanayake, Jill Sheffield, Clive Shiff, Patricia Stevenson, Terrie Taylor, Ann Tinker, Hans Troedsson, Tomris Turmen, Ronald Waldman, Bill Watkins, Peter Winstanley and Debrawerk Zewdie.



6 Environment

Score

3



Score

3

Goals

- **Stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.**
- **Implement conventions related to the conservation of biodiversity.**
- **Halve the proportions of people without access to water and sanitation by 2015.¹**

Environment

The world has no shortage of environmental goals. Governments have negotiated more than 500 multilateral environmental agreements, including global conventions that create frameworks to address global warming, loss of global biodiversity, destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer, trade in endangered species and other dangerous global environmental trends. But the record of effective environmental protection is very poor. True, many nations have made progress controlling local pollution, creating parks and protected areas—and, in a few cases bringing plants or animals back from the brink of extinction. Yet the implementation of global environmental policies has been piecemeal. Governments are making only halting efforts to abide by their commitments, and neither civil society nor private sector efforts even begin to fill the gap. The promise of global environmental agreements remains unfulfilled.

The consequences of continuing inaction are likely to be severe. Key long-term environmental trends continue to be negative. And by not aggressively pursuing our global environmental goals, we are missing important opportunities to alleviate hunger and poverty and improve people's livelihoods. Needed is a stronger connection between poverty alleviation goals, economic development goals and the environment—recognizing that the environment is inseparable from the other two.

The Global Governance Initiative cannot monitor global efforts to live up to all of the hundreds of environmental agreements currently in effect. But it is possible to select key issues that provide a general sense of how sustainably humanity is interacting with the natural environment. For its assessment of global environmental efforts in 2003, the initiative selected stabilizing the climate, protecting biological diversity

and expanding the availability of safe drinking water and sanitation. Each addresses commitments to reduce large risks to human well-being.

Our world is shaped by, and our economies depend on, the Earth's climate and biological systems. This interlinkage needs to be defined and documented so that practical realization of sustainable development goals can be meaningfully pursued. People derive life and livelihood from Earth's living systems. Ecosystems directly support close to half of all jobs, providing us with food, water, medicines, energy and the fibre we use for paper, clothing and lumber. And water, of course, is essential to human survival. Polluted drinking water takes a vast toll in disease, causing 3–5 million avoidable deaths each year, most of them children.

Global efforts to achieve these goals do not begin to approach the levels necessary for significant progress. While it is possible to identify encouraging examples of progress—countries that have made safe drinking water much more broadly available, companies that have made significant voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, public-private partnerships that protect biological diversity—these achievements show what is possible. They do not demonstrate global commitment.

A decade ago the picture looked much brighter. At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, more than 180 countries reached a consensus on the connection between environmental protection and human development. Their shared understanding was that wealthy nations would take the lead in adjusting their own policies to respond to global environmental problems. They would also increase their assistance to poorer countries to enable them to address urgent environmental problems without

Regional climate changes due to temperature increases have already affected many physical and biological systems—and the evidence suggests adverse impacts on human settlements from the greater frequency and intensity of floods, droughts and other severe weather events

diminishing their commitment to development. But the wealthy did not keep their promises. And some poor countries have used that failure as an excuse for inaction. Environmental deterioration of many kinds has since proceeded apace.

Climate change—slow progress and uncertainty

Addressing global climate change is one of the paramount environmental challenges of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the chief heat-trapping greenhouse gas,² has risen 35%—from about 275 parts per million by volume to 370. This increase is mostly due to human activities, primarily the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.

These changes in the composition of the Earth's atmosphere increased the average global surface temperature by about 0.6° C (1° F) over the past century. Regional climate changes due to temperature increases have already affected many physical and biological systems. And the evidence suggests adverse impacts on human settlements from the greater frequency and intensity of floods, droughts and other severe weather events.

If current trends in greenhouse gas emissions growth are not altered, average global temperatures are expected to rise between 1.4 and 5.8° C (2.5 to 10.4° F) by 2100,³ according to the latest assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.⁴ The precise effects of such temperature changes on agricultural production, water supply, forests, vector-borne diseases, biodiversity and overall human development are not known. But they are likely to be bad for a large portion of the world's population, particularly developing countries.

Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations is a long-term goal. The near-term challenge is to put the world on an emission trajectory that makes the long-term goal attainable. The international community has developed a first response to this challenge through the adoption of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the associated Kyoto Protocol. While insufficient on their own to eliminate the long-term threat of climate change, they represent milestones for evaluating progress.

Climate change does not have a specific greenhouse gas concentration as an agreed target or a defined timeline for the reductions. World efforts may thus be assessed against two standards: progress towards zeroing out emissions, as required for any level of stabilization of atmospheric concentrations, and a more “reasonable” metric assessing institutional changes and progress under the current national and international regimes.

Government efforts

In the convention, industrial countries pledged to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. They did so, collectively reducing emissions by about 1% over the decade. But this happy result came about mostly due to economic difficulties in countries of the former Soviet Union, whose emissions remain far below 1990 levels, rather than from policy changes to get countries off the dangerous emissions trajectory. Many countries did not meet the target—emissions in the United States, for example, rose by about 18% over the decade. And even if all countries had met their individual targets, it was widely recognized that the 1990 level was not good enough to prevent the buildup of dangerous concentrations of greenhouse gases.


The Kyoto protocol contains no targets and few provisions for reining in emissions from developing countries—where future emissions increases will be the largest

So, strenuous efforts went into negotiating the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention, signed in 1997 as a modest but necessary first step towards getting serious about climate change and quantifying goals and targets. But the United States withdrew from the protocol, making it clear that it does not intend to undertake meaningful action to control emissions in the near term. This put the protocol's future in serious doubt: it will enter into force only when ratified by 55 countries with a 55% share of carbon dioxide emissions in 1990. There is substantial uncertainty over Russia's ratification, and if Russia does not ratify, the protocol will definitely not come into effect.

The convention and its protocol are laudable. They establish an overall goal, short-term targets and specify institutions and procedures for expanding future efforts. But even these initial steps are in danger of failing. If the protocol does not enter into force, and no comparable agreement is reached in the same time frame, it may be too late to avert dangerous consequences.⁵ Even if it does enter into force, the Kyoto protocol is only a start. It contains no targets and few provisions for reining in emissions from developing countries—where future emissions increases will be the largest. And even if all developed countries fully complied with the protocol, declining emissions in the industrial world would likely be at least partially offset by shifting trade and investment flows. To stabilize emissions and avoid harmful impacts, significantly stronger efforts are needed soon.

Official efforts to control those emissions are national or even local, and in evaluating the world's efforts it is important to differentiate among countries. Actions undertaken by some governments, and by some corporations, make clear what could be done

The United States and the European Union have added most to global CO₂



Source: IPCC 2000.

globally with greater determination. Initiatives by the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local governments can be extremely effective means of change. The challenge is to link global objectives to local initiatives.


The EU has taken concrete steps to address climate change, establishing a greenhouse gas emissions trading system, to begin in 2005 with or without the Kyoto Protocol. The European Council adopted a new directive on energy taxation, increasing incentives to use energy more efficiently.

Several member states have also promoted renewable energy and adopted targets for long-term emission reductions. But even with these actions, EU emissions are barely stable—and part of this stability can certainly be attributed to slow economic growth.

There are also positive trends in some developing countries. China's emissions have increased slowly relative to its rapid economic growth, resulting in a massive drop in carbon intensity (tons of carbon emitted per dollar of GDP) of almost 50% since 1990. This drop is in part due to government policies and measures, such as reducing coal and oil subsidies between 1990 and 1995. China has also introduced tax incentives for constructing energy-efficient buildings—and now requires that all industrial boilers cogenerate electricity with their waste heat.

But China's participation in the convention process is often less constructive than it could be. And recent data suggest that China's emissions are again climbing, with future economic growth threatening to produce still higher emissions. The climate implications remain worrisome.

The carbon intensity of GDP is down almost everywhere, especially in China



A few forward-leaning multinational corporations are aware that the future trend is towards less carbon-intensive economies, prompting investment in energy efficiency and carbon savings

Other countries are doing much less than they could. Russia has taken virtually no steps to address climate change. Australia, highly dependent on coal, has one of the world's highest per capita emissions. And from the outset, Australia's commitment to the Kyoto Protocol was weak. It negotiated an 8% increase on 1990 level greenhouse gas emissions, the only Annex 1 State apart from Iceland to negotiate an increase. Australia is determined in its stance not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, even though it is almost on track to achieve its Kyoto targets.

The United States is the largest contributor to the buildup of greenhouse gases (about 28% of the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels over the past century). And as the world's wealthiest country, it is widely perceived to have significant capacity to reduce its emissions. But it has a long way to go to approach what other countries are doing given its open animosity towards multilateral solutions to many global problems, the absence of federal climate change legislation, the renewed interest in coal burning and even the flashes of public contempt for energy efficiency and conservation. Even so, there are some bright spots, especially the climate-friendly state and local initiatives that have sprung up without meaningful federal efforts. California, for example, approved a law that will establish the country's first major greenhouse gas emission standards for automobiles.

Nonstate actors

Some nonstate actors have also begun to take actions. A few forward-leaning multinational corporations are aware that—with or without the Kyoto Protocol—the future trend is towards less carbon-intensive economies, prompting investment in energy efficiency and carbon savings. BP and

Shell's voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction plans have been widely publicized. Toyota has sharply increased its sales of hybrid vehicles. Dupont has already achieved its voluntary target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 65% below 1990 levels, a target it had set for 2010.

In Europe, where more official regulations and incentives are in place, local companies have begun to benchmark greenhouse gas efficiency as a part of their corporate investment strategy. In the United States, where no federal regulations have been implemented, some companies seeking to distinguish themselves as environmentally responsible have made voluntary emission reduction commitments. Entergy is the first U.S. electric power company to commit to stabilizing its emissions through 2005 at 2000 levels. Alcoa has pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2010, and by 50% from 1990 levels over the same period if inert anode technology succeeds. Johnson & Johnson has committed to reducing its greenhouse gases by 7% from 1990 levels by 2010, with an interim goal of 4% by 2005. Polaroid has assumed a carbon dioxide reduction of 20% below 1994 by the end of 2005, and 25% by 2010.

Many nongovernmental organizations function as important sources of information, analysis and advocacy. Much of the progress of the international negotiations as well as the rising consciousness of the private sector can be ascribed to the indefatigable work of these NGOs.

Need for a radical transformation

Yet global emissions continue to increase. Current voluntary actions are inadequate to stem the tide, and the patchwork efforts to refine current energy

Addressing climate change will require a technological revolution that ultimately leads to a global society that produces zero, or close to zero, net emissions of greenhouse gases

systems, while in the right direction, are decidedly insufficient. Addressing climate change requires nothing short of radically transforming the way we produce and consume energy.

Addressing climate change will require a technological revolution that ultimately leads to a global society that produces zero, or close to zero, net emissions of greenhouse gases. Governments have only begun to take the steps to speed the transition to a carbon-neutral global economy. Difficulties in cooperation—and vested interests in electric power, transportation and agriculture—have encumbered climate protection efforts. Nor have efforts to promote economic development and alleviate poverty been aligned with long-term interests in a stable climate system.

Biodiversity—accelerating losses met by a weak policy response

Biodiversity is the variety of life on Earth, the millions of animals, plants and micro-organisms, the genes they contain and the complex ecosystems they help form. Each species has evolved into its current form in relation to numerous other species, processes and environments. So, diversity is more than a characteristic of genes, species and ecosystems: it is the condition of their possibilities for existence. That is why the loss of even a single species is of such great concern (box 6.1).

Biodiversity today is being lost at a rate that is 100–1,000 times faster than throughout geological history. This loss is driven by human demands on the environment, harvesting species of economic value, converting natural habitats into agricultural lands, inflicting invasive alien species, various environmental pollutants and changing the climate.

Box 6.1 Why conserve biodiversity?


The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the intrinsic value of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic contributions of biodiversity to human well-being. It affirms that the conservation of biodiversity is a common concern of humankind, because life-sustaining systems on our planet depend totally on the variety of genes, species and ecosystems.

Experts have defined several benefits of biodiversity:

- “Nonuse values” such as cultural values of many charismatic animals and plants, or the mental well-being people experience from visiting a national park. Biodiversity also underpins the ecosystem services to humanity, such as soil formation, water purification or flood protection.
- “Use values” of biodiversity are essential for all humanity. Examples are forest products (export value: \$137 billion a year) and fish. Fish currently provide more than 15% of global animal protein supplies. International trade in fish products is worth about \$55 billion a year, and about 35 million people work in fishing and fish farming.
- The term “option values” has been used to indicate the potential values humanity may receive from biodiversity in the future, but that are not yet known (such as unknown medicinal properties of some plants).

The Convention on Biological Diversity, entering into force in 1993 with about 190 parties, is one important response to this loss. Its three goals are conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of biological resources and equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources. The Plan of Action adopted by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit

Forests are disappearing in every region—especially Asia



Source: Global Forest Watch.

on Sustainable Development called for “coherent implementation of the three goals of the Convention [on Biological Diversity] and the achievement by 2010 of a significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biological diversity”. This was a weaker formulation than agreed by a meeting of ministers convened in 2002 at the Sixth Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which called for putting into place by 2010 measures to halt the loss of biodiversity, not just slow the rate of loss. Achieving this will require linking social and economic development to this important environmental goal.

Achieving even the more modest objective brings difficulties. One is the lack of fully accurate estimates of either the total number of species on our planet or of the rate of loss of these species. But the data are good enough to make it clear that the policy response, despite some important achievements, is still woefully inadequate to significantly slow the rate of loss of biodiversity.

Forests

Current forest cover is 3.86 billion hectares, but 16.1 million hectares of natural forest worldwide were lost each year in the 1990s.⁶ A number of particularly rich tropical forest regions have been especially hard hit. In the Amazon, more than 50 million hectares, some 13% of the region, have been converted to other uses since 1972—a similar amount has been severely damaged by logging crews and fire damage to standing forests. In Indonesia almost 17 million hectares have been cleared in the past 12 years, a quarter of the forest cover in 1985. But in many industrial countries, forests have been expanding for several decades, especially where agriculture is no longer economically viable.


It appears that few new ideas are available for conserving forests, even though tropical deforestation is well recognized

The main causes of deforestation are agriculture, infrastructure and resettlement. Overharvesting of timber, overgrazing, fire, insects, diseases, storms and air pollution add to the degradation.

It appears that few new ideas are available for conserving forests, even though tropical deforestation is well recognized. International instruments—such as the UN Forum on Forests, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (drafted by the Food and Agriculture Organization in 1985) and the International Tropical Timber Agreement (an international commodity agreement that brings together 58 countries that produce and consume tropical timber)—have generally failed to slow the rate of forest loss. Governments have great difficulty in coming up with viable solutions because forest plantations cannot yet meet the high demand for timber. And while many sound policies are in place, the institutional capacity to implement them is inadequate.

Such failures have global implications. Thanks to trade, forest management policies anywhere can have biodiversity implications elsewhere, positive or negative. For example, one study suggests that for every 100 hectares of forest protected in North America and Europe, five hectares of forest would be cleared in Africa, Asia, South America and the former Soviet Union to meet the existing demand. This displaced deforestation is evident in the massive increases in China’s imports after its ban on domestic logging and in the increased logging trade in countries close to the Chinese border, such as Myanmar. Estimates show that the value of China’s total timber pulp and paper imports increased by 75% from 1997 to 2002.⁷ China is now investing in reforestation, which could eventually have a significant impact on global wood

Use of aquaculture is helping world fish production grow even more



Source: FAO 2002.

and pulp trade. Displaced deforestation exemplifies the need to address supply and demand throughout the product lifecycle.

Nongovernmental actors and a few governments devised certification schemes for environmentally sound harvesting of lumber and pulp wood. The Canadian province of New Brunswick made forest certification compulsory on public forest lands, and the Forest Products Association of Canada will require forest certification for membership in the organization after 2006. In North America the certified area reached 28.6 million hectares in 2002, an increase of 3.9 million hectares in the United States and 4.5 million hectares in Canada. The prime certification body is the nongovernmental Forest Stewardship Council.

The council's certified forest areas increased 30% a year between 1998 and 2002, still less than 1% of global forest cover. A major limitation to certifying sustainable forest practices in the tropics is that "sustainable tropical forest management" has not yet been defined in an operational sense. And some conservation organizations consider certification schemes to be "greenwash" because the standards are so weak and vague that any relation between compliance and true sustainability would be impossible to verify.

In short, sustainable forestry remains little more than a pipe dream. Logging practices are governed far more by market forces than by long-term sustainability. Biodiversity losses continue to accelerate.

Fisheries

Fishing has become an enormous global industry, managed and subsidized to the point of significant overcapacity. The world fish catch increased from

19 million tons in 1950 to 91.3 million tons in 2001 (82.5 million marine and 8.8 million inland). Experts believe that the world's fishing fleet is twice what is appropriate for a sustainable yield of fish. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that humans are continuing to have a profoundly negative impact on the health of our planet's oceans. As one result, governments agreed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development to create national networks of marine protected areas by 2012 and to rebuild overexploited fisheries by 2015.

Simply stopping the fishing effort does not mean that stocks will recover. The Newfoundland cod fishery, for example, employed 40,000 people and yielded 100,000 tons of fish in 1968. But the stocks crashed and the fishery was closed in 1992 in an effort to allow its recovery. A decade later, stocks have still not recovered.

Many organizations—from specialized scientific groups, such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, to influential NGOs—have been arguing for years that most current fisheries practices are not sustainable. International instruments have been developed to address the issue, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the FAO agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management measures by fishing vessels on the high seas, numerous agreements on specific stocks and the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation. Decisionmakers struggle, however, with politically sensitive actions to reach the goals

More detailed biodiversity information should guide the establishment of additional protected areas if the biodiversity target is to be met

set by these international instruments, such as reducing the size of the fishing fleet. So there has been almost no progress in implementing the agreed measures.

Private sector and civil society initiatives have delivered positive results. Marketable quotas—where fishermen are allowed to sell catch rights, implemented in Iceland and New Zealand since the late 1980s—have led to more profitable catches and rebounding fish populations.

The Marine Stewardship Council, created in 1997 by Unilever, the world's largest buyer of seafood, and the World Wildlife Fund, the international conservation organization, establishes standards for sustainable fisheries. It has raised consumer awareness and used consumer behaviour to influence the fishing industry. Harnessing consumer power, it is hoped, will stimulate the fishery industry to adopt more sustainable practices.

Protected areas

Protected areas regulate essential ecological processes, conserve wildlife resources and genetic reservoirs and support scientific enquiry and education.⁸ They help ensure that natural resources are conserved to meet the needs of people now and in the future. They are thus essential to any global conservation effort.

Protected areas have become a cornerstone of conservation in most countries. They can be expensive to establish and manage well. But it is far less expensive to protect their ecological integrity and manage the goods and services they provide than to replace them once their watershed, wildlife and other environmental values have been lost.

About 12% of the earth's land surface is now under protected status, including more than 100,000 sites. For the marine environment, the figure is less than 1%. The 12% figure sounds impressive, but the habitats of at least 1,310 vertebrate species (831 risking extinction) are not protected in any part of their ranges. So more detailed biodiversity information should guide the establishment of additional protected areas if the biodiversity target is to be met.

Spending on protected areas is estimated at \$4–7 billion a year, more than half in North America alone. It is estimated that good management of all protected areas would cost about \$30 billion per year. These figures reveal two challenges. The funds available are not sufficient for effective management of established protected areas. And enormous spending discrepancies exist between the developed world and the developing world (though the richest biodiversity to be protected is in the tropics).

Most developing countries find it difficult to justify higher spending on protected area management, which incur higher indirect costs at a local level and even higher local and regional opportunity costs. The link with economic development is seen as too remote. The diversion of other program funds is seen as too expensive in the short-term. And the potential land-use conflicts with local governments and local populations are seen as too troublesome. Despite the difficulties, protected area trust funds are in place in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and no doubt many other countries as well. They provide a basis for better marshalling of the needed funds.


Threats to protected areas cannot be understood in isolation from the social, political, economic and ecological processes that affect them. Solutions for

The cost of delivering safe drinking water and basic sanitation is far lower than the cost of treating the diseases that occur in their absence

many of the threats facing protected areas belong in the realm of national and international politics. Important influences on the demand for protected area resources—such as local land ownership patterns, credit and income inequalities among agricultural producers and indigenous people's rights to land and resources—are politically volatile and often beyond the power of park managers to control. This aspect of environmental management is gravely undervalued, though recent initiatives, such as those outlined in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation, indicate the importance of community and stakeholder involvement. Often other government ministries have policies directly at odds with the goals of conservation: frontier settlement programmes, planned colonization of protected areas for national security reasons, infrastructure development and commercial exploitation of natural resources to service national debt.

The target of reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010 is slipping farther behind, despite some serious efforts in many parts of the world. One major problem is perverse economic incentives—governments spend an estimated \$1.9 trillion a year on subsidies and incentives that drive overexploitation and work against sustainable development. Another is the lack of well-packaged information. The Global Biodiversity Information Facility, which started work in March 2001, is vastly improving our knowledge of the actual state of biodiversity. But the biodiversity message needs much better packaging if it is to be relevant to the general public. Above all, the human, political and financial resources being applied to biodiversity conservation are clearly inadequate. Real pricing should be encouraged, and the goods and services provided by the biosphere should be better measured and incorporated in land and resource decisions.

Way off the path to the goal for water and sanitation in Africa



Source: WaterAid (U.K.).

Drinking water and sanitation—uneven performance on an inadequate goal

If ever an investment could make a difference in food security, health, environment, governance, gender equity and poverty alleviation, it is one that provides access to safe water and sanitation services for billions of people. Stronger organization, greater imagination and more local resources—with attuned leadership—can bring safe water and sanitation services to those in need and at an acceptable cost. But the investments are not happening at rates that would reach even half of those in need by 2015.

At the Millennium Summit in 2000 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, governments recognized the importance of increasing access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation as essential for development and the reduction of poverty. And they set goals for their provision. The provision of drinking water and sanitation is neither overly difficult, nor inordinately expensive. Technologies exist and so do the resources. The problem is focusing the energies of society on delivering these amenities as a matter of priority (box 6.2).

Experience in developed countries and results from innumerable studies in developing countries show that the cost of delivering safe drinking water and basic sanitation is far lower than the cost of treating the diseases that occur in their absence. For example, an inexpensive alternative to laying large pipes under streets and buildings has been used by the low-income neighbourhoods in El Alto, Bolivia. By laying small-diameter pipes at shallow depths, and engaging the community in the process, the city has dramatically reduced the cost of improving water supply to 600,000 inhabitants.

Africa is clearly far from the trajectory to achieve the goals—but in several countries in Latin America and in China, India and the Philippines, the trend is somewhat more positive

Box 6.2 South Africa tackles water supply and sanitation

The South African Government adopted a water policy in 1997 to address access to water and sanitation. The goal: to provide clean water to all the people of South Africa by 2008.

South Africa's water policy recognizes that water resources cannot be managed in isolation from other natural resources. It also recognizes people's "right" to water for washing, cooking and drinking, for growing crops and for economic development, as detailed in the constitution.

To implement the policy, the South African government began a Capital Works Programme to meet the water needs of more than 7 million people, many of them living in poverty. Water supply schemes such as Working for Water have been organized to provide poor families with paid work, cutting down invasive tree species to increase the flow of water in local rivers and streams.

South Africa has also endorsed a policy of "free basic water" to promote more equitable access. Local authorities are encouraged to provide the first 6,000 litres per household per month, free of charge. But government figures for 2003 show that more than 60% of South African households, especially those in rural areas, have yet to be provided with free water.

Few actions of national governments, international agencies and donors could have higher social, economic and environmental value.

Africa is clearly far from the trajectory to achieve the goals. But in several countries in Latin America and in China, India and the Philippines, the trend is somewhat more positive. Since 1985 the Chinese government, supported by the World Bank, has developed its Rural Water Supply and Sanitation

Program. About 6 million households have benefited from better services. In many places, however, the trend towards privatization and the use of bottled water may undercut the goal of expanded availability. In India spending on bottled drinking water was \$370 million in 2002, growing at close to 80% a year. At this rate, the spending on bottled drinking water will exceed the entire national budget for municipal drinking water supply within the next three to four years. The implications are stark: some 10–20 million people will have insulated themselves from the drinking water problems of the remaining 1 billion.

The Millennium Goal itself is inadequate. It is stated as a proportion, using a 1990 baseline. But with populations growing, even with the achievement of the goal of halving "the proportion" of people without safe drinking water or sanitation would not significantly reduce the absolute number. The World Health Organization estimates that the number of people without safe drinking water would come down from just over 1.1 billion (1990) to just under 0.8 billion (2015). According to this estimate, there would still be more than 1.5 billion people without one or both of these basic amenities in 2015. Nor do these projections take into account people with inadequate access to water or inadequate sanitation. Even more disconcerting, it is unlikely that even these goals will be met at current rates of progress. World Bank figures suggest that at current rates of development and service expansion, "about 37% of the developing world is on track to reach the water supply target, and about 16% to reach the sanitation target".⁹

The world's water problem is broader than the goal of access and sanitation. More than a billion people face absolute water scarcity, and use is rising twice as fast as population. Much of the world's food

The failure is not one of capacity— it is a failure of will

supply is dependent on potentially unsustainable irrigation. Three great rivers—the Amu Darya, the Colorado and the Yellow—no longer reach the sea in dry seasons, consumed entirely by the competing demands of agriculture, industry and cities. So if water resources are to be sustained in a way to support use by humans and nature, an ecosystem approach to the management of watersheds will have to be developed and implemented.

Conclusion

Among the historic shifts in values and awareness that marked the 20th century was a change in the way people perceive nature. What had been seen as threatening and inexhaustible—a force to be subdued and consumed—has come to be seen as fragile and essential—a resource to be protected. In that century about 12% of the land surface of the Earth was at least nominally protected. The wealthiest nations hugely reduced water and air pollution even while their economies produced an extraordinary expansion of wealth. Those accomplishments are the product of public will, effective policy and the inventiveness of those challenged to comply with the requirements of policy.

We do not see that same level of commitment today in the pursuit of the world's declared environmental goals. The obstacles to fulfilment of the climate, biodiversity and drinking water goals are real—and in some cases formidable. But they are surmountable. The failure is not one of capacity—it is a failure of will. Governments have not set out to fulfil their commitments and they have failed even to try. And civil society has failed to insist that they try.

Endnotes

1. The climate protection goal was set forth in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate

Change, ratified by 186 countries, among them all the major greenhouse gas emitting countries. The loss of species goal was agreed to as part of the Plan of Action adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The drinking water and sanitation goal was established in the Millennium Declaration as part of the Millennium Development Goals. It was restated and expanded in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Action to include basic sanitation.

2. The full range of gases includes carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorochemicals and sulfur hexafluoride, known as “greenhouse” gases since they trap heat that would otherwise be reflected from Earth out into space.
3. IPCC (2001).
4. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is composed of thousands of scientists and is the most authoritative global voice on the science of climate change.
5. IPCC (2001).
6. FAO (2000).
7. Lague (2003).
8. A protected area is an area of land or water legally demarcated and dedicated to the conservation of biological diversity and of natural and associated cultural resources, managed through legal or other means.
9. World Bank (2003c).

References

- Balmford, A. and K.J. Gaston. 1999. "Why Biodiversity Surveys Are Good Value." *Nature* 398(6724): 204–05.
- Balmford, A., A. Bruner, P. Cooper, R. Costanza, S. Farber, R.E. Green, M. Jenkins, P. Jefferiss, V. Jessamy, J. Madden, K. Munro, N. Myers, S. Naeem, J. Paavola, M. Rayment, S. Rosendo, J. Roughgarden, K. Trumper, and R.K. Turner. 2002. "Economic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature." *Science* 297(5583): 950–53.
- Bruner, A.G., R.E. Gullison, R.E. Rice, and G.A.B. da Fonseca. 2001. "Effectiveness of Parks in Protecting Tropical Biodiversity." *Science* 291(5501): 125–28.
- Delgado, C.L., N. Wada, M.W. Rosegrant, S. Meijer, and M. Ahmed. 2003. *The Future of Fish: Issues and Trends to 2020*. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy and Research Center and WorldFish Center.
- Dulvy, N.K., Y. Sadovy, and J.D. Reynolds. 2003. "Extinction Vulnerability in Marine Populations." *Fish and Fisheries* 4(1): 25–64.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 1985. "Tropical Forestry Action Plan." Rome
- . 1993. "Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas." 24 November, Rome.
- . 1995. "Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Twenty-Eighth Session of the FAO." 31 October, Rome.
- . 2000. *Global Forest Resources Assessment*. Rome.
- . 2002. *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture*. Rome.
- . 2003. *State of the World's Forests*. Rome.
- Gell, F.R., and C.M. Roberts. 2003. "Benefits beyond Boundaries: The Fishery Effects of Marine Reserves." *TREE* 18: 448–55.
- Global Forest Watch [<http://globalforestwatch.org>]
- Id21 Communicating Development Research. 2003. "Water and Sanitation Goals: Is Progress in the Pipeline?" [<http://www.id21.org/urban/Insights45editorial.html>]
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2000. *Special Report on Emission Scenarios*. Geneva.
- . 2001. *Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third Assessment Report*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Lague, David. 2003. "Asia's Forests Head to China." *Wall Street Journal* 23 December.
- Myers, N. 2003. "Conservation of Biodiversity: How Are We Doing?" *The Environmentalist* 23(1): 9–15.
- ODI (Overseas Development Institute). 2003. "Millennium Development Goals and the IDC." London.
- Pauly, D., V. Christensen, S. Guénette, T.J. Pitcher, U.R. Sumaila, C.J. Walters, R. Watson, and D. Zeller. 2002. "Towards Sustainability in World Fisheries." *Nature* 418(6898): 689–95.
- Sustainable Forestry Initiative. [<http://www.aboutsfi.org>].
- UN (United Nations). 1983. "International Tropical Timber Agreement." 18 November, Geneva.
- . 1992a. "Convention on Biological Diversity." June, Rio de Janeiro.
- . 1992b. "Convention on the Law of the Sea." 10 December, New York.
- . 1992c. "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." 4–14 June, Rio de Janeiro.
- . 1994. "International Tropical Timber Agreement." 24 January, Geneva.
- . 2000a. "Millennium Declaration." 18 September, New York.
- . 2000b. "Millennium Summit." 6–8 September, New York.

- . 2002c. “World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Action.” 4 September, Johannesburg.
- . 2002d. “World Summit on Sustainable Development.” 26 August–4 September, Johannesburg.
- UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 1997. *Progress of Nations 1997*. New York.
- United Nations Population Division. 2002. *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision*. New York.
- WHO (World Health Organization) 2000. *The Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report*. Geneva.
- World Bank. 2002. “Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program in China.” Washington, D.C.
- . 2003a. “Progress Report And Critical Next Steps In Scaling Up: Education For All, Health, HIV/Aids, Water And Sanitation.” Washington, D.C.
- . 2003b. “Millennium Development Goals Lecture Series” and “Water Supply and Sanitation Lecture Series.” Washington, D.C.
- . 2003c. “Water Supply and Sanitation and the Millennium Development Goals.” Addendum to “Progress Report and Critical Next Steps in Scaling Up: Education for All, Health, HIV/AIDS, Water and Sanitation.” Washington, D.C.

Methodology

The Environment Expert Group selected three environmental goals to review, and prepared short papers on the level of effort being made based on opinions of experts, recent global and regional assessments, and other relevant information. A score for each of the three goals was prepared by the group based on their best judgements. The members of the group feel quite confident in the underlying judgement that global efforts fall far short of what would be necessary to achieve the agreed upon goals.

Expert Group members

Chair: Jonathan Lash, President, World Resources Institute

Achim Steiner, Director-General, World Conservation Union

Mark Halle, European Representative and Director, Trade & Investment, International Institute for Sustainable Development

Christiana Figueres, Founder and Executive Director of the Center for Sustainable Development in the Americas

Ashok Khosla, President, Development Alternatives


Key informants

Kevin Baumert, Daniel Bodansky, David Brackett, Peter Bridgewater, George Carpenter, Martha Chouchena-Rojas, Kok Kee Chow, Eileen Claussen, Angela Cropper, Joanna Depledge, Gustavo Fonseca, Gourisankar Ghosh, Jose Goldemberg, Joyeeta Gupta, Biksham Gujja, Eric Haites, Geoff Hawtin, Natarajan Ishwaran, Tom Jacob, Ashish Kothari, Emilio L. La Rovere, Thomas Lovejoy, Andrei Marcu, Juan Mayr, Bill Moomaw, David Moorcroft, Allison Moran, Norman Myers, Ganesh Pangare, Vasudha Pangare, Jonathan Pershing, Stuart Pimm, Peter Raven, Jean Luc Redaud, Kent Redford, David Redhouse, Walt Reid, Richard Robarts, Setiati Sastrapraja, John Scanlon, Peter Schei, Sara Scherr, Youba Sokona, Fernando Tudela, Diana Wall, Bob Watson, Harald Winkler, Farhana Yamin, ZhongXiang Zhang



7 Human Rights

Score
3



Score

3

Goals

- **Uphold international human rights standards, with particular attention to:**
 - **Prevention of torture and ill-treatment.**
 - **Protection of the rights of migrants.**
 - **Enforcement of international labour standards.**
 - **Implementation of voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives.**
 - **Promotion of the effective rule of law and the right of the public to have access to information.**

Human rights

Almost all countries have signed several or most of the international human rights treaties and conventions ratified since the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. World leaders reaffirmed their commitment to human rights in the Millennium Declaration. Every issue addressed by the Global Governance Initiative deals with one or another of the political, civil, cultural and economic rights that constitute the essential elements of the human rights framework.

But the worldwide human rights story also includes key topics highlighted in the Millennium Declaration and other agreements but not covered elsewhere in this report: torture and ill-treatment, the rights of migrants, labour rights and corporate responsibilities and effective public services and the rule of law.

Context

Today's human rights framework was established after the second world war, starting in 1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the world's governments at the United Nations. That declaration, and subsequent intergovernmental agreements, defined people's rights and made the fulfilment of those rights primarily a responsibility of states. As a result, governments usually have the first responsibility to protect and promote human rights under international law.

But other actors also have responsibility. Indeed, the first article of the Universal Declaration calls on "every individual and every organ of society... [to] strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms, and by progressive measures, including national and

international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance...". The preambles of both the main Human Rights Covenants (on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) state that: "the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the society to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognised in the present Covenant...".

So although states have most duties under human rights law, greater attention has been given in recent years to the responsibilities of other actors. Intergovernmental organizations may have an independent identity, but most have been created by states and are financed by and accountable to states. Responsibility for such organizations lies eventually with the states that hold authority over them. In that sense they are properly subject to human rights law, as states are, though their accountability may be indirect, and no practice for its application or enforcement may have been developed.

The responsibilities of nongovernmental actors are generally less well defined, though what companies or armed groups do clearly affects whether human rights are achieved. Armed groups, for example, commit many crimes of violence and other abuses against civilians. Companies affect the lives of surrounding communities as well as those they employ. The media influence policy and public attitudes as well as provide information. Human rights law concerning the responsibilities of business is particularly undeveloped. As human rights and international law evolve further, they are likely to increasingly encompass the activities of actors other than states.

Because it is not possible for the Global Governance Initiative to cover all aspects of human rights adequately, the focus here is on four themes that illustrate the underlying issues. The choice of torture and ill-treatment draws attention to the fact that even well-established rights may be threatened. The treatment of migrants illustrates how far the rights of some groups of people remain unprotected. Labour rights and business accountability reveal the importance of work to achieve all human rights. The rule of law and access to information underline the fact that many mundane services are essential to the quality of life for many people and are frequently implemented badly or not at all.

Torture and ill-treatment

Torture, prohibited under all circumstances by international human rights law, is one of the gravest human rights violations. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1, defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”.

The period after September 2001 has raised issues of particular concern, centred on the conduct of military and security operations in the context of

the international campaign against terrorism, launched and led by the United States. Those directing this campaign have sought to redefine the parameters of what governments consider to be “war” and the appropriate or lawful conduct of war. This has put pressure on some of the fundamental legal assumptions that underpin the laws of war and the responsibilities for command that have governed understanding of legal accountability for war crimes, genocide and other violations of humanitarian and human rights law since at least the end of the second world war.¹ For both lawyers and the wider public, it has become less clear rather than more when “a state of war” exists (or does not), what distinguishes “combatants” from “civilians” in conditions of conflict and therefore what rights and protections those two categories of people can claim. By extension, it has also become less clear when a detained individual is entitled to claim the status of “prisoner of war”.

One legal and humanitarian concern focuses on the treatment and status of those detained by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba, following the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001-02. The U.S. authorities have defined the Guantanamo detainees as “illegal combatants”, neither (civilian) criminals nor (military) prisoners of war. In effect, they fall outside the provisions of international law and, according to the U.S. authorities, can legitimately be judged by special courts and procedures established after September 2001. Because U.S. courts have ruled that the Guantanamo facility lies outside the jurisdiction of national courts (including those of the United States), those detained there (with the exception of U.S. citizens²) are not protected by the normal legal safeguards that civil and military detainees are entitled to internationally. These

While governments cannot publicly espouse or defend torture, efforts can be focused on gradually persuading them to both renounce it and enforce its abolition

rulings are not internationally accepted. The International Committee of the Red Cross, responsible for monitoring humanitarian law, is among the organizations that have expressed disagreement with the United States' interpretation of its international responsibilities in this matter.

Human rights and legal experts in the United States and abroad have also been concerned about the treatment of many people detained—often in secret, without charge or trial—because the administration considers them to possibly have connections of one kind or another with terrorism.

The treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, and of those detained on suspicion of terrorism, is important because it may create a precedent for treatment of many other individuals in future “nonformal” conflicts. In so doing it may weaken the protection afforded to both civilians and combatants under international humanitarian and human rights law. The detainees have been held in somewhat extreme conditions for many months without trial. Although there is no evidence that detainees at Guantanamo have been tortured, they have been put under severe psychological pressure, and some have attempted to commit suicide.³

The treatment of detainees in many other countries, especially of those accused of acts of terrorism, is much worse. Detention regimes in many countries are not subject to monitoring to the extent that Guantanamo Bay has been. Persistent reports suggest that torture and ill-treatment of detainees may be spreading in the more security-conscious and permissive climate since September 2001.⁴ Of particular concern is the claim that detainees have been informally transferred to countries known to practice torture or ill-treatment, by officials or

military forces, notably those of the United States, that have captured or taken custody of them.⁵

The principle that torture and ill-treatment should be prohibited under all circumstances is solidly established, but this does not mean it has been honoured in practice. Numerous official institutions in many countries—security agencies, military and police forces, prison officials—have committed torture and ill-treatment. And in many cases such abuses have been institutionalized.⁶ Even so, that the principle of prohibition has been widely accepted remains of fundamental importance. While governments cannot publicly espouse or defend torture, efforts can be focused on gradually persuading them to both renounce it and enforce its abolition. Any erosion of agreement on what constitutes torture and ill-treatment, and tolerance of interrogation or detention procedures that weaken the definition of ill-treatment under international law, will seriously undermine protection of detainees' rights and human rights more generally.

This is all the more important because torture and ill-treatment, once established, do not primarily affect political dissidents or detainees. The torture of criminal detainees is frequent. Many cases of serious ill-treatment occur following arrests for minor offences.

A very positive development in 2003 was the creation of the International Criminal Court and the appointment of officials to staff it. The court strengthens the national and international legal capacity to bring to trial individuals who are charged with very serious human rights abuses, including torture. It fills an institutional vacuum that has weakened enforcement of international rights law for many years, capping years of struggle to

**The International Criminal Court
fills an institutional vacuum that
has weakened enforcement of
international rights law for
many years, capping years of
struggle to end impunity for
very serious crimes, including
war crimes and genocide**

end impunity for very serious crimes, including war crimes and genocide.

The United States has refused to support the court. It has even pushed many countries that support the court to sign bilateral agreements with the United States that will exempt U.S. citizens from being called before the court, even if accused of grave human rights abuses.⁷ As of June 2003, 43 countries had signed such bilateral agreements. Others have refused: Canada, most countries of the European Union and Bulgaria, Colombia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The International Criminal Court will not address cases that occurred before its creation. During 2003 several countries used national courts or processes to prosecute or establish the true facts about serious political and human rights crimes. Argentina, for example, took further steps to try leading figures in the military government that governed the country between 1976 and 1983 for torture and other human rights crimes. In September 2003 the Truth and Justice Commission of Peru completed an important inquiry, investigating the deaths of thousands of Peruvians during the government's conflict with the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) movement. It established that government troops were responsible for the majority of abuses and that most of the victims were indigenous rural villagers. In Sierra Leone a court was formed to try the many very serious human rights crimes committed during the civil war in that country—and in 2003 it issued its first indictments.

Also in 2003 the governments of Costa Rica and Switzerland, supported by an alliance of governments and civil society organizations, sponsored the adoption of a Protocol to the Torture

Convention, through the United Nations. This will create a panel of independent inspectors with authority to visit places of detention and thereby strengthen the protection of detainees.

Several governments initially opposed this limited and optional extension of international protection, including China, Cuba, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and the United States. All these countries were among the 53 members of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2002 or 2003. Some of them have worked, even within the commission, to weaken the discussion and application of human rights. This contributed to the perception that UN processes, including the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, have lost credibility and are currently unacceptably politicized.

Migration

People who move between countries do so for many reasons and are categorized in various ways. But all share the dangers of exclusion, which raises vital issues because human rights regimes are most effective when there is consent to the principle of equal treatment. As noncitizens, migrants are often not held to have equal rights in law with citizens. "Undocumented" (illegal) migrants are particularly vulnerable to legal discrimination by governments and to economic exploitation by employers or groups that organize criminal trafficking.

The international community has traditionally recognized three categories of migrants: people who cross international frontiers as refugees, people who are internally displaced within their countries and people who are voluntary migrants. Two categories were recently added: people

The international community has failed to deal with migration


trafficked across borders and people smuggled across borders. People trafficked are considered to be under duress, while people smuggled are not.

The international community has generally failed to deal with migration, despite its growing scale. In 2000 some 175 million people were living outside their country of birth.⁸ But this figure does not adequately take into account unregistered (undocumented or illegal) migrants, about whom no exact figures are collected. The EU and its member countries have established draconian controls that tend to criminalize human movement without successfully controlling it. But political discussions in other countries with large flows of migrants—including Australia, Japan and the United States—have not been much more creative.

Refugees are protected in law by the 1951 U.N. Convention on Refugees, which grants protection to migrants who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their nationality, religion, race, political opinions or membership of a particular social group. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, created after the second world war, is mandated to provide international protection to refugees and seek solutions to their plight.⁹ But the refugee regime is under pressure. Many states have passed regulations that circumvent the spirit, and often the letter, of the 1951 convention.

Although some 20–25 million people are internally displaced (at least twice the number of refugees) they are not covered by any international convention or institution. The duty to protect them lies primarily with national governments. Bitter experience shows that, particularly during civil conflicts, national governments frequently fail in that duty. As a result, overseas governments and international institutions are

More than 25 million people were refugees or internally displaced in 2002



a. Includes 1.1 million internally displaced persons who returned home in 2002.
Source: UNHCR 2003.

increasingly understood to have a role in their protection. In this context, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (which the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, introduced in 1998) has played a valuable role. The principles clarify who internally displaced people are and name the rights and guarantees they are entitled to in all phases of displacement.¹⁰ Though not legally binding, the principles reaffirm established principles of international law and provide a legal framework that the various governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental actors that provide protection and assistance to internally displaced people can apply.¹¹

Those deemed to have migrated voluntarily have generally not been the subject of international concern. An Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration—later renamed the International Organization for Migration in 1989—was created in 1951, but it remained outside the UN system. It is an intergovernmental agency with a limited remit to help “manage” migration flows. It has no explicit mandate to protect migrants. Indeed, no international institution or mechanism frames or manages the movement of people between countries on the basis of human rights norms and principles.

As the recent histories of Australia, Latin America and the United States amply demonstrate, people have always moved—and in large numbers. Distinctive today is that while most areas of economic activity (trade, investment, production) are being deregulated, human movement across borders is increasingly being restricted. As a result, people in poorer economies are not as free (as in past times) to seek opportunities abroad. This creates pools of unemployed people in some

The way migration tends to be regulated, especially in the EU, creates an irrational political and economic environment that encourages discrimination against migrants

regions and labour shortages in others. And since people move anyway, many are working clandestinely in other countries. No accurate estimates are available, but it is believed that in Europe alone as many as 3 million people are working as “undocumented” (or illegal) migrants.¹² They are subject to exploitation by their employers (low pay, bad conditions). And they and their families often lack access to health, education and other services that citizens are ordinarily entitled to.

The fundamental principle underlying human rights is that every person has certain rights because he or she is a human being. Yet many countries treat “undocumented” migrants in law as if they are less than full persons, ineligible to claim basic rights. The criminalization of migration creates conditions that encourage true criminality—trafficking migrants to industrial countries and trafficking women and girls to work in the sex industry. For many criminal networks, trading in people has become as valuable as trading in drugs and guns.

Governments are doing more to track and prevent human trafficking. In 2000, with unusual speed, two new UN agreements on Transnational Organised Crime were passed. The Palermo Protocols on Trafficking and Smuggling focus on law enforcement. Few of their provisions protect the rights of migrants. While trafficked persons are assumed not to have given their consent and are treated as “victims” or “survivors”, smuggled people are considered to have willingly engaged in a criminal enterprise. They are entitled only to “humane treatment”, even though in practice no easy distinction can be made between the two groups.

Overall, the way migration tends to be regulated, especially in the EU, creates an irrational political and

economic environment that encourages discrimination against migrants. Most EU economies, short of labour, depend on illegal or half-legal migrants to sustain many services. Yet they continue to pursue policies that strictly restrict legal migration. Political discussion in the United States (where policies towards migration were traditionally more open) and in Australia have scarcely been more enlightened. And Japan and the Republic of Korea have virtually been in denial over the issue.

It is widely understood privately that current policies are unsustainable—and most politicians in industrial countries condemn racism and the policies of most industrial countries prohibit racial discrimination. But political leaders, left and right, have found it difficult to challenge, and have sometimes exploited, xenophobic attitudes in their electorates. Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have failed to frame rational principles that would respect human rights and establish workable entry rules.

Migration and forced displacement are not confined to industrial countries. They occur wherever there are sharp economic gradients between regions and wherever conditions in countries of origin become acutely insecure, economically or politically. OECD states have a particular responsibility to develop humane and sustainable approaches to human migration because they have the expertise and resources to do so.

Legal migrants face harassment as well. Cases are frequent in the Gulf, where hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and other countries service essential industries in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.¹³

Huge challenges lie ahead in employing the world's people, ensuring that the conditions of work meet labour rights standards and involving businesses in the implementation of human rights

Many business leaders recognize the value of migrants to the economy and could do more, particularly in the OECD countries, to press for rational management and investment in economic migrants. They could also work to ensure that migrants are integrated into their workforces and do not suffer discrimination in the workplace or in society.

There are indications (it cannot be put any stronger) that momentum may be building for a more rational approach. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families finally entered into force on 1 July 2003 after an exceedingly slow ratification process. But not a single industrial country has ratified it, and none of the 21 countries that have pledged to respect its provisions in their domestic laws have significant incoming migrant populations.

An important civil society initiative, started in 1998, brought together a wide range of organizations with support from the Dutch Government to develop a more coherent and positive set of migration policies, a process that led to the 2002 Hague Declaration.¹⁴ A Global Commission on International Migration was formed at the end of 2003 at the initiative of Sweden and Switzerland, with the support of several governments from both sending and receiving countries. It could stimulate serious policy debate and perhaps make the case for creating an international organization to protect the rights of migrants and address their needs.

The political climate is generally unhelpful, however, and progress is unlikely to be rapid. Political resistance to policy reform will be considerable, and substantive change is likely to take years.

Box 7.1 Newsletter of UNITED, a European network of 560 antiracist and refugee organizations

20 June: International Refugee Day

"On Monday this week, many would be migrants from Africa drowned near Sicily in a sea tragedy.

On Tuesday, in the Straits of Gibraltar, Spanish marines rescued about 160 refugees who got into distress.

While the leader of Italy's far-right Lega Nord [Italy] suggests shooting 'illegal' migrants with cannons out of the water, thousands of refugees in desperate situations die at the borders of fortress Europe.

On 18 June this year, BBC reported about a would-be immigrant, who died after jumping into the English Channel. It seems that the 25-year-old man from the Ivory Coast decided to jump overboard when the crew found him hidden on the upper deck of a container ship. Earlier this year, a 22-year-old Nigerian died of lack of medical care in the refugee centre of Thurhof (Switzerland), followed just a few days later by an 18-year-old Iraqi, who was crushed to death while trying to climb on a lorry in Calais (France) on its way to England."

Since 1993, UNITED has documented more than 3,800 deaths of immigrants, including those who drowned in the Mediterranean or Straits of Gibraltar, suffocated in trucks during transit or committed suicide in detention camps. (<http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/listofdeaths>).

Conditions of work and the responsibilities of companies

Huge challenges lie ahead in employing the world's people, ensuring that the conditions of work meet

None of the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved if people cannot work and earn their living

labour rights standards and involving businesses in the implementation of human rights.

In the only direct reference to work and employment in the Millennium Declaration, the world's leaders "resolve to develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work". This is crucial. None of the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved if people cannot work and earn their living.

Legal and institutional frameworks

The majority of the poorest people are unemployed or work in the informal economy or as subsistence producers. They lack clear legal status—or they are classified as self-employed. Many employers are not legitimate enterprises or are not identifiable, allowing them to avoid legal responsibilities or treat workers as independent enterprises. To create decent jobs, and protect the rights of those who fill them, a legal framework is required to test and enforce them in relation to other claims. Appropriate legal and institutional frameworks are essential.

All this has important implications for macroeconomic policy. Governments and the Bretton Woods institutions are frequently criticized on the grounds that their macroeconomic policies increase economic and social insecurity, particularly for poorer and less skilled groups of people. Structural economic reforms often undermine protection of fundamental human rights, including the rights to health, food, water and education. As macroeconomic reform across the globe puts more pressure on national economies to be competitive, many governments are tempted to attract foreign investment by depressing social protection and worker rights.

This is visible in export processing zones, for example, where labour rights are routinely flouted.

There is concern that the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the major donor countries that dominate their boards have not focused enough, or successfully, on the need to generate jobs and work across the world. The Marrakesh Agreement that created the WTO specifies that countries should conduct their trade and economic relations in ways that raise living standards and secure full employment. Yet these organizations are regularly criticized for dislocating employment when they introduce economic and structural reforms and for failing to take adequate account of the social impact of their policies.

International responsibility for setting and monitoring labour rights rests with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a UN institution with a "tripartite" structure. Its members are states, represented at the ILO by governments and representatives of employer and worker organizations. The ILO has approved numerous labour standards (nearly 190 conventions since 1919), all binding for states that have ratified them. The ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948, No 87) and on Protection of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (1949, No 98) are binding by virtue of ILO membership, irrespective of ratification. With the related jurisprudence for the ILO's supervisory mechanisms,¹⁵ they are the keystone of international legal protection of trade union rights.

In 1998 the ILO adopted a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. It reaffirmed four core principles, now universally referred to as "core labour standards": freedom of

Recent public debate about protecting labour standards has tended to focus on the supply chains of multinational enterprises, especially those in labour-intensive manufacturing of consumer products

association and the right to collective bargaining, elimination of forced or compulsory labour, effective abolition of child labour and elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. Unlike ratified conventions, this declaration has a promotional character. It commits member states to respect and promote these rights, whether or not they have ratified the relevant conventions. It includes a Follow-Up Mechanism.¹⁶ The ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977, amended in 2000) also sets out key principles that employers, governments and trades unions should respect. Among other commitments, parties are expected to respect international human rights standards.

However, implementation of ILO labour standards has often been weak. Responsibility for implementation rests with states, and some governments refuse to apply ILO standards or ignore specific recommendations from the ILO's supervisory mechanisms. The ILO itself has no enforcement powers. Employers and governments sometimes oppose ILO investigations into mass violations of trade union rights. In June 2003, for example, both the ILO Employers' Group and most governments represented on the ILO Governing Body voted against the establishment of an ILO Commission of Inquiry into trade union rights in Colombia, where hundreds of trade unionists have been killed each year since the late 1980s.

The influence of another set of international rules, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, has been growing. Adopted in 1976, these government recommendations cover many of the activities of multinational enterprises and are to be applied by all OECD governments. Several other

governments have chosen to adhere to them. The guidelines set out "good practice" only for companies that operate worldwide, and they are not legally enforceable. Followup procedures include a regular overview of the guidelines and every country adhering to the guidelines is required to set up a national contact point to promote and implement the guidelines and deal with cases that trade unions or other concerned parties raise. In the last two years, national contact points in several European countries have addressed alleged breaches of the guidelines by companies active in Burma, which according to the ILO systematically imposes forced labour on its civilian population.

Because employers are often to blame for violations, and governments are not always able to oblige companies to comply, civil society groups are targeting business directly. Recent public debate about protecting labour standards has tended to focus on the supply chains of multinational enterprises, especially those in labour-intensive manufacturing of consumer products. Several developments in 2003 deserve mention. The Fair Labor Association—an alliance of business, civil society organizations and universities—published considerable information on factory conditions. The Ethical Trading Initiative, Social Accountability International, the Workers' Rights Consortium, the Clean Clothes Campaign and the FairWear Foundation are also developing new forms of collaboration to monitor employer compliance with labour standards.

Some enterprises, especially those in Europe, have adopted global agreements with international trade union federations. Called "framework agreements", most are based on universally

While some leading multinational enterprises have begun to implement human rights policies across their operations, the vast majority of national and international enterprises have not begun to consider their human rights responsibilities systematically

Box 7.2 Words of a union organizer in the Bataan free trade zone, Philippines

"I started working at 19 in a bag-making factory: we worked 14 or even 16 hours a day for the minimum wage. We even had to work for two days nonstop without receiving the statutory compensation payment. The management had a clearly antiunion approach: those trying to form unions were dismissed, and after one strike the management cut the workforce from 600 to 300, getting rid of everyone on a temporary contract. The Korean managers used to shout at the workers. While I was in the export department I saw a Korean manager throw a bag at the face of one worker, injuring him near the eye. That incident really shocked me. When I was 22, I joined ALU. After two years, the 300 core staff recognized the union. The temporary workers were too scared, since the management told them quite clearly that the renewal of their contracts depended on their 'positive attitude'. In 1998 the factory closed down...only to reopen elsewhere under a new name but with exactly the same management."

accepted core labour standards, including trade union rights. They allow trade union organizations to raise cases with these enterprises.

Overall, there is widespread agreement that businesses have a clear duty to protect and respect labour standards. But many companies (local, national and multinational) have not yet made systematic efforts to ensure decent working conditions, and at country level, severe abuses of workers' rights are not uncommon (box 7.2). Worldwide, more than 213 trades unionists were killed in 2002 for their activities in support of labour rights, nearly 1,000 were attacked and beaten and 30,000 were sacked for defending worker's rights.¹⁷

Wider business responsibility

The broader role of businesses in ensuring the protection of human rights is the subject of lively debate. Public awareness of the link between business and human rights has grown significantly. Through a variety of initiatives, notably the UN Global Compact and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (launched in 2003), numerous businesses have acknowledged their responsibility to address human rights issues related to their activities. But while some leading multinational enterprises have begun to implement human rights policies across their operations, the vast majority of national and international enterprises have not begun to consider their human rights responsibilities systematically.

The UN Global Compact proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Davos at the 1999 World Economic Forum was officially launched in July 2000. Companies that endorse its nine principles commit themselves to respect ILO core labour standards and human rights, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (box 7.3). The Global Compact sets out to be a platform for dialogue, learning and voluntary action. Its Advisory Council comprises representatives from businesses, trade unions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Many NGOs feel that the Global Compact shares many of the weaknesses of voluntary codes of conduct and would like it to develop reporting and accountability mechanisms. In April 2003 four international NGOs, two of them on the Advisory Council, formally expressed this hope in a letter to the UN Secretariat.¹⁸ Trade union organizations consider the nine principles to be inferior to existing instruments that address the social responsibilities of business. Like employer organizations and most participating companies, they prefer to preserve the Global Compact as a space for dialogue and joint action.

Voluntary codes can help to promote a culture of compliance with labour and human rights law and can also encourage governments to assume their responsibilities

Box 7.3 What the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says about labour rights

Article 23

- Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment
- Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
- Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

In August 2003 the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a group of government-appointed experts, approved Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.¹⁹ Prepared over three years, the norms consolidate existing social and environmental standards and interpret the responsibilities of business. They envision periodic monitoring and verification by the United Nations and other national and international mechanisms, but do not specify how this will be done.

Supported by many civil society organizations, the norms are now being examined by companies interested in corporate accountability.²⁰ But OECD governments and business associations generally have strong reservations. The norms have been submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights, in the next stage of a process that might eventually lead to their adoption by the UN system.

Debates on the norms and the Global Compact reflect concern about the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives for corporate social responsibility. Companies in several industries, including automobiles, consumer electronics and agriculture, have taken steps to adopt codes of conduct. Several industrywide initiatives deserve mention. The Kimberley Process aims to eliminate conflict diamonds from global trade. The International Cocoa Initiative aims to eliminate child and slave labour in the cocoa industry. In the oil, gas and mining sectors, a number of companies agreed to adhere to industrywide standards. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—launched by the U.K. government and supported by several companies, civil society organizations and host country governments—aims to promote good governance and respect for human rights by increasing the transparency of financial transactions that companies make to secure the right to explore and develop energy reserves. It is analogous to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which have steadily expanded their impact since being signed in late 2000.

Voluntary codes can help to promote a culture of compliance with labour and human rights law and can also encourage governments to assume their responsibilities. They can create space for trade unions, and for more constructive relations between unions and employers. But there is concern that their diversity and number will dilute their value—and that the difficulty of monitoring them will erode their credibility. Voluntary codes cannot fulfil—and should not replace—a proper legal and institutional framework.

Effective services and the rule of law

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan began the last

**More is being done to improve
governance and participation, by
governments and other institutions
in both industrial and developing
countries, with mixed quality and
uneven success**

chapter of his 2003 report on the implementation of the Millennium Goals and Declaration as follows: “Human rights are universal principles, but, inspiring as these principles are, none implement themselves. Good governance, effective institutions, adequate material resources and international support are usually what make the difference between noble aspirations and effective realization.”²¹

As he noted, the ambitious goals set out in the Millennium Declaration will not be achieved in societies that do not possess an honest and efficient administration and an accessible and efficient justice system. It is probably true that the most rapid progress towards protection of human rights across the world can be made by delivering basic, even banal, administrative services more efficiently.

Without effective courts and institutions, people cannot protect themselves from crime, corruption, maladministration, misfortune, sickness, unemployment or natural disaster. Protecting people against egregious and malicious violations of rights is vital. But no less important is ensuring that they have access to cheap and effective services and have redress to maladministration, petty crime and corruption. Wherever people cannot avail themselves of the services they are entitled to, the poorly educated, poorly connected and least well-off suffer most.

Sound justice and governance have been appreciated more widely in recent years. All the major actors in international development—including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), other UN organizations, the World Bank, bilateral agencies and large NGOs—now give explicit attention to governance issues.

Consider the theme of *World Development Report 2004: Access to Services for the Poor*.

More is being done to improve governance and participation, by governments and other institutions in both industrial and developing countries, with mixed quality and uneven success. Programmes to decentralize government have been introduced in many countries, partly with the objective of improving the accountability of government and the quality of local services. Governments, Transparency International and international agencies have taken steps to curb corruption. The International Monetary Fund, UNDP and the World Bank have invested more in administrative capacity, especially that of justice systems. And many NGOs and public sector unions have begun to participate in government-led reform programmes.

The creation of national human rights institutions in many countries has also been a positive step. They can focus attention on the deficiencies or abuses of government. They can make government more accountable. And they can increase the possibilities of redress for ordinary people. Local government reforms also can be beneficial. However, the real performance of local governments after reform, and national human rights institutions, has been uneven, and it depends on the financial and political framework provided by national governments for their operation.

Aid programmes, many now designed to improve justice and governance, continue to be criticized for well-known weaknesses. Donors are often accused of competing to introduce their own systems, without regard for the long-term interest of recipient countries. Aid programmes are rarely well coordinated. Some are overfunded or duplicated,

Laws and practices that require governments to release information to the public enable citizens to hold their governments accountable and to participate meaningfully in political decisionmaking

and others underfunded or neglected. Prosecutors' offices and, too often, prison systems are often ignored in this way. Where institutions are corrupt, abusive or very inefficient, donors are too sensitive to domestic criticism and liable to pull away from funding even though it is evident that successful reform will take time. In general, the time horizon of aid programmes is far shorter than what is required to implement reform successfully.²²

In Sub-Saharan Africa, where administrative and judicial systems are often weak, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) should be followed with particular interest. Initiated by African leaders, NEPAD promises to promote important political and human rights reforms and to strengthen government accountability and the rule of law—all in cooperation with African governments, international donors and national organizations. Civil society organizations in Africa have greeted the project with interest and scepticism, because of the suspicion that characterizes relations between many governments and civil society on the continent. NEPAD is at an early stage, and it is premature to judge whether African governments will give it the political support it needs to succeed. But if it lives up to its promises, it will create new opportunities to improve the quality of official services and people's access to them.

A growing trend, in response to citizen demands, is for governments to provide better access to information—a promising avenue to better governance. Laws and practices that require governments to release information to the public enable citizens to hold their governments accountable and to participate meaningfully in political decisionmaking. Dozens of countries have new access to information laws, and more are in process, even in countries long tightly closed.

China began to release more information as part of its anticorruption campaign, to fulfil WTO rules and in response to the SARS epidemic, which dramatically illustrated the risks of excessive secretiveness. India and Mexico are struggling with their recent national access-to-information laws. Overall, many more of the world's people are benefiting from transparency. But some global leaders seem to be moving backward. In the United States, the move to greater secrecy in the wake of the terror attacks in September 2001 continued. And several European countries find that laws guaranteeing citizen access to information conflict with the requirements of membership in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The implementation of national laws continues to be flawed almost everywhere.

National reform holds the key to progress, but it is vital that international agencies should coordinate their work. In May 2003 the UN agencies agreed a "common understanding" of what the human rights-based approach to development implies. This opens the path for more effective collaboration by UN agencies in promoting human rights—and more effective action on the ground to apply human rights principles in operational programmes that UN agencies support or implement.

The terms of this common understanding: "All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.

Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and

programming in all sectors and all phases of the programming process.

Development co-operation contributes to the development of the capacities of 'duty-bearers' to meet their obligations and/or of 'rights-holders' to claim their rights."²³

Conclusion

2003 saw significant progress on human rights. Examples include the creation of the International Criminal Court, the entry into force of the Migrants Convention, which protects the rights of migrant workers and their families, the addition of new safeguards to prevent torture and the growing interest among corporations in codes of conduct to strengthen their social accountability.

But there is reason to be concerned. Most human rights experts and activists feel that civil liberties and respect for international human rights values have been weakened, especially as an effect of the international war against terrorism. They are also concerned about the loss of credibility of some human rights bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights, and the diplomatic undermining of new human rights institutions, notably the International Criminal Court. What is feared is that the human rights movement may face a historical reversal that would generally weaken respect for human rights and for international human rights law.

Endnotes

1. A separate body of humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, governs the conduct of war. Responsibility for this area of law has been vested by governments in the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

2. And possibly Australian and U.K. citizens, under an arrangement reached in 2003.

3. UN (1984).

4. Human Rights (2003); AIUSA (2003); Lawyers Committee on Human Rights (2003).

5. *Human Rights News* (2003); Priest Gellman (2002).

6. AIUSA (2001); UN (2001).

7. The agreements prohibit the surrender to the International Criminal Court or a third country or entity for the purposes of transfer or delivery to the court of a broad scope of persons including current or former government officials, employees (including contractors) or military personnel or nationals of the United States. In some agreements the exemptions are reciprocal. They do not include an obligation to subject such persons to an investigation or prosecution (CICC 2003). The U.S. government opposes the court because it fears U.S. citizens will be the target of specious and politically motivated charges. In fact the document creating the court contains clauses designed to ensure that the court's procedures cannot easily be used to bring charges irresponsibly. Most countries, including members of the EU, accept that these safeguards are adequate.

8. Annan (2002).

9. OAU (1969); OAS (1984).

10. OCHA (1998).

11. Recognizing that internally displaced persons are poorly protected, the UN system asked its agencies to adopt a "collaborative approach".

Many gaps remained, however, and in 1997 the U.N. Secretary-General asked the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to be the UN focal point on internally displaced persons issues. In 2001, OCHA itself created a small, nonoperational, interagency Internally Displaced Persons Unit in an attempt to improve international response, but numerous problems persist.

12. Richburg (2002).

13. For examples, see *News Bulletin* of the Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants.

14. See Society for International Development, Netherlands Chapter (2003).

15. Specifically, the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards.

16. Member states that have not ratified a core convention are asked each year to report on the status of relevant rights and principles within their borders, noting impediments to ratification and areas where assistance may be required. These reports are reviewed by the Committee of Independent Expert Advisers, whose observations are considered by the ILO's Governing Body.

17. ICFTU (2003). Of those killed, no less than 184 (86%) were murdered in Colombia alone.

18. Oxfam International, Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch (2003).

19. UN (2003a).

20. Chief executive officers, grouped in a new Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, convened by Respect Europe, have decided to assess the norms in the course of 2004–05, for example.

21. UN (2003b).

22. International Council on Human Rights Policy (2000).

23. Silva (2003).

References

- AIUSA (Amnesty International USA). 2001. "Turkey's Endemic Use of Torture Is Warning to U.S. Advocates: Ill-Treatment of Detainees Violates Rights and Erodes Values." News Release, 8 November. New York.
- . 2003. "The Threat of a Bad Example." AI Index AMR 51/114/2003. 19 August. New York.
- Annan, Kofi. 2002. "Speech at the Launch of the Declaration on the Future of Refugee and Migration Policy." 22 November, The Hague.
- CICC (Coalition for the International Criminal Court). 2003. *European Newsletter* 32.
- EITI (Extractive Industries' Transparency Initiative). 2003. "High-Level Multi-Stakeholder Conference." 17 June, London.
- Hammarberg, Thomas. 1999. *Taking Duties Seriously: Individual Duties in International Human Rights Law*. Versoix, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy.
- Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners. 2003. "Allegations Surrounding the Torture of a Citizen by an Officer in Luxor Traffic Unit," Press Release 5 June. Cairo.

- Human Rights News*. 2003. "The Legal Prohibition Against Torture." [<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/TortureQandA.htm>]
- Human Rights Watch. 2003. "Counter-Terrorism Measures and the Prohibition against Torture and Ill-treatment." Submission to the European Parliament Hearing's on Human Rights in the European Union. 24 April, Luxembourg.
- ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions). 2003. "Annual Survey on Trade Union Rights Violations." Brussels.
- ILO (International Labour Organization). 1948. "Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, no. 87." Geneva.
- . 1949. "Convention on Protection of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, no. 98." Geneva.
- . 1977. "ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy." Governing Body of the International Labour Office. 204th Session, November, Geneva.
- . 1998. "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work." 86th Session, June, Geneva.
- International Council on Human Rights Policy. 2000. *Local Perspectives, Foreign Aid to the Justice Sector*. Versoix, Switzerland.
- Jesuit Refugee Service. 2003. "Treatment of Haitian Migrant Workers in the Dominican Republic." *Dispatches* 132. Rome.
- Lawyers Committee on Human Rights. 2003. "Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security for the Post-September 11 United States." New York.
- News Bulletin*. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants, Hong Kong. [apmm@hknet.com]
- OAS (Organization of American States). 1984. "Cartagena Declaration on Refugees." 19–22 November, Cartagena de Indias.
- OUA (Organization of African Unity). 1969. "Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa." 6–10 September, Addis Ababa.
- OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 1998. "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." Introductory Note by the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. Geneva.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1976. *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Declaration and Decision on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises*. Paris
- Oxfam International, Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch. 2003. "Letter to Ms Louise Fréchette, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations." 7 April, New York.
- Priest, Dana, and Barton Gellman. 2002. "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities." *The Washington Post* 26 December.
- Richburg, Keith B. 2002. "Illegal Workers in W. Europe Do Continent's Heavy Lifting: Increasingly Scorned Immigrants Help Secure Standard of Living." *The Washington Post* 3 August.
- Silva, Marie-Luisa. 2003. "The Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding among UN Agencies." Speech at Interagency Workshop on a Human Rights-Based Approach in the Context of UN Reform, New York.
- Society for International Development, Netherlands Chapter. 2003. "Follow-up Project on the Future of Asylum and Migration (FAM)." The Hague.
- UN (United Nations). 1948. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." General Assembly resolution 217 A (III). 10 December, New York.

- . 1966a. “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI). 16 December, New York.
- . 1966b. “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI). 16 December, New York.
- . 1984. “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” 10 December, Geneva.
- . 1990. “International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.” 18 December, New York.
- . 2000a. “Millennium Declaration.” 18 September, New York.
- . 2000b. “Millennium Development Goals.” 18 September, New York.
- . 2000c. “Protocols against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants.” 15 December, Palermo.
- . 2000d. “UN Global Compact.” 26 July, New York.
- . 2000e. “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.” 20 December, New York.
- . 2001. “Director of UNAIDS Addresses Commission on Human Rights: Special Rapporteur on Torture Discusses Situation in Brazil.” Press Release 11 April.
- . 2002. “Hague Declaration.” 22 November, The Hague.
- . 2003a. “Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.” Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 16 August, New York.
- . 2003b. “Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration.” Report of the Secretary-General, Follow up of the Outcome of the Millennium Summit. UN General Assembly, Document A/58/323, paragraph 73. September, New York.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2003. “Refugees by Numbers 2003.” Geneva.
- World Bank. 2002. *World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World*. Washington, D.C.
- WTO (World Trade Organization). 1994. “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.” 15 April, Marrakesh.
- Xiaoling, Ma. 2003. “China’s Employment Situation and Forecast in the Next Few Years.” *China and the World Economy* 4: 34–43.

Methodology

The Expert Group on Human Rights selected four broad themes: torture, an illustration of egregious human rights abuse; migration, an example of exclusion; labour rights and business obligations; and delivery of core services, essential for the protection of rights and the quality of ordinary life. Because other expert groups were examining poverty, education, hunger and health, this group decided to give more attention to rights that fall under the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and less attention to rights covered by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For the same reason the group avoided discussion of humanitarian law and protection of human rights during conflicts.

The analysis took into account the advice from subject matter experts who had been asked to comment on particular issues. The group agreed on the overall assumptions and the claims and arguments that would be made in the final report.

Each member of the group privately scored the overall performance of the four actors and then presented the score to the group along with the reasoning behind the score. There was a high level of agreement on the final score: no individual score was lower than 3 or higher than 4. The final score presented here is the average of all the scores.

Expert Group members

Chair: Robert Archer, Executive Director,
International Council for Human Rights Policy

Chidi Odinkalu, Senior Legal Advisor, Open Society
Institute

Rachel Brett, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva

Janek Kuczkiewicz, Head, Department of Trade
Union Rights, International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions

Aron Cramer, Vice President, Business for Social
Responsibility


Marcia Kran, Professor, University of British Columbia

Key informants

Christian Ahlund, Oleksander Betsa, David
Fernández Davalos, Surya Dhungel, Nicholas
Howen, Shoji Nishimoto, Helena Nygren-Krug,
Wiktor Osiatynski, David Petrasek, Dimitrina
Petrova, Nawa Silwal, Edwin Tollefson, Theo van
Boven

For more information





For more information

The results are in. The international community as a whole is committing only a fraction of the effort needed to meet the global challenges it has pledged to confront in the Millennium Declaration and other international agreements. Yet no matter how daunting these challenges may seem, the obstacles to achieving important international goals are all “solvable problems”. Furthermore, the inclusion of hard targets, indicators and timelines into the Millennium Development Goals thrusts great responsibility on the international community to take timely action and mandates the commensurate allocation of resources towards their achievement. Where no strict timelines have been set, the recognition of the interdependence of all of the goals emphasizes the need for action across the full range of challenges.

None of the goals will be achieved without substantial contributions from the private sector and civil society, in addition to governments and international organizations. Business, for example, can become more active through socially responsible investments, corporate philanthropy, management decisions on corporate citizenship, helping local entrepreneurs develop business plans and providing them with funding and redesigning its own business models to realize the full market potential of the world’s poor. Civil society is often involved in advocacy at all levels, formal policy development together with governments and international organizations, monitoring the implementation of international accords and many dimensions of service delivery.

The preceding chapters contain many examples of such innovative engagement by diverse stakeholders. However, precisely because so many individual efforts are under way around the world with respect to each goal, it is difficult to assess where one organization should get involved—and how.

In each of the seven areas covered in this report, a number of critical nodes have emerged which serve as valuable points of entry for organizations—companies, industry associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropists—to gain information and even directly engage in contributing to the achievement of these important global goals. Some organizations serve as broad information providers, with links to other groups. Others are service providers, specializing in training and resources. The listing of organizations below does not constitute an endorsement of their work.

Cross-cutting

Global Reporting Initiative ***<http://www.globalreporting.org>***

Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an independent NGO supported by the United Nations Environment Program and the Global Compact. GRI has issued guidelines for responsible conduct on themes ranging from human rights to biodiversity. To date 339 companies in the auto, utility, consumer

products, pharmaceuticals, financial, telecommunications, transport, energy and chemicals sectors, among others, have published reports that adopt part or all of the guidelines. GRI incorporates the active participation of representatives from business, accountancy, investment, environmental, human rights, research and labour organizations from around the world.

International Business Leaders Forum

<http://www.iblf.org>

The International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) promotes responsible business practices internationally that benefit business and society and that help achieve social, economic and environmentally sustainable development. IBLF work focuses on advocacy, brokerage of partnerships, capacity-building in training managers and partners for leadership and action and dissemination of ideas and best practices.

UN Global Compact

<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp>

The UN Global Compact is an initiative of the UN Secretary-General to bring companies together with UN agencies, labour groups and civil society to support nine principles in the areas of human rights, labour and the environment. The Global Compact offers facilitation and engagement through several mechanisms: policy dialogues, learning networks and projects. As of October 2003, more than 1,000 companies are participating in the Global Compact.

Peace and security

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

<http://cns.miis.edu/cns/index.htm>

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. Located at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California, CNS maintains excellent databases on weapons of mass destruction and is the largest NGO in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.

Global Witness

<http://www.globalwitness.org>

Global Witness is an NGO that works to expose the link between natural resources exploitation and human rights abuses. Global Witness works to change corporate and government practices that result in an unregulated exploitation of resources and to break the links between the exploitation of natural resources and the funding of conflict and corruption.

Henry L. Stimson Center

<http://www.stimson.org>

The Henry L. Stimson Center's mission is to offer practical, nonpartisan, creative solutions to the problems of national and international security through research projects of the highest quality. Based in Washington, D.C., the centre publishes books and reports on a range of international peace and security issues.

International Center for Transitional Justice

<http://www.ictj.org>

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) assists countries pursuing accountability for mass atrocity or human rights abuse. The ICTJ works in societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict and in established democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved. It provides comparative information, legal and policy analysis, documentation and strategic research to justice and truth-seeking institutions, NGOs, governments and others.

International Crisis Group***<http://www.crisisweb.org>***

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) works globally through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict between and within states. Its analysts are located within or close to some 40 countries or territories at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decisionmakers and backed by high-level advocacy.

International Institute for Strategic Studies***<http://www.iiss.org>***

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), located in London and internationally staffed, is a source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. IISS services target politicians and diplomats, foreign affairs analysts, international business, economists, the military, defence commentators, journalists, academics and the informed public.

International Peace Academy***<http://www.ipacademy.org>***

The International Peace Academy (IPA) is an independent, international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states through policy research and development. Based in New York, IPA works closely with the UN, regional and other international organizations, governments and nongovernmental organizations, as well as with parties to conflicts in selected cases.

Small Arms Survey***<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>***

Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. It serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms and as a resource centre for governments, policymakers, researchers and activists.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute***<http://www.sipri.se>***

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) conducts highly regarded research on questions of conflict and cooperation of importance for international peace and security, with the aim of contributing to an understanding of the conditions for peaceful solutions of international conflicts and for a stable peace.

World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit***<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/ConflictPreventionandReconstruction>***

The World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPRU) supports conflict analysis and develops tools and strategies to deal with development in conflict areas. Based in the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., the CPRU provides financing for physical and social reconstruction initiatives in post-war societies and works to design development efforts specific to conflict-affected countries that will help prevent further conflict and ease transition out of conflict.

Poverty***ACCION International******<http://www.accion.org>***

ACCION International was founded in 1961 to address poverty in Latin America's cities and is today one of the premier microfinance

organizations in the world. ACCION partners with microfinance organizations throughout Latin America, Africa and the United States in a wide variety of activities including customized microlending methodologies, business planning, staff training, new product development and market research.

Canadian International Development Agency
<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is Canada's official development assistance programme. CIDA supports sustainable development in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. CIDA provides development assistance in the form of goods, services, the transfer of knowledge and skills and financial contributions. It works with the private and public sectors to support projects in more than 100 countries.

Catholic Relief Services
<http://www.catholicrelief.org>

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is the official international Catholic relief and development agency of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. CRS work includes responding to victims of natural and manmade disasters, providing assistance to the poor, helping those it serves to restore and preserve their dignity and helping to educate the people of the United States to fulfil their moral responsibilities in alleviating human suffering.

Grameen Bank
<http://www.grameen-info.org>

Grameen Bank (GB) provides credit to the poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh. GB provides three types of loans: income-generating, housing and higher education for the children of Grameen

families. As of September 2002 GB had 2.4 million borrowers, 95% of them women. With 1,175 branches, GB provides services in 41,000 villages, covering more than 60% of the total villages in Bangladesh.

International Fund for Agricultural Development
<http://www.ifad.org>

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a specialized agency of the UN, established as an international financial institution in 1977. IFAD has the mandate to combat hunger and rural poverty in developing countries. Its target groups are small farmers, rural landless, nomadic pastoralists, indigenous peoples and, across all groups, rural poor women.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<http://www.oecd.org>

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) groups 30 member countries and works on economic and social issues. The OECD takes a multidisciplinary approach in fighting corruption and also assists nonmember countries in improving their governance and antibribery standards through a number of outreach activities in the Anti-Corruption Division and the Public Management Service as well as the work of the OECD Development Centre.

International Finance Corporation
<http://www.ifc.org>

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a member of the World Bank Group, established in 1956 as the largest multilateral source of loan and equity financing for private sector projects in the developing world. The IFC promotes sustainable private sector development primarily by financing

private sector projects and helping private companies in the developing world mobilize financing in international financial markets. The IFC also provides advice and technical assistance to businesses and governments.

Japan International Co-operation Agency
<http://www.jica.go.jp>

The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) was set up in 1954 to assist Asian countries in their socioeconomic development. It now includes countries outside Asia. JICA carries out a variety of technology and knowledge transfer programmes to support the socioeconomic development of developing countries through technical cooperation.

Just Pensions
<http://www.uksif.org/JJZ/ZIjp/home/main/index.shtml>

Just Pensions is a programme of the U.K. Social Investment Forum, the United Kingdom's membership network for socially responsible investment. Just Pensions aims to educate and influence U.K. pension funds and other institutional investors about the importance of international development issues in their practice of socially responsible investment. Just Pensions also coordinates indepth research to assess current practices that blocks to the growth of pro-poor socially responsible investment.

Opportunity International
<http://www.opportunity.org/international.html>

Opportunity International (OI) is a network of 48 organizations whose mission is to provide opportunities for people living in poverty. OI's strategy is to create jobs, stimulate small businesses and strengthen communities among poor people by providing small business loans,

training and advice to poor microentrepreneurs. In its 30-year existence the OI network has helped create more than 1 million jobs.

Oxfam International
<http://www.oxfam.org>

Oxfam International is a confederation of 12 organizations working together in more than 100 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice. Oxfam works on development programmes, humanitarian responses and lobbying for policy changes at the national and global levels. Its work focuses on five main human rights: a sustainable livelihood, the right to services, security, participation and diversity.

Transparency International
<http://www.transparency.org>

Transparency International (TI) is an NGO launched in May 1993 devoted to combating corruption. TI also promotes new intergovernmental agreements to fight corruption in an internationally coordinated manner. Special emphasis is placed on monitoring the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. In October 2001 TI launched a new annual publication, the *Global Corruption Report*, which brings together news and analysis on corruption and the fight against corruption, addresses international and regional trends, highlights noteworthy cases and provides useful empirical evidence of corruption, including TI's own Corruption Perceptions Index and Bribe Payers Index.

United Nations Development Programme
<http://www.undp.org>

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's global development network, advocating for change and connecting countries to

knowledge, experience and resources. UNDP helps countries build and share solutions to the challenges of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and environment, information and communications technology and HIV/AIDS.

Unitus

<http://www.unitus.com>

Unitus is a nonprofit organization that relies on the financial resources of individuals, families and foundations to fulfil its mission. To address the challenges facing existing microfinance institutions, Unitus provides the necessary high-impact capital funding and strategic organizational capacity building consulting to the highest potential microfinance institutions in developing countries.

Women's Opportunity Fund

<http://www.womensopportunityfund.org>

The Women's Opportunity Fund provides opportunities for people of all religions in chronic poverty to transform their lives. It empowers extremely poor women in developing countries to create viable business, improve their quality of life and strengthen their communities. It works through local partner organizations that provide small business loans, training and counsel.

World Bank Institute

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBI>

The World Bank Institute (WBI) is the learning arm of the World Bank. The WBI reinforces the Bank's antipoverty efforts in the developing world by providing access to the Bank's worldwide expertise and experience through learning programmes, policy consultations, knowledge networks and scholarship programmes. The Attacking Poverty Program aims to build the capacity of poor

countries to design and implement effective poverty reduction strategies. The Poverty Analysis Initiative aims at enhancing the capacity of different audiences in three areas: poverty measurement and diagnostics, poverty monitoring and poverty impact evaluation. WBI programmes are offered in more than 150 countries and include government officials and policymakers, staff from NGOs, journalists, academics, secondary school teachers and children.

Hunger

Bread for the World

<http://www.bread.org>

Bread for the World seeks justice for hungry people by engaging in research and education on policies related to hunger and development. Bread for the World oversees several programs related to hunger education and research such as Hunger Basics, a compendium of facts on hunger and poverty in the United States and around the world, Hunger No More, a leader's guide to help present important hunger and poverty issues to congregation study groups, and Alliance to End Hunger, a coalition of religious bodies, businesses, universities, civil rights groups and labour unions.

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

<http://www.cgiar.org>

The Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is an association of public and private members supporting a system of 16 Future Harvest Centers that work in more than 100 countries. CGIAR's mission is to achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy and environment. CGIAR

works with developing country partners to strengthen their scientific capacities. More than 75,000 scientists and technical experts have received training at the centres. More than 30 years of experience environmentally friendly technologies developed by CGIAR have saved between 230 and 340 million hectares of land from cultivation worldwide.

Food and Agriculture Organization

<http://www.fao.org>

The Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) mandate is to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity and to better the condition of rural populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialized agencies in the UN system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries and rural development. FAO has worked to alleviate poverty and hunger by promoting agricultural development, improved nutrition and the pursuit of food security—defined as the access of all people at all times to the food they need for an active and healthy life.

The International Food Policy Research Institute

<http://www.ifpri.org>

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was founded in 1975 to develop policy solutions for sustainably meeting the food needs of the developing world. Research, capacity strengthening and policy communications at IFPRI concentrate on achieving economic growth and poverty reduction in low-income countries, improving food and nutrition security of poor people and managing the natural resource base that supports agriculture. IFPRI researchers work closely with national counterparts and collaborate to strengthen research capacity in developing countries. IFPRI also strengthens the link between research and

policymaking through its regional networks. It communicates the results of its research to influence policymaking and raise public awareness about food security, poverty and natural resource issues.

Oxfam International

<http://www.oxfam.org>

Oxfam International is a confederation of 12 organizations working together in more than 100 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice. Oxfam works on development programmes, humanitarian responses and lobbying for policy changes at the national and global levels. Its work focuses on five main human rights: a sustainable livelihood, the right to services, security, participation and diversity.

Save the Children

<http://www.savethechildren.org>

Save the Children mobilizes communities and partner organizations to address the root causes of food insecurity, targeting the most vulnerable, usually young children and their mothers. Save the Children works with children and their communities to develop their capacity to respond to and solve their most pressing food security problems. Food aid and monetary resources are used to manage programmes focused on improving agricultural production and household nutrition, as well as responding to emergency needs.

United Nations Children's Fund

<http://www.unicef.org>

Supporting community-based nutritional programmes is one of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) priorities. UNICEF works with governments to support participatory, community-based programmes focusing on children's survival, growth and development. UNICEF has launched well-known community-based child survival, growth

and development programmes in Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Oman, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand and Uganda.

World Food Programme

<http://www.wfp.org>

The World Food Programme (WFP) feeds the hungry poor and helps them break the cycle of hunger and poverty. It provides grants in the form of food aid for emergency and development projects which directly go to beneficiaries. Food-for-Work projects pay workers with food to build roads or ports, hospitals and schools, start small businesses or replant degraded forests. With its school feeding projects, the WFP provides free lunches that lure children to school and give them the energy to study.

Education

Changemakers

<http://www.changemakers.org>

Changemakers is a U.S. public foundation that models and supports community-based social change philanthropy. Changemakers works within the philanthropic sector to shift where money is directed and how it is given, urging individual donors and philanthropic organizations to become more accountable, strategic, inclusive, collaborative, democratic and creative. The three main areas of current programme activity include grantmaking, donor leadership development and outreach and advocacy work.

Education For All Fast-Track Initiative

<http://www1.worldbank.org/education/efa.asp>

The Education for All Fast-Track Initiative has been elaborated by the World Bank in partnership with recipient countries, donors and other international

organizations. The Fast-Track Initiative offers donor financing for countries willing to prioritize primary education for all children and to embrace policies that improve the quality and efficiency of their primary education systems. Under the Fast-Track Initiative representatives of the international donor community agreed to help seven developing countries in Africa and Latin America to educate roughly 4 million girls and boys.

Global Campaign for Education

<http://www.campaignforeducation.org>

The Global Campaign for Education (GCE) promotes education as a basic human right and mobilizes public pressure on governments and the international community to fulfil their promises to provide free, compulsory public basic education for all people, in particular for children, women and all disadvantaged, deprived sections of society. The campaign was founded in 1999 by a group of NGOs and teachers' unions, and national NGO networks from Bangladesh, Brazil and South Africa.

Global March Against Child Labour

<http://globalmarch.org>

The Global March Against Child Labour movement began as a physical march in 1998 and culminated with the adoption of the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 1998. It has partners in 150 countries. Its mission is to mobilize worldwide efforts to protect and promote the rights of all children, especially the right to receive a free, meaningful education and to be free from economic exploitation.

NetAid

<http://www.netaid.org>

NetAid is a nonprofit organization based in New York. It was established in 1999 through a partnership between the United Nations

Development Programme and Cisco Systems. In cooperation with a broad-based community of individuals, organizations and corporations NetAid is contributing, with the World Schoolhouse, to a campaign to get children into school. NetAid tries to raise awareness in wealthy countries about extreme poverty and to promote actions that will make a meaningful difference in the lives of the world's poorest people.

Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas

<http://www.preal.org>

The Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL) was established in 1995 by the Inter-American Dialogue and the Corporation for Development Research. PREAL is a hemispheric partnership of public and private sector organizations seeking to promote informed debate on policy alternatives, identify and disseminate best education practices emerging in the region and elsewhere and monitor progress towards improving education policy.

Health

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
<http://www.vaccinealliance.org>

The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) is a public-private partnership committed to one goal: saving children's lives and people's health through the widespread use of vaccines. It provides financing to the world's poorest countries to strengthen health infrastructures and introduce new and under-used vaccines. Partners include national governments, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Bank, the World Health Organization and the vaccine industry.

Program for Appropriate Technology in Health
<http://www.path.org>

The Program for Appropriate Technology in Health's (PATH) mission is to identify, develop and apply appropriate and innovative solutions to public health problems, particularly for women and children in low-resource settings. It shares knowledge, skills and technologies with community-based groups, ministries of health, NGOs, private-sector companies and funding agencies. The Children's Vaccine Program works to ensure that all children receive the full benefits of new lifesaving vaccines without delay.

Save the Children

<http://www.savethechildren.org>

Save the Children is a nonprofit child-assistance organization founded in the United States in 1932. It works to help children and families improve their health, education and economic opportunities. Save the Children also mobilizes rapid life-support assistance for children and families caught in the tragedies of natural and manmade disasters.

United Nations Children's Fund
<http://www.unicef.org>

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is mandated by the UN General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. UNICEF works with families, communities and partners in many countries to design, carry out and evaluate a wide range of communication strategies to advance goals for immunization, child protection, early childhood, girls' education and HIV/AIDS prevention and response.

World Economic Forum Global Health Initiative

The Global Health Initiative (GHI) works to increase business activity against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The GHI is a collaboration between the World Economic Forum's member companies, Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB partnerships, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and the World Health Organization's (WHO). The GHI focuses on three work streams: developing policy and programme tools for businesses, partnerships and advocacy. The GHI also serves as the focal point for the private sector to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

World Health Organization

<http://www.who.int>

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the UN specialized agency for health. WHO focuses its work in six core functions: advocacy; management of information; catalyzing change through technical and policy support; negotiating through partnership; monitoring implementation of norms and standards; and stimulating the development and testing of new technologies for disease control, risk reduction, health care management and service delivery.

Environment**Global Biodiversity Information Facility**

<http://www.gbif.org>

The purpose of the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) is to make the world's primary data on biodiversity freely and universally available via the Internet. The GBIF works cooperatively with and in support of several other international organizations concerned with biodiversity. These include (but are not limited to) the Clearing House Mechanism and the Global Taxonomic Initiative of

the Convention on Biological Diversity and regional biodiversity information networks.

International Institute for Sustainable Development

<http://www.iisd.org>

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) works on policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate change, measurement and indicators and natural resource management to make development sustainable. The IISD seeks to promote government expenditure and taxation policies that encourage the transition to sustainable development, to develop and promote creative responses to climate change and its impacts and to encourage more sustainable forms of agriculture and other natural resource use.

Tata Energy and Resources Institute

<http://www.teriin.org>

The Tata Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) is a developing-country institution committed to every aspect of sustainable development. It was established in 1974 and focuses on research activities in the fields of energy, environment and sustainable development. TERI's headquarters are in New Delhi, but it has regional centres in Bangalore, Goa and Guwahati as well as a presence in Japan, Malaysia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.

WaterAid

<http://www.wateraid.org.uk>

WaterAid is an international NGO dedicated exclusively to the provision of safe domestic water, sanitation and hygiene education. It works in partnership with local organizations in 15 countries in Africa and Asia to help poor communities

establish sustainable water supplies and latrines close to home. WaterAid also works to influence governments' water and sanitation policies to serve the interests of vulnerable people.

World Business Council for Sustainable Development

<http://www.wbcasd.ch>

The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a coalition of 170 international companies united by a shared commitment to sustainable development. The WBCSD seeks to provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable development and to promote the role of ecoefficiency, innovation and corporate social responsibility.

The World Conservation Union

<http://www.iucn.org>

The World Conservation Union's (IUCN) membership includes more than 75 states, 108 government agencies and 750 NGOs. IUCN's mission is to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world in conserving the integrity and diversity of nature and ensuring that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable.

World Resources Institute

<http://www.wri.org>

World Resources Institute (WRI) is an environmental think-tank that seeks to find practical ways to protect the earth and improve people's lives. WRI provides comprehensive global environmental data through its EARTH TRENDS portal and recently launched the Climate Analysis and Indicators Tool, a user-friendly, interactive tool supported by a comprehensive and comparable database of greenhouse gas emissions data and other climate-relevant indicators.

World Wildlife Fund

<http://www.panda.org/>

With offices on five continents, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is a global organization whose mission is to stop the degradation of the planet's natural environment by conserving the world's biological diversity, ensuring that the use of renewable natural resources is sustainable and promoting the reduction of pollution and wasteful consumption.

Human rights

Amnesty International

<http://www.amnesty.org>

Amnesty International (AI) is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights. It is independent of any government, ideology, economic interest or religion. AI has a varied network of members and supporters (1.5 million) in more than 150 countries. AI is currently working in 12 campaigns including the stop torture, death penalty and control arms campaigns.

Business for Social Responsibility

<http://www.bsr.org>

Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) is a nonprofit global organization launched in 1992. It serves as a resource for companies by providing advice, information, tools and support for innovation to make corporate social responsibility an integral part of business operations and strategies. BSR's human rights team works with companies in diverse industry sectors to help them develop and integrate human rights principles into their global operations.

Business and Human Rights Resource Centre

<http://www.business-humanrights.org>

The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is an independent, international, nonprofit

organization in a collaborative partnership with Amnesty International, business groups and leading academic institutions. The purpose of the centre's Web site is to promote greater awareness and informed discussion of important issues relating to business and human rights. The centre's online library covers more than 150 topics, 160 countries and 150 industry sectors. The site is composed of links to a wide range of materials published by companies, NGOs, governments, intergovernmental organizations, journalists and academics. It includes reports of corporate misconduct, as well as positive examples of "best practices" by companies.

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk>

The mission of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford is to provide a strategic, integrated approach to understanding contemporary and future migration dynamics across sending areas and receiving contexts in the United Kingdom and EU. This includes some of the following objectives: interdisciplinary research on key aspects of global mobility and migration and evaluation of national, European and international policy options and practices for effective and just migration management.

Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org>

Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an independent NGO. HRW researchers conduct fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in all regions of the world in an attempt to embarrass abusive governments in the eyes of their citizens and the world. It is based in New York, with offices in Brussels, Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, San Francisco and Washington.

International Committee of the Red Cross
<http://www.icrc.org>

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
<http://www.icftu.org>

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) is a confederation of national trade union centres. ICFTU has five priorities for action: employment and international labour standards; tackling the multinationals; trade union rights; equality, women, race and migrants; and trade union organization and recruitment.

Migrants Rights International
<http://www.migrantwatch.org/>

Migrants Rights International (MRI) is an NGO in special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Its purposes to promote recognition and respect for the rights of all migrants and to advocate for ratification of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

Open Society Institute
<http://www.soros.org>

The Open Society Institute (OSI) is a private operating and grantmaking foundation. OSI and the

Soros Foundation Network implement a range of initiatives that aim to promote open societies by shaping government policy and supporting education, media, public health and human and women's rights, as well as social, legal and economic reform. The nearly 30 OSI initiatives cover a range of activities including the strengthening of civil society, economic reform, education at all levels and human rights.

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

<http://www.unhchr.ch>

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) seeks to protect and promote all human rights for all. The OHCHR aims to ensure the practical implementation of universally recognized human rights norms and press the international community to take the steps that can prevent violations, including support for the right to development.

The World Economic Forum is an independent international organization committed to improving the state of the world. The Forum provides a collaborative framework for the world's leaders to address global issues, engaging particularly its corporate members in global citizenship. Incorporated as a foundation, and based in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Economic Forum is impartial and not-for-profit; it is tied to no political, partisan or national interests. The Forum has NGO consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
www.weforum.org

